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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation examines the nexus of three trends in electricity systems 
transformations underway worldwide—the scale-up of renewable energy, 
regionalization, and liberalization. Interdependent electricity systems are being 
envisioned that require partnership and integration across power disparities. This 
research explores how actors in the Mediterranean region envisioned a massive scale-
up of renewable energy within a single electricity system and market across Europe, 
North Africa, and the Middle East. It asks: How are regional sociotechnical systems 
envisioned? What are the anticipated consequences of a system for a region with 
broad disparities and deep sociopolitical differences? What can be learned about 
energy justice by examining this vision at multiple scales? A sociotechnical systems 
framework is used to analyze energy transformations, interweaving the technical 
aspects with politics, societal effects, and political development issues. This research 
utilized mixed qualitative methods to analyze Mediterranean electricity 
transformations at multiple scales, including fieldwork in Morocco and Germany, 
document analysis, and event ethnography. Each scale—from a global history of 
concentrating solar power technologies to a small village in Morocco—provides a 
different lens on the sociotechnical system and its implications for justice. This study 
updates Thomas Hughes’ Networks of Power, the canonical history of the 
sociotechnical development of electricity systems, by adding new aspects to 
sociotechnical electricity systems theory. First, a visioning process now plays a 
crucial role in guiding innovation and has a lasting influence on the justice outcomes. 
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Second, rather than simply providing people with heat and light, electrical power 
systems in the 21
st
 century are called upon to address complex integrated solutions. 
Furthermore, building a sustainable energy system is now a retrofitting agenda, as 
system builders must graft new infrastructure on top of old systems. Third, the spatial 
and temporal aspects of sociotechnical energy systems should be amended to account 
for constructed geography and temporal complexity. Fourth, transnational electricity 
systems pose new challenges for politics and political development. Finally, this 
dissertation presents a normative framework for conceptualizing and evaluating 
energy justice. Multi-scalar, systems-level justice requires collating diverse ideas 
about energy justice, expanding upon them based on the empirical material, and 
evaluating them with this framework.  
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CHAPTER 1 
VISIONS FOR ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONS: INTEGRATING POWER AND 
POLITICS ACROSS A REGIONAL SYSTEM 
 
Burnt Norton 
Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in time future 
And time future contained in time past. 
If all time is eternally present 
All time is unredeemable. 
What might have been is an abstraction 
Remaining a perpetual possibility 
Only in a world of speculation. 
What might have been and what has been 
Point to one end, which is always present. 
Footfalls echo in the memory 
Down the passage which we did not take 
Towards the door we never opened 
Into the rose-garden. My words echo 
Thus, in your mind. 
But to what purpose 
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Disturbing the dust on a bowl of rose-leaves 
I do not know.   
 -- T.S. Eliot, the Four Quartets 
Just after sunset, I am sitting outdoors at a café on the Friedrichstraße in Berlin 
waiting for my dinner. As I look around me, I see all of the trappings of modernity on this 
commercial, cosmopolitan street. Nearby there is an H&M, Starbucks, Hugo Boss, and 
the Westin Grand. I hear bustling traffic and crowds of people speaking various 
languages, and the U-Bahnhof electric train rumbles below. As the sun sets, signs and 
streetlights begin to illuminate this modern “Great White Way,” a term that described the 
first world’s electrified streets. I imagine how much the Friedrichstraße has changed 
throughout its storied history. The new Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church is a half-mile 
from here, standing amidst the ruins of the original 1890 church that was mostly 
destroyed in intense bombing during World War II. As recently as 1989, the Berlin Wall 
divided the street separating East from West Berlin, and the past of the Wall is present in 
the brick line that still bisects the city. Checkpoint Charlie was active just down the street. 
As my thoughts return from the Berlin of the past to the present, I begin thinking of my 
recent interview with a consultant who is part of a group of investors from a consortium 
called Desertec, seeking to build a Mediterranean-wide electricity grid that would one 
day export solar energy from the Sahara Desert to Europe. As I look around at the lights 
forming the constellations of the city, I find myself wondering what this would all look 
like if the Desertec vision were to come to pass. In fact, what would it look like if the 
entire Mediterranean were powered with Saharan desert power? 
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While it is dark now here in Berlin, the late day sun is still shining on the site of a 
solar power plant under construction in rural Morocco. Some imagine that the electrons 
generated at that site could be transmitted underneath the Mediterranean and across 
Europe to light the streetlights in front of me on the Friedrichstraße. It occurs to me that 
very little would look different here, yet much would change as a behemoth, complex 
system would have to be constructed to make Berlin’s Great White Way come to life at 
night with renewable energy from the desert sun rather than coal. I imagine a sea of 
mirrors glimmering amongst the empty sand dunes of the Sahara Desert, making the 
desert blossom with green electrons. Such a dream has been dreamt for a century and a 
half but that passage we did not take.  
Six months later, I wandered through the village of Tasslemante, Morocco in the 
High Atlas Mountains of Morocco. My colleague remarked that this is an idyllic place. 
The mountain air smelled fresh, and there was not a cloud in the sky. Children played in 
the street and rarely saw cars. Palm trees glistened in the oasis, and the village was nearly 
silent. There were ruins of a Kasbah in the middle of the village, a testimony to the 3,000-
year history of the Berber dynasties in this area. Despite this peaceful scene, these are not 
empty sand dunes—Ouarzazate, a city of almost 70,000 people, is only about ten miles 
away, and the broader Province of Ouarzazate is home to a fast-growing population of 
almost 300,000.  
I saw an old woman in a pink traditional djellaba (robe) pulling brackish water up 
from a rudimentary well. Clean drinking water is a long walk from here. I climbed up the 
berm on the side of the village and saw the beginnings of construction on the world’s 
largest solar energy facility just a stone’s throw away. I wondered, what would people 
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here think if the electricity from the nearby power plant were to be exported to power the 
Friedrichstraße? What would the outcomes be for social justice if the power system were 
globalized to bring together these disparate places—the commercial present of East 
Berlin with its storied past and the future of a small village at the door of the Sahara that 





Figure 1. Village of Tasslemante, Morocco, Photo by Author. 
The Challenge of Designing Sustainable Energy Systems 
 
Electrical grids are “critical infrastructure” in the industrialized world, driving 
economies supporting much of contemporary life (Farrell, Zerriffi, & Dowlatabadi, 
2004). Electricity powers the production of goods like iPads and building materials, the 
operation of the Internet, the provision of water, and the production and transportation of 
food. Developing countries lack sufficient access to energy and lack sufficient capital to 
                                                        
1
 This scene follows the structure of the T.S. Eliot poem above. 
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build the energy infrastructure needed for a burgeoning population and escalating energy 
demand. They are also disproportionately exposed to global energy production’s negative 
consequences, including climate change and human displacement. Worldwide, 
interdependent electricity systems are being envisioned that require partnership, 
integration, and negotiation among developed and developing countries. This research 
explores how actors separated by broad power and wealth disparities and heterogeneous 
energy needs envision regional sociotechnical systems and the technologies embedded 
within them. The visioning process, which is further defined below, plays a crucial role in 
guiding innovation and has a lasting influence on systems’ shape as well as societal and 
justice outcomes. 
The sustainability challenge related to designing a new energy system is a 
systems-level challenge. Renewable energy systems are not built from scratch but must 
be grafted onto obdurate existing infrastructure, as well as onto a sociopolitical landscape 
with disparate energy policies and goals. It is commonly assumed that renewable energy 
has not become a significant part of the energy mix because it is too expensive. I 
illustrate that the challenge is more formidable than this. The factors are not just 
economic, rather stakeholders must retrofit an existing system in a complex political and 
cultural landscape with a stakeholder network that has evolving goals. Even the most 
powerful companies in the world are struggling to transform energy systems to 
incorporate renewable energy. Although it is commonly assumed that renewable energy 
will de facto obviate the social, political, and justice problems oil causes and therefore be 
intrinsically sustainable, this study illustrates that this is not the case. 
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The most ambitious vision worldwide for a sustainable electricity system is 
unfolding in the Mediterranean region. The idea is to build dozens of large-scale solar 
and wind power plants in the Sahara desert and export part of the electricity to Europe. 
The initial vision was for a regional system that would supply North Africa, Europe, and 
the Middle East with sustainable and affordable power. It would entail building around 
40 large-scale solar and wind power plants mostly in North Africa, interconnecting the 
somewhat fragmented transmission infrastructure of 38 Mediterranean countries, and 
linking North Africa to the European Union (EU) through undersea transmission cables. 
The organization most known for promoting this vision, the Desertec Industrial Initiative 
(Dii), is a limited liability corporation and a conglomerate of companies that at its peak 
reached 56 shareholder and partner companies. Dii’s organizational structure and 
network rivals the novelty and complexity of its vision, not to mention the numerous 
other actors promoting similar visions in the Mediterranean.  
The Mediterranean is a strategic site for research in regional and in transnational 
sociotechnical systems due to its unique regional development history. Recently, the EU 
provided a variety of incentives for integration, including allowing member states to meet 
renewable energy mandates with imported electricity from non-member states through 
Article 9. The Desertec vision is thus situated in a broader political and institutional 
context of regional energy integration. The EU’s roots in regional energy integration 
trace back to the 1950s with the European Coal and Steel Community. The European 
Coal and Steel Community was not merely an economic liberalization project, it was a 
political initiative and fulcrum for spurring European integration and trust (Spierenburg 
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& Poidevin, 1994). It also sought to ensure that Germany was kept in check both 
economically and politically (ibid).  
Morocco is also a strategic site for research, as it would be a crucial node in this 
imagined system. It is committed both to regional renewable energy integration and to 
developing 2 GW of domestic solar power by 2020, plus an additional 4 GW of wind and 
hydropower. Construction is already underway on the Noor solar power facility in the 
Atlas Mountains of Morocco, which, when complete, likely will be the largest 
concentrating solar power plant on the globe. Noor provides a case study relating to solar 
power’s effects on local villages in the MENA region and how power plant siting would 
affect the energy justice dynamics of the regional system.  
I used multi-scalar analysis over four years to understand the vision for an 
integrated Mediterranean electricity system from different perspectives. My objectives in 
this dissertation were analytic and normative: 1) to understand how a network of actors 
constructed and negotiated a vision for a regional energy system and 2) to evaluate the 
justice implications of electricity systems using a framework grounded in the justice and 
sociotechnical systems literatures and refined by this empirical study.  
 
Desertec Vision Synopsis 
  After the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, physicist Dr. Gerhard Knies dreamt 
of safer large-scale sources of energy. He made a back-of-the-envelope calculation that 
the world’s sunbelt received far more than enough solar energy to power the world with 
energy from deserts. Knies noted that deserts have lots of space and sunlight stating, 
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“within six hours deserts receive more energy from the sun than humankind consumes 
within a year.” Because 90% of the world lives within 1,800 miles of a desert, and since 
HVDC can transmit electricity with losses of 3% over 1,000 kilometers, he calculated 
that the world could be powered from renewable energy from deserts.  
  Knies founded the MENA-REG conferences that convened engineers and 
politicians in Ghana, Amman, Cairo, and Damascus to discuss renewable energy 
development in deserts. A conference participant said, “Yeah and so this was very 
creative, very, very good. Also the guys from North Africa and the Middle East joining 
the project were very interesting guys from universities there, and it was a really fantastic 
cooperation.”2 During the second conference, the Trans-Mediterranean Renewable 
Energy Cooperation (TREC) organization was established. MENA-REG was later 
commandeered by the Germany Ministry of the Environment and lost its north-south 
collaboration goal, so the TREC founders broke off and changed the name of their vision 
to Desertec. TREC continued to promote the Desertec vision with the support of the 
Jordanian Prince Hassan, the head of the Club of Rome.
3
 
  At least three designs for a Mediterranean power system developed under the 
umbrella of the Desertec vision. Prior to an international renewable energy development 
conference in Germany in 2006, the German Federal Ministry of the Environment was 
searching for an ambitious project to showcase Germany’s commitment to renewable 
energy. They funded the German Aerospace Center, DLR, to conduct three feasibility 
studies on TREC’s Desertec vision to present at the conference. These studies fleshed out 
                                                        
2
 This quote is based upon interviews conducted for this study with those involved in the formulation of the 
Desertec vision. 
3
 The Club of Rome is a think tank and network of intellectuals interested in addressing environmental and 
social problems. 
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what I call Design I, which will be further described in Chapter 5. One year later, the 
Desertec White Book was published, with an introduction by Prince Hassan and 
contributions from other Middle-East-North-Africa (MENA) region authors about how 
their countries could benefit from the vision. This illustrated support from the Southern 
Mediterranean for the vision. The White Book was then presented in Berlin to an 
overcapacity audience of 400 people in an evening presentation that ran four hours longer 
than expected, illustrating the growing interest in the vision. In 2008, the Desertec vision 
became the flagship initiative for the Union for the Mediterranean under the name 
Mediterranean Solar Plan.4 Therefore, the Desertec vision had gained significant traction 
outside of the TREC network and was even adopted by the Union for the Mediterranean, 
the political authority responsible for Mediterranean integration.  
  In January 2009, the TREC institutionalized its vision by incorporating the 
Desertec Foundation, which is a nonprofit organization seeking to export the Desertec 
vision to other regions of the globe. TREC also helped to form the Desertec Industrial 
Initiative (Dii) as a private limited liability corporation. Dii was founded with 12 
shareholder companies, including Siemens, Munich Re, and Deutsche Bank, to accelerate 
progress on the Desertec vision in the Mediterranean region. There were no North 
African companies initially involved. It was launched on July 13, 2009 in Munich, 
Germany in the largest press conference in Munich Re’s history (Heckel, 2011). The 
                                                        
4
 The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched in July 2008 with the Paris Summit, led by the 
French. The development of the Union and its French leadership were controversial, especially with tension 
from Germany related to French control of the Union. It also struggled because of the controversial 
inclusion of Israel in the UfM. They searched for a non-political topic to guide the Union, and solar power 
was selected. The Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) sought to develop 20 GW of renewable energy and to 
harmonize the energy efficiency measures in the member states of the UfM. However, the plan is stalled 
because the involved parties did not reach a consensus on the roadmap in late 2014. While related to the 
Desertec vision, the Mediterranean Solar Plan is out of the scope of this study. 
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Desert Power 2050 studies published by Dii in 2012 outline what I call Design 2 in 
Chapter 5. A third design for the system later arose from the shareholder companies to 
fund virtual exports, meaning to finance renewable energy projects in North Africa 
through a surcharge on European electricity bills without building a regional power grid. 
 
Visions of sociotechnical systems 
In today’s knowledge societies, large-scale sociotechnical systems’ evolution is 
often guided by a distinct and systematic visioning phase (Borup, Brown, Konrad, & Van 
Lente, 2006). The visioning phase encompasses formal policy processes, such as 
developing roadmaps and steering a course for the future through legislation. These 
formal processes often include conducting studies to prove that the vision is feasible. The 
visioning phase also includes informal processes, for example, conversations and 
decisions made behind the closed doors of corporate conference rooms and government 
offices. It extends from the back-of-the-envelope calculations Knies made for the 
Desertec vision through to a concrete design up until construction begins. The visioning 
phase plays a crucial role in proffering, jettisoning, and cementing aspects of the system’s 
design. Decisions made in the visioning phase steer innovation and have lasting influence 
on the system’s shape. Visions are powerful and have effects in the real world even if 
nothing material is built. 
It is important to better understand, and even improve, the visioning phase, as 
energy system builders grapple with long time horizons and uncertainty. An investment 
cycle in the power sector is between 25 and 50 years long, depending upon who one asks, 
as it encompasses planning, permitting, constructing, operating, and decommissioning. 
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Poorly planned dreams for electricity systems could later turn into nightmares. For 
example, the complex power market and transmission systems operator put in place in 
California in the 1990s liberalization push attempted to implement a new management 
scheme over a complex system, which led to rolling blackouts.
5
 Better planning in the 
visioning phase could help system builders to anticipate future problems and avoid 
building technological juggernauts. As critical infrastructure, the Desertec system, if it 
were built, would be too big to fail. Therefore, the pressure to maintain it at all costs, 
even if it perpetuates the energy justice failures of the current system, would be great. 
Visions are also important because they help to anticipate what technologies 
might play a role in destabilizing the current, obdurate electricity system. Geels added to 
the conception of sociotechnical systems the multi-level theory of sociotechnical regime 
change. He defines niches as incubators in which radical innovations could carve out a 
place in the system. Niches can break through the socio-technical regime up to the 
landscape level (Geels, 2004) but breaking through is difficult (Verbong & Geels, 2007). 
A niche could also be viewed as the future spaces or future moments that social groups 
then occupy in order to control the future (Brown, Rappert, and Webster, 2000). How are 
these windows of opportunity imagined, what problems do they create in the system, and 
how are these problems addressed?
6
 The answer to these questions could lead to a more 
nuanced understanding of why it has been seemingly impossible to integrate renewable 
energy to significant scale into the ‘energy mix.’  
                                                        
5
 See Chapter 5. 
6
 See Chapter 5. 
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Visions also play an important role in innovation (Selin, 2006) by setting 
expectations for the technology and its future benefit. These expectations are 
“performative,” because they attract and coordinate actors who influence or align 
themselves with the vision (Borup et al., 2006). Embedded in these imaginations are 
powerful ideographs (popular but empty terms), such as technological progress, which 
legitimate expectations for future social benefits from the envisioned technology or 
technological system (Van Lente, 2000). These expectations for social benefits become 
requirements after they are used to recruit supporters to a shared vision (Van Lente & 
Rip, 1998). What happens to this network of supporters when a vision must conform to 
the realities of construction delays, siting processes, and disruptive events, which could 
result in certain expectations not being met?
7
 What forces are needed to accelerate a 
fantasy for a new electricity system from the dreaming, to the visioning, to the design, 
and finally to the construction phase? 
Within the vision, expectations shape the depictions and assumptions of what 
society might look like in the future. However, in the visioning phase societal outcomes 
are often poorly thought through and unrealistic. Narratives of futures reflect ideologies, 
just as interpretations of the past do (Brown, Rappert, & Webster, 2000) Means of 
representing the future are often utopian, offering win-win promises greater than what 
can be achieved in reality (ibid). Geels & Smit (2000) argue that imagined futures for an 
emerging technology are biased by the cultural framings of the current period. They also 
argue that future representations of technology often reflect static conceptions of society 
and social practices.  
                                                        
7
 See Chapter 5. 
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Selin (2008) stated that visions are “speculative framings and expectations that 
accompany and fortify a new technological field” so as to “colonize the future.” 
Expanding upon Selin’s definition, this study develops a more concrete model of what a 
vision for a sociotechnical system is, as well as its anticipated societal outcomes. The 
components comprising a vision are scattered throughout the literature.  
Table 1 collates these components, outlining a model of a vision, including the 
compositional factors of the technological system and its spatial distribution, as well as 
its representation of the future and promises for societal benefit. I call the actors shaping 
this vision the system imaginers. The vision is also shaped by the macro-level socio-
political context and major disrupting factors, which scenario planners call wildcards. 
(Hughes terms these drivers the “system’s environment.”)  
Chapter 5 expands and improves upon this model that was developed from the 
literature through further empirical study. It seeks to improve understanding of the 
processes necessary to move from a dream, to a vision, to a design, to a constructed 
power system in the desert. This is not necessarily a linear process, and the vision can 
move backwards across these phases. For example, technologies construed as elegant and 
sustainable in the design phase are reimagined and problematized when they are situated 
in particular sociocultural and geographic contexts, sometimes shifting the system design 
back to the visioning phase. The updated model will aid in understanding how the vision 
is constructed and negotiated over time and what processes affect whether it will come to 
be built in the future or deferred.   
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The research questions relate to generalizable questions of how sociotechnical 
systems are envisioned and designed, how they cross scales in a globalized world, and 
their enduring implications for justice. This research asks:  How are regional 
sociotechnical systems envisioned? What forces and processes shape aspects of the 
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design? How do design elements achieve closure, and what does it take to reopen a 
closed design feature? What are the anticipated consequences of a system for a region 
with broad power and wealth disparities, heterogeneous energy needs, and deep cultural 
differences? By examining this vision at multiple scales, what can be learned about 
energy justice and equity? 
Electrical Power Systems in Brief 
 
The Desertec vision case study illustrates that changes in energy systems extend 
beyond changes in individual technologies to a system-level. Even minor changes in the 
technological mix quickly scale up to challenges in systems governance and management. 
In order to appreciate these challenges, an overview of the current electrical power 
system is necessary in order to understand the significance of these systems-level 
challenges. Electrical power systems, which are for the most part currently centralized in 
configuration, consist of generation, transformation, transmission, and distribution (see 
Figure 2). First, electricity is generated mainly in large-scale power plants often sited in 
remote areas. Then, the voltage is ramped up for efficient transmission along 
transmission lines to cities. Once the power reaches cities, the voltage is ramped down for 
safe distribution along power lines to consumers. Utility companies then sell electricity to 
consumers.  
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Figure 2. The Grid. From Wikipedia commons by MBizon.
8
 
Electricity demand, also called the load, follows a curve throughout the day called 
the load curve. Peak hours of usage vary across regions based on the type of industry, 
services, and household usage in the area, as well as the weather. Load shedding occurs 
when supply cannot meet demand, typically during these peaks, and blackouts or 
brownouts occur. Curtailment occurs when supply exceeds demand and electricity is 
wasted.   
                                                        
8
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electrical_grid#/media/File:Electricity_Grid_Schematic_English.svg 
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Different types of generation facilities are used to supply electricity at different 
points on the load curve. Baseload power plants, typically nuclear and coal-fired plants, 
run continuously and are difficult, costly, and inefficient to shut down and restart (see the 
baseload demand in Figure 3). Baseload power plants are also important for ensuring the 
system operates at a constant voltage. “Peaker plants,” typically natural gas plants, meet 
peak demand. Electricity is more expensive to generate during peak hours because peaker 
plants are generally old and inefficient. Power plants that can be easily controlled — 
turned on and off or ramped up and down— to provide electricity on demand are called 
“dispatchable” power sources. While there is no direct market for dispatchable power per 
se, it is valued indirectly for its role in ensuring the reliability of electrical power systems.  
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The Desertec vision illustrates how system builders are trying to integrate 
renewable energy into this system while maintaining its overall centralized configuration. 
This study discusses three main renewable energy technologies included in the Desertec 
vision—wind, solar photovoltaics (PV), and concentrating solar power (CSP, or solar 
thermal), with the greatest focus placed on CSP.  Solar PV uses sunlight (photons) to 
generate electricity; the solar cells convert solar radiation directly to electricity through 
photons exciting electrons. Sometimes PV panels are sited en masse in the desert. PV can 
also be placed on rooftops for point-of-use generation. An electrical power system in 
which PV panels or other small-scale energy technologies provide point-of-use power for 
                                                        
9http://www.gg.uwyo.edu/content/laboratory/coal/economics/electricity_intro/demand/peak.asp?callNumbe
r=23165&SubcallNumber=0&color=873F8A&unit= 
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homes or businesses is called a distributed generation system. In contrast, the Desertec 
vision imagines that these PV panels would be sited in large desert installations in a 
centralized system. 
Unlike PV, CSP uses the heat from the sun to generate electricity rather than light. 
A CSP tower plant consists of a field of heliostats, or towers with garage-door-sized 
mirrors affixed on them, which concentrate sunlight on a central power tower receiver, 
heating air or water to drive a steam turbine to generate electricity. This generating 
system is very similar to that of a conventional power plant, although the heat comes 
from the sun rather than from fossil fuel combustion.  
This study also addresses wind energy. Wind turbines use the kinetic energy from 
wind to turn the turbine’s blades around a rotor. This kinetic energy drives a turbine to 
produce electricity. Wind energy became cheaper than CSP over the course of the 
Desertec vision. 
By scaling up large-scale renewable energy technologies in deserts, the Desertec 
vision seeks to reach nearly a 90% renewable energy future while maintaining the overall 
system configuration described above. A key challenge facing renewable energy is how 
to scale it up while maintaining the reliability of the system and its overall centralized 
configuration. In the power sector, intermittent renewable energy is generally viewed as a 
challenge to system reliability. Unlike coal, which provides reliable power on demand, 
the sun does not always shine, nor does the wind always blow. Renewable energy is 
dependent upon the whimsy of the sun and wind throughout the day, and upon the 
seasons. Even flocculent, passing cloud cover disrupts the supply of power from large-
scale PV plants. In contrast, CSP provides the system benefit of dispatchability. It can be 
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coupled with thermal storage to generate electricity up to 20 hours per day—even at 
night— and it can be coupled with natural gas backup to even out the fluctuations during 
start up and passing clouds. CSP is more nimble than baseload power plants because it 
can be easily shut off by simply moving the mirrors to the stow position. By building 
dispatchable renewable energy technologies and integrating the transmission grid across a 
region, electricity companies involved in the Desertec vision hope to build a reliable, 
centralized system with very little fossil fuels. 
Reliability is a highly valued systems trait in centralized electricity systems which 
renewable energy complicates. In my research on electricity systems in the U.S. West, I 
found that utility companies viewed themselves as selling the service of reliability, rather 
than the product of electrons (Miller & Moore, 2011). A lack of reliability has a high 
price on a country’s economy; for example, Munich Re estimated that blackouts cost the 
U.S. economy $100 billion per year despite the fact that U.S. electricity infrastructure is 
typically very reliable (Munich RE, 2015).
10
 A reliable power system is often seen as a 
precursor to growing a robust industrial sector in a country. Most regulatory bodies in 
Western countries require 10-25% reserve generation capacity in the system, which is 
generating capacity that is typically not used but can be quickly brought online if a spike 
in demand or an unexpected loss of supply were to occur. This ensures demand can be 
met and that system reliability will be maintained if unexpected increases in demand or 
failures occur.  
Generally, it is possible to integrate up to 20% renewable energy generation 
capacity into the system without affecting reliability or radically reshaping it. Above 20%, 
                                                        
10 Munich Re is a reinsurance company, including insurance provided to the power sector. 
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energy might not be available from intermittent renewable energy when it is needed. 
Therefore a transformation in the system would be required, such as building significant 
storage technologies or integrating the power system at significant east-west and/or 
north-south scale to compensate for seasonal variations and variations in demand 
throughout the day. For example, peak hours of usage in the afternoon in Germany would 
be balanced out by peak hours of usage in the evening in Morocco. The system would be 
integrated across such a large area that generation capacity would be available 
somewhere within the region to meet demand elsewhere in the region. 
 
Expanding Sociotechnical Systems Analysis through Energy Transformations Analysis 
 
Key to understanding changes in energy systems and their significance to society 
is conceiving of electrical power systems not as technological systems but as 
sociotechnical systems. Sociotechnical systems analysis combines analysis of the 
hardware of the system— power plants, transmission lines, transformers—with an 
analysis of the human, social, and institutional aspects of power systems—regulatory 
institutions, engineers, political frameworks, activist groups, villagers, and financiers. 
This is essential both to understanding how electrical power systems work and to 
evaluating their sociopolitical stakes. It also illustrates that energy systems—and the 
visions for the energy systems of tomorrow—are shaped by complex sociopolitical 
landscapes that cannot be ignored if new systems designs are to be made a reality. 
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Sociotechnical systems theory provides a meso-scale analytical framework for 
understanding how electrical power systems are shaped by political, social, and financial 
institutions (See, for example, Glaser, 2009; Hughes, 1983; Nye, 1990; Rose, 1995; 
Tobey, 1996). Much of what is known about how sociotechnical electrical power systems 
evolve has been developed through historical case studies, particularly Hughes’ seminal 
work on how electrical power systems formed in the late 1800s and early 1900s in the 
United States, Germany, and England. These case studies offer a rich starting point for 
understanding how sociotechnical systems are shaped and evolve. However, I will argue 
that some of the assumptions made in Hughes’ work about the set-up of these 
sociotechnical systems no longer hold true.  
Hughes argued that electrical power systems are better characterized as 
sociotechnical systems, rather than technical systems, as they are shaped by social factors 
including economics, politics and political institutions, and geography. Therefore, 
technological standards—like the frequency of the transmission network—are often 
established for political or social reasons, not technical reasons. Hughes viewed systems 
as groupings of interacting parts arranged in a network configuration, which in the power 
sector have historically been centrally controlled and arranged hierarchically (Hughes, 
1983). These systems develop within exercises of power to reflect the interests, values, 
and politics of powerful social groups. The system exerts an influence on its environment 
(e.g., on communities, landscapes, politics) and is also shaped by its environment (e.g., 
by geography, major events, policies) (ibid). Hughes’ comparison among three countries 
illustrates that the electricity system is a “cultural artifact” influenced by the 
technological style of each individual country. For example, Thomas Edison’s U.S. 
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system could not be transferred to Britain, where the political movement for municipal 
socialism shaped the electrification of the country.   
In the first phase of sociotechnical systems development, inventor-
entrepreneurs—or system builders—like Thomas Edison, possessed both the technical 
acumen to develop new technologies and the business and networking prowess to grow a 
system into which these technologies were integrated. In the second phase, the 
technology was transferred from one region of a country to other. In the third phase, the 
system grew and was influenced by the surrounding geography and country-specific 
technological style. In the fourth phase, the system achieved substantial momentum with 
mass, velocity, and direction. In the final phase, holding companies emerged to manage 
monopolies and consulting engineers gained prominence as problem solvers.  
Once systems have achieved momentum, also termed path dependence or 
technological lock-in, they are remarkably difficult to change (Arthur, 1994; Hughes, 
1994). It would most likely require a major event such as a world war to transform such 
systems, although I argue later that electrical power systems are continuously in 
transition at the microscale. For example, World War I was powerful enough to influence 
the momentum of the electrical power system. For example, Germany and the United 
States built monolithic power plants for war, such as the Muscle Shoals hydroelectricity 
power plant to provide the electricity needed for fertilizers and explosives (ibid). War 
also increased the interconnection and centralization of power systems to improve their 
efficiency (ibid). Actors can also make changes to the system within particular 
constraints through radical inventions (ibid). In some cases such inventions could 
transform the system, although this largely remains to be proven in the power sector since 
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the centralized system arrangement has remained in place for over a century. Radical 
inventions typically emerge after a “reverse salient” is identified, which is a part of the 
system that is marching behind or out of sync (ibid). The people Hughes called “system 
builders” work to invent solutions to these reverse salients. If a solution cannot be found, 
the system must shift to a certain extent in order to grow. 
This study will extend Hughes’ work in several ways. Most significantly, it will 
look in greater depth at the visioning phase for sociotechnical systems, which is typically 
not fully recorded in historical case studies but plays an important role in innovation and 
in shaping the electrical power systems of the future. It will also look at how 
sociotechnical systems are shaped across nation-state lines—on a transnational instead of 
cross-comparative basis. Additionally, it will extend Hughes’ view of the spatial and 
temporal factors that shape the system.  Finally, as the goals for electrical power systems 
are expanding from powering cities to empowering sustainable development, I explore 
the energy justice aspects of energy transformations. 
I also argue that the founding principles of the electrical power systems from 
1880 are different today and that sociotechnical systems theory needs to be revised to 
account for them. The development of electrical power systems in the 21
st
 century is a 
different challenge from what Hughes (1983) studied. Building a sustainable energy 
system includes a refurbishing and retrofitting agenda, as system builders cannot start 
from scratch but must graft new infrastructure on top of old systems. The most popular 
type of future energy technology assessment examines the simple substitution of a 
conventional technology like coal with a technology like solar power (Byrne et al., 2006). 
The Desertec case study illustrates that a new type of energy assessment is needed at the 
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system-level because energy transformations relate to the integration of technology into 
systems. For example, if wind energy were used instead of CSP, this would reconfigure 
the overall shape of the system. In Hughes’ case, this existing infrastructure did not yet 
exist. 
The challenges at stake are not merely about electricity as they were in 1880 but 
also about water, poverty, food, and development. Rather than analyzing one technology 
versus another, energy policy for the 21
st
 century must understand these broader, 
integrated system challenges. The problems the system builders seek to solve are not only 
technical but are social problems with major political challenges. A case study that 
explores future visions for electricity systems illustrates the values and goals 
underpinning competing dreams for energy futures and their anticipated outcomes. 
Transnational Energy Transformations. This dissertation explores the social, 
political, cultural, and technological shaping of global energy transitions to better 
understand how sociotechnical systems are shaped. Energy systems are continually in 
transition to a certain extent, as power plants are decommissioned and fuel sources shift, 
the geographies of energy are rearranged, and fuel sources are depleted. Laird (2013) 
argued that the term “energy transition” has been used so narrowly to describe the 
technical aspects of substitutions in fuels and technologies that it masks the important 
social and political stakes of energy transitions. Scholars need either a new word or a 
complete reevaluation of how scholars and system builders conceive of energy transitions 
(ibid). This is not merely a matter of semantics but a call for scholars to design 
methodological frameworks sufficient to the task of understanding the social and political 
underpinnings of energy transitions. This dissertation uses multi-scalar analysis to focus 
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on major disjunctures in energy systems that could destabilize their shape and result in 
extensive social, policy, and regulatory changes. I take Miller, Iles, & Jones' (2013) lead 
in referring to energy transitions as “energy transformations” to highlight the extent of 
these system-level changes. 
Studying energy transformations in their early—visioning— stage, which is often 
not available in the historical record, illustrates the constitution of current energy systems. 
Moreover, it makes visible the sociopolitical conflicts surrounding changes to the modern 
infrastructure of societies that is often only visible when it fails (Davies & Selin, 2012; 
Edwards, 2004)— for example, the power poles that blend into the urban landscape, the 
energy generation that is out of sight, and the gas stations people are accustomed to 
seeing at every major intersection. While I agree with Starosielski (2012) that these 
infrastructures are, in fact, visible to certain populations and that this visibility is 
negotiated, it is also the case that these infrastructures are largely latent and invisible to 
the majority of people who benefit from them and overlooked by technological designers. 
Qualitative methods can be used from the perspective of an infrastructural outsider to 
observe changes in these often-invisible infrastructures. 
The path of energy transformations across the globe is still uncertain, allowing for 
a window into their reorganization. Energy transformations relate fundamentally to scale 
e.g., centralized versus decentralized, point-of-use vs. remote, domestic versus regional. 
Below I describe the four possible scenarios (posed as questions in italics below) for the 
overall systems configuration of the future of electrical power systems I identified 
throughout the course of this research, which differ greatly from the context in which the 
power systems of the 1880s formed. In each case, the scale of the envisioned problem 
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relates closely to how actors frame the scale of the problem. For example, the appropriate 
technology movement of the 1970s focused on individual-level solutions to 
environmental problems. The Club of Rome focused on planetary-scale problems and 
developed a solution related to massive transmission integration for efficiency and 
flexibility. 
Scenario 1. Will future energy systems blend distributed and centralized 
generation, which is appropriately scaled to industrial and household needs, as 
recommended by Amory Lovins? In the 1970s, Lovins envisioned the “soft path,” which, 
although often misunderstood as promoting green energy, related instead to the scale of 
energy generation. He called for technologies that are appropriately scaled to match their 
use; household demand could be most efficiently met with distributed PV panels, 
whereas a factory would be best supplied with centralized, large-scale sources of power 
(Lovins, 1977). In this vision, the most flexible sources of energy are those that are 
appropriately scaled.  
Scenario 2. Will the power systems of the future be mostly distributed, with point-
of-use generation and efficient storage? This option would construct a completely 
distributed, small-scale, point-of-use electricity system as advocated by the appropriate 
technology movement, Schumacher’s Buddhist economics, and certain environmental 
groups worldwide. This would result in the most radical transformation in the power 
sector and would require a breakthrough in storage technologies likely coupled with a fall 
from power of the current energy system builders. In this vision, small-scale energy 
technologies are framed as the most flexible.  
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Scenario 3. Will centralized grids sprawl across four or five major regions of the 
globe to balance out intermittent renewable energy through massive systems integration? 
(This dissertation uses the term “regional” to refer to the Mediterranean region, not 
regions within a country.) The Limits to Growth report by the Club of Rome framed 
environmental problems at a planetary scale, arguing that the earth’s population was fast 
outstripping its carrying capacity, which would lead to environmental demise (Meadows, 
Randers, & Meadows, 1972). Desertec, as originally promoted by the Club of Rome, 
envisions that the most flexible and agile solution for a growing planet is an energy 
system that is regional in scale. Environmental sustainability is framed as the integration 
of power systems to enhance efficiency and enable the use of less polluting energy 
generation, up to 90% renewable energy generation (Euro-Mediterranean Energy Market 
Integration Project, 2010). In this vision, the most flexible power system is an integrated 
one. 
Scenario 4. Finally, will energy systems remain in generally the same 
configuration as today, powered by new and extreme sources of fossil fuels? The 
business-as-usual alternative would require more extreme methods of fuel extraction but 
not a systems-level transformation. Extreme methods of extracting fossil fuels, like 
fracking and ultra-deepwater drilling, along with new sources of fossil fuels like shale gas, 
will preclude an electricity transformation but at great cost to society and the 
environment. In this case, reliability and maintaining the traditional fossil fuel sector 
would be prioritized over environmental protection. Business-as-usual appears to be a 
more likely scenario in the United States than Europe. 
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  Three major trends underway in power systems across the globe will affect which 
of the end scenarios described above might be reached in the future. Desertec provides a 
case study at the nexus of these three trends. The envisioned system transformations, and 
the trends observed during my empirical work, help to illustrate why system builders 
would consider the extreme measure of sourcing electricity generation from a different 
continent.  
  First there is an ongoing shift toward the liberalization, or deregulation, of power 
markets. Market liberalization breaks up longstanding vertically integrated monopolies in 
the power sector and reduces state control over the power sector. In states or countries 
with a vertically integrated monopoly in the power sector, utility companies control 
generation, transmission, and distribution. In states or countries with a liberalized market, 
separate companies control generation, transmission, and distribution. Most power 
markets are neither fully liberalized nor fully monopolized.  
  In Europe, liberalization has been changing the power sector since the 1960s 
(Verbong & Geels, 2007). In the 1980s, politicians and regulators across the globe 
questioned whether vertically integrated utility monopolies were the best arrangement for 
the sector (Hirsh, 1999; Dubash, 2005). This led to a global deregulation trend that was 
aggressively pursued by multilateral development banks and thereby shaped the power 
sectors of at least 70 countries (Dubash and Williams 2006), including Morocco. In many 
cases, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) mandated deregulation as 
a prerequisite to receiving energy loans (Dubash, 2003; Dubash 2005). They expected 
that developing countries could become electrified without the strong state support and 
regulated monopolies essential to U.S. electrification (ibid). The Washington Consensus 
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was disrupted by black-outs in California, Argentina, and elsewhere and by exposing the 
depth of the Enron Corporation’s global malefactions in the energy sector (Dubash & 
Singh, 2005). However, many countries’ electrical power systems are still in disarray 
following deregulation reforms made in the 1990s.  
  In the early 2000s, the World Bank acknowledged that the needs of each 
country’s electrical power system are unique (Byrne & Mun, 2003). They shifted from a 
deregulation model to a Private-Public Partnerships model (Dubash & Williams 2006), 
which balances state and private control and is used today in the Moroccan renewable 
energy sector, for example. Despite this caution, there is still a general trend toward 
liberalization of power markets around the world. The liberalization trend will affect 
whether regional power systems can be built, as liberalized systems make it easier to sell 
electricity across nation-state lines. It will also affect how much distributed energy is 
built into the system, as liberalization generally allows small-scale generators of 
electricity to access markets.  
The second trend is grafting renewable energy technologies onto existing 
systems. This could result in the most significant energy transformation. Today, the 
global recognition of the contribution of the world’s energy system to climate change is 
bolstering actors’ and institutions’ attempts to shift toward renewable energy. UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon named 2012 the International Year of Sustainable 
Energy for All, which was recently expanded into the Decade of Sustainable Energy for 
All. Recently, Spain and Germany have integrated over 20% renewable energy capacity 
into their electricity systems to meet European targets. Changes up to 20% are framed as 
picking “low hanging fruit,” or making the easiest adjustments to the system. Once 
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renewable energy generation exceeds 20% of generating capacity, major systems 
transformations are no longer optional. Spain and Germany’s system configurations have 
not dramatically shifted but are at a breaking point. Electricity storage or hydrogen would 
be possible technical solutions for balancing out intermittent renewable energy, but they 
are not well developed. This is because since the 1900s, baseload power plants have been 
“load-seeking turbines,” and system builders have always constructed additional demand 
through promoting new uses of electricity, rather than designing storage technologies 
(Nye, 1990; Rose, 1995). Despite this historical lack of focus on storage, it is possible, 
although not probable, that a radical system transformation could occur from centralized 
power systems to distributed (decentralized) energy generation with storage. Another 
option would be to mix distributed and centralized electricity, although this would likely 
maintain a high level of fossil fuel generation in the system to balance out renewable 
energy’s intermittency. A third option would be to integrate power systems across a 
region to balance out renewable energy’s intermittency while allowing for 80% or higher 
renewable energy generating capacity. 
The third, and most recent trend, relates to electrical power systems crossing 
nation-state borders. An expert from the major power technologies manufacturer ABB 
said “…the only solution for balancing seasonal mismatches of load and generation that 
we see with our knowledge of available technologies today is large, interconnected power 
systems.”11 Until recently, electricity generation and distribution has largely been based 
upon local markets, as opposed to oil, which is sold through global markets. More recent 
trends show that electricity systems have become increasingly interdependent across the 
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 Based on an interview conducted for this study. 
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globe (Yergin, 2006). Choi & Caporaso (2002) argue that globalization is, in fact, largely 
the regionalization of trade and investment. Seen through this lens, system builders are 
imagining the eventual globalization of electricity markets. This has implications for 
north-south collaboration, the distribution of the benefits and drawbacks from energy 
systems, cooperation among diverse stakeholders, and energy geography. The impetus 
for integration is partly to address renewable energy’s intermittency while maintaining 
the centralized systems configuration. Put differently, renewable energy, often see as a 
technology to promote energy independence, is in fact spurring greater energy 
interdependence. 
While electricity has not yet become globalized, there are many examples of long-
distance transmission projects and the early transnationalization of electrical power 
systems in which the electricity from a single generating station is exported across 
nation-state lines to meet the demands of another country’s electricity system. On each 
continent, High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) transmission lines are already 
transmitting electricity across thousands of kilometers. Below are some examples, 
although not a comprehensive list.  
 Asia. Since 2010, a Chinese hydropower plant in Xiangjiaba has connected 
consumers 3,500 kilometers away in Shanghai via HVDC cables with a loss of 
7%. The Greater Mekong Sub-region power market connects China, Laos, 
Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia. India and Nepal share electricity across 
borders.  
 Middle East. In the Middle East, the Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection 
Authority began trading electricity in 2010, linking Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
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Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. Iran is selling electricity to 
its neighbors, including Syria, in order to skirt international sanctions that prevent 
it from exporting its oil (Mirsaeedi-Glossner, 2013).  
 Africa. On the African continent, South Africa already uses advanced HVDC 
lines to connect its Cahora Bassa hydroelectric plant to Mozambique through the 
Southern African Power Pool.
12
  
 South America. In South America, a 3,500-kilometer HVDC line is being built to 
connect the Itaipu dam in Brazil to load centers. Argentina exports power to 
Brazil through a 1,000 MW capacity line called the Garabi project. The Electrical 
Interconnection System (SIEPAC) project connects electricity across nation-state 
borders in Central America.  
 Europe. In Europe, many electricity experts view the Nordic electricity market as 
the most successful integrated electricity market within the European Union. 
Visions for more deeply integrated electricity systems, like the Desertec Industrial 
Initiative’s vision for a supergrid and single electricity market in the Mediterranean 
region, would fully integrate electricity markets at a regional scale, which could lead to 
the globalization of electricity. This would link all three of the trends (liberalization, 
renewable energy, and transnationalization), because integrating intermittent renewable 
energy into the centralized system is the main impetus for regionalization and in order to 
construct this regional market the power sectors of each country would likely have to be 
liberalized. Dubash & Williams (2006) argue that the internationalization of electricity 
                                                        
12 The Southern Africa Power Pool connects Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
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will pose many of the same sociopolitical considerations as the internationalization of oil. 
For example, they speculate that proposed interconnections across nation-state lines in 
Asia could result in an inequitable “electricity resource colony” relationship (ibid). 
Additionally, it could lead to oil-poor states to become rentier states, which are less 
accountable to their citizenry because they are not reliant on tax revenue (Ross, 2001).
13
 
Therefore, these rentier states are freer to make electricity policies based upon generating 
rents rather than increasing domestic access to energy. Mitchell (2011) turned this 
argument around by asserting that today’s Western democracies are “carbon based” 
because unionized coalmine workers played a key role in developing regulations and 
institutions that spurred democratic reforms, supporting workers and mobilizing civil 
society. The core observation that is relevant to this study is that energy development and 
political development are closely intertwined. In this study, by political development, I 
am largely referring to the aspects of political development that relate to national and 
social cohesion and identity, as well as questions of a potential change in who 
participates in political decision-making following the Arab Spring
14
 (e.g., new expert 
groups, youth, rural citizens). I found that a country’s social contract or social pact for 
electricity, which is an informal agreement about what social benefits an electricity 
system promises to provide a country (Victor & Heller, 2006), is shaped by and shapes a 
country’s political development. Power systems are also shaped by how nation-states 
frame what counts as a modern power system. I also found that unlike oil and gas 
                                                        
13
 A rentier state is “a state that derives a large fraction of its revenues from external rents,” such as the sale 
of oil or the Suez Canal crossing (Ross, 2001). 
14
 This is a controversial term with the problematic insinuation that the Arab World was frozen before the 
spring. Even the person who coined the term is skeptical about its usefulness. I use it in the dissertation 
because it is widely recognized. 
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pipelines, regional electricity integration requires concurrent and highly temporal 
integration of technological, social, political, and regulatory institutions, to an extent that 
oil markets do not. The scenarios and trends for the future of electrical power systems 
described above paint a much different picture from the context of Hughes’ work in 
1880. 
Temporality.  In addition to adding transnational analysis to sociotechnical 
systems theory, Hughes’ attention to the temporality of these systems should be extended. 
Hughes began Networks of Power by calling on social scientists to pay more attention to 
temporality in their analysis by studying the past to interpret the present. In addition to 
understanding how sociotechnical systems evolved in the past, it is important to add to 
sociotechnical systems analysis a more complex understanding of the future as an 
ontological object and an examination of the upfront stages of innovation often not 
captured in historical documentation. Understanding projections of the future is essential 
for understanding energy transitions and transformations. Despite these important issues 
of planning across long timescales, the temporal aspects of energy transitions are often 
overlooked. To landscapes, Adam (1998) added the concept of “timescapes,” stressing 
“the temporal features of living…its rhythmicities, timings and tempos, changes and 
contingencies.” She theorized that through an Enlightenment shift from “natural time” to 
“clock time,” humans have come to commodify, control, and colonize time. Energy 
systems are a key domain in which “ [we] insert ourselves into the future” (Brown, 
Rappert, & Webster, 2000). Adam’s concept of the “immaterial real” adds that even 
though the future does not yet exist, it gains a sort of ontological status by being 
constructed in the present (Adam, 2004). For instance, positioning the future as proximal 
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or distant does work (Selin, 2008). Actors make representations of the future, which are 
“objectified on paper” (Brown, Rappert, & Webster, 2000). I found that there are 
methods by which system imaginers construct technological feasibility and maturity in an 
attempt to colonize the future through reframing the emergence of technology. Clashes 
over the construction of the future are the temporal versions of energy siting conflicts. 
Situating the future entails even more uncertainty than siting power plants. 
Chapter 5 describes how Adam’s conceptualization of timescapes should be 
added to Hughes’ concept of momentum. Electricity markets are fundamentally temporal. 
Demand must match supply at each moment or the load is shed or curtailment occurs. 
Shifts in energy demand cannot occur quickly enough to account for these 
asynchronicities in power markets. If surplus electricity is generated in one country and 
cannot be exported, it will be curtailed and is as useless as surplus coffee beans that 
cannot be exported when global markets bottom out, for example. If intermittency is 
framed as the reverse salient in the system, then system imaginers see controlling time 
and the weather as the solution to this reverse salient. Temporal disjunctures stemming 
from the timescapes of renewable energy are one impetus for the transnationalization and 
potential globalization of electricity systems. Through massive systems integration, 
renewable energy’s intermittency can be controlled. 
In the past, electricity systems were crucial in constructing clock time, allowing 
people to work and play around the clock (Nye, 1990). Today, the Desertec vision 
illustrates a reconfiguration of electricity systems to match the natural time of wind and 
solar cycles. Without being integrated into a highly temporal system, renewable energy 
cannot produce electricity around the clock in the way that fossil fuels can. System 
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imaginers are attempting to adjust the centralized system described above to account for 
these rhythmicities. These system-level temporal challenges are equally important to 
renewable energy’s more often acknowledged economic challenges. 
Transnational sociotechnical systems. Hughes wrote about the differences in 
technological style across three different countries. Today’s world is more closely 
intertwined, although certainly not flat. Contemporary theories will need to address how 
transnational sociotechnical systems are developed. In addition to the cross-country 
comparison Hughes employed, contemporary case studies must address the 
internationalization, or even globalization, of electricity. One way of considering this 
shift to transnational electricity systems is through the lens of what Castells calls the 
“network society.” The network society is characterized by the following traits: 
technology is not hardware but material culture (what [Bijker, 2010] calls technological 
culture), technology plays a crucial role in globalization, there is a growing ecological 
consciousness worldwide, and the importance of the nation-state is receding as 
multinational corporations and non-state actors gain power (Castells, 2000). Networks 
have eliminated centralized, hierarchical forms of organization, and infrastructure is 
characterized by the space of flows (ibid). These factors should be considered in 
contemporary theories on sociotechnical systems.  
As the network society model would suggest, the perceived and actual changes in 
the role of the nation-state within the Mediterranean region have profoundly shaped the 
vision. Regional systems imaginers assumed regional markets could transgress nation-
state borders. However, Morocco’s national social pact for electricity, developed under a 
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sovereign kingdom dating back to 1631, and its specific national-level electricity 
challenges, guide its domestic and regional plans for solar power.
15
  
Also in accordance with the network society, I found that ecological 
consciousness is changing the temporal aspects of how actors imagine systems. This is 
partly due to an increased concern for sustainability and future generations. For example, 
Design 1 of the Desertec vision sought to build infrastructure that met integrated 
challenges, such as power plus water desalination; it considered the lifecycle assessment 
of the relevant technologies; and it aimed to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions at a large 
scale.  
Access to infrastructure in the network society is uneven. Graham (2000) argued 
that one’s level of power in society is closely coupled to those who have the best 
access—or any access— to high-reliability networks. Certain areas (e.g., neighborhoods, 
countries, communities) with preferential access to water, electricity, and 
communications infrastructure are “premium networked spaces” with more power in a 
globalized world (ibid). Premium-networked spaces “are the results of the strategies of 
coalitions of interests within the contested and highly complex geopolitical and 
governance context of their respective cities” (ibid, p. 186). The Desertec vision promises 
to extend premium-networked spaces to nearby developing countries to improve 
livelihoods. I found that many officials in Morocco saw themselves as being unjustly 
severed from premium-networked spaces due to European politics, although the justice 
outcomes of the networking process are highly dependent upon establishing a just process 
                                                        
15 See Chapter 6. 
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for integrating regulatory and political frameworks. Chapter 8 addresses the procedural 
and other justice aspects of energy systems. 
The central analytical question of the network society is how shared social 
meaning results from the networking of disparate spaces through an “instrumental, global 
logic” (Castells, 2000). Societies with similar infrastructures seem less foreign or exotic 
than those with different infrastructures (Edwards, 2000). In the Desertec case, is it 
possible to tie together such disparate spaces in a regional power grid? What inequities 
will result? Throughout the dissertation, I explore the issue of connecting people in 
remote desert landscapes to premium-networked spaces. This study found that an 
“instrumental, global logic” attempts to flatten sociopolitical differences both at the EU 
level, as well as the EU-MENA level, which was a major stumbling block to achieving 
the vision. Chapter 4 explores whether this integration discourse focuses on true 
collaboration and bridging political and socioeconomic divides, or seeks to promote 
unanimity in the region that keeps people separate but equal.  
The interplay between technologies and systems. This dissertation examines 
the interplay between the framing of emerging technologies and the framing of systems. 
While the sociotechnical systems approach provides a mesoscale view of sociotechnical 
systems, the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) approach provides for 
microscale analysis of how technological systems are socially shaped. SCOT illustrates 
that as fledgling technologies and technological processes emerge, stakeholder groups, 
including both users and technologists, form different framings of them through 
interpretive flexibility. Controversy develops around these competing framings, and 
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through the mobilization of resources by the stakeholder groups technologies stabilize 
into a particular form (Bijker, 1995). “Closure” occurs when conflict is resolved and the 
artifact is declared to work, or when the technology’s problems are reframed as attributes 
(ibid).  
Combining these approaches contributes to the understanding of systems-level 
challenges to better understand modernity and technology. It emphasizes that renewable 
energy technologies evolve within system contexts, and systems are shaped by the 
context of available technologies and the benefits or drawbacks they offer the system. 
This analysis provides more feedback between the SCOT technological framing 
approach, which is typically not studied in a systems-level context, and the sociotechnical 
systems approach, which often overlooks how microscale framings of technologies affect 
the shaping of the visions for a system. Chapter 5 analyzes the framings of ensembles of 
technologies within a systems context, considering what benefits they provide the overall 
system.  
The politics of the technologies within the vision are then dependent upon the 
politics of the overall system. Langdon Winner argued that artifacts have politics, and 
infrastructure can legislate. He drew upon the example of the bridges in the New York 
City area that were designed to be too low to allow buses carrying people of color to 
reach wealthy beaches like Jones Beach (Winner, 1986). Furthermore, certain 
technologies, such as nuclear power, necessitate an authoritarian politics and governance 
by a “techno-scientific-industrial-military” elite (ibid). Winner says that technologies like 
solar PV are fundamentally democratic (ibid). If actors view technologies as mere tools—
e.g., a hairdryer to dry hair—then they neglect to consider how these tools are embedded 
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in systems composed of complex high technologies that restructure lives. He stated, “We 
continue to talk about technologies as if telephone and electric systems were analogous in 
their employment to a simple hand drill, as if an army were similar to an egg beater” 
(Winner, 1977, p. 202). This dissertation illustrates that technologies’ politics are 
dependent upon the broader system in which they are embedded. I found that some of an 
energy technology’s politics are flexible and others endure over time. The technology’s 
politics were not as cemented in the visioning phase as I originally assumed they would 




Expanding the conceptualization of how geography shapes systems. Hughes 
observed that geographical factors shaped electrical power systems as they first 
developed. For example, the existence of large hydropower resources in California 
shaped the U.S. electrical power system by transforming nature into a resource and 
spurring the development of long-distance transmission systems to make up for “natural 
inadequacies” in other areas. This study builds upon Hughes’ observation within a 
transnational context. Here too, the technological system is envisioned to enroll nature to 
account for spatial disjunctures in the distribution of energy wealth. But in the 
contemporary development of electrical power systems, the geographical scale is much 
greater, and I use a constructivist lens on the region’s geography to illustrate how the 
actors’ imagination and construction of geographical space through mapping and 
abstraction affect electricity system designs. 
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Energy transformations reconfigure space, as power plants, transmission lines, 
pipelines, and other infrastructure are situated in specific places. These technologies and 
systems are shaped by their surrounding geography and shape or even dramatically re-
landscape the geographies in which they are situated. Energy transformations change who 
sees energy systems and what they see. Energy siting conflicts have arisen over the new 
geographies of renewable energy, from conflicts about how wind turbines affect citizens’ 
sense of place through disruption of viewsheds, noise, and avian death to large-scale solar 
power’s effects on rare and endangered flora and fauna, to homeowner’s associations 
placing restrictions on rooftop solar panels.
17
 Much has been written about siting 
conflicts over renewable energy in Europe (Devine-Wright, 2011). This literature 
illustrates that citizens oppose renewable energy not just for instrumental reasons—
reduced property value, noise, disruption of viewsheds—but for reasons relating to 
symbolic interactionism, such as the perception that the new technologies are 
“anachoristic” (Cresswell, 2004), or out of place within the landscape. Relatively land-
intensive technologies like CSP (a 400 MW CSP plant requires about 4,000 acres of 
contiguous land) are contentious because they involve the loss of places that may be of 
material, cultural, spiritual, or visual importance to affected publics. Such effects would 
scale up to a system’s level and reshape the region’s geography, just as the geography 
influences the technological design. Chapter 7 examines the effects on local communities 
in Morocco of a CSP plant that is under construction as an example of the effects of 
siting renewable energy in North Africa.  
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This study illustrates how these perceptions of landscapes, places, and even 
regions shape visions for sociotechnical systems. The relationship between new energy 
systems and human geography is complex and often contentious. In addition to siting 
concerns, this study addresses how regional electricity system designs reflect the 
constructions and representations of the region’s geography. Energy justice has a spatial 
component, as some geographical features, and some populations, are invisible in these 
abstract representations, while others are prominent. If electricity systems become 
interconnected over greater distances, these issues of abstraction and scale will become 
more prominent in the calculus of energy justice. Chapter 4 examines the geographical 
shaping of the regional vision for an integrated electricity market.  I found that the system 
is not just influenced by where the energy resources are as Hughes found, but also by 
how landscapes are envisioned, perceived, and mapped and the politics behind this 
process. The representations and framings of the region matter for energy justice, as they 
exclude particular populations and convey unity and separation within the region. 
Examining the spatial aspects of energy transformations make visible the political 
development issues at stake. 
In fact, the spatial aspects of energy transitions illustrate a political development 
challenge in the West— that people want to live in premium-networked spaces but many 
want this infrastructure to remain invisible. As siting conflicts grow in the West, will 
electricity generation be pushed even further away from load centers into the developing 
world, and at what social consequence? Or, will electricity systems come closer to 
citizens, literally to their backyards? The head of the Desertec Foundation asked in an 
interview with me, “what is really the acceptance [sic] of these [transmission] lines? We 
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have a discussion in Germany, a very intense discussion, of, yes, we need the lines, but 
not in my backyard.”18 The Desertec proposal, in part, responds to the attempt to address 
European resistance to power plant siting, which could be worrisome as the countries it 
looks to may have fewer democratic institutions and a less publically mobilized civil 
society than European countries. Through a transnational electricity system, the energy 
usage of one country would shape the landscapes of another. For example, Algeria’s 
natural gas export industry has dramatically reshaped its landscape, mostly for European 
consumption (Ghosn, 2009). There are 16,000 kilometers of pipeline laid in Algeria and 
across the Mediterranean (ibid). Europe, in some sense, consumes much of Algeria’s 
space. Chapter 5 illustrates that the Desertec vision was disrupted by transmission siting 
concerns in Spain, despite the attempt to site generation facilities on a different continent.  
Multi-scalar analysis. Edwards (2004) argued that multi-scalar analysis should 
be used as a method of examining modern technological systems, because infrastructures 
look different on different scales of force, time, and social organization (Edwards, 2004). 
Each scale yields true but incomplete stories (ibid). The STS literature traditionally 
focuses on the microscale through the SCOT or actor-network approach, while the 
literature on modernity examines the macroscale. The SCOT approach is careful to 
attribute agency to individual actors in order to avoid technological determinism. While 
this is important it also risks missing broader systems-level and structural effects. The 
microscalar analysis of SCOT should be paired with meso-scale work on large 
technological systems as well as a macroscale understanding of political economy and 
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Since many interviews were conducted in the interviewee’s second (or even third or fourth) language, [sic] 
is used more often than usual in this study. 
  45 
governments. Additionally, to examine the infrastructure of modernity, geophysical 
scales of force should be considered to account for the extensive effects of climate 
change (ibid). This dissertation explores the vision for a sociotechnical system across 
multiple scales, from the global history of CSP technology, through to a regional vision 
for an integrated sustainable energy system based partly on CSP in the Mediterranean 
region, to the national interpretation of CSP technology and visions for a Mediterranean 
energy system in Morocco, to the village level where the first CSP plants are being built. 
One theme of this dissertation is to explore the relationship between modernity and 
electrical power systems as the system imaginers conceive it.  
A multi-scalar systems-level approach to energy justice. In addition to the 
analysis of sociotechnical systems, this dissertation also has a normative goal to evaluate 
the anticipated outcomes of building sociotechnical systems in a complex world. Energy 
justice in a globalized world is fundamentally multi-scalar. One area justice theory has 
not extensively explored is developing principles of justice for globalized energy systems 
that affect people differently at local, regional, national, and international scales. Energy 
technologies cross temporal scales throughout a technology’s lifecycle. Complex energy 
supply chains interweave justice issues in disparate locations. For example, photovoltaic 
panels on rooftops in Arizona may be tied to rare earth metal mining in China where 
workers have insufficient protection from hazards. Germany’s bustling commercial 
streets could be tied to energy generation in small villages in Morocco.  
Decisions made in the energy sector today during the visioning stage will have 
significant effects on justice for decades to come. The massive investment needed ought 
to be guided by ethical principles early on, especially in order to build socially and 
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environmentally sustainable energy systems. Systems-level justice calls us to collate the 
diverse ideas about energy justice, expand upon them based on reasoned principles, and 
re-evaluate them with a new framework. Chapter 8 presents an energy justice framework 
I developed from the justice literature and then applies and refines it using the empirical 
information from the Desertec case study. This chapter illustrates how sociotechnical 
complexity relates to the energy justice challenge. It adds to the framework issues 
identified in the dissertation relating to moving from the outmoded concept of energy 
sovereignty to capacity building and freedom from coercion, energy security and human 
security, trade-offs and win-win discourses, as well as systems justice. This framework 
ties together the various analytical components of the dissertation into a normative, 
principled framework for use in planning large-scale energy systems. 
Conclusions: Contemporary Energy Transformations 
 
Part of what Hughes wrote about the development of electrical power systems in 
the United States, Germany, and England includes generalizable factors about how 
electricity systems develop that hold true today. Above I discussed how this study 
updates Hughes’ findings to include the visioning phase and to account for the fact that 
electricity systems of the 21
st
 are not built from scratch but built on top of existing 
systems. I also discussed how the conceptions of the spatial and temporal aspects of 
electricity systems should be updated. Below I discuss several additional findings related 
to theories on sociotechnical energy systems.   
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Situated emerging technologies and deferred dreams. I found that CSP, and 
the dream to build a massive energy system in the Sahara, have been deferred dreams for 
over a century and a half. This illustrates that the emergence of a technology is situated 
with its political development context and history. Time past, time present, and time 
future must be accounted for to contextualize a technology’s emergence. Whether a 
technology is framed as emerging or mature depends upon the constellation of actors 
advocating for it. Today, in the Desertec vision, CSP is framed as a mature technology 
subsumed under a vision for a broader system. In Morocco, it is framed as emerging, and 
in need of research and development, because it is being pursued under Morocco’s 
broader industrial strategy to help it emerge as a knowledge economy. Furthermore, the 
politics of these emerging and reemerging technologies are not set in stone. In the 1880s, 
CSP was framed as a technology to dominate nature and humans and later as a 
technology that could fight climate change and connect two culturally disparate 
continents.
19
 (The one framing of CSP that remains consistent is that of an energy farm.) 
Emerging technologies are deferred for a variety of reasons. The most important 
is their failure to be integrated into a system, which is often because they do not meet the 
system’s scale and needs. Renewable energy has often been seen as too difficult to scale 
up, too weak, and incapable of contributing to a reliable power system. Alternatively, it is 
imagined as being built in a completely distributed fashion that does not fit the current 
systems configuration; these visions of renewable energy as distributed have impeded the 
progress of large-scale renewable energy. When CSP reemerged in 2005, it did so in the 
context of a vision for a broader system.  
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I found that the vision shifted along the continuum from imaged to constructed. 
Proving that the system, and the ensemble of technologies therein, was feasible was an 
important step in shifting the vision from designed to a constructed reality. However, 
when Desertec’s promoters disagreed on the method of proving feasibility, it unmasked 
substantial value conflicts and pushed the system design backwards toward the dreaming 
stage. 
New reverse salients. While Hughes examined technological asynchronicities, or 
reverse salients, that led to changes in systems, the main reverse salients in systems today 
are posed by broader environmental and social challenges—such as global climate 
change and population growth. Today, system builders are working within a complex 
context with broader sustainability goals not considered when the initial systems were 
built. In the 1800s, CSP was framed in terms of the domination of nature, but when it 
reemerged in 2000s, it became part of the sustainability debate about living harmoniously 
with nature. Unlike with the domination of nature framing, which sought to remove 
ethical restrictions from technological development, society now seeks to imbue 
democratic culture with ethical restraints to technological change. In the 2000s, people 
started asking not just whether CSP was technologically feasible, but whether it was 
socially feasible and environmentally desirable.  
Rather than simply providing people with heat and light, electrical power systems 
are now being called upon to address integrated solutions. For example, meeting the 
challenges of the energy-water nexus was an important part of the initial Desertec vision 
but was lost in its second instantiation. When construction started on CSP in Morocco in 
a water scarce region, the question of the energy-water nexus reemerged, and it became 
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clear that addressing the energy problem without addressing the water challenge was 
unsustainable.  
Innovation. Unlike in 1880, system builders now perceive innovation as a 
deferred dream, and principles behind it, successfully taking root, rather than the 
deployment of novel energy technologies. A modern energy system is not necessarily an 
innovative one, but a vision whose time has come. This is evidenced by the relative 
absence of the inventor-entrepreneurs key to Hughes’ story; instead, the system imaginers 
of today are “project accelerators” seeking to speed progress toward a particular future 
rather than invent technologies that scale up into systems. The drawback of this 
perspective on innovation is that it does not capture the massive system-level 
transformations entailed in deploying renewable energy, nor does it address how 
technologies should be designed to improve the capabilities of people living in specific 
contexts.
20
 What largely goes unaddressed is that the innovation involved is in massive 
systems integration across nation-state borders and its management, more so than in 
developing renewable energy technologies. 
Political development, sovereignty, and energy systems. A modern energy 
system is framed differently in different political contexts. Desertec’s proponents have 
sought to accelerate progress toward what they have constructed as an inevitable future to 
make technologies whose time has come a reality. In contrast, Morocco is balancing its 
past, present, and future within its electricity policy, and is attempting to address multiple 
social challenges through a social pact for electricity generation. The Moroccan state has 
viewed a modern electricity system as a centralized one from the Protectorate through to 
                                                        
20
 See Chapter 8. 
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King Hassan II’s giant dam building projects for irrigation and electricity that he 
continued after independence from France. As a technology long framed as an energy 
farm, CSP would balance Morocco’s past and present as an agrarian society with its 
imagined future as a knowledge economy. Political development questions, such as how 
much power should be apportioned to public versus private actors in society, that were 
fundamental to the development of electrical power systems in the United States would 
be made at the multilateral level rather than the national level under the Desertec vision. 
These political development differences and national specificities in power 
systems illustrate how difficult it would be to build across a region in reality. Visions for 
new systems face difficulties when they do not sufficiently account for the complex 
existing context in which they would be built. Regional systems pose unprecedented 
political development and multi-lateral cooperation challenges. A supranational 
regulatory body would have to be established to govern the regional system (called the 
High Authority in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community (Spierenburg & 
Poidevin, 1994)). A “region-state” with harmonized policies, standards, and rules would 
have to be established for the system to function properly. Warleigh-Lack & Robinson 
(2011) draw upon Hettne & Soderbaum’s theorizing on the social construction of regions, 
to define a region-state (or regional multilateralism) as a “new, multi-layered 
organization that based on voluntary evolution by its member states has developed into a 
novel, heterogeneous form of statehood,” or the highest level of “regionness” (p. 259). 
They also see the region-state as “hypothetical” and “unlikely” (Hettne & Söderbaum, 
2000). Countries’ lofty goals for their energy systems and their focus on developing 
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national pride for them could be contradictory to the multilateral cooperation needed to 
build a regional energy system. 
Chapter overview. Chapter two describes the multi-scalar methodology used in 
this study. At the global and historical scales, Chapter three illustrates how an energy 
technology’s emergence is situated in particular contexts and time periods by describing 
CSP’s century and a half long history as a deferred dream. By taking a longitudinal 
approach, it identifies how the framings for the technology have shifted over time, with 
the exception of the enduring solar farming frame. It identifies the reasons why CSP and 
other large-scale engineering dreams for deserts failed to take root. It also discusses other 
deferred dreams for engineered systems in North Africa, illustrating how the complex 
sociopolitical landscape prevented these dreams from becoming a reality.  
At the regional scale, Chapter four illustrates how the Desertec vision is couched 
in the Mediterranean politics, its history, and national and global conceptions of energy 
security. Then it analyzes the various geographic representations and framings of the 
vision for Mediterranean regional systems integration and how these representations 
affect possible energy justice outcomes and reflect the politics involved in shaping a 
transnational sociotechnical system. Through this, the chapter extends Hughes’ 
observations of how geography shapes sociotechnical systems, as well as how 
transnational sociotechnical systems are shaped. Also at the regional scale, Chapter five 
resumes CSP’s history as it is enrolled in the sustainability debate in Europe in 2005. It 
illustrates that the power sector does not see innovation as deploying novel or radical 
technologies; rather, they see innovation as realizing a deferred dream for CSP and a 
renewable energy system in the proximal future. It describes the temporal tactics that 
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actors use to attempt to root the vision in reality. To illustrate this, it compares and 
contrasts three versions of the Desertec vision over time and describes the societal factors 
that shaped them, especially regional politics and value conflicts within the 
Mediterranean region and among the stakeholders advocating for the Desertec vision. 
This comparison also examines the interplay between technology-level and systems-level 
framing. This chapter illustrates the importance of viewing renewable energy transitions 
as systems-level transformations—not as a matter of adopting new technologies.  
At the national level, Chapter six voices Moroccan views on renewable energy 
integration in the Mediterranean and illustrates how the Morocco Solar Plan fits into 
broader plans for an integrated Mediterranean electricity market. It also explores the 
domestic political and social development issues related to renewable energy systems 
transformations at a nation-level. I found that Morocco’s renewable energy strategy has 
become part of nation-building and nation pride as well as an evolving social pact for the 
benefits of electricity systems in post-Arab Spring Morocco. How Morocco imagines a 
modern electricity system relates closely to its political development. Morocco adopts the 
solar farming frame as a method of straddling its agricultural past and present with a 
vision to transform Morocco into a future knowledge economy with a robust national 
system of innovation. This illustrates a delicate balancing act among the past, present, 
and future that has long been important in Morocco’s political development. While the 
first Desertec vision framed CSP as a mature technology, Morocco frames CSP as an 
emerging technology that could help it emerge as a knowledge economy, further 
illustrating that a technology’s emergence is situated in political and historical context. 
Through it renewable energy strategy, Morocco is building its capacity as a country to be 
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in a more advantageous position in the international community, free from coercion. This 
chapter also illustrates how a regional electrical power system would be couched in a 
complex backdrop affecting multilateral electricity systems planning. 
At the local scale in Morocco, Chapter seven analyzes the effects of the siting and 
early construction phase of the world’s largest CSP plant under construction in Morocco 
on local villages. It continues with the themes of political development and modernity in 
electrical power systems, exploring what the public engagement process around solar 
siting might mean for the broader decentralization of governance in Morocco. I found 
strong local support for energy integration but also found that the siting process lacked 
sufficient local buy-in and compensation. This chapter problematizes the win-win 
discourse relating to Mediterranean electricity systems integration, which generally does 
not consider the local scale. No system is a win-win; there are always trade-offs at 
different scales, especially as integrated challenges such as the energy-water nexus arise. 
Therefore, I compare the benefits and drawbacks of national-scale versus local-scale 
integrated development projects. At the level of multi-scalar systems justice, Chapter 
eight uses this multi-scalar empirical information to apply and test a framework for 
energy justice developed from the literature. The chapter ends with a summary of visions 
for just energy systems. 
  




Overall, I used mixed qualitative methods drawing from history, social science, 
and communication studies to analyze the evolution of the Desertec vision at multiple 
scales. Qualitative data analysis often focuses on a single scale. This study’s design is 
unique in focusing on multiple scales. In order to understand the effects of a transnational 
energy system, it is important to look at the scale of local communities, who will be 
affected by power plant siting; national governments, whose visions for their domestic 
energy policy and security affect the potential for multilateral electricity systems 
planning; regional processes and politics; and even global scale effects like climate 
change and the global history of CSP technologies. If I had looked only at the regional 
scale, I would have missed the significant effects of decisions made in Berlin on, for 
example, small villages in Morocco. These multi-scalar effects are important to the 
calculus of energy justice, as I will argue in Chapter 8. I brought a diverse data set, 
including documents, images, tweets, interview transcripts, observations, and news 
clippings, to bear on the research questions. I conducted fieldwork primarily in Morocco 
and Germany, as well as Egypt and Spain, including helping to lead two ASU study 
abroad trips to Morocco and Spain. At the global scale, I used historical methods to 
understand the evolution of CSP technology. At the regional scale, I interviewed 
decision-makers and conducted document analysis related to the development of the 
regional Desertec vision. At the nation-state scale, I used fieldwork, interviews, and 
document analysis to understand national Moroccan views on regional energy 
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integration. At the local-scale, I used interviews and fieldwork to understand how local 
communities would be affected by the construction of a regional power system. 
As an American studying Desertec and Moroccan energy systems, I was often 
asked to justify my presence as the exotic other. A key anthropological premise is that 
having distance from the culture is useful in observing in vivo issues that are so obvious 
to actors immersed in the culture that they are overlooked. Furthermore, energy issues are 
fundamentally international and multi-scalar; as a U.S. scholar it is still essential to 
understand the energy systems in other parts of the world in order to understand energy 
domestically. My perspective as an American researcher who has studied CSP siting 
issues in California and energy transitions in Arizona gave me an informal source of 
constant comparisons useful in understanding energy transitions in the Mediterranean. 
However, the researcher as a “human instrument” is at a disadvantage conducting 
shorter-term fieldwork in multiple countries, which requires quickly overcoming the 
early stages of culture shock to begin research. This was inevitably a research project 
seen through the lens of an American studying issues outside of her domestic context. 
News Analysis 
Prior to entering the field, I conducted news analysis on Desertec. I used Zotero to 
store and organize news clippings on Desertec and snapshots of webpages. This news 
analysis aided in understanding how the media was framing both the Desertec vision and 
the Dii, as well as the public responses to the vision that shaped it over time. I sampled 
Dii news articles by collecting articles over a two-year period through Google news alerts 
and email newsletters.  Then I conducted a Google search, a Google news search, and a 
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LexisNexis search for “Desertec Industrial Initiative.” I gathered 396 articles, which was 
close to the population of unique, non-repetitive articles on Dii in English and French 
when I conducted the analysis in early 2013. I removed Dii and company press releases 
from the sample to distinguish Dii’s discourse from the media’s discourse. I analyzed 
Dii’s tweets and Facebook feed separately. Much of the coverage was in niche news 
sources on energy and environment (29%) and blogs (20%). European and North African 
newspapers (26%) and magazines (9%) represented the rest of the coverage, with sources 
including The Guardian (UK), BBC (UK), Der Spiegel (Germany), and El Watan 
(Algeria). The U.S. media rarely covers Desertec. 
I uploaded these articles into NVivo software and coded roughly half of the 
sample (193 articles) for the metaphorical language used; descriptions of Dii; discussions 
of temporality and speed; and key words, such as vision, concept, and barren land. The 
metaphor analysis yielded 802 instances of metaphorical language, which I grouped into 
82 metaphor themes. I further organized these groups into 16 categories. Coding can be a 
reductionist method. To address this in all of the coding I did throughout the study, I 
created longer codes including more context and wrote memos and annotations 
throughout the coding process. I triangulated this analysis with other document analysis, 
interviews, and fieldwork.    
 
Document Analysis 
I conducted extensive document analysis including reports and magazines from 
the CSP sector, especially through CSP Today magazine; flyers, pamphlets, and other 
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promotional materials from conferences and industry events; Moroccan and European 
policy documents; and reports from various institutions advocating for Mediterranean 
electricity systems integration including TREC, Dii, the Desertec Foundation, the 
Desertec academic network, the Union for the Mediterranean, Medgrid, and Res4Med, as 
well as some similar initiatives to build clean technologies in the deserts of MENA (e.g., 
Sahara Forest). This allowed me to understand how the industry and policy sectors 
framed the project and how it fit into broader framings of energy security and foreign 
policy. 
Six documents were particularly crucial for tracing how the Desertec vision 
evolved over time. The four volume (400-page) MedRing studies (final version 2010) on 
electricity integration in the MENA region provided a crucial starting point for 
understanding the current state of the Mediterranean transmission ring and its imagined 
future as an integrated power system with a particular, constructed geography. I did not 
code the Medring studies due to their length but instead analyzed them heuristically. 
Second, I analyzed the three Desertec feasibility studies from 2006 conducted by the 
German Aerospace Center, DLR (most importantly Trans-CSP, but to a certain extent 
also Med-CSP and Aqua-CSP). Third, I open coded the 2007 (first edition) Desertec 
White Book, a qualitative document outlining the problem Desertec sought to solve and 
reiterating the DLR vision, as well as the 2009 Desertec Red Paper, which was initially 
the Desertec Foundation’s main promotional report. These documents allowed me to 
understand the construction of feasibility, the system goals, the technology properties, 
and other elements of the first version of the vision. Interview data helped to triangulate 
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this information and understand the founding visionaries’ perceptions of the vision and 
how it changed.  
I then open coded the first half of the 142-page Desert Power 2050 report, Dii’s 
first major study released in 2012. This report was instrumental to my understanding of 
the design of the system for which Dii was advocating, and it provided a point of 
comparison to the first vision. I studied, although did not code, the Desertec Getting 
Started study, which described the initial steps Dii thought should be taken to implement 
the vision. I triangulated this with extensive data from interviews with shareholder 
companies, particularly to fill in gaps about how they anticipated the system would 
benefit society. I found that open coding these lengthy technical documents yielded some 
insight but was generally unwieldy. More targeted coding of these documents for terms 
such as sustainability, foresight, social benefits, terms related to speed, and particular 
system and technology traits was in the end a better method for identifying the main 
goals for the technology and the system. This updated coding was informed by interviews 
with key systems imaginers who helped me to identify the main issues I should be 
analyzing.   
 
Visual Analysis 
I triangulated the results of the document analysis with analysis of visual images 
and video clips. Visual images offered concrete representations of Dii’s vision of the 
future, illuminating the cultural milieu in which the vision was constructed and related 
biases, such as Orientalist prejudices. Data sources included visual depictions of the 
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Desertec vision (e.g., maps, transmission schematics, solar radiation maps); industry 
promotional videos from Dii and its shareholders, such as Flagsol’s “We are developing 
the future”; shareholders’ advertisements; and pictures I took in the field. I explored a 
variety of issues related to the composition of the images. What kinds of people—if 
any— are portrayed or left out of the images? How is the technology framed (e.g., 
portraying the technology’s scale, relation to social progress, and revolutionary 
potential)? How is the landscape proposed for development portrayed (e.g. uninhabited, 
wasteland, wilderness)?  
 
Moroccan Scoping Trip 
I used Morocco as a case study within the vision for Mediterranean electricity 
systems integration. This case study allowed for exploration of North African 
perspectives on regional integration. It offered generalizable lessons for understanding 
how visions for regional integration relate to nations’ politics, political development, and 
history. Additionally, Morocco would be a crucial node within the Desertec vision, and it 
is therefore important to understand its perspective on Desertec in order to evaluate the 
future prospects of Mediterranean electricity systems integration.  However, caution 
should be taken in presuming that Morocco’s support for Desertec applies to all countries 
in the MENA region, as it has closer relations with Europe than most other MENA 
countries. Chapter 6 further discusses the merits and drawbacks of Morocco as a case 
study.  
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I first visited Morocco in June 2012. During this trip I traveled to Rabat, 
Casablanca, and Marrakech. I then took the bus over the Atlas Mountains from 
Marrakech to Ouarzazate. The winding treacherous road underscored this region’s 
isolation. A PhD student from my program traveled with me for part of the time, which 
provided an additional perspective during the observations. I made a number of contacts 
with Fulbright students, Peace Corps volunteers, U.S. embassy employees, and 
government officials in the renewable energy sector. I conducted preliminary interviews 
with the representatives from the World Bank and Association Tichka, an NGO working 
in Ouarzazate primarily on clean water issues and distributed solar energy. In Rabat, I 
met the head of the YAANI, the Young Arab Policy Analysts International, (which later 
became MENA Policy Hub), who was instrumental in helping me find housing and make 
contacts. This led to an ongoing collaboration and later a letter of intent for cooperation 
between ASU and the MENA Policy Hub. We had a half-day discussion/debate on 
sustainability with young professionals from MENA Policy Hub on the two study abroad 
trips. 
Study Abroad Trips 
I helped to lead two ASU School of Sustainability trips to Morocco and Spain in 
May-June 2013 and 2014, called “Sustainable Development Across the Mediterranean.” 
These three and a half week long trips—with a third planned for 2015—were crucial for 
connecting my research to teaching, and it allowed me to see Morocco in a new light 
through the eyes of the students. The programs provided a mobile classroom through 
which we studied multi-scalar energy development from the upper echelons of the 
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Moroccan government in the capital city, all the way to NGOs that work at the village 
level, including the High Atlas Foundation and the Human Touch. We started in the 
capital city of Rabat, which added the following group meetings to my sample: two visits 
to the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and New Technologies (later called the Ministry 
of Industry, Commerce, and the Digital Economy, as more agencies emerged to govern 
other new technologies) or Ministère de l’Industrie, du Commerce, de l’Investissement et 
de l’Economies Numérique (MCINet) to learn about Morocco’s industrial policy; an 
additional visit to the Société d’investissement énergétique (SIE); a tour of the laboratory 
facilities and Q&A session with three officials at an energy research organization called 
Mascir; a meeting with an energy economist at the U.S. embassy; a meeting with officials 
from the German embassy and the German KfW development bank; two additional 
meetings with the Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN), and a meeting with an 
official from the Ministry of Energy.  
We traveled from Rabat to Marrakesh to Ouarzazate, where, in the second year, 
we stayed at Dar Taliba, a boarding school for rural young women, providing significant 
cross cultural interaction between ASU and Moroccan students and staff. Outside of 
Ouarzazate, we visited the village of Tasslemante, adjacent to the construction site of the 
Noor facility. We then traveled to Kelaa-Mgouna, the site of the Moroccan rose festival 
and a dagger cooperative to understand local development programs. From there, by way 
of the Valley of a Thousand Kasbahs, we journeyed to the desert town of Merzouga along 
the Algeria border, where we rode camels and camped in the desert, met desert nomads, 
and experienced an unreliable electricity grid. Next, we traveled through the village of 
Boumia where a Moroccan family with ASU connection served us a meshwi (sheep’s 
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leg), chicken, and couscous—the most generous meal a guest could be served. We also 
visited the family’s organic apple orchard and learned about the challenges encouraging 
local farmers to try organic farming, as well as the difficulties accessing European 
markets. From Boumia, we visited the imperial cities of Fes and Meknes. After stopping 
at the beach town of Azilal, we journeyed to Tangier and then took the ferry across the 
Strait of Gibraltar to Spain through Morocco’s brand new Tangier-Med port, a part of its 
industrial policy.  
The journey between two continents allowed us to compare the conceptions of 
sustainable development between the two countries with widely different cultures. In 
Spain, we visited Sevilla and Granada, including the Alhambra, which illustrated the 
deep historical roots between the two countries back to Andalusia. We took a day trip 
outside of Granada to the Solar Plataforma in Almeria, a CSP research platform founded 
in the 1970s and described in detail in Chapter 3. The trip to Spain added data from 
another country to my analysis, to which I would not have otherwise had access, 
including meetings both years at the government Institute for the Diversification and 
Saving of Energy and a meeting with the Spanish transmission systems operator, Red 
Eléctrica. These trips provided me with additional opportunities for cross-cultural 
learning and meetings with people with whom I would otherwise not have had access. 
 
Event Ethnography 
I conducted short but productive event ethnographies at two in-person Dii 
conferences and one virtual conference. These conferences provided insight from 
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officials who were too busy to schedule interviews. First, I attended a two-day conference 
held in Cairo in 2011. While in Cairo, I also attended the two-day Worldwide Wind 
Energy conference, which provided additional contacts and additional insight into a 
technology that later became important in the Desertec vision. I arrived in Cairo a week 
prior to the conferences in order to learn about the culture and visit historical sites. I 
visited Cairo at an opportune moment in history, just seven months after the revolution 
and only a week before Tahrir Square erupted in protest again. While in Cairo, I met with 
five young Egyptians through the couchsurfing website, who provided unique 
information about the culture and recent uprisings. Tour guides and couchsurfing friends 
graciously shared their moving stories of the revolution with me, and I remained in touch 
with many of them via Facebook. 
I attended the 2012 Dii conference in Berlin online, as it was not financially 
feasible to attend in person. All panel events were available in real-time online. One 
benefit to attending online was that I transcribed a significant portion of the event.  
I attended the 2013 Dii conference in Rabat in person. By this time, I was already 
familiar with many of the key actors. It provided a window into Dii’s evolution and an 
opportunity to ask follow up questions to interviewees. I also forged a research 
collaboration at this conference with a German NGO, Germanwatch, that provided access 
to the villages adjacent to the Noor solar power facility in Morocco. 
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Interviews 
Since many of my interviews were with elites from government agencies and 
large multi-national firms, I learned much about interviewing experts. I planned to ask 
open-ended questions to encourage the interviewees to consider broader social issues and 
to discuss the history of their involvement in regional systems integration. This was 
challenging because these experts were used to being asked highly technical, specific 
questions. If my questions did not illustrate sufficient technical expertise, I risked being 
dismissed as uninformed and unworthy of the person’s time. To cope with this, I 
sometimes had to ask more technically say questions first and save questions about the 
social impacts of the vision for later in the interview. It also helped to explain initially 
that I was interested in broader socioeconomic and policy questions.  
For the Dii/ Desertec sample, I contacted all shareholder companies and the 
Desertec Foundation for interviews. Given the stature of the involved companies, I was 
unable to secure interviews with all of them. LinkedIN was helpful for identifying the 
best contacts as one key individual from CSP Today connected me within one degree to 
numerous individuals working in the solar industry in the MENA region. 
Over one month in Germany, I visited Munich, Stuttgart, Mannheim, Bonn, 
Cologne, Aachen, Essen, Hamburg, and Berlin. Overall, I conducted 32 interviews on the 
European/international level. The sample included four employees of the Dii plus a Dii 
consultant and the two Desertec Foundation directors. I interviewed nine Dii shareholder 
companies: two people at M+W Group, Munich RE, HSH Nordbank, ABB, Deutsche 
Bank; two people at Red Eléctrica; two people at RWE, Schott Solar; Cevital, plus two 
field visits to the Abengoa Solar Solucar plant in Spain (Abengoa was also a 
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shareholder). One of the Dii interviewees worked for the shareholder company First 
Solar, and I also spoke informally with several First Solar employees in Arizona. To 
understand the initial Desertec vision, I interviewed two scientists from the German 
Aerospace Center (DLR) involved in the 2006 Desertec feasibility studies, as well as the 
father of the Desertec vision, Gerhard Knies. Outside of the Dii network, I conducted two 
interviews with the Union for the Mediterranean including the head of the Mediterranean 
Solar Plan (MSP) and a consultant from the German Development Corporation (GIZ) 
who works on the MSP, plus the head of the MENA CSP program at the World Bank, an 
official from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), and two German 
researchers who have studied Desertec. I interviewed government officials from BMWi, 
the German Foreign Office, the German Development Agency (BMZ), the German 
Environmental Agency (BMU), and the German development bank, KfW. I also 
interviewed an employee of BP to gain an oil industry perspective on Desertec. I 
conducted 23 of the interviews in person and eight via phone or Skype. The interviews 
lasted at least one hour, with many in-person visits to offices extending into two or even 
three hours. The majority were recorded on a digital recorder and transcribed verbatim in 
NVivo. 
I conducted interviews in Morocco from mid-August of 2013 to mid-December of 
2013. While there, I lived in an apartment in the conservative, working class 
neighborhood of Salé, Rabat’s sister city situated across the Bou Regreg River. There, I 
was embedded in how average urban Moroccans went about their days. In the first half of 
my time there, I had assistance arranging and conducting interviews from a Moroccan 
economics student. It was challenging to recruit interviewees from the Moroccan 
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government since I was not working under the aegis of a Moroccan agency or 
organization, nor did the officials have any incentive to speak with me. It was also 
challenging to use snowball sampling within this cultural context. When I did secure 
referrals, the person to whom I was referred would often show deference to his colleague 
by stating that if I had spoken to him, in addition to himself, then I knew already 
everything there was to know. This made it inappropriate to persist in my request for a 
referral unless I could identify a very specific piece of knowledge or data I needed. Many 
people agreed to interviews but rescheduled them numerous times up until my departure 
date. I would have benefitted from more time in the country to navigate this labyrinth of 
contacts and time delays. That said, once I did secure interviews they typically lasted two 
or even three hours. Numerous Moroccans showed me the deepest hospitality and 
generosity I had ever experienced, and I am deeply grateful for their support. 
In Rabat and Casablanca, I sampled based on representation from the three main 
energy agencies plus the state-run utility company, major industry actors, state-run 
investment funds, and energy researchers and research funding agencies. I conducted a 
total of 20 interviews in Rabat. The sample included two leading solar researchers, two 
officials from MASEN, the head of the state-run energy investment company Société 
d’investissement énergétique (SIE), three researchers from the country’s leading research 
center Centre National Pour Le Recherche Scientifique et Technique (CNRST), two 
officials from the Office National de l’Electricité et de L’eau Potable (ONEE) (one in 
Casablanca and one in Ouarzazate), the head of the funding agency for Solar Energy and 
New Technologies called the Institut de Recherche en énergie solaire et énergies 
nouvelles (IRESEN), one official from the Energy Ministry, Ministère de l’Energie, des 
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Mines, de l’Eau, et de l’Environnement (MEMEE), the head of the Moroccan Foundation 
for Advanced Science, Innovation and Research (Mascir), and one official from the 
World Bank in Rabat. I also gained the perspectives of Germans working in Morocco by 
interviewing German officials who work on energy in Rabat including the Germany 
embassy, the U.S. embassy, and two people from GIZ who work within the Agence 
Nationale pour le Développement des Energies Renouvelables et de l’Efficacité 
Energétique (ADEREE) and one who works within the Moroccan Agency for Solar 
Energy (MASEN). I also interviewed the head of Sahara Wind, a Moroccan organization 
working on energy integration with Mauritania and building HVDC lines to connect 
Moroccan wind to European markets.  
I filled in the gaps in my data by attending professional events. I attended the 
November 2013 Renewable Energy Exposition in Casablanca, Morocco, which featured 
dozens of booths with multi-national and domestic energy companies. At the exposition, I 
also attended a three-hour symposium sponsored by a group of researchers in the 
renewable energy sector called the Moroccan Society for the Development of Renewable 
Energy (La Société Marocaine de Développement des Energies Renouvelables, or 
SMADER) to discuss the changes that should occur in the Moroccan higher educational 
system to prepare students for the renewable energy marketplace. Furthermore, the 2013 
Dii conference in Rabat featured speakers from the Union for the Mediterranean and all 
of the Moroccan government energy agencies. I also had dinner with the head of the 
Regional Center for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (RCREEE) to discuss 
their Arab Energy Future Index report and lunch with Bertrand Piccard, who made the 
  68 
first transcontinental flight in a solar plane he built, and a group of young Moroccan 
climate change activists. 
 
Fieldwork in Ouarzazate 
Ouarzazate is currently Morocco’s motion picture capital, but it is also envisioned 
as the world’s new solar capital. It is located on a plateau between the High Atlas 
Mountains and the Anti-Atlas Mountains, with a mostly Tamazight (Berber) population 
of 69,364 people. Just outside of Ouarzazate, near the village of Tasslemante, the Noor 
solar facility is under construction. Noor is the largest concentrating solar power facility 
under construction in the world and is a major component of the Moroccan Solar Plan.  
I made five trips to Ouarzazate. The first was the 2012 scoping trip described 
above. The second was on the first ASU study abroad trip, during which we visited the 
Noor site as construction was just beginning. Grading was in progress, and the water 
pumping station and roads had already been built. I took the third trip during my semester 
living in Morocco. During this trip, I conducted an additional two-hour long interview 
with the head of Association Tichka, and I accompanied one of their employees on a day 
trip to the village of Zaouite Sidi Ahmed to see an integrated development project include 
solar water irrigation for olive trees, an olive press, and spirulina farming. I interviewed 
the head of the Commune Ghesset, which is the commune of villages that is being 
affected by the construction of the Noor facility. This trip allowed me to better 
understand the local, small-scale development initiatives and challenges in the 
Ouarzazate region. 
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The fourth time I visited Ouarzazate was for a two and a half week trip in 
February 2014 to join part of the fieldwork led by Germanwatch. I have worked with 
Germanwatch since late 2013 to write a report on the social sustainability of CSP and the 
socioeconomic impacts of the Noor facility. In Ouarzazate, I joined a team of German, 
Morocco, and Egyptian researchers, as well as four highly skilled Moroccan student 
research assistants, to evaluate the socioeconomic impacts of the Noor facility. All of the 
researchers stayed together at the same lodge and shared all meals together in an 
immersive environment. I learned much about rural Moroccan culture by working in this 
close environment with our Moroccan collaborators. During the fieldwork, I helped to 
code data from interviews the student researchers were conducting and to being grouping 
these codes into social impact categories. I had access to an internal baseline report that 
Germanwatch wrote on the social challenges facing the Ouarzazate region. Additionally, 
I went into the field with the students to observe the interviews, landscapes, and villages. 
We visited the villages of Tasslemante, Idelsane, and Agdz to conduct interviews. 
Through these interviews, I learned about the lives of rural Moroccans and by driving 
around the region I gained a better understanding of the landscape of the Ouarzazate 
region. I observed five focus groups with citizens from Tasslemante, heads of local small 
and medium sized enterprises, women, farmers, and young college graduates. I had 
access to the data translated into English from roughly 100 interviews conducted in the 
Ouarzazate region in RQDA software. Readers should refer to the Germanwatch and 
Wuppertal Institute report, Social CSP, for the full socioeconomic impacts evaluation of 
the Noor solar power facility. 
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I took my fifth trip to Ouarzazate with the second study abroad program. We 
stayed for two nights at a girl’s boarding school, which allowed for cultural exchange. 
We visited the Noor site again, after roughly half of the mirror fields and the beginning of 
the molten salt storage had been installed. This allowed for comparison between the two 
phases of the project. We visited the village of Tasslemante, adjacent to the Noor site 
with the NGO The Human Touch, which was formed by the Moroccan students who 
assisted with the Germanwatch research. We spent the afternoon interacting with primary 
school students from the village, including an educational clown show arranged by The 
Human Touch. We had to bring out own bottled water to make tea, as the village lacks 
clean drinking water. 
 
Historical Methods 
Historical documents and articles provided compelling context for the data on 
Desertec. I reviewed the literature on large-scale engineering projects planned for the 
Sahara Desert during colonial times to provide for comparison to Desertec. In order to 
understand the history of CSP across the globe, I drew upon French texts from the late 
1800s (e.g., Royaumont, Pope) and magazine articles describing efforts to build CSP in 
Egypt in the early 1900s. Additionally, I reviewed the existing history of solar power (for 
example, Perlin, 2013). A textbook I purchased on a trip to the Solar Plataforma in 
Almeria, Spain was crucial in understanding the history of CSP research in the 1970s and 
1980s (Ruiz Hernandez, n.d.). I combined this with current and historical data collected 
for my masters thesis on solar development in California. For the Moroccan case study, I 
  71 
drew upon nine articles written in French about the colonial electrification of North 
Africa (1911-1956), in order to understand how electrical power systems developed in 
Morocco, as well as an account by Swearingen that was useful in understanding how the 




Multi-scalar analysis has disadvantages. First, it is time consuming. My field 
research started with my time in Egypt in late 2011and then extended from mid-May 
2013 through December with the study abroad trip, my month of fieldwork in Germany, 
and a semester in Rabat. The intervening time was spent on document analysis, which 
started in 2009 when I wrote a class paper on Desertec, as well as securing funding. 
Multi-scalar analysis often requires language learning, but it is not possible to learn all of 
the relevant languages. I learned French, since I had previous experience with it, and it is 
widely spoken in Morocco, especially in the government. I took introductory formal 
Arabic (Fus’ha) in Arizona, which allowed me to read the alphabet but this differed from 
the local Moroccan dialect of Darija, for which my skills are rudimentary; therefore I had 
to rely on translators in Ouarzazate. Fortunately, elite interviews in Europe could be 
conducted in English, and many educated Egyptians speak English, although I studied the 
Egyptian dialect before leaving and found my cursory Arabic served me well in bridging 
cultural divides. Even though multi-scalar analysis is time consuming, the time spent at 
each location was rushed. Multi-scalar analysis differs from long-term participant 
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observation or ethnography in a single place—or even multiple sites— even though it 
draws upon similar methodological tools. While I wrote memos and reflections while in 
the field, I wrote very little thick description because my constant travel schedule did not 
permit it. This is a factor to consider for studies designed around intensive travel 
schedules. This methodological framework also requires collating and connecting a very 
large amount of disparate qualitative data, which can result in inaccuracies.  
Another methodological challenge was that many of the interactions played out 
“backstage” (Hilgartner, 2000) outside of the view of the researcher. For example, much 
of Dii’s work occurred at private shareholder meetings and was often misrepresented in 
the media. At times, these issues could be addressed interviews but not always due to the 
sensitivity of the information, such as government negotiations, personnel decisions 
within the Dii, and financial transactions related to the power plants. Furthermore, 
Moroccan society is highly stratified, making access to backstage information even more 
difficult to gain. As with all research, certain information was therefore unknowable. 
Overall, the multi-scalar analysis aided in understanding the potential wide-
reaching effects of a vision for a regional sociotechnical system. It also helped with 
evaluating energy justice by unmasking potential injustices that crossed scales, which 
were otherwise obscured by the actor’s win-win discourse. Finally, it provided a broader 
and more comprehensive view of the anticipated system-level effects of the vision than 
could have otherwise been gained by focusing on a single scale.    
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CHAPTER 3 
WHAT HAPPENS TO A DREAM DEFERRED? THE ONGOING EMERGENCE OF 
CONCENTRATING SOLAR POWER 
Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) Timeline 
 
1866: Augustin Mouchot presented his solar engine to Napoleon III who funded him to 
build a solar engine in Algeria 
1870s: Major engineering projects for the Sahara were envisioned including the Trans-
Saharan Railroad and the Sahara Sea  
1875: Mouchot went on a scientific expedition to Algeria with the French Minister of 
Education to further test CSP 
1877: John Mittell and George Ditzler were the first inventors to patent a solar device in 
the United States  
1878: William Adams, a British colonist, in Bombay wrote Solar Heat: A substitute fuel 
in tropical countries 
1882: Abel Pifre developed a solar powered printing press in France 
1882: Louis de Royaumont published The Conquest of the sun: scientific and industrial 
applications of solar heat  
1901: Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany stated, in reference to German imperialism, "In 
spite of the fact that we have no such fleet as we should have, we have conquered for 
ourselves a place in the sun." 
1901: Aubrey Eneas, an Englishman living in Boston, built a solar collector in California 
for irrigation.  
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1909: Frank Shuman built a CSP trough plant in Maadi, Egypt to irrigate cotton. Shuman 
imagined a project of 20,000 square miles in the Sahara desert to generate 270 million 
horsepower, or all of the world’s energy demand in 1909.  
1920: Atlantropa, a project to dam the Strait of Gibraltar to power Europe plus irrigate 
the Sahara desert, was proposed and promoted until 1960. It bears interesting similarities 
to the Desertec vision. 
1954: Willy Ley wrote Engineer's Dreams, detailing incomplete large-scale engineering 
projects worldwide 
1970: Arnold Goldmann wrote "A Working Paper on Luz," which developed a Jewish 
philosophy for CSP technologies
21
 
1976: United Nations Environment Program published report “The Prospects for Solar 
Energy in the Mediterranean Region" 
1977: The Solar Plataforma was founded in Spain 
1977-1982: The Spanish government took interest in renewable energy. Isofoton was 
founded and long-time engineering firm, Abengoa, in Seville began work on the Solar 
Plataforma (solar research platform) 
1979: Luz Energy was founded 
1981: Italia-Sicilia 1 MW- Eurelios CSP plant constructed 
1981: 1 MW SSPS CSP plant was completed at the Plataforma with the participation of 
nine countries in Spain 
1982: The Solar I power tower plant was commissioned at Daggett, California 
1983: New Mexico 1 MW CRT plant was commissioned  
                                                        
21 Exact date unknown. A copy of the work is no longer available.  
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1983: 1 MW CESA-1 Tower was commissioned at the Solar Plataforma in Spain 
1984: France- Targasonne 2.5 mw Themis CSP plant 
1986: Crimea built 5 MW SPP5 CSP plant 
1984: SEGS I CSP plant was constructed in California by Luz Energy 
1990: SEGS IX (the final stage) was commissioned by Luz in California 
1991: Luz Energy filed for bankruptcy 
1990: EU Council established the Energy Charter to promote energy cooperation between 
the east and west of Europe and the former USSR 
1995: Solar I was converted into Solar II, adding heliostats and molten salt storage 




2004: New Spanish electricity law was adopted creating the conditions for solar thermal 
growth 
2004- 2007: German Aerospace Center conducted Desertec feasibility studies 
2005-06: Russian-Ukraine natural gas crisis  
2007: EU Council established 20/20/20 targets for 20% renewable energy, 20% energy 
efficiency, and 20% carbon dioxide reductions from 1990 levels by 2020 
2007: PS10 CSP plant in Spain started delivering power to the grid 
2007: Nevada Solar I was constructed (by Solargenix, a subsidiary of Acciona Energia in 
Spain) 
2009: Andasol I CSP plant was completed in Spain   
2009: PS20 CSP plant was completed in Spain 
                                                        
22 According to Ruiz Harnandez, n.d. 
  76 
2010 - MASEN (Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy) was founded to build CSP plants, 
including the Noor facility  
  77 
What Happens to a Dream Deferred? 
Does it dry up  
like a raisin in the sun?  
Or fester like a sore--  
And then run?  
Does it stink like rotten meat?  
Or crust and sugar over--  
like a syrupy sweet? 
Maybe it just sags  
like a heavy load. 
Or does it explode? 
-- Langston Hughes 
 
Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) has been framed as an emerging technology for 
a century and a half. This chapter explores CSP as a deferred dream, initially couched in 
the colonial enterprise and then in large-scale engineering projects that sought to 
landscape the desert through CSP and other technologies. Dreams for large-scale 
engineering projects in the Sahara described in this chapter have been remarkably 
persistent, lasting for decades with strong advocates who conducted reams of feasibility 
studies. However, CSP was never built en masse in the Sahara desert, primarily because 
it failed to gain sufficient traction to be scaled up into systems for a variety of reasons, 
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and when CSP was imagined as part of a system, the system imaginers lacked political 
support and underestimated the sociopolitical complexity of the landscape in which they 
sought to build. Additionally, these deferred dreams faded from imagination due to major 
world events, changing priorities, priority given to nuclear technologies, and changes in 
the goals actors had for the electricity system. Yet they were resilient enough to reemerge 
later in new forms. This chapter also shows that Andalusia and the Sahara have been 
framed as attractive places to build CSP for over a century. Desertec is therefore one of 
the latest instantiations of the dream deferred to scale up CSP in deserts. 
By examining CSP’s history, this chapter illustrates how a technology’s 
emergence is constructed and situated in particular time periods and contexts. The term 
emerging technology is often used as a static concept in the literature, but it would be 
better analyzed as an actor category that is strategically constructed over time. A 
technology’s emergence should also be considered in the context of other emerging and 
mature technologies and systems; for example, CSP has reemerged in times when nuclear 
power has fallen from favor and coal was feared to be running out. Scholars might expect 
that a technology like CSP that did achieve closure and was not successfully integrated 
into a system would disappear, like Betamax tapes did when the video industry became 
path dependent on VHS (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995). Instead, CSP’s emergence is 
ongoing as it has been born and reborn in different cultural contexts, rarely changing 
significantly, not successfully integrated into systems, but also never dying. Each time 
the technology has emerged, its advocates have worked to frame it as feasible. Proving 
feasibility is a necessary but insufficient step for a deferred dream to gain the momentum 
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required to reach the construction phase.
23
 Overall, this dissertation explores CSP’s rise 
and fall from 1850 to the present, from the United States to Morocco, illustrating how 
societal goals have led to resurgences of the technology but numerous factors described 
below have caused it to be deferred. 
The history below shows that, despite being framed as feasible, the dream for 
CSP was deferred numerous times between 1850 and 2000, most importantly because 
CSP failed to become integrated into a broader system design. I argued in Chapter 1 that 
energy transformations have important scalar aspects; the ability of an energy technology 
to appropriately fit the scale of the existing system is key to its emergence. Electrical 
power systems are not complex systems in the postmodern sense, which lack central 
control—for example, the World Wide Web has been defined as “scale-free”—they are 
still hierarchical systems, as will be illustrated in Chapter 5. CSP has the advantage of 
being a substitutable technology that could fit fairly well into this existing, centralized 
system. Even so, CSP suffers from problems with being integrated into a system at 
sufficient scale, which illustrates how challenging it is to build new energy infrastructure 
on top of the old. In the 1850s, CSP was seen as too difficult to scale up, too weak, and 
incapable of providing sufficient power during peak hours of electricity usage. CSP was 
briefly envisioned as part of a system in the early 1900s but was halted by World War I. 
Some viewed CSP as impeding the reliability of the conventional electrical power system 
because it was too weak and capricious to generate reliable power.
24
 In the 1970s, CSP 
was again briefly considered in California as part of a transition toward renewable 
                                                        
23
 See Chapter 5 for a continued discussion on feasibility and visions for sociotechnical systems. 
24
 See Chapter 1 for an explanation of the importance of reliability as a systems trait. 
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energy, but ironically environmentalists, who focused instead on small-scale generation, 
impeded it.  
CSP’s failures related to several other factors including the rise and fall of nuclear 
technologies, opposition from the fossil fuel lobby, bad luck and poor timing due to 
intervening world wars, the untimely death of prominent advocates, and economic crises. 
Chapter 5 illustrates how the CSP dream reemerged in Europe in the 2000s as part of the 
first Desertec design for a system in which CSP would have provided the specific and 
crucial systems property of dispatchability. However, CSP played a minor role in the 
second system design, because the system design changed to obviate the need for 
dispatchability, which led CSP to be deferred again. CSP’s reemergence is examined in 
the Global South in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, where it is the focus of the Moroccan Solar 
Plan due to its perceived ability to meet socioeconomic goals. 
By taking a longitudinal look at an emerging, or a deferred, technology, it is 
possible to see how the technology’s politics and framings have changed over time. The 
politics of CSP were not cemented but shifted as CSP was enrolled in meeting various 
goals. Ironically, the CSP technologies that are today framed as utopian and sustainable 
have their roots in empire building as they were enrolled in the search for cheap and 
abundant sources of fuel to power resource extraction in North Africa. CSP began with a 
domination of nature framing during a period in which scientists sought to remove ethical 
restrictions imposed by religion on the exploitation of nature. Large-scale engineering 
projects for the Sahara, along with CSP, stemmed from the ambitious dreams of colonial 
engineers who sought to reshape desert landscapes into productive zones, with profound 
consequences both for the environment and its human inhabitants, who were often 
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written out of the landscape or at least imagined as not needing energy. When CSP 
reemerged during the 1970s energy crises, system builders sought to replace fossil fuels 
in electricity systems to increase countries’ energy independence and sovereignty. CSP 
faded along with the energy crisis; a general challenge for CSP is that government 
support for it has been directly tied to the goals developed during crises that eventually 
fade. When CSP reemerged in the 2000s, it was part of a profoundly different 
sustainability and climate change debate. By this time, it was clear CSP was a feasible 
technology—CSP can be built, but should it be built and in what places? CSP faltered as 
environmental activists in California opposed it for being ‘out-of-place’ in the pristine 
desert landscape and, while it met carbon dioxide reduction goals, it did not, in their 
view, meet overall sustainability goals. Across the Atlantic, the first Desertec vision 
framed CSP as a technology that could bridge continents in the post-colonial world, 
provided the technology was integrated into a massive system. Thus CSP, which was 
developed to dominate nature, was enrolled in a complicated debate about ethics, 
sustainability, preservation, and global climate change. These complex, contemporary 
goals relating to CSP illustrate how different the energy transformation challenge is in the 
21
st
 century than the original sociotechnical systems construction process Hughes 
studied. 
One framing of CSP that did endure over time is that of the solar farm. This 
history illustrates that CSP is a technology of the frontier, constructed by pioneers in 
depressed desert zones to make the desert bloom through irrigation powered by massive 
solar farms that reap abundant rays in virgin landscapes. The solar farming metaphor 
used today frames the technology as benign but also references a potentially insidious 
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colonial metaphor. Chapter 4 illustrates how the 2006 version of the Desertec vision 
framed a modern energy system as one based on energy farming. Chapter 6 then 
describes how Morocco is currently developing these “solar farms” in a way that reflects 
its agricultural policy dating back to the Protectorate era. One drawback with this 
agricultural framing in terms of CSP’s success is that individual farms do not necessarily 
scale up to form centralized power systems. 
Since CSP’s emergence relates not just to the technology itself but its integration 
into systems, this chapter illustrates why it is important for energy policy in the 21
st
 
century to consider emerging technologies within the context of the existing 
sociotechnical systems landscape. This landscape cannot simply be clear-cut for solar 
farms. Emerging, low carbon energy technologies would need to be used to refurbish the 
existing system, or a complete paradigm shift in how electricity is generated, distributed, 
and consumed will be needed. Either way, emerging technologies must fit into an 
existing and complex sociopolitical terrain shaped by histories that matter to citizens and 
policymakers. Visions for CSP have often developed within an energy landscape that was 
far more socially and geographically complex than the system imaginers acknowledged 
and were often based in false assumptions and social stereotypes. Furthermore, today’s 
sustainability challenges are integrated challenges that bring together complex 
intersecting domains, for example, water, poverty, and energy. This dissertation explores 
the sociopolitical complexity and systems complexity into which emerging technologies 
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Overview of CSP Technology 
 
A CSP tower plant consists of a field of heliostats, or towers with garage-door-
sized mirrors that concentrate sunlight on a central power tower receiver, heating air or 
water to drive a steam turbine to generate electricity.
 
CSP parabolic trough plants, which 
are the most widely deployed technology, concentrate the sun’s energy on a tube attached 
to a parabolic mirror rather than a tower to drive a steam turbine. This steam turbine 
generating system is very similar to that of a conventional power plant, although the heat 
comes from the sun rather than from fossil fuel combustion. This power is then delivered 
to consumers through transmission lines. A less popular type of CSP is the Stirling dish 
engine, which resembles a satellite dish and concentrates sunlight onto a focal receiver 
attached to the disk. The Stirling engine heats a gas connected to a drive shaft to power a 
generator, providing electricity to transmission lines. The pictures of CSP below illustrate 
how similar the technologies have remained over time. 
 
                                                        
25 Chapter 8 describes different types of complexity and how it relates to energy justice outcomes. 
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Figure 5. Kuraymat CSP Trough Field Added to a Natural Gas Plant, 2010 Near Cairo, 
Egypt. Photo by Author. 
 
                                                        
26 http://peswiki.com/index.php/Reprint:Tesla%27s_Solar_Ideas 
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Figure 6. The CRS Tower Plant in Spain, 1981. Source: Plataforma Solar de Almeria 
website. Used with permission.27 
 
 
Figure 7. One of BrightSource Energy's Ivanpah Towers, 2013. Source: BrightSource 
Energy Ivanpah website. Used with permission.
28
 
                                                        
27 http://www.psa.es/webeng/instalaciones/receptor.php 
28 http://www.ivanpahsolar.com/photos-and-videos 
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Figure 8. Mouchot's Solar Engine Used to Power a Printing Press, 1882. Originally from 




Figure 9. Eurodish Stirling Engine, Solar Research Platform, 2013. Source: Plataforma 
Solar de Almeria website. Used with permission.
30
 
These pictures illustrate the different types of CSP technology and show that today’s 
technologies are similar in design to the first models developed in the 1880s. 
Large-Scale Engineering Visions for a Coveted Sahara Desert 
 
While the media frames contemporary dreams to build CSP in the Sahara as 
unprecedented, they are situated in a long history of deferred dreams for large-scale 
                                                        
29 http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/6/beautifulpossibility.php 
30 http://www.psa.es/webeng/instalaciones/receptor.php 
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engineering projects in the desert. This section briefly outlines the history of non-solar 
large-scale engineering dreams for the Sahara Desert before addressing solar power 
specifically. The Sahara has long been an important landscape for large-scale engineering 
dreams, for the development of CSP, and for the contemporary Desertec vision. This 
section illustrates the historical roots of several themes developed later in the dissertation: 
technological systems in the Sahara as improving connectivity and accessibility, the 




Since colonial times, technology has been used by developed nations as a metric 
for judging civilization and progress in the Global South (Adas, 1990). According to 
Adas (1990) the colonial project was underpinned by a civilizing discourse that the 
colonized were backwards savages, incapable of progress without European technology 
and that Europeans had a normative duty to civilize others (ibid). For example, the 
French justified their intervention in North Africa by asserting that their engineers could 
properly exploit its natural resources.  
For colonialism to be successful on the coasts of North Africa, the desert could 
not be ignored but had to be pacified through military and technological control (Bisson, 
2003). As colonial empires were forming, the Sahara was a "coveted desert," viewed by 
Europeans as terra nullius (land belonging to no one) and a virgin and unoccupied space 
(Bisson, 2003; Heffernan, 2011). The North African deserts were difficult to access, and 
several prominent expeditions ended in shipwrecks along the Atlantic Coast of Morocco. 
This contributed to the image of a remote Sahara shrouded in mystery (Bisson, 2003). In 
                                                        
31
 See especially chapters 4 and 5. 
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the 1850s, conquering the desert became the focus of imperial design and scientific 
curiosity (ibid). As exploration began, it was a “bitter surprise for the conquerors who 
believed the Sahara was empty of men because it was not only space that they had to 
conquer but also the Saharans themselves!” (Bisson, 2003, p. 61). Although the French 
saw the Sahara as useless land outside of the Mediterranean agricultural zone (ibid; 
Swearingen, 1988), it became the focus of arguably the most ambitious colonial 
technological projects, such as the Trans-Saharan Railroad.  
It is clear that technology played an important material and discursive role in 
colonization in the Sahara, but less scholarly attention has been given to colonial-era 
dreams for massive engineering systems that would radically reconstruct colonized 
deserts. How did these visions for systems evolve? Why were they so persistent, and 
what happened to them when they were deferred? What services did they seek to provide 
and for whom were they anticipated to benefit? Europeans imagined roughly a half-dozen 
ambitious Saharan technological systems during the colonial period and pursued them 
without success over decades (Bisson, 2003). These failed projects “allow [for] an 
exploration of the outer edges of the French colonial imagination in Africa” (Heffernan, 
2011 p. 619), as well as a lens for understanding contemporary regional development 
projects.  Because of these grandiose dreams, engineers “loomed large in colonial 
mythology” (Slavin, 2001, p. 92).  
I offer three examples of incomplete dreams for Saharan systems in order to 
address the questions above. These engineering systems have in common immense scale 
and plans for the massive provision of water and electricity for irrigation and resource 
extraction to the extent that they could be called geoengineering projects in today’s 
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lexicon.
32
 They all focused on improving connectivity between territories and shifting the 
Mediterranean region’s geopolitical weight through technological integration.33 Each 
vision was backed up by years of feasibility studies, publications, and advocacy by 
project proponents. They all unmask problematic and even racist/Orientalist assumptions 
of the time period. As one would expect for the time period, the plans do not consider the 
environmental effects. The visions were popular enough that they did not “dry up like a 
raisin in the sun,” rather they faded from imagination as priorities changed, new 
technologies were introduced, and new goals were identified. These visions left behind a 
wealth of knowledge supporting them, which is part of the reason they endured over 
decades and later reemerged in new forms. 
In Engineers' Dreams, published in 1954, Willy Ley described nine large-scale 
technological projects imagined by engineers worldwide that were technologically 
feasible but "incomplete dreams," because the ideas were clear but missing a crucial 
piece of the development—what I refer to in this dissertation as deferred dreams. He said 
that "engineers' dreams are things that can be done as far as the engineer is concerned," 
but that many of these projects remain dreams due to “political barriers.” Four of the nine 
projects he described were for the deserts of the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) 
region. This illustrates that even as MENA nations were gaining their independence in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, the MENA region was still imagined as a space to be 
redesigned by engineers. The book has “staying power” and “continued currency” 
because of the grand scale of the projects and their demonstration of engineering’s 
                                                        
32
 I am not referring to climate engineering here, but to a project of such scale that it would affect the entire 
globe. 
33 These themes are continued in Chapter 4 on the Desertec vision. 
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potential for major planetary change (Petroski, 1997, p. 3). It seems geoengineering is not 
such a novel idea but has roots in large-scale Saharan sociotechnical systems such as 
those described below. 
Replacing the trans-Saharan trade routes with new technologies of transport was 
one of the earliest large-scale engineering schemes for the Sahara first envisioned through 
rail and much later pipelines and transmission corridors.
34
 Colonial powers sought to 
conquer, pacify, and connect the desert through a Trans-Saharan railway running north-
south through the Sahara (Bisson, 2003). Bridging the desert would provide territorial 
continuity among the North African colonies (ibid), accessibility to the desert, and allow 
for the transportation of people and colonial goods. This focus on connectivity and 
continuity through desert technology persisted over a century to the present.
35
 While the 
project was never constructed, the vision extended from the 1870s to the end of the North 
African colonial period in the 1960s (Heffernan, 2011). Over 500 books and articles were 
written about the railway, a commission was formed to investigate its feasibility, and 
meetings were held to promote the feasibility of the project and its economic and political 
benefits (Heffernan, 2011). The project waned during World War I and the Great 
Depression. In 1941, construction restarted using Jewish slave labor but ceased after the 
Anglo-American invasion of North Africa (Heffernan, 2011). Heffernan argued that the 
railroad project faded away toward the end of the colonial period after the discovery of 
hydrocarbons, which are more efficiently transported long distances through pipeline 
rather than rail. (Saharan hydrocarbons were largely exploited after the colonial period, 
                                                        
34
 See Chapter 4. 
35 See Chapter 4. 
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which had focused instead on agricultural development (Bisson, 2003).) There was also 
social opposition from the Toureg people in the desert—who had defeated the initial 
surveying team. Horden (2012) argued that the failure of technological systems like the 
Trans-Saharan railway “added further to the myth of Saharan inaccessibility and 
“anarchy” (p. 32). 
Another persistent engineering dream for the desert was the Sahara Sea, which 
Jules Verne wrote of in Invasion of the Sea. Initially, the French and British hoped to find 
the mythical Lake Tritonis, described in ancient texts as somewhere in present-day 
Tunisia. They envisioned building a canal from the lake to the Red Sea to irrigate cotton 
(Bisson, 2003). When Lake Tritonis was not discovered, the French developed plans to 
engineer a Sahara Sea by piping Mediterranean water into a desert depression. Surveying 
missions deemed it infeasible because the depression was higher than sea level 
(Ghassemi & White, 2007; Ley, 1954). A German government-employed architect, 
Herman Sörgel later imagined that the Sahara Sea could be developed by refilling 
dwindling Lake Chad with seawater and then forming a massive Congo Lake south of the 
‘Chad Sea’ (ibid). Building a major waterway in the middle of Africa would improve 
access to the Sahara and connectivity (ibid). Sörgel argued that it would be cheaper and 
easier to navigate North Africa by boat rather than the Trans-Saharan railway (ibid). As 
late as 1957, Project Artemis36 again sought to develop a plan to use an interior sea for 
hydroelectricity, seawater desalination, and mineral mining, although little 
documentation of the project exists (Bisson, 2003; Ghassemi & White, 2007). As late as 
1983, the Tunisian and Algerian governments formed a society to further pursue this 
                                                        
36 Association de Recherches Technique pour l’Etude de la Mer Intérieure Saharienne 
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vision, which concluded that it was unprofitable and had negative social and 
environmental impacts (Ghassemi & White, 2007).37 
Sörgel’s more popular project, which was introduced in the 1920s, was Panropa, 
later called Atlantropa. The vision framed North Africa as an unproductive wasteland 
waiting to be put to use as an agricultural and hydroelectric “hinterland” for Europe 
(Muller, 2005). Sörgel’s geoengineering dream included a massive 35-kilometer, 365,000 
MW dam that would plug the Strait of Gibraltar, plus two dams added later near Italy and 
the Dardanelles strait, connecting the Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmara (Ley, 1954; 
Credit Suisse Group, 2003). Atlantropa would reduce the size of the Mediterranean by 
250,000 cubic kilometers of water and introduce 220,000 square miles of new land (ibid). 
It would increase physical connectivity in the region, putting back in place the former 
land bridges theorized to exist between Spain and Morocco, Tunisia and Sicily, and 
Greece to the eastern end of the present sea, irrigating the Sahara to turn it into a 
breadbasket for Europe (ibid). The project would also raise the ocean level by three feet 
everywhere else (Ley, 1954) illustrating its scale as an early geoengineering dream. 
Atlantropa was not the fantasy of a single engineer but was backed up by a social 
movement led by the Atlantropa Institute, which persisted until 1960 (Credit Suisse 
Group, 2003). Four books and roughly 1,000 publications were published on the topic 
(ibid). Gene Roddenberry even depicted a dam on the Strait of Gibraltar in his 1979 
book, Star Trek: The Motion Picture. 
                                                        
37 Société d’Étude Tuniso- Algérienne de la Mer Intérieure 
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Figure 10. Atlantropa, Deutsches Museum, Used with Permission 
 
The plan had racist overtones, reflected the civilizing discourse, and was 
explicitly imperialistic. Sörgel saw Atlantropa as a peaceful alternative to ‘living space’ 
(Lebensraum, or the displacement of supposed ‘inferior races’ by the supposed ‘Arayan 
master race’) by creating more land by desiccating the Mediterranean. The vivid images 
that promoted the project, such as the one above in which an African woman is handing a 
bountiful harvest up to the white European colonist, illustrates this racial superiority 
complex. Such Orientalist advertising was common for overseas imports to Germany. 
“Colonial goods,” such as chocolate, spices, and coffee, were luxury products that 
advertisers marketed as exotic goods by using images of black people and oriental 
servants (see Figure 11). Chapter 5 questions whether electricity from North Africa is 
being treated as an exotic export.   
 
 
Figure 11. Colonial Goods Advertising. Photo taken by author at the Cologne Chocolate 
Museum. Used with Permission.  
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Geopolitically, Atlantropa was envisioned to provide a united Mediterranean, in 
which Europe controlled the energy, land, and water resources of North Africa, to 
balance out the rising forces of Asia and America (Trischler & Weinberger, 2005). While 
Atlantropa’s geopolitical aspirations were popular at the time, Trischler & Weinberger 
(2005) argued that it was put to rest by the rise of nuclear power, which offered similar 
promises for European integration.
38
 In Chapters 4 and 5, I will illustrate how CSP 
currently offers promises for Mediterranean electricity integration. 
Visions for Euro-African technological integration did not end with the colonial 
empires, and technology played an important role in the vision of an integrated Euro-
African community. In the 1960s, the Méditerranée-Niger plan sought to create a new 
Saharan state south of Morocco and Algeria—retaining visions for Saharan territorial 
continuity— and Le Plan de Strasbourg of 1952 imagined a Euro-African community 
(Bisson, 2003). The Euro-African imaginary sought to maintain the integration of 
Europe’s Mediterranean colonies as part of an expanding European Union (Muller, 
2005). Muller explained that engineering played an important role in this stating, 
 
Pan-European imperialism often reveals a striking faith, pseudo-religious, in 
technology…For most of the twentieth century, part of the interest in Africa is the 
                                                        
38 German readers can find more information on Atlantropa at Gall, Alexander. Das Atlantropa-Projekt: 
Die Geschichte einer gescheiterten Vision: Hermann Sörgel und die Absenkung des Mittelmeers. Frankfurt: 
Campus, 1998. 
  96 
fact that it is deemed void, like a blank page provided to the brush of European 
engineering”39 (p. 360)  
 
French agro-industrial projects in North Africa and the Atlantropa movement 
were emblematic of this faith in technology (ibid). Chapter 4 shows the pictures painted 
of a new large-scale engineering system for the Mediterranean—a single transmission 
grid. Even into the 1960s, Africa was seen as an El Dorado because of its space and sun, 
with the possibility of a zone of free pan-African exchange (ibid). Electricity played an 
important role in this. Muller stated, 
 
White Africa and its government will make Africa a techno-utopia. The divine 
electricity will arrive. ‘Africa will emerge from the shadows of the back of God. 
The light and electrical power will kill the darkness…In one fell swoop, 
electricity will civilize it or there will be no civilization….’ Africa asleep, 
henceforth electrified, civilized, and full of energy… ‘will jump forward’… and 
turn into ‘a new world…’40 (Muller, 2005, quoting Peter Penn Tomorrow’s 
Continent, in 1948, p. 366). 
 
                                                        
39 "Le pan-impérialisme européen révélé souvent une foi saisissante, pseudo religieuse, dans la 
technologies….Pendant la plus grande partie du XXe siècle, une part de l’intérêt pour l’Afrique vient du 
fait qu’elle est réputée vide, comme une page blanche offerte au pinceau du génie européen." 
40 L’Afrique blanche et ses gouvernements feront de l’Afrique une techno-utopie. La divine lumière 
électrique arrivera : « L’Afrique émergera de l’ombre du dos de Dieu. La lumière et la puissance électrique 
tueront les ténèbres [...]. En un seul coup l’électricité civilisera là où il n’y avait aucune civilisation. »… 
L’Afrique endormie, désormais électrifiée, civilisée, pleine d’énergie …transformera en « un nouveau 
monde [...] 
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Muller went on to say “For the Europe of tomorrow, three elements are lacking: space, 
energy, and primary materials. Europe, in exchange, must deliver men, technique, and 
capital,” which could be realized in a Euro-african framework (ibid, p. 384).41 In the 
1960s, Africa supplied uranium for atomic energy projects in Europe, and it was viewed 
as a new source of salvation for Europe (ibid). This discourse is still popular today, but 
the Euro-african community failed when its developers became sensitive to neocolonial 
critiques, Germany opposed privileging North Africa over other regions for investment, 
and former colonial powers were concerned that they would fund unprofitable 
development projects in the region while other countries reaped the benefits of profitable 
projects (ibid). I will explore Euro-africa’s new instantiations in Chapters 4 and 5. 
International relations scholars have argued that “new regionalism” emerged after the 
formation of the European Union, based upon globalization of trade, a break down of 
sovereignty, and the removal of barriers that impeded connectivity across nation-state 
borders. Old regionalism, in contrast, sought to build up regional might to counter forces 
such as the Soviet Union. When compared to Desertec, the visions for regional 
technological systems illustrate many parallels between the framing and use of 
technology in regionalism from 1860-1960 and today’s regionalism. Technology is still 
seen as the glue that ties the region together, providing connectivity, bridging disparities 
                                                        
41 « Pour faire l’Europe de demain, trois éléments lui manquent : l’espace, l’énergie, les matières 
premières. L’Afrique peut les lui offrir ; l’Europe, en échange, doit livrer hommes, technique, capitaux. 
Quoting Jean-Michel de Lattre, « Le Sahara, clé de voûte de l’ensemble eurafricain français », Politique 
étrangère, n° 4, 1957, pp. 360, 366, 384. 
 
  98 
in the distribution of natural resources between South and North, and compensating for 
the lack of space in Europe.  
Who benefits from these systems?. These engineering dreams were underpinned 
by false assumptions and stereotypes. From an energy justice perspective, Willy Ley’s 
engineering dreams were incomplete because they had a limited imagination for who 
needed energy in the region and for what social good. He depicted these areas as needing 
electricity for resource extraction, not for inhabitants. Through this, large-scale 
engineering was wrapped up in colonial electricity policy, focused on powering resource 
extraction and viewing the desert as barren of people, and certainly barren of people 
deserving of electricity.
42
 Besides Atlantropa and the Sahara Sea, the projects Ley 
described include a hydroelectric plant on the Jordan River to pump water from the 
Mediterranean Sea to power a mining operation or to fill up the Qattara Depression in 
Egypt, one of the lowest elevations in Africa, for hydroelectric power. About a proposed 
dam on the Red Sea at the Strait of Bab el Mandeb (Djibouti/Eritrea/Yemen area), Ley 
said "But nobody in the general area of the Strait of Bab el Mandeb needs such quantities 
of electrical current" (p. 156). About the Qattara Depression project, which is still under 
consideration today, Ley said,  
 
There isn't anything in particular in the way of such a plan except an absence of 
customers for the current generated. While the cities of the Nile Delta are within 
easy reach for the high-voltage wire, they are not industrial cities and do not need 
much electricity (pp. 116-117). 
                                                        
42 See Chapter 6 for a related discussion of colonial electricity policy in Morocco. 
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Today, the Cairo area (current population 17.8 million) cannot meet its domestic 
electricity demand and suffers daily from rolling blackouts. Yet the myth that this region 
does not need much electricity and is an uninhabited desert persists today and was 
foundational to the Desertec vision.
43
 Similarly, Cronon (1991) observed about the 
presence of Native Americans in the connectivity of the Chicago region in the United 
States that “the dream would not contain them” (Kindle location 1306). Often projects 
viewed as appropriate for local people were small-scale systems, such as the French 
colonial approach to building small hydroelectric and drinking water projects in the 
mountains of Morocco to win the “hearts and mind[s]” of villagers  (Swearingen, 1988, 
p. 88) while building large dams to power resource extraction. There is a risk that 
contemporary dreams for electricity in the Sahara do not contain the people who live in 
the desert and do not seek to connect them to premium-networked spaces.
44
 This 
indicates a lack of recognition justice, which I will discuss in the energy justice 
framework in Chapter 8. 
 
The Colonial and Agricultural Framings of CSP 
 
Like other deferred dreams for the Sahara, CSP developed within a colonial 
context over a century before it became enrolled in the sustainability movement and the 
fight against climate change. This section illustrates that, to use Winner’s terms, CSP 
                                                        
43
 This is explained in Chapter 4 and the point is revisited in the energy justice chapter (Chapter 8). 
44
 See Chapter 4. 
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originally had the politics of a colonial technology. The mechanical use of solar heat was 
developed in 1767, when Horace de Saussure invented a hot box, essentially a shoebox-
sized glass greenhouse (Perlin, 2013). William Adams, an English settler in Bombay, was 
one of the first people to imagine solar heat being put into service for the colonial 
mission. He patented a solar cooking device featured in Scientific American (Pope, 1903). 
In his report in 1878, Solar Heat: A substitute fuel in tropical countries, he argued that 
solar energy could replace coal despite its intermittency (ibid). Some British imperialists 
were skeptical that solar was strong enough to supplant coal, while others were already 
concerned that the world was running out of coal and that CSP was needed as a new 
energy source (Ragheb, 2011; Royaumont, 1882).   
The focus on the human domination of nature through science and technology 
(Leiss, 1972) shaped CSP’s framing. In 1882, Louis de Royaumont published The 
Conquest of the sun: scientific and industrial applications of solar heat (La conquête du 
soleil, applications scientifiques et industrielles de la chaleur solaire (héliodynamique)). 
He began with a derisive history of the "indigent natives" who worshiped the sun, and he 
argued that the Arabs were backward because they did not give up this primitive sun 
worship when they converted to Islam. “The people of the Arabian peninsula were 
desperate worshipers of the sun which seems, in fact, the only sovereign [ruler] of the 
desert” (p. 6).45 Royaumont viewed solar engines as the scientific conquest of the sun, or 
the ultimate control of nature, which was reject these “primitive” religious beliefs. On the 
front page of the book (below), an anthropomorphized sun is perturbed that man has 
                                                        
45 Les habitants de la presqu'île arabique étaient d'acharnés adorateurs du Soleil qui semble, en effet, le seul 
souverain du désert. 
  101 
conquered its rays. Royaumont stated, “science and philosophy have joined forces; 
philosophy freed the slave, science enslaved the Sun” (p. 311).46 This domination of 
nature framing is surprising for a technology framed today as having the politics of a 
benign and environmentally friendly technology.   
CSP’s framing was also shaped by international technological competition. 
Royaumont saw the mechanical use of solar heat as a means for France to regain its 
scientific standing in the international community, which he viewed as having fallen 
behind the United States, Germany, and England. While England was using its coal to 
industrialize rapidly, France lacked domestic coal deposits, making it difficult to compete 
with England (Perlin, 2013). Royaumont asked, “Is [solar power] to satisfy the needs of a 
scientific mission made with the burning heat of the tropical deserts or a body of colonial 
troops fighting for the defense of the national flag?’47 (p. 264). It was ultimately seen as 
both. Settlers could use solar cookers to prepare food, purify water, and distill wine far 
from the “civilized center”. Sappers could use it on desert caravans for water or even for 
the construction of the Trans-Saharan railroad. CSP was shaped by the civilizing 
discourse; a French newspaper called the invention of CSP “a glory for a civilizing and 
generous France”(ibid, p. 271). 48   
                                                        
46 La science et la philosophie ont joint leurs efforts ; la philosophie a affranchi l'esclave, la science a 
asservi le Soleil. 
47 'S'agit-il maintenant de satisfaire aux besoins d'une mission scientifique aux prises avec l'ardeur des 
déserts tropicaux ou d'un corps de troupes coloniales préposé à la défense du drapeau national? pg 264 
48 «Cette invention, dit le même journal, est une gloire pour la France civilisatrice et généreuse. 271  
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Figure 12. The Cover of de Royaumont’s La Conquête du Soleil, 1882, Source: Google 
Books (public domain). 
 
In 1866, Frenchman Augustin Mouchot constructed one of the first solar steam 
engines, an insolateur (insolator), in the shape of a dish (Ragheb, 2011). In 1903, Pope 
described him as “the greatest of pioneers in solar enginery. The world owes him a large 
debt” (Pope, 1903, p. 35). While France increased its coal production in the second half 
of the 1800s, Mouchot thought that coal would run out quickly and CSP would replace it, 
creating a goal for CSP that become obsolete when this energy crisis faded (Perlin, 2013). 
In the summer of 1866, he presented this engine to Napoleon III who funded him to build 
a solar engine in Constantine, Algeria. The French government thought that solar power 
might replace costly coal in its colonies, which they were importing from England 
(Perlin, 2013) (Hydrocarbons were not discovered in Algeria until much later.)  
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CSP’s applications were still open to the imagination. In 1870, Mouchot’s 
funding waned due to the Franco-Prussian war, but he supported his efforts through the 
wine industry, which used the solar engine to distill alcohol (Perlin, 2013). In 1875, the 
French Minister of Education launched a scientific expedition to Algeria with Mouchot to 
verify Mouchot’s results and to test his solar oven, or marmite solaire (Royaumont, 
1882).
49
 Mouchot also tested solar water pumps for irrigation in Algeria (Perlin, 
2013). The Minister said that it was "indeed under the sky of our colony, a sky always 
ardent, much more than under the sky in Paris”50 that solar power should be developed 
(ibid, p. 233). This was perhaps the earliest reference to the assertion that North Africa is 
the appropriate place for solar energy due to its high solar insolation. Mouchot received 
5,000 francs from the Counsel General in Algeria, 5,200 francs from the French 
Association for the Advancement of Sciences, and 14,428 francs from the Minister of 
Agriculture to build a larger solar engine for the universal exposition in Paris. Several 
years later, people at the exposition were astonished to see Mouchot’s solar engines cook 
food and distill wine without coal (Perlin, 2013; Royaumont, 1882). Pifre, Mouchot’s 
engineering assistant realized it would be an interesting paradox to use the solar engine to 
make ice at one of these fairs (Royaumont, 1882). He also used it to power a printing 
press (Pope, 1903). In 1880, Mouchot sold his patents to Pifre and an inventor in London 
(Cordier) to continue on his work (Royaumont, 1882).  
Royaumont thought solar power’s primary application was to cultivate the desert 
through solar irrigation, which he emphasized was not a utopian but a feasible idea and 
                                                        
49
 This reflects was what Shapin & Schaffer (1985) called the visual attestation of the technology. 
50 L’était en effet sous le ciel de notre colonie, ciel toujours trop ardent, beaucoup plus que sous le ciel in 
constant de Paris. 
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reflects the long-standing relationship between CSP and farming. He saw Senegal as the 
most promising country, where rum could be made with solar distilleries, and Algeria, 
which could regain its status as “the Granary of Rome,” reflecting another poignant myth 
about the Sahara that will be discussed in Chapter 6. With solar power or heat, Algeria 
and Tunisia could grow alfalfa, exploit their forests, and distill dates to produce alcohol. 
He also imagined that the Sahara Sea could be developed using solar engines.  
In addition to irrigation and food preparation, CSP had the broader potential to 
complete incomplete engineering dreams. It played a role in at least one of the large-scale 
colonial engineering schemes described above. Mr. Fournier, the Minister of Public 
Works in 1880 in Algeria, instituted a “solar heat” commission to investigate whether the 
sun could fuel the construction of the Trans-Saharan railroad. Two sub-commissions 
were formed in Montpellier and Constantine. They approved of using solar insolateurs 
for the railway. However, Pifre had insufficient resources to pursue this, and his biggest 
advocate, Mr. de Freycinet, left his post shortly thereafter leaving the work to waste away 
in boxes. Pifre formed the Central Society for the Use of Solar Heat (Société Centrale 
D’utilisation de la chaleur solaire) composed of men with experience and a good 
reputation in science and industry, including Alphonse Courvreux, who helped plan the 
Suez Canal. They tried to make solar engines lighter and cheaper for industrial use. The 
Society declared “Our goal was to take the utilization of solar heat at its origin and follow 
it up to its complete development. This goal was reached” (Royaumont, 1882, p. 278).51 
                                                        
51
 Notre but était de prendre l'utilisation de la chaleur solaire à son origine et de la suivre jusqu'à son 
développement complet. Ce but est atteint.   
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CSP was again declared to be feasible, but these solar engines were never successfully 
integrated into a project or a system. 
Ultimately, CSP’s proponents did not convince the colonial government that it 
could meet the needs of the emerging electricity system in North Africa. Royaumont also 
envisioned that solar insolateurs could be taken on French desert caravans to purify water 
through pasteurization and cook food, and Mouchot’s insolateurs were carried on the first 
scoping mission for the Trans-Saharan railway. A commission convened to study the use 
of solar insolateurs on caravans, but they disapproved of the technology because it did 
not work during the night. CSP did not match energy needs in North Africa because 
Saharan settlers saved the most grueling physical work for 6pm to midnight (ibid). (Peak 
load is still 6-9pm in Morocco as people are arriving home from work and turning on air 
conditioning and other appliances, as discussed in Chapter 6.) Mouchot developed a 
method of heating water in an insulated box during the day and then this water was used 
to vaporize a liquid that would boil at a low temperature, similar to today’s CSP storage. 
CSP did not sufficiently fit electricity needs in North Africa. Thermal storage for CSP 
was still under investigation when de Royaumont published his book, and this storage 
technology eventually led Desertec promoters to value CSP for its ability to generate 
dispatchable electricity, including at night. However, the French ultimately decided that 
solar energy was not reliable enough, and the mirrors were too expensive to polish 
(Perline, 2013). 
Across the Atlantic, CSP developers in the United States framed CSP’s use more 
explicitly as a pioneering technology to irrigate desert frontiers in the Southwest. In 1877, 
the first inventors to patent a solar device in the United States were John Hittell and 
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George Ditzler. Hittell wrote a book, The Resources of California, which drew the 
world’s attention to California’s agricultural methods (including the French protectorate 
in Morocco, as described in Chapter 6) (Pope, 1903). In 1870, an American named John 
Ericsson developed solar engines similar to Mouchot’s, but in 1884 he changed his 
design to parabolic trough-shaped mirrors with a coating to prevent them from tarnishing 
(Perlin, 2013; Pope, 1903). Ericsson garnered interest among farmers for using his design 
for irrigation, but he died in 1889 before his plans could be implemented (ibid). 
Despite Ericsson’s death, interest in CSP grew in the United States, again due to 
coal strikes and concern that coal was running out (ibid). In 1901, Aubrey Eneas, an 
Englishman living in Boston, built a solar collector in California that further illustrated 
CSP’s agricultural roots. He used it to power a water pump with 1,788 mirrors that 
concentrated sunlight onto a boiler. Eneas’ patent stated that his solar generator "is 
especially intended for use in connection with irrigation of the arid plains of the west” 
(Eneas, 1901). Eneas used conical reflectors because he believed they were stronger than 
the parabolic trough. He displayed his solar engine at an ostrich farm in southern 
California. By using the solar engines to pump groundwater, Eneas said “the region 
ceases to be a desert, and can be made to blossom as the rose” (Pope, 1903, pp. 86-87).  
Pope (1903) stated  
 
The grain-grower and the orchardist and horticulturist join him [the farmer] in 
asking for water-raising apparatus; and the Auteil machine and the Pasadena 
[solar] engine are his reply. Pure country power may be had as well as "pure 
country milk;" and the costless engine may replace the expensive ones now 
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enjoyed by but a small part of the people who need them (pp. 122-123, original 
emphasis).  
This quote illustrates CSP’s persistent framing as a farming and agricultural technology 
and the assertion that power from the sun is free. Eneas later built solar engines in 
Chandler and Tempe, Arizona in 1903 (Perlin, 2013; Pope, 1903). He proclaimed, “sun 
power is now at hand!” (Perlin, 2013, loc. 1725).  Willsie and Boyle also experimented 
with solar boilers using ammonia and hot boxes with the aim of powering irrigation and 
mining (Perlin, 2013). Given CSP’s exclusive focus on irrigation in the United States, it 
most likely would have been necessary for CSP to have been integrated into the large-
scale plans for irrigation under the U.S. Reclamation Act of 1902 for to have been 










Figure 13. Eneas' Pasadena Pumping Engine. Note the similarity to the Sterling engines 
developed at the Solar Plataforma in Figure 6. Source: SolarEnergy.com, public domain52 
Soon after, solar was again developed to improve colonial agriculture, and the 
CSP trough design took hold. In 1911, Frank Shuman developed a 2,700-meter 
                                                        
52 http://solarenergy.com/power-panels/history-solar-energy 
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demonstration solar plant in his backyard in Philadelphia and founded the Sun Power 
Company (Ley, 1954). Shuman effectively advertised CSP’s benefits to industry and 
agriculture in the world’s sunbelt (Perlin, 2013). He secured initial funding in the United 
States, but the funds he needed to build a large-scale power plant came from London 
(Jones & Bouamane, 2012). The British were looking for energy to support the colonial 
enterprise, which suffered from a lack of cheap coal, especially for irrigating cotton 
plantations. Shuman argued that he could produce 25% more steam in a “tropical 
environment” using hot boxes to heat ether to drive an engine (Ragheb, 2011; Perlin, 
2013).53 The investors asked a prominent physicist, Sir Charles Vernon Boys, to review 
Shuman’s design. He recommended a parabolic trough design, and investor support was 
made contingent on Shuman’s acceptance of Boys’ parabolic trough design. While 
Shuman lamented that the new design would provide less horsepower, he accepted the 
parabolic trough design (Ley, 1954), which today remains CSP’s most popular design. 
Shuman's plant had about 5% efficiency, which was acceptable for the time period (ibid). 
In 1913, Shuman built “Solar Engine One,” consisting of five parabolic troughs, in 
British-controlled Egypt using local material and labor in Meadi (or Maadi).  Meadi was 
a farming village and is now a relatively affluent suburb of Cairo. Solar Engine One used 
a storage tank to operate around the clock (Perlin, 2013). At the plant’s inauguration 
Shuman touted the benefits of solar power:  “high efficiency, low installation, capital, and 
operation and maintenance costs, well defined length of service, and the possibility of 
operation with local labor without the need for specialty training” (Ragheb, 2011, p. 46). 
                                                        
53 The colonies were called tropical environments, from Morocco to India. 
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As Ragheb argued and I illustrate later in this dissertation, Shuman’s principles still 
largely apply today. 
After the completion of the plant, Shuman said,  
 
Sun power is now a fact and no longer in the beautiful possibility stage. We have 
proved the commercial profit of sun power and… after our stores of oil and coal 
are exhausted the human race can receive unlimited power from the rays of the 
sun (“American Inventor Uses Egypt’s Sun for Power,” 1916) 
 
Again, solar power was proclaimed to be feasible. Shuman agreed to build a system to 
irrigate 30,000 acres of cotton in Sudan, which was under British control. He also 
presented his technology to the German Reichstag, which offered him 200,000 Deutsche 
Reichmarks to build a solar power plant in German East Africa (Ragheb, 2011; Jones & 
Bouamane, 2012; Scientific American 1917).  
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Figure 14. Shuman's CSP Plant. Source: New York Times, July 2, 1916, public domain. 
As enthusiasm for Shuman’s power plants grew, CSP was fleetingly imagined as 
part of a broader system to supply electricity to the region. Foreshadowing the Desertec 
vision, Shuman imagined a project of 20,000 square miles in the Sahara desert to 
generate 270 million horsepower, or all of the world’s energy demand in 1909. He stated, 
“deserts in remote corners of the world could be made to bloom with the aid of sun-
powered irrigation” (Jones & Bouamane, 2012, p. 8) He was not the first to imagine that 
distant locales could power the earth using heat from the sun. In 1903, Pope wrote that 
through solar heat "distant cities may be illumined from some 'long, sequestered vale,' 
where sunshine bestows its noiseless benison [blessing]” (p. 123). He went on to say that 
320 acres covered with solar should power the railroad that would link up to a 
manufacturing center rivaling the largest in the world. Developing solar heat was a vision 
to dominate nature and, implicitly along with it, the Saharans. Pope stated 
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Many lands have large tracts which have heretofore passed as deserts because of 
the abundance of the sun’s downpouring; this very fact is destined to make 
Algeria, the Soudan, Egypt, India…grow opulent when the utilization of solar 
heat is carried to the point of simplicity and economy. An indescribably large 
benefit will accrue to hundreds of millions of people by the subjugation of the sun 
to common human service. What a motive to the truly humane inventor and 
capitalist!...If the desert may be made to blossom, what has prevented the Sahara 
from being turned into one magnificent oasis? Solar heat is ‘no dream;’ it is: let 
no man hereafter speak a word of question (pp. 140-42-45). 
 
Here CSP is again declared to be a feasible reality. Furthermore, Shuman viewed it as a 
technology that will have development benefits through the human subjugation of the 
sun.  
Shuman’s plan ended in crisis. The British coal industry was prepared to fight the 
scale up of CSP in North Africa. Furthermore, Shuman’s plan did not get far as World 
War I began and the British reneged on their contract with Shuman and dismantled the 
system for scrap metal. The engineers working on the project returned to their home 
countries. Some speculated that the plant was dismantled because the British were angry 
that Shuman agreed to work with the Germans (Ragheb, 2011). Shuman was originally of 
German descent and spoke German.
54
 Shuman was welcomed in Germany as a native 
(Ragheb, 2011). The idea was dealt another blow as Shuman unexpectedly died of a heart 
attack in 1918. The postwar recession followed by the Great Depression and the British 
                                                        
54 He had changed his name from Schuman to Shuman to sound less German. 
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nationalization of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company prevented a post-war reemergence of 
CSP.  
Despite its lack of success, from its inception through 1920, CSP’s promoters 
declared the technology to be feasible. Royaumont stated, "[CSP] is now a practical 
reality" (Royaumont, 1882, p. 227).
55
 What constitutes reality here is viewed as material, 
an engineered reality, yet it was not successfully adopted within a system. Below I will 
illustrate that each discovery was disjointed from the last, and utterances that “solar is 
now a practical reality” were made over the course of more than a century. The end of the 
coal crisis, World War I, the death of prominent advocates, the lack of reliability, and the 
inability to meet peak demand in North Africa—as well as CSP’s overall failure to be 
integrated successfully into electricity systems—prevented it from taking hold. While this 
could have easily been the end of the technology, it reemerged in the late 20th century.  
 
CSP’s Resurgence in the 1970s: La Plataforma Solar de Almería 
 
Solar energy received scant attention from governments from World War I until 
the energy crisis in the 1970s, resulting in its relative dormancy. For example, in 1935, 
Germany passed the German Energy Industry Act, which put the government in charge of 
the energy sector and solidified the monopolies of existing energy companies, cutting out 
small-scale generation for 60 years (Berlin Technology Museum, 2013).
56
 Starting in the 
                                                        
55 «C'est maintenant une vérité pratique! » 
56 Shortly thereafter, Hermann Honnef envisioned building monolithic wind turbines providing 130 GWh 
per year, which enthralled Hitler although nothing was built (Berlin Technology Museum, 2014; Metcalfe, 
2013). 
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1950s, most of the Western world was focused on nuclear power, not solar, with visions 
of atoms for peace and electricity too cheap to meter. The technology was kept alive 
during this period because individual researchers continued to experiment with the CSP 
technologies that are still used today. For example, in 1930s, the Secretary of the 
Smithsonian Institution, Dr. C.G. Abbot, an astrophysicist who studied solar radiation, 
patented solar cookers, distillers, and hot water heaters. He also built a solar trough 
similar to Shuman's design but with a more advanced method of tracking the sun (Ley, 
1954). Solar development was a hobby for Abbott, who used his solar demonstrations to 
garner public interest in solar physics (Devorkin, 1998). In 1933, the Russians built a 
small experimental CSP plant in Tashkent, the capital of the Uzbek Soviet Republic, 
which was one of the only recorded government CSP projects during this time (ibid). In 
1949, Felix Trombe built a solar furnace in the French Pyrenees, similar to technology 
later built at the government-funded solar research platform. Some other minor 
experiments were undertaken as described by Spencer (1989), but significant research did 
not begin again until the 1970s.  
During the 1970s oil crises, governments across the world renewed their support 
for CSP. Although the crisis was not caused by a successful embargo but was instead due 
to consumer panic that led to over-purchasing petroleum and government 
mismanagement, it provoked fear of the Arab “energy weapon” and the “limits to 
growth” due to finite world resources (Mitchell, 2011). Shortly thereafter, CSP 
reemerged as a government-supported project. In the early 1980s, many industrialized 
countries developed experimental CSP plants, including Italy, Japan, the United States, 
France, Spain, and Crimea (Ruiz Hernandez, n.d.). Germany also invested 10 million 
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euros in CSP in 1974 and a German CSP company called Solar Millennium was founded 
in 1998. However, it is relevant to note for the Desertec vision that CSP was not 
developed on German soil, likely due to its land and solar insolation needs. The only CSP 
plant in Germany is a very small 1.5 MW experimental tower plant build in Julich in 
2008 to test air cooling and storage systems. Germany has long looked overseas for its 
CSP ambitions.  
Solar hot water heaters and solar PV panels were the focus of “solar for hippies” 
(Perlin, 2013, Kindle loc. 4685) during the small is beautiful movement of the 1970s to 
decentralize energy production and put it in the hands of the people. In contrast, the goals 
for CSP related to national security, independence, and national technological prowess.  
Several factors affected CSP’s framing during this period, which will be described in the 
next section. First, CSP was torn between being a technology of international cooperation 
and one of national pride and energy independence. Second, CSP continued to be framed 
as a technology of the frontier, developed in economically depressed deserts by pioneers. 
Third, CSP trailed after nuclear power and was designed in its image in the United States. 
Fourth, the rise of environmental consciousness contributed to CSP’s resurgence, 
although this is a more important framing in the 2000s.  
Unlike wind power, which was developed by small eco-friendly organizations and 
later co-opted by large corporations (Hess, 2005; van der Vleuten & Raven, 2006), CSP 
has long been a large-scale, corporate technology developed initially during this 
resurgence by major electricity, defense, and military contractors. At the solar research 
platform in Spain, Martin Marietta and Iteratom built CSP’s mirrors or heliostats, 
Siemens built the control system, Initec provided engineering consulting, 3M provided 
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glue for mirror bonding, and the Spanish engineering firm Abengoa also provided 
heliostats. Some of the research on CSP in the United States was conducted at national 
laboratories prominent in the nuclear research, such as Sandia National Laboratory, 
which built CSP in the image of nuclear power. 
Shortly after Franco’s death, Spain arguably made the most concerted efforts 
worldwide to that point to develop a CSP R&D program. The Spanish engineering giant 
founded in 1941 in Seville— Abengoa—began to work on CSP technologies, later 
becoming one of the leading CSP developers. In 1976, Juan Temboury, the director of the 
Spanish Ministry of Industry and Energy, attended a meeting of the International Energy 
Agency and learned about plans to develop the Small Solar Power Systems Project 
(SSPS), a CSP tower plant, among nine countries (Ruiz Hernandez, n.d.).  He was 
determined to win the project for Spain to jumpstart its solar energy industry. He 
conducted a feasibility study, and in 1977, the IEA named the German Aerospace Center 
(DLR), Germany’s NASA, as the operating agent and Spain as the host country.57 The 
task was, again, to “prove the feasibility of producing electricity from solar energy” 
(Barrera, 2010). 
In 1977, La Plataforma Solar de Almería (PSA, or the Solar Research Platform in 
Almería) was founded, and it went into operation in 1981. The data used below is based 
on oral histories compiled by Ruiz-Hernandez (n.d.) about the PSA in a 510-page book 
and video, as well as in-person visits to the PSA I made in June 2013 and 2014. The PSA 
researchers and Protermosolar, the lobbying group for the Spanish CSP industry, 
published the PSA book and video, which commemorated the heroes of solar energy. 
                                                        
57 Previously DFVLR, now DLR, the developer of the Desertec feasibility studies. 
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They emphasized that the Spanish researchers and companies working on the PSA should 
be recognized and listed names of people involved in the project in almost Old Testament 
fashion.  
The PSA researchers saw themselves as young, idealistic innovators who “are 
going to be the pioneers” in reviving an economically deprived desert to make the solar 
“utopia become reality,” reflecting CSP’s frontier/farming framing. They chose the 
Tabernas desert in Almería, a Mediterranean province in Southern Spain and the only 
desert in Europe, because of its high solar radiation and flat land. After the researchers 
identified the Almería coast on a solar radiation map, they met with the head of the 
provincial council there who said, “you can have the whole coast” (Barrera, 2010). 
Almería was a key example of what Roux (1997) termed a “depressed Mediterranean 
zone.”58 Its main industry was the filming of spaghetti westerns. One engineer described 
Almería as a “ghost town” when he arrived. Another said, “these facilities in the middle 
of a barren landscape, some of which seem to have come from the future, make up the 
biggest test center in Europe…” To illustrate their commitment to rural uplift, the 
researchers used the Indalo as the project logo for the SSPS, which is an ancient symbol 
of a man holding a rainbow in his arms over his head (see Figure 15). 
 




                                                        
58 “zone Méditerranée défavorisée » 
59 http://www.estelasolar.eu/index.php?id=34 
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The Indalo was used as a good luck charm in Almería of in the middle of the 19
th
 
century when the region was suffering from droughts and economic downturn (“Inland 
Almeria, villages in the province of Almeria Andalucía, Southern Spain,” n.d.). Running 
water, electricity, and telephone service lagged behind other areas of Spain (ibid). The 
electricity grid in the area was unreliable, and the closest access to transmission was a 
measly 32 kV line of questionable quality (Ruiz Hernandez, n.d.). The PSA constructed a 
66 kV line and improved the reliability of electricity infrastructure in the area. After the 
PSA was built, they referred to the Tabernas as “the international laboratory for 
concentrated solar experiments,” which fit into a longstanding discourse on deserts as 
scientific laboratories. However, not everyone in Almería was enthralled with the PSA. 
Some thought that it was causing drought. Citizens criticized the project for using more 
energy than it generated. The head of the local electricity company ridiculed the unusual 
technologies. 
National Spanish leaders, however, were excited to have the project during their 
transition to democracy. Spain believed that it was left out of the Industrial Revolution, 
and advancing its progress in renewable energy was seen as a “Third Industrial 
Revolution” (Frolova, 2013). “Spain was aware from the very beginning that it had to be 
in the front row and not miss the train like it did in other processes of technological 
development” (Ruiz Hernandez, n.d.). CSP was part of Morocco’s post-Arab Spring 
political transition decades later.
60
 Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, the previous President 
of Spain, opened the textbook by framing Spain as an innovative, technological 
pioneering nation due to its work in CSP. He stated  
                                                        
60 See chapters 6 and 7. 
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For a long time, Spain’s image has frequently been associated with sun and sand. 
A Mediterranean country, with a culture as diverse as it is rich, of friendly open 
people. Too often the enterprising character of its citizens and the talent of its 
researchers are forgotten. A trait which, however, thanks to the work and 
perseverance of persons such as those mentioned in [this book], has made it 
possible for Spain to also be seen today as a daring and innovative 
country…Spain is now one of the pioneering nations in renewable energies… 
(Hernandez, 2010, p. 19). 
 
President Zapatero captured the nationalistic attitude toward CSP and its importance to 
Spanish pride. CSP was also a source of political power, and the video in the PSA’s 
visitor center in 2013 even referred to concentration as a “secret weapon” in 
technological innovation. 
The Spanish vacillated between framing the PSA as a distinctly Spanish 
nationalist effort versus an international research center with nine participating countries, 
which was recognized as a European Large Scientific Installation in 1990. Financially, 
the United States was the largest contributor to the first power plant SSPS-DCS, a 1.2 
MW parabolic trough, followed by Germany, followed by Spain. The project used 
American cylindrical parabolic mirrors with German tracking technology. The 
researchers recounted that the PSA was driven by a fear that they were falling behind the 
United States in the development of CSP, even though the project was supported by U.S. 
funding and U.S. contractors. After a year, the German government wanted to pull out to 
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focus on PV and nuclear but were convinced to stay. In 1986, the Spanish-German 
cooperation agreement included a renewed commitment to the PSA collaboration. CSP 
was always an extra-territorial obsession for the Germans. While Spain proceeded with 
CSP at home, Germany pursued PV and later looked to North Africa to provide 
dispatchable solar power to balance out the intermittent PV it built into its grid.
61
  
The Spanish researchers were injured by derisive comments that the PSA was 
“that German thing in Almería” (Ruiz-Hernandez, n.d.). The German who was most liked 
on the project was the first to learn Spanish and to adapt to the local culture. One 
researcher reflected on how proud he was to be a Spaniard when they connected the 
project to the grid. Another said  
 
the truth is I never felt dependent on the outside world. We considered this to be 
our own project and it used our own resources. It was our know-how and skills. 
Everything we needed was at hand and we threw ourselves into it. 
 
One researcher said ““[The development of the PSA and CSP] was done with 100% 
Spanish technology, 100% Spanish workers and all of us really young. And it worked…” 
He mentioned that the EU green and white books advocating for the use of renewable 
energy are the colors of the Andalusian flag.  
In contradiction with this nationalism, the international collaborative process at 
the PSA was also a source of pride, and the video in the visitor’s center stated that the 
researchers worked with different cultures and languages to “[learn] how to concentrate 
                                                        
61
 See Chapter 5. 
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knowledge.” The researcher quoted above about the Andalusian flag also called Germany 
“the motor of the SPSS project” (p. 197). The project encompassed both the complexities 
of developing innovative technologies and of balancing international collaboration, and 
he stated, “all this was like an enormous puzzle in which pieces were coming from 
different countries without any previous cross knowledge and with different companies 
supplying different components.” Another said that the mutual trust developed between 
the Spanish and Germans contributed to the project’s success stating that “the prospects 
for a truly sunny future in German-Spanish co-operation have seldom been as good as 
they are today!” Another called the PSA a “Spanish-German plum cake”.62  
 
 
Figure 16. SPSS. Source: The PSA, Used with Permission 
                                                        
62
 There is emphasis in the oral histories of the PSA of meals and apartments shared, bars visited, life 
events celebrated, deaths mourned, and a general solidarity built up from living in a remote location where 
researchers found little entertainment. Some researchers, however, insinuated that there was a lot of conflict 
in the “collaboration-confrontation” with the installation companies, the story of which was too early to 
tell. 
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Figure 17. CESA-1. Source: The PSA, Used with permission 
 
Figure 18. Eurodish Stirling Engine, Solar Research Platform, 2013. Source: Plataforma 




Figure 19. DISS Parabolic Trough. Source: Plataforma Solar
64
  
In 1986 the PSA suffered a devastating blow from a sodium fire in the SSPS, 
which occurred only five months after the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Sodium is also 
used in fast breeder reactors, so the PSA gave a press conference to reassure the public 
                                                        
63 http://www.psa.es/webeng/instalaciones/receptor.php 
64 http://www.psa.es/webeng/instalaciones/parabolicos.php 
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that the sodium was not radioactive.  The PSA lost momentum as support “went up in 
smoke,” although support was already waning as the energy crisis faded from memory. 
The Spanish Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism, questioned why this “outlandish” 
technology had been built “in the middle of nowhere” (Ruiz-Hernandez, n.d.).  The 
United States and Germany wanted to tear down the power plants. The PSA used a 
loophole in its founding documents to collect insurance money from the fire to continue 
its work. The unexpected death of the PSA’s head also disrupted the PSA. The PSA 
researchers conducted freelance work for the European space program to keep the PSA 
operational. One of the PSA’s engineers referred to this persistence as “the vigor of some 
green shoots that have colonized an inhospitable land” (ibid, p. 226). International donors 
withdrew from the project, making it a Spanish project under the Spanish research center, 
CIEMAT. One of the PSA employees saw this loss of international support as the 
beginning of the solidification of Spain as the world leader in CSP 
 
…I had a baptism of fire” [before the sodium fire]…”But it was not the end. It 
was the rebirth. Like the phoenix that is born from its own ashes, we saw how that 
famous (or infamous) fire turned a new page in the history of the PSA…[it] later 
took off, leaving [the Germans and Americans] behind and making Spain the 
world leader in concentrating solar thermal energy technologies (pp. 364-65).  
 
The PSA is still operational. It spurred the construction of 46 commercial solar 
thermal power plants in Spain. Many of the involved companies still operate in the CSP 
sector and continue to frame the Mediterranean as the ideal place for CSP. Michael 
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Geyer, International Director of Abengoa Solar proclaimed “We have brought 
Andalusian solar technology to the world.” Geyer calls himself “a German from 
Almería” (Ruiz-Hernandez, n.d., p. 246). At the commissioning of the PS20 plant, Jose 
Monzonis from Acciona, a Spanish construction firm, stated, “The Mediterranean has 
significant potential not just for the countries in North Africa but in the medium term for 
all Arab countries and southern Europe” (Barrera, 2010) Currently, Acciona is 
constructing the Noor I solar trough plant in Ouarzazate as the technology is being 
adopted in the MENA region. 
While environmentalists often blame the fossil fuel villains and detractors for 
solar energy’s failures, CSP has equally suffered from bad luck. The PSA textbook’s 
commemoration and celebration of the technology and its pioneers were premature. They 
tried to solidify and close the technology, but three years later, crisis ensued. The weighty 
effects of the Eurozone crisis in Spain led to negative public perceptions of the feed-in 
tariff subsidy that was essential for supporting renewable energy, which was later dubbed 
“the feed-in debt”. In 2013, the Spanish government revoked the feed-in tariff, not just 
for new installations but for existing installations, replacing it with a flat rate of return of 
roughly 7% over a plant’s lifetime (Hashem, 2014).  At the time of publication, Spain 
was facing lawsuits from several renewable energy developers for reneging on its 
subsidies. In March 2014, the CSP Today industry magazine quipped that Spain can “say 
adios” to CSP investors as they look to the Middle East and North Africa instead 
(Hashem, 2014). Today, the PSA does not give the impression of a high-tech research 
facility, like the clean rooms of PV manufacturing facilities, but resembles the remnants 
of a failed experiment from the 1980s, with loose pieces of equipment strewn about and 
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many of the original technologies still standing. The 2013 video in the PSA’s visitor 
center boasted that the PSA uses advanced equipment, which evoked laughter from our 
student audience visiting the PSA as the video pictured researchers working on unwieldy 
computers from the 1980s. The video has since been updated to portray the PSA as 
modern and cutting-edge. 
 
Designing CSP in the Image of Nuclear Power: California in the 1970s 
 
The U.S. focus on solar thermal technology from the 1970s onward was on 
building it at a large scale (Ruiz Hernandez, n.d.). The U.S. Electric Power Research 
Institute and the U.S. Department of Energy optimistically estimated that by 2010, 
electricity from CSP would cost 4 or 5 cents per kilowatt-hour (ibid). Since it seemed 
likely that the cost of fossil fuels would continue to skyrocket, utility companies invested 
in CSP to maintain their centralized system configuration while substituting fuel from the 
sun. Government CSP research was shaped by the U.S. nuclear legacy. National 
laboratories developed during World War II for atomic weapons programs, like Sandia 
and Livermore, began focusing on building solar power plants “in the image of nuclear” 
in a way that could be plugged into the grid.  
Sixty to 70 percent of the research conducted on solar by U.S. government and 
industry focused on CSP tower (Boesman, 1994), emphasizing centralized sources of 
renewable energy over distributed. The U.S. Energy Research Development 
Administration (the precursor to the Department of Energy or DOE) and a U.S.-Israel 
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company called Luz were the leading developers of CSP. The Electric Power Research 
Institute, which had an industry-run CSP R&D program, saw the power tower, not the 
solar trough, as the most likely candidate for central electricity generation (Metz, 1977). 
Solar PV received some attention but was not the primary focus. In 1982, the DOE, 
utility companies Southern California Edison and the Los Angeles Department of Water 
and Power, and the California Energy Commission completed construction on Solar One, 
a solar power tower demonstration plant in Daggett, California. It was a 10 MW plant 
with a field of 1,818 mirrors that focus heat on a central tower (Boesman, 1994). It was 
redesigned in 1995 with an innovative molten salt storage system, allowing the plant to 
generate power through the night. In 2010, it was torn down and replaced with a trough 
plant, as the CSP industry continuously vacillates between the two designs. 
 
 
Figure 20. Solar I, Daggett, California (completed in 1981). Source: California.gov
65
 
                                                        
65 http://www.gosolarcalifornia.ca.gov/about/gosolar/california.php 
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Figure 21. Solar I with the Old Solar One Tower in the Background and the Trough in 
the Foreground. Photo by Author. 
CSP’s emergence should be understood in the context of nuclear power. Critics of 
this R&D agenda complained that the program was “making solar after nuclear power” 
and focusing on solar power tower technology at the expense of solar photovoltaic 
panels. (Hammond & Metz, 1977, p. 241). Amory Lovins called ERDA’s work 
“ingenious high technology” but criticized it for supplying “energy in a form and scale 
inappropriate for most end-use needs (Lovins, 1977, p. 42). The Congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment also criticized the ERDA for devoting much of its resources to 
utility-scale solar. They argued that the CSP program was set up like the nuclear breeder 
reactor program, scheduled to proceed from a small test to the first commercial plant in 
four stages (Hammond & Metz, 1977).  
Luz International developed the most successful commercial demonstration of 
CSP during this time period, which was couched in a religious framing of the technology. 
In the 1970s, Luz, now BrightSource Energy, was experimenting in Israel with parabolic 
trough technology. In the 1970s Luz’s founder, Arnold Goldman, published A Working 
Paper on Project Luz, and Moving Jewish Thought to the Center of Modern Science, 
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which illustrated his personal convictions for the technology that were influenced by the 
Israeli Kubbutz movement and what he called “Jewish thinking,” or tying knowledge to 
concrete action (“Meet BrightSource’s Arnold Goldman,” 2010). Goldman imagined Luz 
as “a utopian eternal city” “[symbolizing] both light and consciousness” and “turning 
rays of light into celestial power” (Berger, 1998). CSP’s image shifted from one of 
humans conquering nature by harnessing the sun while leaving behind primitive sun 
worship, to a resurgence of CSP as a divine, utopian technology operating harmoniously 
with the environment. In 1979, Goldman raised $2 million from a jointly funded US- 
Israeli initiative for the parabolic trough technology and incorporated Luz International. 
Luz’s funders were Patrick Francois, a marketing entrepreneur, and Neto Becker, who 
was the world’s largest individual investor in Israeli technologies (Berger, 1998). Luz 
started out by providing solar energy to textile companies in Los Angeles. 
In 1979, Luz secured a contract with Southern California Edison to build a CSP 
plant on land adjacent to Solar One. They built the Solar Electric Generating System I 
(SEGS I), which is a 13.8 MW plant consisting of 82,960 square meters of parabolic 
mirrors that rotate to track the sun throughout the day (LA Times, 1985) (See Figure 22). 
The mirrors concentrate sunlight in a central tube filled with oil, which heats to 750 
degrees Fahrenheit to drive a steam turbine. This became the first commercially operated 
CSP plant in the world, built for $62 million compared to Solar One’s $108 million 
(Boesman, 1994). It is still operational today. Mitsubishi provided the turbine, Bechtel 
conducted feasibility studies, and CH2M Hill provided consulting services (Berger, 
1998); these companies still play significant roles in CSP today.
 
Luz went on to build 
eight more facilities in this area—collectively called the 354 MW Solar Electric 
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Generating System (SEGS)— which sells power to Southern California Edison (Lotker, 
1991). Luz Industries Israel became one of the top ten Israeli exporters of goods between 
1986 and 1990 (Berger, 1998). "If we can keep going strong past 1988 we will prove that 
we are not just an experimental company but the first new legitimate source of energy 





Figure 22. SEGS I.  Wikimedia Commons, Bureau of Land Management
66
 
However, CSP suffered from scalar conflict. In terms of financing, the National 
Energy Tax Act provided a 15% federal energy tax credit for investment in renewables, 
and California provided a state-level 25% renewable energy tax credit (Kemp, Rip, & 
Schot, 2001).
67
 Furthermore, the 1978 Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) 
both supported and impeded Luz’s plants. While PURPA’s goal is often colloquially 
thought to be the expansion of renewable energy, the political goal was in fact to disrupt 
the vertically integrated monopolies that utilities had over electricity distribution and 
power generation. PURPA allowed small-scale independent energy generators, including 
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 http://www.ca.blm.gov/cdd/alternative_energy.html 
67 For a detailed discussion see Van Est, 1999. 
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but not limited to renewable energy generators, to sell their energy to the grid (ibid). 
Federal legislators left the implementation of PURPA up to individual states. California’s 
Governor Jerry Brown, who was then supportive of small-scale technologies like wind 
and solar, strictly implemented PURPA (Hirsh & Serchuk, 1996). 
In 1983, the California Public Utilities Commission required utilities to sign 
contracts with “qualifying facilities (QFs),” or facilities that produced less than 30 MW 
of electricity under PURPA (Blumstein, Friedman, & Green, 2002). (Compare this, for 
example, to California’s 2,240-MW Diablo Canyon nuclear reactors.) These 20-30 year 
contracts locked utility companies into paying a rate determined by mistaken assumptions 
that the price of oil would continue to increase rapidly (Hirsch & Serchuk, 1996). Wind 
and solar producers, including Luz, sold their energy to the grid through QF contracts, 
although much of the QF generation came from cogeneration plants
68
 (Lotker, 1991).   
The energy policy community widely assumes that Luz failed because the Reagan 
administration did away with the federal energy tax credits, but the reason is more 
nuanced. The energy tax credits were extended after they expired in 1985 (four years into 
the Reagan administration), but Congress had to renew them annually, creating an 
atmosphere of uncertainty and rushing construction times for each phase of SEGS 
(Lotker, 1991). Furthermore, PURPA’s focus on small-scale generation stunted CSP. 
CSP is not a small-is-beautiful technology like PV in which economies of scale come 
from the factory size not siting, but a standard steam-turbine technology in which 
economies of scale come from the size of the power plant. Luz built the SEGS plants in 
                                                        
68 Cogeneration, which is also called combined heat and power or CHP, is a means of reusing the leftover 
heat from electricity generation. Typically this heat is released through cooling towers at power generation 
plants. Cogeneration plants use this waste heat to heat in homes or for other purposes, such as use in 
factories.   
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30 MW phases because of PURPA’s limitations, which limited their economies of scale 
and resulted in a higher electricity price of 25 cents per kWh (ibid). They successfully 
lobbied the federal government to make the last plant 80 MW, bringing the levelized cost 
of energy (LCOE) down to 10 cents per kWh (ibid). In 1989, Congress extended the 
Energy Tax Credits for only nine months. Furthermore, extending the California property 
tax exemption for solar installations was controversial since it was essentially a tax credit 
for only one company (ibid). The California legislature approved the credit, but the 
governor delayed signing the bill into law (ibid). This compressed Luz’s construction 
time from 10 to seven months in order to secure the tax credit. The tax credits were 
extended again from 1990-1991, but the shortened construction schedule had already 
consumed Luz’s net worth. Luz also admitted that it had significant management 
difficulties. Political uncertainty prevented Luz from securing financing for another plant, 
and it filed for bankruptcy in 1991.
69
 Some speculate that CSP’s greatest commercial 
success might have also been its greatest failure, as investors were turned off by Luz’s 
bankruptcy (Feld, 2012). The important point to note is that a conflict over the 
appropriate scale of energy was at least equally important to the uncertainty in the tax 
environment to the failure of CSP.  
 
The New Solar Gold Rush 
In the mid-2000s, the goals for the reemergence of CSP changed as it was 
enrolled in the sustainability and climate change debate. California sought to use CSP to 
                                                        
69 In 1992, many Luz engineers took the intellectual property rights to form a company called Solel, to 
build parabolic troughs. (Solel was bought by Siemens in 2009 and went bankrupt when Siemens left the 
CSP sector in 2012). 
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meet renewable energy and climate change targets, but these environmental goals also 
made it vulnerable to criticism. Metaphors portraying solar as California’s “new gold 
rush” or “solar gold” or a 21st century El Dorado made headlines, reminiscent of the 19th 
century colonial search for El Dorado in the deserts of North Africa. In 2004, Goldman 
resurrected Luz as BrightSource Energy. But Arnold Goldman's utopian dream was again 
corrupted in 2007 when environmentalists criticized the site selection for BrightSource’s 
first power plant in California—the Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating System (ISEGS) 
(see Figure 23)— due to the project's negative effects on the local desert environment. In 
this time period, it was clear that CSP was technologically feasible—it could be built. But 
should it be built and in what landscapes? Activists criticized Ivanpah and similar 
proposed solar projects for their industrialization of public land in remote areas and their 
effects on endangered and threatened species like the desert tortoise and rare plants and 
sites of spiritual importance to Native Americans. They questioned whether large-scale 
solar fits the desert landscape and advocated instead for distributed, point-of-use 
renewable energy generation. Ivanpah uses dry-cooled technology, but in wet-cooled 
power plant siting cases in California and Arizona activists were outraged by CSP’s 
water usage. For these activists, Goldman’s machine had entered the garden (or the “old 
growth desert” as the activists called it), but in a way that violated sacred values, rather 
than connecting earth to the heavens. In Spain, the Andasol solar trough projects drew 
similar criticism from the local community. BrightSource won the siting permit, in part, 
by launching a public relations campaign that effectively portrayed their project as 
inevitable. Substantive conflicts were presented as mere delays; their emerging project 
was not an “if” but a “when.”  
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During ISEGS’s construction, it became clear that it would affect the tortoise 
population more significantly than expected (660-880 tortoises would be harmed on the 
project site, rather than the original estimate of 30). As ISEGS started operation, 
observers gawked as “streamers”—birds, insects, and debris—lit on fire in the air when 
they approached the mirror field. (Perhaps the solar farm had come to resemble slash-
and-burn agriculture.) Currently, skeptics in the United States and abroad are questioning 
whether CSP meets the criteria of a sustainable technology or if it has become a 
technological juggernaut. These challenges that cut across environmental, social, and 
technological domains illustrate the integrated challenges relevant to the construction of 





Figure 23. The Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating System (2014). Source: 
BrightSource Energy. 
 In Europe, CSP reemerged during this time period as part of the Desertec vision, 
originally as a technological solution to the “limits to growth” framing of environmental 
problems.
70
 However, after Germany withdrew from the PSA, and the Chinese began 
                                                        
70
 See Chapter 5. 
  133 
heavily investing in PV, CSP lost its strong government advocates outside of the United 
States. The head of the Desertec Foundation stated in an interview with me,  
 
So then all the money that the companies put in research and development, was 
put in wind and photovoltaic [because of the renewable energy conditions in 
Germany and CSP not being feasible there]. Because the German market was so 
interesting. But CSP...is a kind of child without a father.   
 
Chapter 5 examines the reemergence of CSP in Europe in the mid-2000s a “mature 





This chapter described CSP’s birth in the mid-1800s followed by its reemergence 
in the 1970s during the energy crises and finally its latest instantiation in the 2000s. It 
began by illustrating how contemporary large-scale engineering visions to put the Sahara 
desert into service by building enough solar generation there to power the world reflect 
certain aspects of plans for colonial-era Saharan techno-utopias like the trans-Saharan 
railway, the Sahara Sea, and the Atlantropa project. The chapter then illustrated that CSP 
was born in colonial Algeria and Egypt in the mid-1800s to early 1900s. Government 
support for CSP plummeted due to the world wars, the Great Depression, and the support 
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for nuclear power post-World War II. It resumed during the 1970s oil crisis. Numerous 
Western countries developed CSP plants in the 1970s and 1980s, with the center of 
activity at the international solar research platform in Spain, as well as the U.S. solar 
demonstration plants constructed by NREL and Luz (later called BrightSource Energy) in 
California. As the energy crisis waned, Luz Solar filed bankruptcy in 1991, beginning the 
“long dark solar night” in which government support for CSP lapsed. In the mid-2000s, 
CSP reemerged in the United States and Europe as part of the climate change and 
sustainable energy debate. More recently, the technology is shifting toward North Africa 
and the Middle East as solar subsidies were recently slashed in Europe and the United 
States during the economic crisis.
71
 
Although it is often assumed that CSP was developed during a rising wave of 
environmental consciousness of the 1970s, it was actually developed during the late 
1800s and was viewed as a means for humans to dominate nature. In the 17
th
 century, 
Francis Bacon argued that scientific knowledge would allow human control over nature 
and would act as an instrument of self-control by means of rational intelligence (Leiss, 
1972). Bacon attempted to remove ethical strictures against the control of nature while 
trying to avoid upsetting the powerful church (Merchant, 1989). Bacon’s view largely 
won out and, at least in the United States, democratic culture has been paired with a 
liberal attitude toward technological process (Ezrahi, 1990). Winner’s core observation in 
Autonomous Technology is that people think artificial things are easier to control than 
natural things, partially as a result of dualistic thinking that emerged during the 
Enlightenment between nature and society. Yet many large-scale technologies are often 
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viewed as having their own agency as they become part of systems that are beyond any 
individual’s control (Winner, 1977). As actors look at green technologies such as the 
recently completed Ivanpah power plant with skepticism—or for some activists, abject 
horror— about whether it meets the criteria for energy justice and sustainability, society 
seeks to imbue democratic culture with ethical restraints to technological change.  
Hence, energy system builders are faced with a new challenge, to shift energy 
systems toward the often ill-defined concept of sustainability, which certainly means 
something other than dominating nature and involves ethical precepts. Too often solar is 
assumed to be intrinsically sustainable. More recently, activists interested in solar power 
are not just asking ‘can we?’ (e.g., is it feasible?) but ‘should we’? Can these systems be 
built without the oppressive and authoritarian technologies Winner (1986) critiques while 
increasing energy access? This challenge is coupled with the fact that the sustainability 
agenda must refurbish and retrofit existing technological systems. CSP, as an emerging 
and reemerging technology, must be successfully integrated into this system in order to 
take root. The rest of the dissertation describes the complex sociopolitical landscape in 
which CSP is being built today and how it shapes visions for energy transformations. 
Then Chapter 8 presents an energy justice framework to aid in evaluating the ethical 
principles entailed in energy technology and systems change. 
In today’s fight against climate change, CSP and the green electrons it provides 
may have a different set of politics than in the past. Since CSP developed within a 
colonial context in Algeria and Egypt, the politics of conquest might endure in their 
design, but it is equally possible they will develop differently within a different time 
period and social context. Today, the debate about CSP’s value is intertwined with 
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complicated questions about what counts as a sustainable technology across the triple 
bottom line and the role of renewable energy in sustainable development. If the end goal 
is the elusive construct of sustainability, rather than the domination of nature, CSP looks 
less like a solution. For the activists at Ivanpah, CSP was not sustainable because it 
resulted in a perverse trade-off between preserving an “old growth desert” teeming with 
life versus reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In the developing world, the question has 
become whether CSP—a technology rooted in imperial conquest— can deliver multiple 
ancillary benefits to society such as the development of supply chain industries, job 
opportunities for both educated and undereducated populations, and a green electron 
export commodity, as well as improving energy equity.
72
 How do the ideological 
promises made for deferred dreams change as it reemerges, and are these past cultural 
expectations for the future of the technology ingrained in it? Or does the technology need 
to become a material reality in order for these expectations to stick? The following 
chapters will continue to explore these themes, finding that, in the visioning phase, a 
technology’s politics are not completely cemented but dependent upon the level of 
procedural justice in its development. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ENVISIONING MEDITERRANEAN ELECTRICITY TRANSFORMATIONS: THE 
SPATIAL ASPECTS OF ENERGY JUSTICE 
 
“[Desertec] it's rather like what Mark Twain said of Wagner's music; it's not as 
bad as it sounds. This idea is catching on. This idea is the idea of the future and 
it's probably going to be the biggest single project which will bring together 
North Africa, the countries of the Arab League, and the European Union.” 
 – Sir Graham Walton, EU Parliament, Dii conference 2012  
 
Introduction: Envisioning Energy Transformations 
In 2012, Sir Walton suggested that the deferred Desertec dream was ahead of its 
time but would be the political integration project of the future. One year later at the 4
th
 
Dii conference, Bertrand Piccard stood in a black flight suit in front of an audience of 
investors to convince them that the Desertec dream could still take off. Piccard and his 
team had developed a solar airplane that could fly without fuel even at night. His maiden 
voyage from Switzerland to Morocco in June of 2012 traced the path of the transmission 
line under the Strait of Gibraltar connecting Spain and Morocco. A team of dignitaries, 
including the head of the Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN), which is 
strongly supported by the King, met Piccard when he successfully landed in the 
Moroccan capital, illustrating the political significance of his trip. Piccard viewed himself 
as a European ambassador of renewable energy, a pioneer of innovation, and an energy 
refugee who fled over the Strait of Gibraltar to escape a foundering European energy 
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policy. The Strait of Gibraltar is sometimes called the Strait of Death because immigrants 
die trying to cross it. 
Piccard’s cross-continental flight symbolizes the goals and challenges of the 
Desertec vision and some of its implications for justice that will be addressed in this 
chapter. Methods of depicting connectivity across the Mediterranean Sea, like Piccard’s 
voyage, have been used to substantiate a vision for infrastructural and geographic 
connectivity for the Mediterranean region. However, centrifugal forces, like the politics 
of immigration, pull the region apart. In its early stages, the Desertec vision promised to 
develop North Africa to halt immigration to Europe, deeply integrating technological 
infrastructure and providing equal access to it but keeping Mediterranean politics largely 
separate. Later on, it promised to deeply integrate Mediterranean infrastructure and 
policy to bind the region together to address shared problems. In a best-case scenario, the 
first version would offer energy equality, ensuring everyone has equal access to energy 
through reliable, interconnected infrastructure while the region remains culturally and 
politically separate. The second version could offer broader energy equity and justice 
outcomes that strike at the core of cultural and political integration issues in a region 
encompassing deep sociopolitical differences and inequities. Both depictions of the 
Desertec vision struggle with issues of political and social feasibility. The first assumes 
that technological integration could be achieved without political integration and the 
second assumes that unprecedented political and technological integration would lead to 
overwhelmingly positive, win-win outcomes.   
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This chapter explores the themes of energy equality and equity and political and 
technological integration from a spatial perspective, showing that the vision for an 
integrated Mediterranean electricity system was shaped by various geographic 
representations and framings of the region and that these representations also affect its 
possible energy justice outcomes. These geographical framings emphasized connectivity, 
empty space, and various system benefits. For example, system imaginers used the 
metaphor of an electricity “island” to argue that a regionally integrated transmission 
infrastructure and electricity market would be more efficient and sustainable than 
building disconnected, or distributed, electricity systems. This chapter empirically 
demonstrates the argument made in Chapter 1 that energy transformations reconfigure 
space in ways that matter for politics and society.  
Hughes (1983) described how sociotechnical systems are shaped by the uneven 
geographical distribution of energy resources. This chapter expands upon that 
observation by illustrating how constructed, political representations of geography shape 
the development of sociotechnical systems. The Desertec system has not been merely 
influenced by where the energy resources are but by how the landscapes are envisioned, 
mapped, and perceived and by the politics underpinning this process. Furthermore, the 
existence of energy wealth itself is necessary but insufficient for framing a landscape as 
an appropriate place for energy generation.  
Chapter 1 also asked what would be the possible sociopolitical and justice 
outcomes of a transnational electricity system, which will be explored in this chapter. 
This process of envisioning landscapes is no longer confined based upon nation-state 
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boundaries as it was in the past, but is occurring at a regional level. Hughes (1983) used 
comparative multi-country case studies to understand how sociotechnical systems are 
shaped. Today’s electricity systems are shaped by regional geography, transnational and 
national politics, and an envisioned globalization of energy, making the context for 
sociotechnical systems development completely different. Significant political 
development challenges are at stake today in the evolution of transnational sociotechnical 
systems. The first section of this chapter discusses the Desertec vision’s significance as a 
regional case study and then describes how the Desertec vision has been shaped by 
transnational and Mediterranean politics. Then, I describe the geographic shaping of the 
Desertec vision and its implications for energy equity and equality. This chapter argues 
that visions for energy systems are shaped by constructed geographies and that these 
geographies are politicized, thereby affecting the implications of the vision for energy 
justice. 
A Macroscale Overview of the Desertec Vision Within Mediterranean Electricity 
Policy  
 
This section argues that the Mediterranean region is a strategic site for 
understanding energy development, security, and justice. The Mediterranean is a region 
encompassing deep cultural differences, disparities, and inequality, with a storied history 
of cooperation and conflict that set the stage for contemporary plans for regional energy 
integration. It is a heterogeneous region, but its member nations share problems with 
transportation networks, overpopulation, urban crowding in coastal cities, the challenges 
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of a fragile environmental system (Roux, 1997), and energy. As explained in Chapter 1, 
Edwards (2004) argued that multi-scalar analysis is important for understanding the 
development of modern technological systems. This section provides the regional-scale 
political context of the Desertec vision. I illustrate that Desertec is not a sui generis vision 
but is integrated into Mediterranean, European, and German energy policy and 
illustrative of the system-level stakes of European energy policy. Plans for Mediterranean 
energy partnership reflect 1) German-led efforts to expand the European Union to 
adjacent regions, as well as German industrial and foreign policy goals 2) a regional, or 
even, global framing of energy security that Desertec and some in the German 
government imagine could be achieved by spreading German technologies and know-
how to surrounding regions. As such, political support for Desertec exists despite it 
immense scale and ambition.  
The Mediterranean region offers an advantageous case study for understanding 
energy inequity, inequality, and justice because it encompasses tremendous energy 
wealth and poverty amidst profound sociopolitical differences. It is an important region 
for understanding conventional energy systems—it includes important global oil 
producers such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, Oman, and natural gas giant Algeria. Thirty 
percent of the world’s petroleum traverses the Mediterranean, linking this fossil fuel 
wealth to European and global markets (Dryef, 1997). It is less often noticed that the 
region also has great energy disparities, inclusive of fuel-poor countries including Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Palestinian territories (Samborsky, Myrsalieva, & 
Mahmoud, 2013). Additionally, Sudan and Yemen suffer from energy poverty (ibid).  
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Together, the MENA region faces skyrocketing electricity demand, which could 
exacerbate these challenges and inequalities in energy access. A reversal of the 
significant gains in energy access achieved over the past decade in the MENA region 
would be detrimental to quality of life, because those who have come to depend upon 
reliable, 24/7 grid electricity access could lose it. The current population of MENA is 355 
million people (World Bank, 2015),
73
 compared to 397.5 million in Western Europe. 
While Europe’s population is stagnating, MENA’s population is expected to double by 
2050 (to 700 million people) and to reach the same level of energy consumption as 
Europe, or a quadrupling of current consumption. As one European energy expert 
explained in an interview “by 2050 [MENA] will be of the same size with regard to 
electricity demand…we are seeing another Europe growing.” Furthermore, following 
demands for increased political participation during the Arab Spring, many of the 
institutions responsible for energy policy in the region have been in turmoil. I found in 
my interviews that Mediterranean energy experts anticipated that some countries in the 
region, like Qatar, are poised to meet this skyrocketing demand while others lack the 
stability and capital. Egypt, for example, is running out of natural gas supplies and has 
suffered from blackouts since the 2011 political revolution.  
While MENA countries face the common challenge of increasing electricity 
demand, their energy security concerns diverge widely. For oil-rich MENA countries, 
energy security generally relates to security of demand for oil exports and high global oil 
prices. The downside to oil wealth is that many of these countries lack economic 
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diversification and heavily subsidize domestic energy demand. Of the 550 billion in fossil 
fuel subsidies worldwide, about half are spent in the MENA region (International Energy 
Agency, 2012). According to a German energy expert, Saudi Arabia subsidizes oil for 
domestic consumption at $5 a barrel that could be sold on the international market for 
roughly $100 per barrel. He joked that they would be better off selling the oil and then 
burning the dollars. Furthermore, oil-rich desert countries have significant idle electricity 
generation in the winters due to lack of demand during temperate weather (45% idle 
generation in Saudi Arabia for example) (Clercq, 2013). While not a security concern per 
se, this is a significant waste of resources that could be used for export. 
Saudi Arabia recently announced a transition to 41 GW of renewable energy by 
2032 to free up its oil for export. Other MENA countries are less certain that their fossil 
fuel wealth should be prioritized for export. For example, Algeria is questioning whether 
it would best serve their energy security and development goals to use their natural gas 
wealth to meet industrialization goals and growing domestic demand or to sell it for 
higher prices on the international market (Ghosn, 2009).  
For oil-poor MENA countries, energy security entails ensuring a reliable, 
affordable supply of fuel for their growing economies, reducing the energy subsidies that 
are straining government budgets not supported by fossil fuel wealth, and finding 
alternate means of economic growth.
74
 Oil-rich countries typically view energy export as 
their exclusive means of economic growth, while oil-poor countries search for other 
sources. For example, following a presentation given by a Moroccan energy advisor on 
Morocco’s energy strategy at a meeting of Arab states, audience members from oil-rich 
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states were in disbelief that any economy with such fuel poverty could survive or grow. 
S/he had to explain that there were other areas of the economy that could be developed. 
Renewable energy for export is one potential avenue for economic growth for oil-
poor countries. In some cases, renewable energy exports would provide a source of 
foreign revenue but would not be essential for the development of a renewable energy 
sector (Euro-Mediterranean Energy Market Integration Project, 2010). In other cases, 
renewable energy export to the EU would be necessary to finance a substantial renewable 
energy market in oil-poor countries. Renewable energy could also secure supply and 
insulate oil-poor economies from the price volatilities associated with fossil fuels 
(Samborsky et al., 2013).
75
 From an energy justice standpoint, countries must decide 
whether exporting electricity would be appropriate if domestic electricity shortages exist 
or are projected.  
While the MENA region seeks to address skyrocketing energy demand, unreliable 
electricity infrastructure, a lack of capital, a lack of economic growth or diversification, 
and political instability, the EU seeks to source low carbon energy to mitigate climate 
change, to phase out nuclear power, and to address security of supply. Climate policy is a 
major driver of European energy policy (“The Energiewende-- is there a Nordic way?,” 
2012). In recent years, Europe’s energy policy has centered on its 20-20-20 goals— to 
implement 20% improvements in energy efficiency, to source 20% of its electricity from 
renewable energy, and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20% of 1990 levels by 
2020.  
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 Countries in the south Mediterranean are deciding whether to pursue renewable energy, nuclear, or coal 
(Euro-Mediterranean Energy Market Integration Project, 2010). Jordan, for example, has chosen to pursue 
nuclear power instead of renewable energy.  
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Unlike the United States, the EU frames itself as already inextricably energy 
dependent due to existing natural gas and oil dependency. However, there are some parts 
of the broader Mediterranean neighborhood that they view as better to be dependent upon 
than others. For example, the EU energy security strategy focuses on energy 
interdependence on countries other than Russia and within the European Union. Russia’s 
Gazprom currently supplies 40% of Europe’s natural gas overall, and 38% of Germany’s 
natural gas (Daly, 2013). Conflicts between Ukraine and Russia over natural gas have 
been formative to European framings of energy security. The European Commission’s 
video outlining their energy security strategy explained that in 2009 the natural gas 
dispute between Ukraine and Russia left “half of the continent shivering” (European 
Commission, 2009). Tensions have remained high, and in 2014 a U.S.-EU sanctions 
package forbid new investment in Russian energy. The European Energy Commission’s 
strategy stated,  
 
Above all, to improve its energy security, Europe needs to develop a well functioning 
internal energy market. At present, energy flows often stop at member-state borders 
because of lack of interconnected infrastructure leading to inefficient supply and 
wasted resources. The solution: greater interconnectivity of the natural gas and 
electricity grids. This will allow permanent exchange of energy…The EU supports 
major gas and electricity infrastructure projects to link Europe to North Africa and gas 
rich regions like the Caspian… (European Commission, 2011). 
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In summary, Europe’s energy security at least discursively focuses on greater EU 
integration and greater integration with markets to the south.  
  Efforts to source natural gas outside of Russia, as well as the perceived benefits of 
interconnection, are essential to understanding EU and German interest in the Desertec 
vision. Desertec is one of several projects that would link the European energy 
community to its southern neighborhood, instead of Russia, to address security of supply 
and climate change mitigation. The German-born EU Energy Commissioner Günther 
Oettinger saw Desertec as one of several large-scale projects to secure supply, including 
the proposed Nabucco pipeline that would have run from eastern Turkey to Austria, 
bypassing Ukraine, to bring oil imports from the Caspian Sea to Germany. In a 2011 Dii 
pamphlet he was quoted as stating that the “[European] Commission will create a 
framework to secure alternative supply routes and sources to enable large-scale projects 
such as Nabucco and Desertec.” The discourse on natural gas integration is identical to 
Dii’s copper plate discourse on electricity described in the next chapter—to build 
bidirectional pipelines that provide energy “where and when it is most needed.”76 The 
Commission stated that the “European way of life depends” on the “modernization of our 
networks” (European Commission, 2011). Nabucco would be a “bridge” to Asia, just as 
Desertec would “bridge” electricity transmission and markets between North Africa and 
Europe, facilitating greater interconnection with parts of the neighborhood outside of 
Russia.
77
 Nabucco failed in 2013 because, like Desertec, it was opposed for being too 
expensive, large, and complex, and it failed to garner sufficient support from the transit 
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77 Fatih Birol interview, available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/fpis_en.htm 
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countries. Nabucco illustrates that even integration projects for traditional sources of 
energy face major challenges. Nevertheless, Europe, having largely acquiesced to its 
energy interdependence, must address where it will source tomorrow’s energy and at 
what cost to the environment and climate. 
  European energy integration alone is a possibility, although Desertec proponents 
argue that it is not as cheap or efficient as integration with the Southern Mediterranean, 
will not allow for a 100% renewable energy future, and will still require the import of 
primary fuels. The Connecting Europe Facility funds such cross border European 
infrastructure including high voltage transmission lines. In February 2015, an EU Energy 
Union was announced with a 10% electricity interconnection target across EU nation-
state borders (although much of Europe is already connected at 10% or higher). Whether 
Europe will pursue greater internal integration or seek greater integration with 
neighboring regions is partly a matter of whether it decides to pursue climate change 
mitigation alone or it attempts to bring the rest of the world along with it (“The 
Energiewende-- is there a Nordic way?,” 2012).  
  Under Germany’s energiewende, or energy turn around or revolution, Germany 
has taken significant strides toward increasing the percentage of renewable energy in its 
system, as well as efficiency and conservation measures. It seeks to reduce its greenhouse 
gas emissions and to phase out nuclear and fossil fuel generation. It also shifted toward 
distributed generation, and it implemented a large subsidy (feed-in-tariff) on rooftop solar 
photovoltaic installations. Germany—one of the European Union’s most powerful 
countries— is committed to expanding climate mitigation and energy policy to the 
broader region. German supporters of energy integration seek to export the German 
  148 
energy revolution to meet domestic and global energy security goals and industrial policy 
goals.  
  The German-led push for energy integration outside the EU is intensified by the 
fact that the reforms made in Germany’s energiewende are a matter of national pride. At 
a 2013 renewable energy exposition in Casablanca, Morocco, the Germany Ministry of 
Economy and Technology (BMWi) advertised, in the largest booth at the center of the 
convention hall, that the energiewende “is equally possible in your country. We put at 
your disposal our experience, our expertise, and our proven products.”78 Anecdotally, 
many Germans assume the word energiewende has become as familiar to Americans as 
the word kindergarten. An interviewee from the German Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development stated, “Germany sees itself, since we have abandoned 
nuclear energy…as [an] expert on….renewable energy and satisfying demand. So it’s an 
idea we also try to export, and we think it’s good…for the rest of the world.”  
  While some European renewable energy advocates, such as Eurosolar, see the 
energiewende as an effort to source more homegrown, green energy, Desertec conceives 
of the energiewende as part of the supranational process of expanding the EU frontier. As 
the Dii CEO stated at the 2012 Dii conference in Berlin, “I always call [Germany’s 
energiewende] the small, local energiewende—we also support all of you in the big 
energiewende because it makes no sense only to do the whole thing in Germany and then 
the rest of the world is in misery.” He explained that it was not a coincidence that the 
conference was held in Berlin at “the center of the energy transition” and that the goal 
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expérience, notre savoir-faire et des produits qui ont fait leurs preuves. 
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was to expand the energy transition to Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East as a 
whole. He stated, “no single country can do much in the big energy transition…we have 
to open up our minds. We have to think beyond borders.” 
  Spreading sustainable technologies and techniques developed in Germany to the 
rest of the world is also part of Germany’s industrial policy. The Renewable Energy: 
Made in Germany report explained that, “German businesses and consultants are already 
sharing this experience [on the energy transition] with many other countries.” While the 
Renewable Energy: Made in Germany slogan could initially be assumed to be a discourse 
about stimulating home-grown green energy production, it concentrates equally on 
developing green energy technologies for export. 
  Germany established bilateral energy cooperation agreements with Morocco and 
Tunisia in 2012. According to an interviewee from BMWi, these partnerships will “pave 
the way for investments and projects in industry,” with the long-term goal to import 
renewable energy from Morocco via the European grid. As part of the Moroccan-German 
energy partnership, Germany finances experts to work within the Moroccan energy 
ministry. The partnership focuses on renewable energy and energy efficiency 
cooperation, a Desertec pilot project, development cooperation, and grid development. A 
German expert in Morocco stated that Desertec is “the main driver for the [energy] 
partnership between Germany and Morocco.”  
  While Germans view themselves as having exceptional energy technologies 
worthy of export, they generally do not perceive themselves as having sufficient, 
affordable primary energy (fuel). An interviewee from BMWi explained that there are 
two dimensions to energy security— quantity and price. In terms of quantity, it is 
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sufficient to generate electricity only in Germany, but this does not account for the price 
or the consideration that the fuel must be imported anyway. Therefore, he argued that 
Germany should look to electricity imports simply if they are cheaper. In interviews, 
advisors to Desertec described Dii’s focus on electricity imports from North Africa as a 
political strategy, because the imports would provide the German government with an 
energy security interest for supporting projects in the region. These imports help to 
achieve a “win” for the European side of the partnership. 
  To others, the motivation for Desertec is not merely cheap supply but the 
unquantifiable benefits stemming from regional integration. Cornelia Pieper, German 
Minister of State of the Foreign Office, stated at the 2012 Dii conference that Desertec is 
part of the strategic foreign policy and energy policy in the ministry to  
 
secure the energy supply not only of the North African region but also of 
Europe…from the point of view of security and foreign policy, one of the essential 
questions is how the energy relationship between Africa and Europe can be shaped in a 
way that energy is not just a product that we compete for but an important pillar of the 
stability and cooperation between our two regions. This means that energy is one of the 
core elements of our foreign policy. We believe that desert energy from renewable 
energy sources will play a major role. In Europe, it will only be possible to have secure 
energy supply if we establish that system with our partners and our neighbors. 
 
In this framing, Desertec meets Germany’s overall foreign policy foci— multilateral 
cooperation, economic soft power incentives rather than militarization, and its role in 
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deepening the EU as its largest country and most stalwart advocate (Green, Hough, & 
Miskimmon, 2011). Furthermore, it relates to Germany’s goal of regional stability in the 
Middle East (ibid).  
  Desertec supporters also emphasize that countries should think beyond their 
national interests and prioritize integration. The CEO of Munich RE asserted that the 
notion that each region should have its own energy production “is the old dream of 
complete autonomy and independence.” Desertec could either bring together a more 
unified Europe based on common values or “risk” falling back on national solutions. Sir 
Graham Walton from the EU Parliament bemoaned the rise in isolationism in Europe 
following the Eurozone crisis, arguing that “in times of crisis, you’re better looking out 
and working with your neighbors than you are retreating into yourself.” An interviewee 
from the Desertec Foundation explained that European countries are too small to be 
energy independent and that climate change disregards nation-state borders. 
  This transnational thinking, as well as efforts to broaden the energiewende 
frontier, underpins a regional or even global framing of energy security absent from the 
U.S. energy independence discourse. The Desertec Foundation’s goal with the Desertec 
Atlas released in 2014 is to “enthuse others for a global energiewende”. Dii’s founding 
MOU depicts a global framing of energy security stating, “The DESERTEC concept 
involves making use of the abundant unused energy in the deserts to promote global 
energy security and help protect our climate” (emphasis added). Since the Desertec vision 
is transferable to other regions, large in scope, and focused on integration, Desertec 
envisions the possibility of “global” energy security where others emphasize only energy 
independence. Chapter 8 expands upon this concept of global energy security. 
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Mediterranean integration. Desertec has also been shaped by ongoing Euro-
Mediterranean identity building and political integration efforts. As Hettne & Söderbaum 
(2000) put it "mostly when we speak of regions we actually mean regions in the making" 
(p. 461). Much of the focus on Mediterranean regional integration has been on dreams for 
integrated energy systems. Starting after the Cold War, the Energy Charter Treaty laid the 
foundation for integrating the energy sectors of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe into 
the European markets (ibid) to facilitate energy cooperation, stability, and reliability. This 
is similar to the Desertec discourse. The European Union has been viewed either as the 
model of regional integration to emulate or as the European Fortress of regional 
protectionism (Panebianco, 2003). The Treaty of Rome established the European 
Economic Community in 1957 but did not include the Maghreb or Mashriq,
79
 which were 
relegated to the status of Mediterranean Non Member Countries (Pace, 2006). In 1994, 
the EU increased its focus on the broader Mediterranean region, and the Mediterranean 
Forum sought to promote political dialogue, mutual assistance, and greater cultural 
understanding (ibid). In 1995, the EU launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP), also known as the Barcelona Process. It included 15 EU countries and 12 
neighboring states/entities in the Mediterranean.
80 
 
Building a regional identity depends upon with whom regional actors imagine 
themselves being in a community (Panebianco, 2003). Mediterranean political integration 
processes seek to construct this imagined community by framing common, regional 
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 The Maghreb typically includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania. The Mashriq 
typically includes the Arab countries east of Egypt (Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and Syria).  
80 It included Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and 
the Palestinian Authority. It excluded the Balkan countries and Libya. Mauritania was included as a special 
guest. 
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challenges. The background report on the Barcelona process written by the EU argued 
that the economy in the Mediterranean has lost competitiveness compared to the rest of 
the EU (Roux, 1997). The "interior EuroMediterranean" outside of the coasts especially 
has development problems and a weak economy (ibid). There are disparities between the 
north and south Mediterranean based on “development, commercial exchange, migratory 
phenomenon, cultural characteristics, and political regimes" (ibid). The EMP, or 
Barcelona Process, identified three common areas of collaboration:  political and 
security, economic and financial (which includes energy), and social/cultural/human 
(ibid). The action plan for the Mediterranean adopted in Barcelona sought to fight 
erosion, improve the rural economy, stop emigration, and open the region to the world. 
The Barcelona process also included a “European Mediterranean Free Trade Area.” The 
Process demonstrated strong support for regionalism facilitated by shared knowledge and 
technology to solve common problems in the Mediterranean.  
As part of region-building efforts, the European Commission funded the Euro-
Mediterranean Energy Market Integration Project (Med-EMIP) in 2001 to promote 
Mediterranean electricity integration. Med-EMIP conducted a four-volume study (600 
pages) of the Mediterranean electricity loop, or “Medring,” which explored the technical 
feasibility of interconnecting the entire transmission infrastructure in the Mediterranean 
basin. The power system in the Mediterranean currently operates in four separate 
blocks—ENTSO-E/ SCR (Europe); Morocco-Algeria; Libya-Egypt-Jordan-Syria-
Lebanon; and Israel-Palestinian Territories, plus Turkey. In 1997, the only underwater 
transmission cable between the North and South of the Mediterranean was built between 
Spain and Morocco under the Strait of Gibraltar, and a new cable was installed in 2001. 
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Linkages in the ring are missing between Turkey/ Bulgaria-Greece, Turkey/Syria, and 
Israel-Palestinian Territory/ Jordan-Egypt. Connectivity is also lacking in the EU, and the 
lines between France/Spain and France/Italy are the most congested in Europe. 
  The Medring studies found that the EU grid is unprepared to handle several 
gigawatts (GW) of solar imports from the South Mediterranean. A Mediterranean 
transmission infrastructure for domestic consumption would be shaped very differently 
than one for export. They concluded that a full AC synchronization of the grid in the 
Mediterranean would be “quite complicated” due to disturbances from continuous 
changes in demand and transmission line switching (Ferris, n.d.).
81
 With AC 
interconnections, small disturbances in the electromechanical oscillations can 
compromise network stability (e.g., between Georgia and Yugoslavia). In November 
2005, an attempt to interconnect the lines between Tunisia and Libya failed because of 
structural weaknesses in the system, which also led to a collapse of the interconnection 
between Morocco and Algeria (Euro-Mediterranean Energy Market Integration Project, 
2010). For the ring to be successful, the power plants in it must provide “reliable and high 
quality power” 24/7/365. The first design of the Desertec vision described in the next 
chapter envisioned that CSP would provide this “reliable and high quality power” and 
that the ring would be closed through HVDC lines instead of AC. 
  This background on the politics of regional energy integration illustrates that 
renewable energy policy for the Mediterranean has been interwoven in a long and 
complex history of Mediterranean and European energy policymaking that did not exist 
                                                        
81According to Ferris (n.d.) “Transmission lines are switched in and out of the network in order to 
maximize economic efficiency of generation dispatch on a bulk electricity network.”  
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when the initial electrical power systems Hughes (1983) studied were under 
development. Furthermore, Mediterranean electricity system builders are not starting 
from scratch in terms of building the infrastructure. Existing infrastructure and energy 
interconnections—such as Russian natural gas dependency—must be reconfigured, 
refurbished, and reshaped. Regional energy integration would allow for very high levels 
of integration of renewable energy into the grid without changing the centralized system 
configuration, but system builders would have to integrate the disparate energy policies 
and goals of the diverse countries in the Mediterranean region. If regional integration 
efforts were abandoned, European countries committed to low-carbon energy would need 
to radically reconfigure their domestic energy systems to allow for high renewable energy 
penetration. The rest of the chapter describes the geographic shaping of this vision and 
the geographic aspects of energy justice.     
 
The Spatial Reconfigurations of Energy Transformations 
 
Visions for energy systems are shaped by perceptions of geography at different 
scales. This chapter addresses the regional-scale geographic shaping of the sociotechnical 
vision, while Chapter 7 addresses the local-scale. How actors in power imagine the 
region affects the design of the sociotechnical energy system and its possible implications 
for justice. The actors involved with the Desertec vision constructed the regional scale by 
depicting the Mediterranean as a coherent region through measurement, mapping, 
abstraction, and scalar techniques, as well as in relationship to framings of the region 
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couched in long histories. This geographical construction is also closely linked to how 
social problems and conflicts are framed in the region. Such techniques do not merely 
depict physical geography but are used to convey social unity or separation, as well as 
who is imagined as part of a region and who is excluded. For example, early maps of the 
Desertec vision depicted the North African deserts as empty. Additionally, some 
countries have attempted to reframe their regional geographical position for strategic 
purposes; Malta and Morocco depicted themselves as energy bridges in the 
Mediterranean to secure a position as a key node in the Desertec vision. Since the system 
is still in the visioning stage, the region’s geography has been sometimes redrawn to 
better fit the technological system (e.g., nation-state borders have been erased on maps, 
boundaries have been redrawn to fit power systems). These visualizations of the region 
tangibly illustrate the dreams of system imaginers, who is included in the dream, and 
whose vision is dominant. They pose several considerations for energy justice that will be 
addressed at the end of the chapter, including the availability of energy for local 




Enduring Mediterranean and Saharan framings. The Mediterranean and the 
adjacent Sahara have long been imagined as part of “barriers, bridges, and borderlands” 
(McDougall & Scheele, 2012). Three framings of the Mediterranean region are relevant 
to this study. They illustrate the long history and biases reflected in visions for 
                                                        
82 The Medring studies depict the unseen Mediterranean. Based on 2 million coordinates, the study 
visualized the rugged and, in parts, very deep Med seabed. The Mediterranean has a very complex 
morphology and depth with valuable flora. Understanding this disrupted the feasibility of the vision, as 
people realized that even from a technological standpoint it would be difficult to build transmission lines 
underneath the Mediterranean. 
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sustainable, regional electricity systems. In the first framing, which emerged after World 
War II, the Mediterranean region is depicted as a shatterbelt, characterized by political 
fragmentation, linguistic and ethic diversity, and contested boundaries (“Shatterbelt,” 
2010). In the second framing, developed by Orientalist scholars, the Sahara is depicted as 
a bridge and an empty space to be crossed to reach the North African coasts or Europe, 
representing “a trans-Saharan rather than intra-Saharan trade” (McDougall & Scheele, 
2012). The Sahara Desert is seen as a path of connectivity to the north but a boundary to 
the south 
… dividing the Mediterranean world from 'real' (i.e., sub-Saharan) Africa, 
isolating the countries of North Africa from their southern and eastern neighbors, 
and demarcating distinct areas of study for scholars and students (McDougall & 
Scheele, 2012, p. 4). 
The third framing, stemming from more recent scholarship on Mediterranean history, 
views the Mediterranean as groupings of interconnected microecologies where life 
depends on connectivity, exchange, and widespread networks of support (Horden & 
Purcell, 2000). Building upon this newer framing, McDougall and Scheele (2012) viewed 
the Sahara “as part of densely interconnected networks…a global borderland.” There is 
more intra-Saharan trade than trans-Saharan trade (Scheele, 2012). There are still 
constraints on motion, such as national boundaries, but people smuggle goods across 
them (McDougall & Scheele, 2012). Each framing has been reflected in visions for 
Mediterranean electricity systems. However, the predominant framing has been the 
second old-world view of the Mediterranean characterized by trans-Saharan trade routes, 
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in which the empty Sahara acts as an energy bridge to the north and a boundary to the 
south.  
Framings of the region’s geography have been used to help legitimate 
technological choice, as well as to identify the landscapes appropriate for this technology, 
within the vision. The old world framing is reflected in abstract pictures and maps that 
emphasize the strength of solar energy resources in the world’s empty deserts (see Figure 
24) and the potential for Mediterranean green electricity trade through transmission lines 
(see Figure 27). A documentary about Spain’s Solar Plataforma83 framed the world’s 
deserts as appropriate for large-scale CSP generation by abstractly depicting the world’s 
“sunbelt,” or the area with the most solar radiation, from above. The sunbelt framing 
constructs a contiguous, alternative source of energy wealth—ripe for export—on an 
abstracted, empty landscape.  
System imaginers argued that electricity should be generated in landscapes like 
the sunbelt where the resources are strongest and then exported, just as Champagne is 
best grown in the terroir of France. This Ricardian model of trade is based on a single 
factor of production, in this case a geographical advantage. Export based upon a 
comparative advantage is indicative of the logic underpinning globalization. It suggests 
that system imaginers are proposing not just a trans-Saharan trade of green electrons but 
in some sense a globalization of electricity. As I argued in Chapter 1 that there is a trend 
toward the globalization of electricity, spurred in part by renewable energy. In this case, 
renewable energy would spur greater energy interdependence across the Sahara and the 
globe.  
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 Described in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 24. A Representation of Earth's Sunbelt. Source: Desertec Foundation. Used with 
Permission. 
By framing desert landscapes as empty, energy-rich zones waiting to be turned 
into “powerhouses,” they have been depicted as the “perfect sites” for solar electricity 
generation for domestic use or export. I observed this discourse while studying the CSP 
industry for six years, from the siting of the Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating System in 
California to siting solar power plants in the Sahara, including the Moroccan Noor CSP 
plant and the Egyptian Kuraymat ISCCS (natural gas combined with CSP) plant. A 
perfect site is foremost the sunniest available site, because that makes the energy cheaper; 
other priorities include flat land, good drainage, access to other infrastructure, access to 
worker populations, and access to water. One-fourth of the renewable energy capacity in 
Europe is in Spain, but Spain has fewer solar sites than in North Africa. In the Desertec 
feasibility studies, North Africa is framed as the best place to site CSP, as it would yield 
more electricity in Egypt than in Madrid, Spain and even more than in Freiburg, 
Germany, which frames North Africa as having a comparative advantage for  
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CSP generation and export. However, no site is perfect; siting decisions inevitably have 
trade-offs, as illustrated in Chapter 7.  
Although CSP requires large swaths of contiguous land, CSP’s proponents often 
trivialize the total amount of land required. Flagsol, a German CSP company that 
developed the Kuraymat plant stated in its advertising materials that there a “nearly 
unlimited number of local options” for siting solar power…On a worldwide scale there is 
an abundance of vast deserts and semi-arid regions. Less than three percent of the Sahara 
desert would suffice to meet the world’s energy demand with parabolic trough power 
plants” (emphasis added). A 2011 Dii brochure described Desertec as “a long-term 
vision: using the abundance of space, wind and sun to generate renewable energy in 
North Africa and the Middle East” (emphasis added). The red boxes on the map in Figure 
27 emphasize how little land would be needed for electricity production from CSP. 
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Figure 25. Worldwide Wind Energy Conference Logo, PV Panels with Small Camels, 
Photo by Author.  
Techniques of measurement and visual abstraction were used to solidify the 
framing of deserts as the ideal sites for tomorrow’s sustainable power infrastructure. The 
logo for the Worldwide Wind Energy Conference, held prior to the 2011 Dii conference 
in Cairo, used scale to portray the vastness of desert landscapes. It featured giant PV 
panels in empty, sandy deserts, below which people on camels were the scale of ants (see 
Figure 25 in the background). In terms of techniques of measurement, the solar industry 
relies on abstract GIS methods, including meteo stations and shadowband pyranometers, 
to identify the best spots for solar power. A technician stated, 
 
Before we build a solar thermal power plant we need to know the exact conditions 
at the respective locations. This includes direct solar radiation above all . . . 
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[Meteo stations with pyranometers are] how we establish certainty with regard to 
planning and investments, because we know exactly where the sun shines most. 
(Solar Millennium AG and Tamia Film &TV, 2010) 
The resulting solar radiation maps illustrate the potential of North African solar power 
and the best parts of the region (in red) (see Figure 26.) 
 
 
Figure 26. Solar Radiation in the Mediterranean Region. Source: Creative Commons 
License, SolarGIS © 2015 GeoModel Solar 
Through visual methods, system imaginers depict the two regions as connected 
through infrastructure. The original picture for the Desertec Foundation’s concept 
showed lines from technology connecting the continents, not from nation-state borders 
(see Figure 27). The European continent is green, while the MENA region is yellow, 
indicating barren land appropriate for CSP.  
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Figure 27. Desertec Foundation's Representation of the Desertec Vision 
According to the vision, the technology belt in Europe must be linked to the 
sunbelt to provide the means of harvesting the energy in it. German initiatives to export 
renewable energy and techniques from the energiewende would provide the technology 
for a modern electricity system. In the advertisement below, Figure 28, German 
photovoltaic technology is compared to the engineering feat of building the pyramids. It 
states, “innovative solutions, award-winning quality, and proven reliability.” This reflects 
the second old-world framing of the Mediterranean as the birthplace of civilization, 
science, agriculture, and technological progress.   
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Figure 28. CentroSolar Advertisement Stating "Innovative solutions. Award-winning 
quality. Proven reliability.” 
As the birthplace of modern agriculture, the Mediterranean has been viewed as an 
ideal region in which to develop a modern electricity system. System imaginers framed 
CSP plants developed in the Fertile Crescent and elsewhere as energy farms. Chapter 3 
illustrated that while some framings of CSP have shifted over time, the farming metaphor 
has persisted over a century and a half. While farming solar power may seem to refer to 
rudimentary technologies, the original Desertec vision framed connected energy farms as 
the epitome of modern energy system. The Desertec feasibility studies explained that 
thousands of years ago humans evolved from nomadic hunter-gatherers to settlers and 
farmers except for in the energy sector in which,  
 
Civilization is still gathering different forms of fossil energy like our ancestors 
collected berries and hunted animals. Fossil energy resources are still sought and 
gathered until the last drop is spent…It becomes evident that this is not a civilized  
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behavior, and certainly not a sustainable one, because there is no other planet in 
view to move to after resources are depleted and the atmosphere is spoiled. 
 
This quote framed farming energy as more modern and sustainable than generating it 
with gathered fossil fuels. Electricity systems, which are often viewed as society’s most 
modern infrastructure, were therefore framed as backwards, evoking Frank Shuman’s 
warning in 1910 that humanity must source power from the sun or “revert to 
barbarism.”84 CSP technology, therefore, has been viewed as part of a modernization 
process to harvest energy from the sun. It has not just been viewed as a single solution to 
a regional problem but as part of global technological progress in energy systems fostered 
in the Mediterranean. While the sustainability literature often portrays distributed, small-
scale, bucolic solutions as the most environmentally friendly, the Desertec vision framed 
large-scale farming connected to regional markets as more compatible with nature. The 
Desertec vision is not viewed merely as a single solution to a regional Mediterranean 
problem but as part of global technological progress in low-carbon energy systems 
fostered in the Mediterranean. (Chapter 5 will illustrate how these energy visions are 
connected to sustainability problems beyond energy, and Chapter 6 will explore how the 
solar farming metaphor has evolved as part of Moroccan political development.) 
The farms themselves would be distributed but the connection to markets would 
be regional and centralized. A later version of the Desertec vision emphasized that it 
would consist not of a single project but of numerous renewable energy farms distributed 
across the region, connected to a regional grid. The red box in Figure 26 broke off into 
                                                        
84 Discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
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many smaller boxes and, in videos, zoomed into project locations with a disclaimer that 
the Desertec Foundation never presumed all of the projects would be sited in one place 




Figure 29. Desertec Foundation, Distributed Projects Emphasis. This image breaks up the 
red box from Figure 27 to illustrate that the power plants will not be sited in one spot but 
across the region. Used with Permission. 
 
Mediterranean and Desert Connectivity  
The harvest from these remote desert farms must be brought to markets through 
increased Mediterranean connectivity. Once electricity from the best sites in North Africa 
has bridged the Sahara, the Mediterranean would serve as a hub for connecting the 
electricity to Europe. Describing the beginning of the vision, an interviewee from DLR 
stated, “and they painted the first picture of a EU-MENA region – Europe, Middle East, 
North Africa— as a whole. Understanding the Mediterranean Sea not as a boundary but 
as a transport means” (see Figure 27). To establish this connectivity, desert frontiers 
would need to be reframed metaphorically and then technologically from boundaries and 
remote spaces to bridges that can be “put into service” (Zickfeld, Wieland, Blohmke, 
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Sohm, & Yousef, 2012) to generate electricity from solar power and to connect it to a 
broader grid. An analysis of this metaphorical reframing helps to illustrate the logic that 
has underpinned this ambitious plan to build a regional energy system and the properties 
for which the electrical power industry values centralized systems.  
Chapter 3 illustrated the long-standing importance of the connectivity discourse in 
large-scale engineering dreams for the Saharan frontier, from the Trans-Saharan Railroad 
to the Sahara Sea. Today, numerous visions for engineering projects in the desert 
emphasize connectivity. For example, the Desert Corps project developed by the Planck 
Foundation seeks to boost the economies of Africa and West Asia, turning deserts into 
areas of economic productivity through seawater irrigation with halophyte crops for 
“manmade Amazons” (compare to the Atlantropa vision in Chapter 3). They state, 
“deserts are now often large barriers. They could become connections. Infrastructure is 
what makes the difference” (Planck Foundation, n.d.) Similarly, the Sahara Solar Breeder 
project proposed by the Science Council of Japan aims to create a “global clean energy 
super highway connecting GW scale PV power stations located at various desert areas 
with high-temperature superconductor (HTSC) transmission lines” (http://www.ssb-
foundation.com/). Additionally, the Sahara Forest project, advanced by a Norwegian 
LLC, seeks to “green the desert” with CSP and greenhouse synergies to address the 
“interconnection” of challenges (i.e., food, water, electricity) 
(http://saharaforestproject.com/). Deserts are framed as the final frontier to be developed 
and connected to the modern world. By connecting the sunbelt to the technology belt 
deserts become powerhouses, although the nexus of social power underpinning them 
would likely be in Europe rather than the empty Sahara.  
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One of Desertec’s founders framed desert connectivity as essential to 
humankind’s very survival, reflecting the third conception of Mediterranean connectivity 
as essential to humans’ survival in the desert, 
 
The North Africans are not typical developing countries because more than 90%, 
more than 95%, are on the grid because you live in a desert. And if you live in a 
desert you live in a community. If you are alone you are dead. So they are already 
very well connected to most of the infrastructure. 
 
As part of the connectivity focus, the Desertec vision imagines the Mediterranean as a 
transportation hub or bridge through which electricity flows due to borderless 
cooperation across the Sahara and the Mediterranean. Desertec proponents conceive of 
the Mediterranean as “a bridge between two continents.” For example, Dii’s slogan for 
the first three years was “renewable energy: bridging continents,” and the Desert Power 
Getting Started report asserted there is “no choice but to understand the Mediterranean as 
a hub rather than a border.” Energy cooperation itself has been described as a bridge at 
Dii’s conferences. At the Dii 2012 conference, Cornelia Pieper, Minister of State from 
the Federal Foreign Office, explained that it is “obvious” that Europe will get power from 
North Africa because they have a more favorable climate for generating this energy. This 
again represents a Ricardian model of a single economic advantage for exports. Desertec 
epitomizes this vision and will help to reassign the Mediterranean its previous role. “It is 
not only a water body that separates us, but it can also be a bridge between our two 
continents.” The program for Dii’s 2011 conference in Egypt stated “it’s about 
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connecting people, cultures, and continents” with a picture of empty, sandy desert space 
and pyramids. In contrast with the quote, the imagery frames deserts as interstitial zones 
through which energy will travel to link cities around the Mediterranean. While the 
bridge and hub metaphors are mixed, they suggest different outcomes—one bridging 
empty space and the other making the Mediterranean the center of vibrant transnational 
trade.  
Transmission lines provide connectivity. The Desertec vision originally sought to 
connect the region through a “backbone HVDC grid” linking the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Europe. High voltage DC lines connecting the continents would act as long-
distance interstate highways, while local AC grids would act as country roads and city 
streets. The first transmission line built underneath the Mediterranean reflected this 
framing. In Transmission & Distribution Magazine the Moroccan utility company ONEE 
and the Spanish TSO Red Eléctrica referred to the transmission line under the Strait of 
Gibraltar as “a bridge between two continents” (Granadino & Mansouri, 2007). They 
framed the line as “the first link in the [Medring] chain” (Manuel Rodriguez Garcia, 
2010).  
The depiction of the regional connectivity in a later version of the vision by Dii 
focused on market connectivity. The map was still borderless but had more emphasis on 
solar radiation resources because the measurement had become more precise since the 
original vision was developed (see Figure 30). The markets flowed internally within 
North Africa and toward Europe, instead of just toward Europe. 
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Figure 30. Dii's Project Vision 2009. Source: Dii, Used with Permission. 
  Dii’s Desert Power 2050 report presented a completely integrated vision of desert 
and Mediterranean connectivity (see Figure 31 and Figure 32). Dii called this vision the 
“copper plate,” which is a flat, perfect diffuser on which electricity is instantly available 
on every point on its surface. Desert Power 2050 envisioned a market and infrastructure 
for electricity that would be so deeply integrated that electricity would be instantly 
available where it is needed, when it is needed. This would flatten any problems and 
intermittencies from peak hours of electricity usage and fluctuating renewable energy 
supply. Figure 31 and Figure 32 depict deep integration but also significant abstraction, 
constructing the region as a whole with percentages, targets, and a bird’s energy view of 
increasing demand and need for supply. These images do not illustrate the sociopolitical 
complexity of the region they would be connecting. Such abstraction may obscure issues 
at a more fine-grained level, such as those discussed in Chapter 7 surrounding the siting 
of Morocco’s first solar power plant.  
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Figure 31: Desert Power 2050 Report, Dii, EU-MENA Connected Scenario, Source: Dii, 
Used with Permission. 
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Figure 32. Desert Power 2050 Report, Dii, Connected Scenario. Source: Dii, Used with 
Permission. 
The front cover of the Desert Power 2050 report is even more abstract, depicting 
energy use and energy flows (see Figure 33). It is a borderless picture, and it emphasizes 
the massive scale of the vision by depicting the edges of the globe. Through its nighttime 
view, it also emphasizes areas of demand, but it uses today’s depiction rather than a 
projection of 2050 demand, which would have illustrated MENA’s electricity needs as 
roughly equal to those of Western Europe. 
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Figure 33. Desert Power 2050 Report Cover. Source: Dii, Used with Permission. 
These visions emphasize connectivity because they depict the most sustainable, 
efficient electricity system as one that would expand the centralized system benefits to 
adjacent regions through deep interconnection. This would compensate for renewable 
energy’s intermittency. In contrast, a distributed energy system with point-of-use 
renewable energy generation would not offer the system benefits Desertec argues a 
regional system would have. Hughes (1983) illustrated that systems grow through 
transfer of technology across regions of a country. Today electricity is crossing national 
borders and is envisioned to extend to the regional scale, in part due to the goal of 
integrating more renewable energy in the system. Desertec’s creators imagined that 
Desertec would modernize and globalize electricity supply and consumption by 
extending the system across the entire Mediterranean. 
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Electricity Islands. The electricity sector uses the metaphor of an island to 
further emphasize that a highly interconnected electricity system would be more efficient 
and sustainable. Islands are the worst positions in a system that prioritizes 
interconnectivity. When an electrical power system is “islanded” it means that it is 
isolated or not fully synchronized with its neighboring systems. To connect to the broader 
grid, the islanded grid must match the same frequency and phase. The Iberian Peninsula, 
for example, is an electricity island because it is not fully synchronized and 
interconnected with the grids of surrounding countries. According to industry experts, 
“traditionally, islanding has been seen by utilities as an undesirable condition due to 
concerns about safety, equipment protection, and system control” (Greacen, Engel, & 
Quetchenbach, 2013). Islanded grids are inefficient because they are more likely to shed 
the load (i.e., experience a blackout) because power cannot be sourced from a 
neighboring grid or to curtail excess generation that cannot be transmitted elsewhere. 
Mediterranean system imaginers perceived that extending the centralized electricity 
system logic with its benefits of efficiency, reliability, control, and safety— while 
addressing its “reverse salient” (Hughes, 1983) of skyrocketing carbon dioxide emissions 
with centralized renewable energy—would be more advantageous than building a 
distributed electricity system and leaving behind isolated islands. 
The Desertec vision implies that the most efficient, feasible way of transitioning 
to renewable energy is through expanding the networking logic of the existing system 
across the region. Connecting solar resources into the grid could allow for more 
flexibility in managing solar energy’s intermittency (ibid). At the Dii 2013 conference, 
CEO Paul van Son emphasized that countries cannot generate electricity in an isolated 
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way unless they are on an island in the ocean. Furthermore, there is nothing worse than 
living on an island because of its lack of economic diversification. System synergies 
could be captured through cooperation and connection that cannot be gained on an island. 
The recently announced (February 2015) EU Energy Union seeks to avoid islanding 
within Europe. 
Islands also lack the “vast” area of deserts and are not well suited for large-scale 
power generating facilities. Policy officials from the island of Malta support the Desertec 
vision because they lack space for energy generation. The Maltese minister said at the 
2012 Desertec conference, “due to its geographical location, Malta has historically been a 
bridge between the North and Southern shores of the Mediterranean on a political, 
cultural, and social level.” Through this, Malta attempted to strengthen its geopolitical 
weight by reframing itself from an island to a bridge. It would both gain access to 
electricity generated on North African land and serve as a hub in the Mediterranean for 
electricity flows.  
This reframing of the region as interconnected used mixed metaphors that may 
subtly suggest different energy justice outcomes. A bridge implies that there is a barrier 
to be traversed, such as an interstitial zone of an empty desert, over an obstacle from one 
point to a second point. The bridge metaphor is unidirectional, or bidirectional at most, 
and may reinforce the common fear that Desertec would result in Europe extracting 
electricity from North Africa. The hub metaphor suggests the Mediterranean is the center 
of activity, with spokes extending out to connect the entire region, possessing a center 
and a radius. The hub suggests multidirectional flows. In a different case, Starosielski 
(2011) found that Guam is the hub for much of the world’s Internet traffic. While maps 
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of this undersea Internet cable infrastructure simply illustrate lines, this does not 
demonstrate the significance of the geographies of power that they connect (ibid). Under 
the influence of U.S. military and private telecommunication companies, Guam is a 
powerful actor in Internet infrastructure (ibid). Similarly, Malta could play this role as a 
hub within the Mediterranean. The bridge versus hub metaphor is significant in framing 
who might benefit and who might lose from regional electricity flows and 
interconnection. Who would be at the center and the periphery of this hub? In what 
direction would electricity flow across bridges? Would the people living in the zone that 
the bridge crosses be recognized and benefit? 
One challenge to avoiding islanding through connectivity is that significant 
political collaboration would be required to harmonize policies, standards, and codes for 
islanded grids to be connected with the main grid. Achieving this would likely require a 
history of political collaboration with mutual trust and increased integration over time. 
Grids with limited interconnection that operate in islanded mode may reflect a lack of 
political integration. From 2007 to 2012, Turkey exported electricity to Syria along a 
single 117 km, 400 kV transmission line in “islanded” operation mode, meaning the grids 
were not synchronized (Hafner, Tagliapietra, Andaloussi, & Habib, 2012). Throughout 
Syria’s bloody civil war, Turkey threatened to withhold these electricity exports 
(Ozerkan, 2011). In 2012, Turkey cut electricity exports to Syria, but they blamed a 
technical malfunction (Khawaja, 2012). Doubting the veracity of these claims, Syria left 
the Egypt-Turkey-Jordan power block and began importing from Iran (Haydar, 2012) 
Iran is skirting international sanctions on its oil indirectly by using the oil to generate 
electricity and then selling this electricity regionally (Mirsaeedi-Glossner, 2013), 
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illustrating the geopolitics potentially involved in regional power systems (Haydar, 2012) 
Since the integration between Syria and Turkey was limited and in islanded mode, it was 
relatively easy for them to extricate their grids. Fully integrated electricity markets and 
grids would be difficult to separate and would demand better political accord as discussed 
below.  
Strategic geographical reframing, technological integration, and political 
integration. The original Desertec studies envisioned creating a new geopolitical region, 
“EU-MENA,” requiring the regional negotiation of new laws, subsidies, and regulations 
to govern this regional, liberalized electricity infrastructure and market. In international 
relations, the framework of Idealism asserts that economic integration will facilitate 
peaceful relations between countries (Guzzini, 2013). Likewise regional electricity 
integration discourses often assume that technological integration will lead to 
cooperation, dual-sided dependence, and peace. Just as Woodrow Wilson thought the 
League of Nations would bring peace through the development of international policy, in 
the Desertec vision, EU-MENA would be economically intertwined through a liberalized 
energy grid that would bring peaceful political cooperation. 
  Like Malta, other countries have attempted to strategically redefine their 
geography to ensure they would play an important role in the new region. Morocco, for 
example, attempted to frame itself as European by applying for EU membership in 1987. 
The EU said Morocco was not a European country due to its nine-mile separation from 
Spain across the Strait of Gibraltar. Morocco now frequently uses its critical location 
within the Desertec vision to highlight its geopolitical importance in the EU-MENA 
region. A Moroccan energy official, Abderrahim El Hafidi, stated during the 2012 Dii 
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conference that “Morocco’s special geographical position puts Morocco at an energy 
crossroads [sic] thanks to its interconnection with Spain and Algeria.” Additionally, 
Amina Benkhadra, the former Moroccan Energy Minister stated, “due to its geographical 
position and its interconnections in the east with Algeria and in the north with Spain, 
Morocco is in a unique position of being a crossroads [sic] for energy.” In another 
example, Germany, the main proponent of Mediterranean systems integration, is in the 
awkward position of not being a Mediterranean country. The Union for the 
Mediterranean, which heads the Mediterranean Solar Plan, includes all of the EU member 
states including Germany. Without including Germany as a Mediterranean country, 
France would likely have been unsuccessful in its bid to control the Union for the 
Mediterranean. For the Desertec vision to work, such political complexities and attempts 
to secure political power would need to be negotiated across dozens of countries.  
In the visioning stage for a regional sociotechnical system, geopolitical 
boundaries are sometimes redrawn to better accommodate the technological system. 
Within the Mediterranean electricity systems integration discourse, Southern Europe is 
often framed as the northern shore of the Mediterranean, while North Africa is the 
southern shore, or “the sunbelt countries.”85 In the MedRing study, southern Europe, 
including Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy, was framed as the “Northwestern 
Mediterranean.” Part of what is often called the Middle East was called the Eastern 
Mediterranean encompassing Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Territories, and 
Jordan. Finally, the South Mediterranean—which could be called North Africa— was 
framed as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. (Southeastern Europe included 
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Slovenia, Croatia, BiH, Serbia, Montenegro, FYROM, Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece. 
Turkey was listed separately.) This framing charts a more unified vision of the 
Mediterranean by framing the Northern coast of Africa as Mediterranean rather than 
African.  
  Instead of removing all nation-state borders from the map, Figure 34 from Dii’s 
Desert Power 2050 report divided up the Mediterranean based on electricity blocks, to 
emphasize the need to interconnect them and avoiding islanding. For example, “Iberia,” 
which is largely islanded, appeared as one country on the map. Morocco, Algeria, and 
Tunisia—which currently lack political integration—were drawn as the Maghreb country. 
These creative reconfigurations of nation-state boundaries are possible in the visioning 
stage but become problematic as the vision progresses; as I describe in the next chapter, 
Spain was uninterested in being reframed as a bridge for Moroccan energy to Europe. 
While maps can be easily redrawn in the visioning phase, during the construction phase 
the design would be affected by physical and political geography. 
  180 
 
 
Figure 34. Desert Power 2050 Report, Portrayal of the Region, Source: Dii, Used with 
Permission. 
In Dii’s 2013 report, Desertec: Getting Started, they recognized that building a new 
region is a long-term effort. 
 
In 1950, Robert Schuman [a founding father of the EU and French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs] said: “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single 
plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto 
solidarity.” This report was researched and written in the spirit of identifying the 
concrete achievements capable of creating the solidarity needed to build a 
sustainable power system for EU-MENA. And in the same spirit, Dii calls on the 
stakeholders and decision makers in the ongoing processes to act now in favor of 
more renewables and electricity system integration around the Mediterranean and 
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in the Middle East…. A sustainable power system for EU-MENA can only be built in 
partnership, with mutual respect, curiosity, and open-mindedness towards new 
solutions. (original emphasis) 
EU-MENA will not be made all at once and would require more than metaphorical and 
cartographic work. According to Dii, building electricity technologies would be the 
concrete step that would be needed to connect the Mediterranean, just as the European 
Coal and Steel Community was Schuman’s concrete step. 
  In the discourse on renewable energy integration, MENA’s regional coherency 
often goes unquestioned despite a lack of south-south political integration. In 2013, the 
Regional Center for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (RCREEE) in Cairo 
released the first Arab Energy Futures Index, which charted the progress of MENA 
countries in renewable energy. The Green Prophet, an insightful blog on green 
technology in the MENA region, pointed out that framing MENA as a unified region was 
problematic.  
 
One of the challenges that I see in the Arab world and in Arab nations is the 
notion that Arab-speaking countries should be lumped together while etching out 
a renewable energy future. And that they should do it collectively. The Arab 
world is HUGE. Lumping all Arab-speaking nations together could be as helpful 
as combining America with Mexico, Cuba and Panama — calling these nations 
the Americas (Kloosterman, 2013).  
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Typically the focus of electricity integration is on north-south integration problems, but 
this author raises the important point that MENA itself also lacks integration and that it 
may not make sense to conceive of the region as a unified whole. 
Regional energy system proponents often frame technology as the glue that would 
unify the vast EU-MENA region, separating technological integration from political 
integration. The Barcelona process sought to develop a “ring of friends” around the 
Mediterranean (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005). Several years later, the EU funded 
Medring, which envisioned that technological integration would glue the region together 
to create this ring of friends. Some system imaginers assume that technological 
integration will eventually result in political integration. In other cases, the technological 
system itself is seen as a proxy for cooperation across this diverse region. The Desert 
Power 2050 report envisioned a system, not of mutually assured destruction but of 
mutual reliance, "in which no single country is dependent on another but instead each 
country is reliant on the system as a whole."  
The binary between technological integration and political integration is 
questionable, as the two are fundamentally intertwined. More recently, common 
regulatory frameworks at least have been acknowledged as an additional adhesive 
necessary for energy integration. According to industry experts, “A key unmet need is for 
the regulatory glue that connects technical standards and the players involved.” (Greacen 
et al., 2013). In 2009, the EU developed such a regulation—a “cooperation mechanism” 
called Article 9. Article 9 allows for renewable electricity imports from “third countries” 
to meet Europe’s 20/20/20 goals. Five years later, no Article 9 projects have been 
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implemented, and the regulatory glue has not interconnected the region due to a lack of 
political integration that will be further discussed in the next chapter.  
The focus on technological integration overlooks the major political development 
questions at stake in electrical power systems development. One question is whether 
North Africa countries will pursue the path of electricity liberalization strongly advocated 
by Desertec proponents, European regulators, and development banks. For example, EU 
Directive 2009/72/EC allows for free access to the network by producers (i.e., 
discrimination against suppliers is not allowed), prohibits geographical discrimination for 
consumers trying to access the network, allows customers to change their supplier, 
recommends producers make informed choices about electricity generation, and suggests 
that the market should be liquid. All market players are required to unbundle the 
Transmission Systems Operator (TSO) and Distribution Systems Operator (DSO) from 
generation and supply. These principles relate to matters of political development, 
particularly how much power public and private actors should be apportioned in a society 
and how much south-south and north-south integration North African countries desire. 
According to the Medring studies, for a country to connect to ENTSO-E (the Western 
European grid) it must, in fact, disconnect from other neighboring regions that do not 
meet ENTSO-E standards. This could impede integration between North Africa and sub-
Saharan Africa. 
The technological integration and political integration binary also illustrates 
several challenges with the regionalization and globalization of electricity. I argued in 
Chapter 1 that the geography of energy, particularly energy siting, is a political 
development challenge for the West. The regionalism alternative creates new political 
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development challenges as it seeks to develop a regional society (Hettne & Söderbaum, 
2000) subject to transnational rules that would facilitate technological development to 
glue the region together. This would change the region’s geopolitics, as is illustrated by 
oil-poor countries attempting to redefine their place in the region by becoming major 
renewable energy exporters. Assumptions that increasing technological integration would 
lead to peace rather than unprecedented challenges for cooperation and security are likely 
unfounded. The regional vision also poses new challenges for international relations, as 
well energy justice as described in the next section. 
 
The Spatial Aspects of Energy Justice  
 
Regional geographic depictions omit particular populations and problem framings 
through methods of mapping, metaphors, and abstraction. This draws attention to the 
importance of examining multiple scales to perceive what is excluded from the system 
imaginers’ vision. Below, I discuss three energy justice areas implicated in the vision that 
will be further analyzed in the energy justice framework in Chapter 8. Through a 
geographical lens, this section helps to answer the question posed in Chapter 1 about 
what some of the outcomes might be for justice as electricity systems begin crossing 
nation-state lines, or are even globalized.  
Solar sovereignty and recognition justice. The sun may be a free resource, but it 
is not evenly distributed across the globe. The Desertec dream of exploiting vast energy 
resources in an empty desert ran aground as some countries questioned who owns the 
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sun, wind, and the land in a desert that is not in fact empty. An interviewee from a Dii 
shareholder company illustrated that,  
 
In my own words, Algeria, for example, didn’t want [sic] Desertec—they were in 
the beginning critical—had a critical view on the Desertec things, to give their sun 
power away to other people. It’s our sun, our land, so we use it for ourselves. 
Morocco was the easiest country and most stable. 
 
Algeria was not alone in their resource sovereignty concerns. Even a Moroccan energy 
expert explained that they saw the sun and wind as free and belonging to everyone, but 
not the land and water. An Egyptian engineer I interviewed who supported CSP stated, 
“we will not give away our land or sell our sand.” The broader question is whether North 
African countries will choose to utilize these resources for export or domestic use. For 
electricity to be globalized, or even regionalized, numerous countries must decide that 
electrons are appropriate for export—and along with the electrons, they will virtually 
export the land, water, and other natural resources that may be used to generate them.  
  Partha Dasgupta’s work on natural capital helps to understand the issues at stake. 
Dasgupta (2010) argued that environmental resources should be accounted for in 
economic growth, wealth, and development as natural capital. It is important not to 
assume that natural capital is fixed, since it can be degraded. Solar heat and light are 
renewable resources that cannot be degraded. Some actors in the region would argue that 
they are attached to global property rights—just as the ocean may have global property 
rights (ibid). However, this solar irradiance is only accessible for harvest via specific 
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parcels of land with private or state property rights. In some cases harvesting sunlight 
uses water and in all cases it uses other resources like steel to generate this electricity. 
These resources can be degraded. Dasgupta (2010) refers to these hidden resource uses as 
“implicit subsidies” on exports that local people affected by the production of the export 
must pay. Who pays is always a difficult issue (ibid) but it is particularly difficult for 
solar because solar is rarely economically feasible in traditional electricity markets since 
it cannot compete with subsidized fossil fuels. This is a dilemma because putting a price 
on the implicit subsidies would likely jeopardize solar energy development in the current 
economic climate, but failing to compensate local people for a loss of natural capital 
would leave marginalized populations to shoulder the burden.
86
  
  Exporting electricity and other resources versus using them domestically is a 
matter of the development pathway a country chooses. In order for affected populations 
to be included in this development, they must first be recognized. The depiction of the 
Sahara as a vast, empty wasteland ignores complex land and water rights, does not 
recognize the people living there, and could result in uneven development. Scheele 
(2012) stated, “If we believe in statistics, the Sahara is perhaps the fastest changing, most 
dynamic, and wealthiest region of the African continent” with rapid urbanization, 
population growth, and significant energy resources (p. 7). Conceiving of the Sahara as 
empty depends upon one’s perception of what counts as empty space. Such perceptions 
have a deep-seated history. As Rabinow (2007) noted, the French colonial experience in 
North Africa reflected the idea of North Africa as a land without people surrounded by 
people without land.  
                                                        
86
 See Chapter 7. 
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During my fieldwork in Egypt, I experienced differences in perspectives of empty 
landscapes when I visited the Kuraymat ISCCS (Integrated Solar Combined Cycle 
System, or CSP-natural gas) plant outside of Cairo near Beni Suef with Desertec 
investors. Prior to the visit, many people informed me that this plant was built on 
uninhabited lands free of conflict. On the drive to the power plant, I saw empty sandy 
areas. However, when I scaled the viewing platform over the power plant, I saw neither 
huts nor nomadic tents but actual apartment buildings (see Figure 35). The perception of 
the landscape as empty contradicted what I saw. What counts as uninhabited land 
depends on upon the representation of the landscape through maps, metaphors, and the 
abstraction of specific spaces. The representations of landscapes affect how they are 
perceived. Chapter 7 will further explore issues of unseen and unrecognized populations 
living in the vicinity of solar power facilities and address how the trade-off calculus for 
solar power plant siting decisions is couched in these issues of perspectives. This issue of 
recognition justice is then included in the framework in Chapter 8.  
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Figure 35. The Kuraymat Solar Field, with Apartment Buildings in the Background. 
Photo by Author. 
  Geographic myths can exclude certain populations and result in overlooking some 
of the social outcomes of the vision. In Chapter 3, I described how Saharan engineers’ 
incomplete dreams excluded the people living in the desert. This is part of a tendency to 
define the Sahara by its technological potential and its physical, rather than human, 
characteristics. Bisson (2003) argued that the boundaries of the Sahara are 
inappropriately imagined based on geographic determinism rather than human 
populations and the management of the Sahara by humans, through irrigation for 
instance. Just as Chicago’s growth dramatically reshaped its surrounding hinterland 
(Cronon, 1992), rapid urbanization shapes the Sahara as Saharans respond to the demand 
for products, like dates, in nearby cities as well as remote European markets (Bisson, 
2003). The Sahara should be defined not only by its physical characteristics but by 
human and social characteristics including rapid urbanization in coastal regions and in the 
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cities on the outskirts of the Sahara—the “doors” to the Sahara— from which products 
are shipped through complex transportation and energy networks (Bisson, 2003). Bisson 
viewed Ouarzazate—a city that will be the focus of Chapter 7— as a key example of such 
a Saharan city, outside of the geographic boundaries of the Sahara, but indelibly shaped 
by it.  
  As the vision progressed, it became apparent that building CSP in the imagined 
middle of nowhere—in unpopulated, sandy Saharan dunes—would be infeasible. An 
interviewee from the oil industry explained that they operate natural gas facilities in 
remote areas of the Sahara Desert only because it is exceptionally profitable. Since 
electricity from CSP is higher than the grid price, it would not offer sufficient payoff. The 
first CSP plants are being built instead in the Sahara’s “doors,” which have at least some 
of the necessary infrastructure including access to water, transmission, worker 
populations, supply chain industries, and stable ground.
87
 Building solar power plants in 
the “doors” would have different social implications than building solar power plants in 
the empty desert. It also suggests that CSP’s feasibility depends not only on geographic 




By 2013, the Desertec Foundation had come to perceive the North African deserts 
as populated. An interviewee from the Foundation stated that a demographically young 
population lives in the deserts of North Africa. Furthermore, the Sahara suffers from 
water shortages, and people are experiencing salt-water intrusion problems and are 
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consuming fossil water resources. He explained that the Atacama Desert in Chile is 
unpopulated. For this and other reasons, the Desertec Foundation partly shifted their 
focus from North Africa to South America. 
Energy for African communities. From the 1970s to the mid-2000s, CSP’s 
developers largely assumed that people in the vast, empty sunbelt regions would need 
little energy in the future.
89
 The original vision assumed that electricity from solar energy 
would need to be transmitted to and consumed in load centers in Europe. On the contrary, 
electricity demand in the MENA region is projected to reach European levels by 2050 as 
demand stagnates in Europe and skyrockets in MENA. When it became apparent that 
MENA would not have surplus electricity for decades, it knocked the Desertec vision off 




Infrastructure in the Western world is characterized by high reliability unlike in 
the Global South (Edwards, 2004). Desertec is a vision in which the system principle of 
reliability would stalk new locales for maintaining the reliability and redundancy of 
premium-networked spaces at unprecedented scales. Many actors saw this vision as an 
inevitable endpoint within a networking logic that seeks out the cheapest commodity 
prices and actively works to keep infrastructure invisible for premium-networked spaces. 
Would the price of this invisibility be that North African populations would shoulder the 
burdens of electricity generation without having access to premium-networked spaces?  
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Perspectives of energy justice and energy poverty shift again when the scale of 
the African continent is considered. In the second framing of the Mediterranean region, 
the Sahara is perceived as a boundary between the Mediterranean region and sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the Desertec system stops at that frontier. Compared to their southern 
neighbors, North Africans enjoy high rates of electricity access; 75% of sub-Saharan 
Africans lack access to electricity compared to 1% of North Africans (World Bank, 
2011). Desertec’s proponents consider it a win-win for all parties, including the energy 
impoverished, but scholars and media outlets have criticized the Desertec vision for 
investing in relatively wealthy North Africa while sub-Saharan Africa lies dark to the 
south (e.g., Simeland & Juma, 2011). The BBC quoted Daniel Ayuk Mbi Egbe, a 
Desertec critic as stating, "When you go to many African countries there are constant 
electricity cuts - if you want to help then you need to think not just about exporting to 
Europe but about supplying Africa as well" (McGrath, 2012).  
While the Desertec vision reframes deserts plus technology as connective tissue 
and the Mediterranean as an electricity hub, the Sahara still functions as a boundary to its 
southern neighbors. A multi-scalar perspective leads to several questions not often 
considered in the Mediterranean context. Who should have the right to be linked to 
premium-networked spaces? What technologies are appropriate in the perceptions of 
local people? Proximity to regional hegemons like South Africa or Europe spurs the 
extension of premium-networked spaces, while solar lanterns are viewed as appropriate 
for the “bottom billion” in more remote African landscapes.  
The politics of difference: equality and equity for Mediterranean electricity 
visions. At the 2013 Dii conference, Bertrand Piccard stated that while in the 20
th
 century 
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pioneers sought to conquer the planet, the 21
st
 century goals of pioneers should be to 
“conquer quality of life.” This reflects, in some sense, the shift in CSP from the 
domination of nature to the sustainability framing, as people try to place ethical and 
environmental restraints on technological change. However, the conquering and 
pioneering metaphors suggest there is a still an envisioned frontier to colonize in order to 
improve quality of life, which may be antithetical to energy justice. Deserts must be 
reframed from barriers to connective tissue within the Desertec vision because they are 
still perceived as empty frontiers to be crossed and conquered, often seen as devoid of 
people. If quality of life is to be “conquered,” will progress be achieved for local 
populations? Furthermore, when this southern frontier actually is perceived as populated, 
not all Europeans wish to be integrated with it, as challenges of cultural difference and 
immigration arise. The geographical construction of the Mediterranean electrical power 
systems vision reflects sociopolitical controversies related to immigration, connectivity, 
and barriers between Western and Arab societies. 
If the Mediterranean were a boundary between North Africa and Europe, it would 
be a porous one. Piccard framed himself as an energy refugee from Europe, reversing the 
typical direction of the journey and portraying himself as immigrating to a more 
progressive energy policy in Morocco. The Strait of Gibraltar is sometimes termed the 
Strait of Death because immigrants die trying to cross it to reach Spain. Unfortunately, 
Morocco has been viewed as the heart of European problems in the Southern 
Mediterranean, including immigration (Zai, 1997). Spain and Morocco frequently quarrel 
over border security, as more sub-Saharan Africans attempt to reach Europe via Morocco 
and its Spanish enclaves (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012). Cannabis production in the 
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Moroccan Rif Mountains provides a significant percentage of drug imports to Europe, as 
well as other contraband goods (ibid). Furthermore, a handful of terrorist bombings in 
Morocco over the past decade and the participation of Moroccan nationals in the 2004 
Madrid train bombings raised fear of Islamic extremism in a country otherwise known for 
its peaceful and mystical interpretations of Islam (Howe, 2005). More recently, wars in 
MENA countries including Syria, Libya, and Iraq led more than 45,000 migrants to 
attempt to cross the Mediterranean in 2013 (Kingsley, 2015). In 2014 and early 2015, 
large protests were held in Germany against increasing Arab migration and the 
“Islamization of Europe” despite pleas from Chancellor Merkel to desist so Germany 
would not be viewed by the rest of the world as xenophobic (Smale, 2015).  
Immigration policy reflects the framing of the Mediterranean as a shatterbelt, with 
little political connectivity and deep cultural divides. Huntington (1996) controversially 
argued that future world conflicts will involve nine world civilizations, or the highest 
grouping of people based on cultural identity including language, history, and religion. 
This “clash of civilizations” discourse was adopted in France after 9/11. The French 
sought to halt immigration, concerned that an influx of Muslims would impinge upon 
their culture (Huntington, 2011). The government banned the headscarf in public schools, 
ID photos, and public buildings (Scott, 2008). Scott (2008) explained that equality in 
France rests upon sameness, not upon embracing diversity. The French concept of laïcité, 
which refers to the protection of the state from religion, the opposite of the American 
conception of freedom of religion— was at stake (Scott, 2008). The recent killing of 12 
journalists and cartoonists at Charlie Hebdo by Islamic extremists has heightened 
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tensions between the north and south of the Mediterranean. Expressions of solidarity in 
France—voiced online through the Je suis Charlie (I am Charlie) hashtag— were 
rebutted by some young activists in the MENA region with the hashtag Je ne suis pas 
Charlie (I am not Charlie). These activists argued that the media was giving 
disproportionate attention to the lives of French citizens over the lives of Syrian refugees 
of war and victims of religious extremism in the Global South. These conflicts are 
underpinned by cultural differences between Western Europe and North Africa that 
simply cannot be swept under the rug by uniting transmission lines. 
The Desertec vision evolved as Islamophobia surged in France in the 1990s. An 
interviewee from the Desertec Foundation explained that the Desertec vision could 
address the immigration and refugee problem, because solar power could improve 
people’s lives domestically so that they are not forced to immigrate. The original 
Desertec vision stated that “tensions from poverty and immigration” could be reduced 
through North African development (Wolff, n.d.). In short, by developing the North 
African nations through solar power and industrialization, immigration to Europe would 
stop. Considering this, would Desertec replace flows of people across borders with flows 
of electrons? Or would the Desertec vision connect the Mediterranean in that groups with 
different interests would negotiate their conjoined futures in an imagined Mediterranean 
community? Is the goal of energy integration to bind people together equitably or to 
achieve energy equality for each separate region (EU and MENA)? Is the Medring an 
“integration miracle” as Dii calls it or a segregation solution? Would Desertec address 
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climate change as a region to avoid addressing adaptation together as a regional or global 
community later? 
The Desertec vision is not intrinsically xenophobic; if the vision further develops, 
the answer to the above questions will be dependent upon the procedural justice of the 
political process pursued and the goals of the involved actors. The quote from Desert 
Power 2050: Getting Started discussed above reflects a positive framing on political 
integration: “A sustainable power system for EU-MENA can only be built in partnership, 
with mutual respect, curiosity, and open-mindedness towards new solutions.” Scott 
(2008) argued that instead of focusing on political oneness and unanimity, Mediterranean 
policymakers should be focusing on how diverse groups of people negotiate their 
differences based on common ground, rather than trying to eliminate these differences. 
Ramadan (2008) opposed the “outdated integration discourse” in the Mediterranean 
because it simply highlights the differences between north and south. South-south 
conflict is perhaps equally prevalent, including ongoing tensions between Morocco and 
Algeria discussed in Chapter 6, and north-north politics within the EU have greatly 
disrupted the Desertec vision, which will be discussed in the next chapter. In contrast to 
Huntington, Nussbaum (2009), argued that we face “a clash within,” as most conflicts 
play out within civilizations not across them. In fact, there is less political integration 
among North African nations than between North Africa and Europe. Awareness of the 
immigration question and the implicated cultural divides behind it will be important as 
electricity integration projects are pursued.  
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter illustrated that Hughes’ observation that geography shapes 
sociotechnical systems should be expanded to encompass constructed geographic 
representations of the landscapes in question, especially as transmission lines cross 
nation-state borders and scales with significant implications for energy justice. Visions 
for a sustainable, modern electricity system in the Mediterranean are couched in complex 
geographical perceptions and representations of the Mediterranean that date back 
centuries, such as the Old World framing of the Mediterranean connected by Trans-
Saharan trade routes. Sites are framed as appropriate, or even ideal, for CSP using 
mapping techniques that depict deserts as empty, barren landscapes. Such geographical 
imaginaries affect how people perceive desert landscapes and who is recognized as part 
of the vision.  
As Laird (2013) argued, energy transformations have significant sociopolitical 
implications. Examining the spatial aspects of these transformations can help to make 
visible the political development issues at stake. The Moroccan government supports 
energy exports, and the European Commission is interested in energy connections with 
nation-states in the Southern Mediterranean. Despite this support, centrifugal forces pull 
the region apart. Piccard viewed himself as an energy refugee, not only because of the 
symbolism of his migration across the Strait of Gibraltar, but also because he fled from 
European politics to North Africa where the deserts await progressive solar power 
development.  
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Regional systems pose unprecedented political development challenges, as a 
“region-state” with harmonized policies, standards, and rules would have to be 
established for the system to properly function. In the field of international relations, 
scholars have observed how regions are being formed and constructed in the era of 
globalization. New regionalism theory provides a framework for understanding post- 
Cold War regionalism and evaluating the depth of regional integration (Hettne & 
Söderbaum, 2000). Regional space has geographic contiguity and is not necessarily 
respectful of state borders. A regional complex is regional space deepened by increased 
human contacts and transactions. A regional society is a regional complex subject to 
transnational rules. A regional community has developed a collective identity and a 
capacity for collective action. A region-state is a new, multi-layered organization based 
on voluntary actions by member states that has developed into a novel, heterogeneous 
form of statehood. One could therefore surmise that a region that is defined based merely 
on geography, rather than political or social bonds, is indicative of a lack of deep 
integration. The Desertec vision, through its framing of the “EU-MENA” region, 
essentially proposed the formation of a region-state. The discourse suggests that 
technology could be the glue that would hold the region-state together, substituting 
political cooperation with technological integration. However, it seems unlikely that 
technological integration could be achieved without political cooperation, and it is even 
possible that such a model aims to keep people separate more than it does to integrate 
them. 
To emphasize its support of transnational political solutions, the Desertec 
Foundation developed the cosmopolitan concept of global energy security. The tenets and 
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principles of what constitutes global energy security, and its relationship to energy 
justice, have not yet been defined. To achieve global energy security based on energy 
equality, everyone should have the same access to electricity, at least in relative terms. 
Energy equity and energy justice, which are more complex concepts, require, for 
example, the fair negotiation of land and water rights, a just process for recognizing and 
engaging local populations in energy siting, and the negotiation of cultural differences. 
Chapter 8 further defines global energy security.  
If attempts to achieve global energy security developed along with the 
globalization of electricity, countries would need to decide whether energy exports or the 
domestic use of energy wealth would be most advantageous to their development and 
their domestic energy security. Germany is eager to export its energy technologies, but 
countries in the Global South might prefer to develop their own technologies as part of 
their industrial policy. In either case, European capital investment may be necessary to 
expand electricity infrastructure to meet growing electricity demand in MENA countries, 
and electricity exports from MENA to Europe may be necessary to sweeten the deal for 
European investment. When OECD countries switch to regional production networks, 
nearby non-OECD countries typically focus on export-oriented industrialization to bring 
investment from OECD countries (Panebianco, 2003). Developing countries can benefit 
from know-how, technology, jobs, and capital, but in reality they often reap few benefits 
(ibid). Ensuring these benefits may be a tenet of global energy justice. 
It would be easy to conclude from the challenges of regional political integration 
that the Desertec dream is infeasible and socio-politically untenable. However, if the 
Europeans decide to pursue energy independence, they will either have to abandon the 
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dream of climate-friendly energy or to address significant systems-level issues to 
integrate large amounts of fluctuating renewable energy into networks. Given the goals of 
European energy policy, business-as-usual seems unlikely. Put differently, if the Desertec 
dream is again deferred, Europe will have to make other, major system-level electricity 
transformations. The next chapter will illustrate these system-level challenges and 
address the temporal aspects of energy transformations in addition to the spatial.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EVOLVING SOCIOTECHNICAL VISIONS AND DEFERRED DESERTEC 
DREAMS? 
 
In his speech at Dii’s 2013 conference, Solar Impulse pilot Bertrand Piccard 
asked, “What is pioneering spirit? What is exploration?” Piccard was not pioneering 
discovery and innovation in the traditional sense. According to him, the pioneering spirit 
does not have to do with new ideas but with belief; for example, humans went to the 
moon because they believed they could. He said that humans are desperate to find the 
best tools to help them in society. Most of these tools are about power, speed, and 
control, but he encouraged Dii investors to embrace the unknown, comparing life and 
investment to being in a hot air balloon in which one has no power, speed, or control. 
One must then metaphorically drop ballast, not in the form of new technologies, but in 
the form of one’s certitudes, or deep beliefs, or paradigms. Piccard stated, 
 
Innovation is not a new idea—it’s an old certitude you throw overboard… People 
who are here [at the Dii conference] believe in the power of dreams, innovation, 
creativity. This is the reason for Solar Impulse. If you want to fly day and night 




Innovation in the Desertec vision is conceived of as the achievement of a deferred 
dream— a dream for a system based on large amounts of renewable energy dating back 
to the early 1900s that could reemerge and be achieved in the present once the various 
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 From my field notes from the conference. 
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factors that have impeded the dream are shed. From this perspective, modern energy 
systems are not necessarily innovative ones, but visions whose time has come. Al Gore’s 
famous quote, which has been widely circulated in the policy domain, reflects this 
mentality: “we have all the technologies we need, more are being developed…but we 
should not wait, we cannot wait, we must not wait.” This perspective is further reflected 
in the popular climate change stabilization wedges scenario, which focuses first on 
picking the “low hanging fruit” of climate change mitigation, such as greater energy 
efficiency. The job of today’s innovators is then to carve out a niche in the future in 
which the deferred dream will be realized and then to speed up progress toward this end 
goal. 
What this perspective on innovation downplays are the significant systems-level 
reorganizations involved in scaling up these existing technologies. This chapter lays out 
the systems-level challenges posed by energy transformations of the 21
st
 century by 
illustrating the significance even of those transformations that generally leave the 
centralized electricity system configuration in place.
92
 Since electrical power systems 
already have over a century-long history, these systems are not being built from scratch, 
rather the old system is being refurbished and rearranged and new infrastructure grafted 
onto the old. This complicates the process of dropping ballast because there is a complex, 
existing sociotechnical and sociopolitical landscape in which “old certitudes” are 
cemented on top of which the system must be built. The Desertec vision seeks to extend 
the centralized systems logic across an entire region to build an integrated system based 
almost entirely on renewable energy, which is a much different system to manage than a 
                                                        
92
 See Chapter 1. 
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power system bounded by a nation-state. The innovation involved is in massive systems 
integration across nation-state borders and its management, more so than in the 
renewable energy technologies. By comparison, groups like Eurosolar envision a more 
radical systems reconfiguration in which electrical power systems would shift to a 
distributed, point-of-use arrangement in which power is generated largely on rooftops and 
in backyards.
93
 Whether extending the centralized configuration across a continent or 
completely uprooting the centralized infrastructure and switching to distributed 
generation—or perhaps another scenario yet to be envisioned— scaling up renewable 
energy would require significant changes. Unlike the distributed alternative, growing 
complex centralized renewable energy-based systems will require centralized 
management, which presents new risks even as it addresses other problems like climate 
change mitigation. 
Part of the significance of system-level energy transformations are the broad-
reaching goals the system seeks to address—as Piccard put it, renewable energy 
innovation is meant to “conquer quality of life” in the 21st century. While the electrical 
power systems of a century ago sought to bring light and heat to cities and remote areas, 
rebuilding electrical power systems to meet sustainability goals brings with it broader 
challenges. My analysis of the Desertec vision illustrates that energy transformations 
relate not only to powering communities but also to addressing integrated challenges 
related to water, poverty, food, and development. It might not only be desirable to 
address these challenges in tandem but also necessary. For example, the energy-water 
nexus is addressed in the first system design of the Desertec vision, but not in the second 
                                                        
93  See Chapter 1 for further explanation. 
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This creates problems as the first CSP plant in Morocco is being built in a water-scarce 
region, as will be discussed in Chapter 7. Some of the most interesting questions of 
energy justice and politics lie in these intersecting domains and their trade-offs. Although 
the system imaginers seek to address multiple challenges at once, no system is a win-win; 
there will always be trade-offs at different scales. If innovation relates to shedding deep 
beliefs, what values and beliefs do underpin these long-term dreams and what makes 
them stick? This chapter shows that the vision’s principles are not cemented in the design 
stage; they are still up for negotiation as the actors work to accelerate the vision from 
design to construction. 
In part, this chapter picks up CSP’s history when I left it in Chapter 3, exploring 
its reemergence as part of visions for sustainable energy systems for Europe and North 
Africa. However, it does so by understanding CSP in the context of a broader and much 
more developed vision for a system than existed when Frank Shuman envisioned building 
270 million horsepower of CSP troughs in the Sahara Desert. This chapter explores CSP 
in the context of an ensemble of technologies in the Desertec vision, including high 
voltage direct current transmission lines, solar PV, wind, geothermal energy, and fossil 
fuels. In 1850, CSP was a dream for a technology; by 2006, it was subsumed under a 
broader vision for a system and prioritized for its system-specific benefits. When the 
envisioned system properties change in the second system design, CSP plays a less 
significant role in the system design.  
In Chapter 1 I asked: How are the windows of opportunity that allow a technology 
to form a niche that breaks into a system imagined, what problems do they create in the 
system, and how are these problems addressed? This chapter analyzes the framings of 
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ensembles of technologies, including CSP, within a systems context, considering what 
benefits they provide the overall system. It combines a SCOT microscale analysis of 
technologies with a mesoscale understanding of the systems-level challenges to better 
understand modernity and technology. It emphasizes that renewable energy technologies 
evolve within system contexts, and systems are shaped by the context of available 
technologies and the benefits or drawbacks they offer the system. The politics of the 
technologies within the vision are then dependent upon the politics of the overall system. 
This analysis provides more feedback between the SCOT approach, which is typically 
not studied in a systems-level context, and the systems-level approach, which often 
overlooks how microscale framings of technologies affect the shaping of the visions for a 
system. Understanding this interplay between the technology and the system provides a 
more nuanced understanding of why it has been seemingly impossible to scale up 
renewable energy. 
This chapter explores these envisioned system-level transformations, the 
technologies they include, and their sociopolitical stakes by analyzing how visions for a 
Mediterranean sociotechnical electricity system were developed and negotiated over time 
and how regional politics and other intervening factors affect the vision and whether or 
not it will be deferred. I identify and analyze three different system designs within the 
broader umbrella of the Desertec vision. I explore how these designs developed over 
eight years and how characteristics of the visions such as feasibility, societal benefits, and 
sustainability are constructed and reframed within new versions of an old dream. 
Comparing and contrasting these visions illuminates the system-level and technology-
level changes the actors are proposing, the principles underpinning them, and their 
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promises for societal benefit, as well as the factors that shaped the visions. It also 
illustrates the politics involved in envisioning a regional sociotechnical system, which 
were not explored in Hughes’ account. What processes would allow electrons to flow 
unimpeded across borders and what stops them? In an energy system encompassing 
dozens of countries whose vision wins out? 
Analyzing these visions also illustrates the temporal significance of energy 
transformations and how they relate to technology and modernity. In Chapter 1 I argued 
that the temporal aspects of energy transitions are as challenging as their geographical 
aspects. Keeping the centralized system configuration in place with large amounts of 
renewable energy is a highly temporally dependent challenge. In Desertec Design II, 
renewable energy’s intermittency would be evened out through “perfect foresight” that 
predicts the weather and the electricity demand at each second to make electricity 
immediately available at any point in the system across an entire region. Even though 
Desertec is an old dream, to revert to sun and wind power while managing their natural, 
intermittent cycles would perhaps be the ultimate project of technology and modernity. 
Again, a modern energy system is not envisioned as one with radically innovative 
technologies but a somewhat different system configuration and different management, 
especially relating to the temporal aspects of the system. 
A new model of a vision. Below I present three system designs under the aegis of 
the Desertec vision and the factors that shaped them. I identified these system concepts 
through the analysis; they are not actor categories. I call Design I “a system for integrated 
solutions on a crowded planet” to reflect the Limits to Growth philosophy underpinning 
it. Design II I call “the integration miracle,” which emphasizes the benefits stemming 
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from extensive large-scale electricity systems and market integration, and Design III I 
call “virtual exports,” which would avoid building cross-continental transmission 
infrastructure and instead develop a virtual carbon market. The first design valued certain 
system properties and goals and then advocated for particular technologies framed as 
fitting these system properties. The second design prioritized different system 
properties—primarily low cost— and was ambivalent about which technologies would be 
used to meet these goals. The third design was a form of what Graham (2000) calls 
“infrastructural consumerism,” to form a niche market for renewable energy in North 
Africa supported by green consumers in Europe. For each design, I compare the 
stakeholders’ overall goals, their implied or explicit definition of sustainability, the 
technologies used, the properties and values imbued in the various renewable and non-
renewable technologies in the energy mix, the principles prioritized in the system (e.g., 
reliability, affordability, dispatchability), and the expected social benefits. I illustrate how 
the Desertec vision has been shaped by public criticism and the changing constellation of 
actors advocating for it.  
  Table 2 presents an updated version of the generalizable model of a vision 
developed from the literature in Chapter 1, improved upon by the empirical study. These 
categories are important in developing, constructing, and negotiating a vision. The first 
part of the table describes the components of a vision for a sociotechnical system (i.e., 
technologies, geographic construction, system properties, depiction of modernity, 
managing organization, shared social problems, construction of feasibility). The second 
part of the table describes the forces and processes that shape the vision (i.e., system 
imaginers, sociopolitical context, timescale, wildcards, philosophy underpinning the 
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vision, media response). This aids in understanding how the vision has been constructed 
and negotiated over time and what processes have affected whether it will be realized in 
the future or deferred. 
This model of a vision and the comparison across concepts illustrate how the 
dream for renewable energy in the Sahara moved back and forth across a continuum from 
being a dream, to a vision, to a design (or a variety of designs), to a constructed system. 
This chapter specifically explores the visioning and design process. As I asked in Chapter 
1: What happens to the network of supporters when a vision must conform to the realities 
of media backlash, financing problems, and disruptive events, which could result in 
certain expectations not being met? These system imaginers are not inventor-
entrepreneurs but act as project “accelerators” to “speed up” the vision to realize the 
deferred dream, prioritizing the urgency in Gore’s plea over technological innovation. 
The term “innovation” is therefore almost completely absent from the Desertec discourse. 
Given the vision’s ambition and scale, actors must depict it as feasible to propel it to the 
construction phase. Proving feasibility is an operationalizable form of what Piccard called 
dropping ballast—convincing people that a crazy idea will fly. Means of proving 
feasibility include framing the end goal as an inevitable and proximal future, framing the 
technologies to be deployed in the vision as mature, and framing the system imaginers as 
credible and objective. Through temporal tactics, the actors construct their envisioned 
future as feasible, catapulting it from the design to the groundbreaking stage. 
Additionally, three methods of proof-of-concept emerged throughout the vision’s 
lifecycle and were contested by the involved actors: building a reference transmission 
line, building a reference project, or lobbying for better regulations and policies to pave 
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the way for the eventual implementation of the vision. Proving feasibility is the force 
needed to propel a vision from a dream to a constructed reality. However, Desertec’s 
promoters disagreed on the means of proof-of-concept, unmasking a substantial value 
conflict and pushing the vision backwards to the dreaming stage. 
 
Table 2. 
Updated Model of a Vision for a Sociotechnical System 
 
VISION                                            EXAMPLES… 
Technology Technological 
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A Tale of Three System Designs 
 
Design I: "solar power for Europe; water and development for MENA": a 
system for integrated solutions on a crowded planet. The Limits to Growth philosophy 
provided the paradigms and values underpinning Design I. The Club of Rome’s Limits to 
Growth report from 1972 defined the “world problematique” facing all nations as, 
“poverty in the midst of plenty; degradation of the environment; loss of faith in 
institutions; uncontrolled urban spread; insecurity of employment; alienation of youth; 
rejection of traditional values; and inflation and other monetary and economic 
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disruptions” (p. 10). It framed the world population as overshooting the carrying capacity 
of the available resources on the planet, and Desertec was later offered as a solution. In 
2003, the Club of Rome and the Hamburg Climate Protection Fund, which were 
interested in addressing population growth on a crowded planet, founded the Trans-
Mediterranean Renewable Energy Cooperation (TREC) to promote the Desertec vision. 
In 2006, the German government commissioned the Systems Analysis and 
Technology Assessment (SATA) division of the German Aerospace Center (DLR) to 
conduct feasibility studies of the Desertec vision to showcase Germany’s commitment to 
renewable energy at an international conference to be held in Germany. SATA had been 
involved in CSP analysis since DLR’s involvement in the Solar Plataforma in Spain. The 
greater focus on electricity for Europe than for MENA in the report is partly the footprint 
of the interests of the client and the event for which the report was written. The studies 
included Med-CSP, which considered the potential for renewable energy around the 
Mediterranean Sea; Trans-CSP, which evaluated the south-north export of renewables to 
complement the European electricity mix; and AQUA-CSP, which explored the 
feasibility of solar water desalination. DLR considered whether it would be feasible to 
provide an 80% renewable energy future for the EU-MENA region, to provide 15% of 
the EU’s power from MENA by 2050, and to foster a positive energy partnership 
between the EU and MENA regions. The scientist who headed the project said, “we got 
an order from the German Ministry of the Environment to check this idea for 
plausibility… then we sat down with our partners, and we tried to kill this concept but we 
did not succeed in killing it.” The rest of this section explores how DLR constructed the 
vision as feasible—by ascribing advantageous traits to technologies framed as mature, or 
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technologies whose time had come that would provide important benefits to the overall 
envisioned system. 
HVDC grid. A technology’s maturity is a key factor in whether it is perceived as 
feasible. Mature technologies can be implemented quickly to speed up progress toward 
realizing the vision. DLR framed HVDC as a mature technology, as opposed to an 
innovative technology. As evidence they stated that—strung together— all of the current 
HVDC lines could wrap around the globe. Furthermore, a total of 75 GW of capacity in 
over 90 projects worldwide have been developed, and the first line was built as early as 
1954 from Sweden to the island of Gotland. They also referenced the existing DC 
submarine cable between Italy and Greece. This mature technology would form the 
“backbone” of the vision, or “highway” connecting the region. Each country would 
maintain its own AC grid, analogous to country roads and city streets. The design 
included 20 power lines of 5 GW capacity each built by 2050. 
In addition to HVDC’s maturity, DLR valued it for numerous other traits making 
it advantageous for building the backbone of the system. They illustrated this through a 
comparison to AC transmission. The battle of the currents between AC and DC that 
Hughes (1983) thought had been put to rest has been reopened. First, HVDC is efficient 
because it has half the long-distance transmission losses than HVAC, and higher-capacity 
longer lines can be built. Second, while AC transmission was framed as safe in the 1900s, 
DLR framed HVDC as safer because AC requires more transformers to maintain the 
voltage on the line and if one AC transformer gets out of sync the entire circuit will be 
short-circuited. With HVDC, if something goes wrong on one end, it grounds to the 
ground rather than short-circuiting. An HVDC grid would also provide the system with 
  212 
the traits of stability and redundancy through the “n-1 criteria” in which a broken power 
plant in one country can be substituted for an operational one in another country during 
an emergency. For example, in 2008, several of the steam turbines at Morocco’s Jorf 
Lasfar coal-fired power plant (300 MW capacity each) unexpectedly shut down. 
Importing electricity from Spain and Algeria allowed Morocco to avoid load shedding 
(Fairley, 2008). HVDC also would provide for connectivity by linking the best sites for 
solar energy in North Africa to Europe.
94
 Additionally, HVAC transmission lines cannot 
be buried, while HVDC can. Since the HVDC cables would be buried underneath the 
Mediterranean and throughout the EU countries, HVDC has the property of invisibility 
for premium-networked spaces in Europe. It would also allow the generation facilities to 
be placed out of sight— on a different continent.95  
Because of all of these advantages, DLR concluded that an HVDC backbone grid 
“will probably be implemented in Europe within this century to enhance security and 
stability.” By framing HVDC as a mature, efficient, stable, safe, redundant, connective, 
and invisible technology, its implementation appeared to be nearly inevitable, or part of a 
networking logic. Therefore, HVDC was not necessarily perceived as an innovative 
technology, but a technology whose time had come. 
Dispatchability. The value of dispatchability underpinned Design I’s logic for 
integrating a power system across dozens of countries, illustrating the importance of 
system-level considerations in energy transformations. Dispatchability means that an 
energy source can be controlled on demand—turned on or off or ramped up or down as 
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 See Chapter 4 for a discussion on why connectivity is important. 
95
 See Chapter 4 on the justice aspects of extending premium-networked spaces. 
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needed by utility company operators (Greacen et al., 2013).
96
 DLR analyzed 50 countries 
in the region and found that each country could reach an 80% renewable energy future in 
terms of resources but not in terms of its system being able to function. Not every country 
has the right kind of renewable energy to independently maintain a reliable renewable 
energy system, which is generally the trait valued most highly by electricity system 
builders. Some in the power sector see renewables as fundamentally untenable because 
they are intermittent and are not dispatchable. Incorporating large amounts of fluctuating 
renewable energy resources into the grid can make it unstable and unreliable (ibid).  
Design I posited that integration across countries could provide dispatchability in 
the system in order to stabilize it. While European countries could generate their own 
fluctuating (intermittent) renewable energy from sources like wind and PV, at a system-
level, they require a replacement for the baseload power provided by coal and nuclear 
power plants that produce a constant flow of electricity 24 hours per day. A DLR scientist 
explained, “In some countries [they] needed this import of solar electricity from the south 
to the north because they had a lack of flexible renewable energy…and this high quality 
of energy, this is only available in North Africa.” Intermittent wind and hydropower in 
the north could be combined with dispatchable electricity from CSP from the south. A 
CSP plant sited in North Africa would be operated as a virtual power plant for Germany, 
replacing baseload power from coal. Unlike in Design II, cost was not the first priority 
for generating dispatchable power; DLR hoped Germany would be willing to pay more 
for this dispatchable power to avoid using fossil fuels or nuclear as baseload power plants. 
                                                        
96 See also the electricity primer in Chapter 1. 
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CSP. While some interviewees asserted that Design I focused on CSP merely 
because of SATA’s experience with it, CSP was advocated for in Design I specifically 
for the system trait of dispatchability. Technological advocates focus on particular 
technologies, but they do so based on their system principles. CSP had an air of 
inevitability at the time; according to the father of Desertec, it appeared to be “only a 
matter of time” before this mature technology was developed because of the important 
role it could play in the electricity system. Unlike in 1880, CSP in Design I was 
envisioned as an important part of the overall electricity system.
97
 Combined with cheap 
thermal storage,
98
 CSP could compensate for fluctuations and nighttime to generate 
dispatchable electricity about 20 hours per day. It is difficult and costly to reduce 
generation from conventional baseload power plants when the generation spikes from 
fluctuating renewable electricity, and it can take 20 hours or more to restart a nuclear 
power plant. In contrast, it is easy to shut down CSP by simply moving the mirrors to the 
stow position.  
Conforming to the Limits to Growth philosophy, Design I also valued CSP plants 
for their ability to address integrated challenges, illustrating that the challenge of building 
electrical power systems in the 21
st
 century goes well beyond providing heat and light. 
DLR framed CSP power plants as multipurpose power plants providing integrated 
solutions. The report stated “In the world’s arid regions, such plants could become the 
nucleus of a totally new social paradigm: like the conservation and recuperation of land 
flooded by the sea in the Netherlands.” DLR argued that building multipurpose plants in 
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 See Chapter 3. 
98 Developed at the PSA in the 1980s as described in Chapter 3. 
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the margins of the desert could prevent desertification, desalinate ocean water, provide 
food by sheltering plants in the shadow of the mirrors, and facilitate foreign cooperation 
(see Figure 36). In the loftiest of CSP’s promises, a solar power and water project for 
Gaza sited in Egypt was envisioned to bring peace to this tumultuous area. 
 
 
Figure 36. Integrated Solar Energy Solutions, Source: Aqua-CSP, German Aerospace 
Center (DLR) Feasibility Studies 
PV & wind. In this design, solar photovoltaics and wind were seen as expensive, 
fluctuating sources of electricity that DLR expected to be built in a distributed 
configuration in Germany and other Europe countries. The fluctuations from wind 
balance each other out in the system to a certain extent, but overall fluctuating energy 
would need to be balanced out by dispatchable, firm power on demand from CSP in 
deserts. This would change dramatically in Design II.  
Fossil fuels. Like HVDC and CSP, DLR framed fossil fuels as mature 
technologies that provided important advantages despite being non-renewable. They 
improve system reliability by ensuring a 25% spinning reserve capacity (i.e., generation 
that can come online within 10 minutes to ensure the system’s frequency is maintained). 
Fossil fuels would also provide for peak power demand. The studies criticized humanity 
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for squandering fossil fuels when other resources are available to meet baseload demand 
(the opposite of today’s system). They stated that humans are “like squirrels eating the 
nuts we should be saving for wintertime.” As discussed in Chapter 4, Design I depicted 
farming energy as more modern and sustainable than generating energy from fossil fuels 
gathered “like our ancestors collected berries and hunted animals.” Using CSP to harvest 
energy from the sun then was viewed as part of natural, global technological progress. 
While DLR framed this system as modern, it was also based upon an old dream for CSP 
seeking to become a reality, providing further evidence that new system configurations in 
the power sector are viewed as more innovative than new technologies.  
Sustainability. How the system imaginers defined sustainability shaped the vision 
and its design. Sustainability is an ambiguous term that is defined differently in different 
cultures. Sometimes it functions as an ideograph, or an empty term that is flexibly 
interpreted and often evokes an emotional, rather than intellectual, response (Van Lente, 
2000). Ideographs legitimate expectations for future social benefits from the envisioned 
technology or technological system (ibid). In other cases, sustainability adopts 
substantive cultural connotations. For example, we found during our study abroad trips in 
Spain that sustainability has been associated with opposing government corruption 
following the Eurozone crisis. 
In Design I, the definition of sustainability was based upon an alternate 
interpretation of the triple bottom line. DLR conceptualized the economic pillar as the 
affordability of electricity and the internalization of the externalities of fossil fuel 
generation. The second pillar was conceptualized as “compatibility with society and the 
environment.” The final pillar was security, which was conceived of as security of supply 
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and security gained through international cooperation. Sustainability was also framed as 
using the least materials possible. DLR’s Med-CSP report included a lifecycle analysis of 
the technologies to consider whether there were sufficient materials available to build all 
of the technologies in the system design. These aspects placed a greater focus on 
integrated solutions and were lost in Design II. 
Societal benefits. Van Lente & Rip (1998) argued that promises for the societal 
benefit of new technologies established expectations for outcomes. These expectations 
become promises and lead to problems for the technology when it is built. In addition to 
setting expectations, the framing of the system-level societal benefits is important to 
establishing the feasibility of the system—not just from the perspective of whether it can 
be achieved technologically but whether it should be built in terms of societal value 
added. The expected societal benefits of Design I included the expansion of premium-
networked spaces, energy interdependence, and win-win cooperation. DLR asked the 
following three questions: Could the common goals overcome frictions and suspicions 
based on cultural differences (which was problematized in the immigration discussion 
discussed in Chapter 4)? Can these regions cooperate without endangering their cultural 
identities? Can all countries become winners through cooperation?  
While promoting societal benefits is essential for establishing feasibility, the 
societal benefits were framed through a promise that the system would not have 
drawbacks, which became problematic in reality. In contrast to the Limits to Growth 
report, which acknowledged the trade-offs inherent in the development of technologies, 
the Desertec vision was framed as a win-win solution from its inception. DLR also 
argued that the vision would result in a win-win outcome for all countries. For example, 
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since there are surpluses in Europe of oranges and tomatoes, European farmers would 
lose from imports, whereas importing electricity could be a win-win. DLR stated, "proper 
general conditions could generate considerable economic and ecological win-win 
configurations for all countries of EUMENA" including to 
1. “enable feasibility and enhance productivity of the cooperation 
2. ensure advantages for all sides 
3. support stability of the interregional relations 
4. bar the abuse for hegemony and cultural domination” (Trieb, 2006, p. 98). 
 
I describe later that system imaginers struggled to convince all parties that the vision 
would be a win-win, and Spain failed to sign a transmission agreement, which disrupted 
the vision’s feasibility. The win-win concept is further explored in Chapter 6 by 
examining the perceived benefits of integration for Morocco and in Chapter 8 as part of 
energy justice. 
I argued in Chapter 4 that expanding premium-networked spaces could be a tenet 
of energy justice. This was another of Design I’s proposed benefits. An interviewee 
pointed out that 25% of Mexico’s population lives in Mexico City because of limited 
access to electricity in the rest of Mexico, while even the Black Forest in Germany is a 
premium-networked space. In this sense, a lack of centralized, interconnected power 
systems centralizes people. DLR argued that energy autonomy and independence goals 
conflicted with Europe’s obligation to be good neighbors. They stated,  
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In fact the autonomy goal, and its proposed solutions, is rather questionable in 
terms of ethics and sustainability: it propagates a Europe unaffected by the future 
misery of its neighbors, and fosters the illusion of independency on a rather small 
and crowded planet. (p. 33)  
 
Design I sought to build an energy system for the Mediterranean in which everyone 
would be equally networked. The Limits to Growth framing underpins the global 
conception of energy security discussed in Chapter 4, in which energy sustainability and 
energy access for a growing population must be addressed at a regional, if not planetary, 
scale due to earth’s limited resources.  
Security. Aside from the global equality framing of security, Design I framed 
energy security chiefly as the diversification of Europe’s energy portfolio. The report 
envisioned that electricity could come from ten sources in 2060, as opposed to the five 
fuels sourced at the time of the report’s publication. They described the current energy 
path as based on high risk, short-term policy decisions, while Design I with renewable 
energy and fossil fuel backup would be “low risk”. DLR also framed network stability, 
which HVDC would provide, as a tenet of security. Finally, Design I partly conceived of 
security as building renewable energy in MENA to relieve pressure on the fossil fuel 
supply for Europe. The framing of energy security changed significantly in Design II as 
will be described later. 
In 2007, TREC published the Desertec White Book, which reflected Design I. The 
White Book was qualitative and included voices from MENA, lending legitimacy to the 
vision from the south of the Mediterranean. Prince Hassan of Jordan, also the president of 
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the Club of Rome, wrote the introduction, which presented Desertec as a solution to 
power and water for a growing population. It also emphasized the vision’s global security 
and interdependence benefits. First, it framed global climate change as the central 
challenge the Desertec vision was seeking to solve. Second, it framed energy poverty as 
the central type of poverty in the world and proposed to fuel economic development with 
energy. Third, it focused on North-South cooperation between the “sunbelt and the 
technology belt.” TREC still saw CSP as the leading technology in the system, and the 
Algerian Hassi R’Mel ISCCS plant was offered as proof-of-concept and evidence of 
technological maturity. Prof. Bennouna from Morocco argued that Europeans could make 
up for the wrongs committed during the colonial era by helping Morocco with its 
industrial development. He argued that Morocco should better negotiate with the EU to 
use renewable energy to fight common challenges of poverty, climate change, and South-
North discrimination. He predicted that “Morocco is on its way to [becoming] an energy 
exporting country.” (In contrast, the European media responded in part to Design I by 
predicting that this scale of cooperation would result in neocolonial relationships.) 
Finally, the report recommended an Apollo-like EU-MENA Desertec Program, which is 
an unfortunate metaphor since Apollo focused on international competition instead of 
collaboration. 
In summary, Design I would maintain individual country-level energy markets, 
CSP would provide the essential service of firm power on demand (dispatchability), and 
fossil fuels would play an important, albeit much smaller, role. The system design 
addressed integrated solutions, to provide solar power for Europe and energy and 
development for MENA. 
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System Drivers: Forces that Shaped the Desertec Vision and its Design from 2007-
2011 
 
This section explores the forces and processes that shaped the vision and its 
design until Design II was published in 2011, in order to illustrate how visions are 
developed and negotiated over time and framed as feasible. These forces and processes 
included the creation of the Desertec Industrial Initiative (Dii); the neocolonial critique; 
differing energy security framings; long timescales; and what scenario planners call 
wildcards, including the drop in the price of PV and the Arab Spring. These represent the 
system drivers in the model of a vision in Table 2. In order for the vision to be perceived 
as feasible from a sociopolitical standpoint, these forces and processes had to be 
addressed within Design II. There are many moving parts to this story, yet it only 
scratches the surface of the complexity of the factors that shape sociotechnical systems in 
a transnational world. In this section, I describe the new institutions and the processes 
that shaped the vision and its design, and in the following section I describe how Design 
II differed from Design I as a result. These processes affect whether the dream will 
become a reality in the future or be deferred. However, Design II did not replace Design I 
but eventually came into conflict with it, as will be described in the end of the chapter. 
 
Mediterranean system imaginers & the Dii. In 2009, the constellation of actors 
advocating for the Desertec vision changed, which shaped the vision through new 
  222 
stakeholder agendas. Euro-Medness infected the energy sector as complementary 
organizations sprang up, including the Union for the Mediterranean’s Mediterranean 
Solar Plan, a political process to promote renewable energy integration in the 
Mediterranean; Medgrid, the French run equivalent to Dii; and Res4Med, Dii’s Italian 
equivalent. In 2010, Friends of the Supergrid was founded, which is a coalition of 
companies advocating for an EU supergrid. TREC was disbanded, and the Desertec 
Foundation was founded to protect the Desertec brand and spread it to other parts of the 
globe. The development of these new institutions shaped the vision and its design.  
Most significantly, in October 2009, a “unique industrial initiative” was founded 
during the largest press conference in Munich Re’s history. There, twelve shareholder 
companies convened to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to implement the 
Desertec vision in the EU-MENA region. The MOU for the Desertec Industrial Initiative 
(Dii) stated, “it is the intent of the companies…to establish a planning entity in the form 
of an incorporated company,” (a limited liability corporation). Over three years, Dii was 
to create a legislative framework to develop projects faster, to facilitate the construction 
of a reference project for proof-of-concept, and to conduct a study with a proposed design 
for the power system of 2050 (i.e., Design II). These steps sought to prove the vision was 
feasible and to carve out a space in the future for it. Dii’s complexity rivals the 
complexity of the vision and requires further explanation to illustrate how its creation 
shaped the vision and its design. 
Dii included a diverse group of stakeholders and was highly complex, shaping 
Design II. The initiative represented an unprecedented effort to convene companies from 
the core value chain and associated chains that would be needed to develop the Desertec 
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vision—banks, utility companies, solar PV manufacturers, CSP developers, TSOs, 
insurance companies, energy companies, and project developers. It included one of the 
world’s largest reinsurance companies (Munich Re), major banks such as Deutsche Bank, 
and large energy and utility companies such as Siemens and RWE. Associated companies 
included those who wanted to carve out a niche within the energy transformation, such as 
IBM, which is working on smart grid software and software to manage wind parks.
99
 An 
interviewee described that as Dii grew, it became an extremely complex, intercontinental 
public-private partnership with 50 companies, each with a different agenda (see Table 3). 
S/he stated, “It was a great learning experience for me as well because I never had seen 
such a big level of complexity.” Several representatives expressed that working across 
different industry and company cultures was a challenge. For example, some companies 
in the consortium were more “cosmopolitan” with greater international experience, while 
others were more focused on domestic business.
100
 Finally, they described themselves as 
balancing complex and sometimes conflicting goals to improve society and the standard 
of living in North Africa versus their business intent. The table below summarizes the Dii 
shareholder companies. 
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 The Dii recruited these companies at conferences. Each shareholder signed a three-year contract and paid 
1 million euros per year; associated partners paid 75,000 euros per year. Dii was headquartered in Munich, 
Germany and employed about 30 staff members, seven of which were “secondees,” or employees of 
shareholder companies who worked for Dii temporarily while the shareholder company paid their salary.  
Dii had a shareholder committee group formed of five or six key individuals nominated by the shareholders 
who met once a month in person. They split into technical working groups including PV, CSP, networks, 
power transfer, storage, local context, and political frameworks. 
100
 Furthermore, I noted that there were particular actors within these companies who were selected as 
cosmopolitan agents of cooperation to make these connections. I heard many stories of people who had 
family connections to the MENA region or previous work experience there and had an appreciation for the 
culture. On the North African side, many of those involved in energy cooperation had lived in Europe or 
the United States for much of their lives and returned to Morocco to work across the aisle on renewable 
energy projects.  
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Table 3. 
Summary of the Dii Shareholders 
 
Shareholder Description Reason for joining 
Schott Solar A German manufacturer of glass products. The CEO of Schott Solar is part of the 
Club of Rome. Involved because they 
developed solar projects and supply 
products to these projects. 
Munich Re The world’s largest insurer, with 250 
billion euros invested in renewable energy 
assets. They seek to invest 1 billion euros 
in renewable energy as a stable asset and 
as a climate mitigation measure. 
Munich Re has a small scientific unit that 
studies the future risks of climate change 
on a massive data-gathering mission to 
track climate activity. A project like Dii 
could mitigate future climate change 
insurance risks. Many people on the Dii 
shareholder committee identified Munich 
Re as the most important member of Dii. 
Red Electrica The Spanish Transmission Systems 
Operator (TSO), which is 20% state-
owned with 25 private distributors.  
They wanted to ensure they were part of 
the project if it moved forward, but their 
enthusiasm fell because they do not see 
who will pay the price gap for renewables 
especially when there is no significant 
price for carbon dioxide emissions. 
ABB A high-tech engineering company focused 
on the power, robotics, and automation 
sector headquartered in Switzerland. Its 
precursor company was founded in 1883 
and played an important role in 
electrification. 
ABB may have first developed the 
Desertec vision independently. They were 
motivated to join Dii not just because they 
make HVDC technology but because they 
are used to “shaping the world” of 
electricity. They believe the system is 
undergoing its first fundamental 
transformation since the 1880s, and they 
want to continue to be a significant 
systems builder. 
Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank’s slogan is “banking on 
green,” and they run the “Get Fit” (feed-in 
tariff) program 
According to Caio KochWeser, vice 
chairman, at the 2011 Dii conference, they 
became involved to make productive use of 
resources and to realize the green growth 
paradigm, to find a way out of poverty for 
millions in Africa without energy, to bring 
the costs of renewable energy down, and to 
be part of a bottom-up coalition of 
businesses partnering across the region to 
develop the Desertec vision. Many of the 
shareholders of Dii are their clients, so they 
became involved to give project finance 
expertise. They believed Dii would 
develop a market for renewables in 
MENA. 
RWE A major utility company that does half of 
its business in Germany and half 
elsewhere. They are the largest mining 
company in Europe (lignite coal) and 
Europe’s biggest carbon dioxide emitter. 
RWE heads Dii’s shareholder committee. 
According to Frank-Detlef Drake, 
chairman of Dii and shareholder from 
RWE, they joined Dii to improve their 
understanding of renewable energy supply, 
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They are also one operator of the Andasol 
III CSP plant in Spain. The company is 
currently not profitable because it is 
paying a high feed-in-tariff to the owners 
of rooftop PV panels in Germany. Their 
business model is in turmoil.  
to understand how to balance Germany’s 
focus on rooftop PV with CSP in sunny 
areas. They expect their membership in Dii 
will pay off in 10-20 years. 
HSH Nordbank A bank headquartered in Hamburg, 
Germany 
They were approached by the Club of 
Rome to join the consortium (both are 
headquartered in Hamburg). They were 
interested in the Dii as the biggest 
renewable energy project in Europe 
because they had a new business unit on 
renewable energy in 2008. In 2011, after 
the Eurozone crisis bankrupted the 
company, they moved their focus back to 
Europe and did not intend to pursue North 
African projects. They do not focus on grid 
interconnection but on financing individual 
renewable energy projects. Therefore, they 
withdrew from Dii in late 2013. 
M+W Group Engineering, procurement, and 
construction company headquartered in 
Stuttgart, Germany. 
They became involved through a personal 
connection with Gerhard Knies. They 
helped fund the printing of the White Book. 
They joined Dii to become involved in 
project development; they have a focus on 
developing a pipeline of projects on North 
Africa and the Middle East. They dropped 
out when they determined they had made 
their technical contribution to Dii and no 
projects were yet available on which to bid. 
First Solar A U.S. PV manufacturing company, 
focused on large-scale PV rather than 
rooftop. 
To sell cost competitive PV panels in the 
MENA region. 
Cevital A large Algerian food manufacturer  No data 
Abengoa A Spanish engineering firm, which was 
one of the initial developers of CSP 
technology. It is one of the only successful 
CSP firms in the world currently. 
No data 
Acwa Power A Saudi power and water utility company. No data 
Enel Green 
Power 
Italian multinational renewable energy 
corporation 
No data 
Flagsol A German CSP developer No data 
Siemens The largest engineering company in 
Europe and a formative player in the first 
electrical power systems and steam 
turbines. 
Siemens withdrew from Dii when they 
closed their CSP operations. 
 
I call Dii and related organizations “system imaginers.” They differ greatly from 
the inventor entrepreneurs that Hughes described as the system builders of the original 
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electrical power systems. These organizations describe themselves as accelerators, 
enablers, catalyzers, facilitators, coordinators, and conveners rather than inventors or 
innovators. They seek to become the catalysts that shift the vision from imagined to 
designed to constructed. Dii uses temporal tactics to attempt to speed up progress toward 
its envisioned system. As Al Gore expressed, energy transformations are a matter of 
addressing urgency rather than technological innovation. These organizations frame, 
colonize, and control the future but not by physically building it or inventing new 
technologies but by convening powerful groups, constructing knowledge, and 
constructing markets. Large energy companies and visionaries do not co-design these 
systems and the technologies as, for example, Thomas Edison did. Dii’s CEO Paul van 
Son, for example, is an effective builder of networks of people, but he does not invent 
technologies or build projects but instead advocates for certain system configurations. 
These large organizations and companies are vested in a particular systems configuration, 
whereas in the early 1900s they were interested in building up a system around the 
technology they invented.  
Utility companies were motivated to join Dii to ensure that their business model 
would still be relevant as energy systems are reconfigured in the future. One shareholder 
representative articulated the importance of maintaining system-level leadership in the 
power sector,  
 
If we believe that the world of electricity is developing in that direction [toward 
systems integration], then we want to be among those that shape this again, also to 
be a dominant player in that again. 
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These companies realize that, while electricity systems have gained significant 
momentum, they are not maintained without continual effort, and that if disruptive 
innovation were to occur that completely changed the system configuration their business 
model could become obsolete. These electrical power systems are being constructed in a 
complex and changing landscape of existing infrastructure and institutions that will work 
to maintain their relevance. Hughes (1983) described the centralized system 
configuration and the education of electrical engineers in a particular form of grid 
management as indicative of the final stage of momentum in electrical power systems. 
Renewable energy advocates in the United States deride the managers of today’s systems 
as DOUGs (dumb old utility guys) who fail to imagine new ways of managing electrical 
power systems. ABB is one of a handful of major companies still in existence involved 
since the inception of electrical power systems, and its aim is to avoid succumbing to 
stagnant thinking. An interviewee from ABB stated “it’s a problem of knowledge, 
achieved knowledge, which unfortunately doesn’t cover all questions, and as you may 
know it’s much more difficult to forget what you know than to learn new things.” 
Although ABB is an old incumbent, it is committed to looking at the energy system in a 
new way. 
Because of Dii’s complexity—with numerous stakeholders with many agendas, 
working across company cultures and balancing business intent and social goals— it 
struggled to project a coherent identity, especially one that would provide it with the 
credibility to shape the future of the power sector. At Dii’s 3rd Annual Conference in 
Berlin in 2013, Aglaia Wieland, Chief Strategy Officer, articulated that Dii is a think 
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tank, an industrial platform to facilitate unprecedented collaboration between companies, 
and a trusted political organization. The multiple identities of the system imaginers affect 
the sociology of expectations. Expectations play an important role in shaping new 
technologies at both the level of systems and individual technologies (Borup et al., 2006). 
As Van Lente (2000) observed, expectations become requirements for the technology 
and— I would add— the system and the system imaginers. For example, if Dii is a 
project accelerator, then people expect the project pipeline will grow faster than it would 
otherwise. If Dii is a trusted advisor, then people expect that the leaders will not air their 
disagreements in the media. When these identities came into conflict it, in part, led to the 
deferral of the dream. Below I explain Dii’s five identities and how they relate to its 
credibility, ultimately to describe how Dii’s identities shaped Design II. This also 
provides a better understanding of today’s system imaginers and the role they play in 
developing tomorrow’s electrical power systems. 
 
A project accelerator. Dii acted as an accelerator to speed up the process of 
helping a deferred dream find its place in the future. Selin (2006) stated, "there is a 
pioneer quality to these visions: they colonize the future and latch on to new spaces, 
staking out unusual territories." Adam (2003) pointed out that time is colonized through a 
capitalist market, as financial and insurance markets predict the future based upon the 
past and make promises to compensate people in the future. This is “based on the belief 
that the future is amenable to human regulation and design in the present.” (p. 73). Dii 
framed the Desertec vision as the inevitable end of a fixed trajectory in order to carve out 
a future space for the dream and to accelerate development toward that future. They 
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framed the end goal of market integration as an inevitable future based on market logic 
while in the present constructing the markets that would be needed to reach this end goal. 
An interviewee from a shareholder company illustrated this perspective,  
 
it’s like water pouring down a river—you can be sure it will go down—but 
sometimes you can accelerate the development. It’s not a question of whether 
Desertec comes at the end of the day, but it’s a question of time and whether you 
can speed up the process. 
 
This temporal tactic attempted to throw assumptions about the infeasibility of renewable 
energy overboard in order to accelerate the vision into an inevitable future. 
Not all shareholder companies agreed on the timescale required to reach this end 
goal, which resulted in disappointed expectations. One interviewee from a shareholder 
company longed for a Desert Power 2020 report, instead of Desert Power 2050. Another 
shareholder interviewee emphasized the uncertainty involved in the process of integration 
but the likelihood of reaching the end goal: “I would say if you try to describe something 
that will happen—that is expected to happen—in 40 years most likely it is wrong. But 
there are good arguments for integration, and I think we will move in that direction.” Dii 
opened up possible imagined systems based on renewable energy integration and worked 
to make the case that they are feasible to project the overall vision as feasible. 
Disagreement about how quickly this could be achieved ultimately created conflict for 
the organization, and failure to achieve results conflicted with its identity as a project 
accelerator (described later in the chapter). 
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Creator of markets. Ironically, Dii exists because the vision is not, in fact, 
inevitable, rather the necessary markets must be constructed in the present in order to 
shape the future. Dii was created to open up markets for renewable energy between the 
EU and North Africa. This private association of industry actors interested in a market-
based approach shaped Design II, whereas Design I was shaped by a government-funded 
research consortium and envisioned power markets bounded by nation-states. As the Dii 
grew, its goal became more explicitly to create a single market for electricity in the 
MENA region, which Europe could benefit from if the grids between the regions were 
integrated. Therefore, the creator of markets identity became increasingly important as 
described later in the chapter.  
A think tank and lobbying organization. Miller, Iles, & Jones (2013) identified 
energy epistemics as a key issue in energy transitions: “who knows about energy systems, 
what and how do they know, and whose knowledge counts in governing and reshaping 
energy futures?” (p. 137). Dii tried to spread its energy epistemics, or new ways about 
thinking about electricity systems integration, in order to make its envisioned future more 
viable. These ideas were also exported to MENA countries as part of Germany’s broader 
foreign policy and industrial policy goals.
101
 
Dii was founded amidst significant public confusion about whether it would 
construct the Desertec system itself. The shareholders decided in 2010 that Dii would not 
build projects itself because they did not want to create a competitor for the shareholder 
companies. Instead, Dii would use its know-how to gain traction in public policy debates 
to construct a particular future with a regulatory environment advantageous to the 
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 See Chapter 4. 
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companies. An interviewee from Munich Re stated, “it’s more a know-how company, 
where the knowledge is bundled, not a company realizing new power plants directly…”  
Dii used this identity as a think tank to frame itself as a credible advisor providing 
know-how and policy advice. Its analysts sought to be “fact based,” and the managing 
director shielded the analysts from politics. Dii described itself as providing business 
plans that its partners can trust. At the 2013 conference, a shareholder company 
representative explained that Dii needed to “step on the toes” of their clients, as a credible 
party and well-respected advisor without a direct financial interest. 
Industrial platform and convener. Dii has taken unprecedented strides in 
convening a large number of companies and stakeholders at conferences that spread their 
energy epistemics to the broader energy policy community in EU-MENA. This helped 
Dii to control the conversation and the knowledge created about future power sectors. It 
also aimed to develop the network of “human power” that Piccard said is necessary to 
make dreams happen. This role is also contested in terms of procedural justice, as some 
people in the region saw Dii as a gatekeeper that limited the conversation on energy 
integration to powerful actors who could pay for the conferences. For example, a 
Moroccan wind energy developer complained that Dii provided neither a venue for 
dissenting views and critique nor a focus on improving energy access.  
Technology neutral advisor. Dii argued that it is a neutral, independent actor 
because it does not represent the interests of one particular group but a wide range of 
industrial partners. Dii’s identity as a technology neutral advisor is important for 
understanding how systems and technologies are co-shaped and why CSP played a less 
prominent role in Design II. 
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In the first year, Dii struggled to negotiate the needs of its CSP-focused 
shareholders versus its shareholders who did not have a stake in a particular renewable 
energy technology. For example, Munich Re, identified in many interviews as the most 
important company in the consortium, is interested in climate change mitigation to reduce 
natural disaster risk and does not have a stake in a particular technology. Other 
companies, like the utility companies, are interested in the cheapest technologies. A 
representative from a shareholder company stated, “we tried not to [focus on CSP] 
because we wouldn’t want to be stamped as a German CSP Club jah.” Therefore, Design 
II focused on developing the lowest cost mix of technologies in the system, rather than 
focusing chiefly on CSP. 
This technology neutrality had boundaries as Dii decided only to consider feasible, 
“industrially stable” technologies. As such, the Desertec vision came to be pioneering but 
not innovative. In other words, they were staking out new territory in terms of system 
integration and scaling up renewable energy, but they focused only on existing, mature 
technologies. Technology neutrality reflects the idea that the necessary technologies exist 
but system imaginers need to throw old certitudes overboard to realize them. The vision 
is therefore visionary only within boundaries and constrained futures. I describe in the 
next section how this focus on technology neutrality had a significant effect on Design II.  
The technology neutral identity was based not only on economic principles but 
also on Dii’s construction of its credibility. At Dii’s 2012 conference, a shareholder 
representative explained that Dii had generated significant credibility due to its 
technology neutrality and the fact that it is one step removed from profit. A Dii employee 
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explained their broad appeal stating,  
 
It’s the association logic. I mean, the UfM and the Mediterranean Solar Plan 
doesn't care what ABB thinks but they do care what a broad spectrum of industry 
thinks. And they care about a broad spectrum of industry far more than they 
would a narrower sector, so that's in a way why Dii is a more attractive forum 
than, for example, the European Photovoltaic Industry Association… that's 
photovoltaic companies and we're banks, insurance, utilities, renewables 
producers, more on the generation side, more on the transmission side.  
 
Being technology neutral became a desired state, analogous to being unbiased and 
objective. 
 
Public perceptions of Dii and temporal complexity. Given its five identities, 
Dii suffered from multiple personality disorder in the media. The media’s response to the 
Desertec vision, as well as the perception of Dii by other Mediterranean stakeholders, 
shaped the Desertec vision and its design. Common, often contradictory, media framings 
of Dii include that of 
 
 a powerful German consortium seeking to supply 15% of the EU’s energy needs 
by 2050. This was DLR’s assessment of the percentage of energy imports that 
would be feasible, which the media and Dii later reified as a goal. The target 
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caused problems for Dii because it appeared as though they were uninterested in 
providing power in MENA where demand is skyrocketing.  
 a consortium seeking to supply local needs and 15% of EU’s energy needs 
 a single project with significant cost, scale, and ambition. Sometimes this was 
framed in a positive light; other times it was used to portray Dii’s vision as risky 
because no one has attempted to deploy renewable energy at this scale. It also set 
the expectation that there was sufficient capital available, when in reality Dii was 
only funded at one million euros per shareholder company, far short of the half a 
trillion dollars DLR projected was necessary to build the system. As described in 
Chapter 4, Dii came to emphasize that it was a grouping of distributed, although 
large-scale, projects in the region not a single project. 
 a project portrayed by the media as merely an idea, fantasy, dream, mirage, or 
white elephant in the desert, which set the Desertec vision a step back in its 
appearance as a feasible plan. 
In the EU-MENA power sector, Dii was often viewed as a private, German 
consortium focused more on profit than on societal benefit. An official from the Union 
for the Mediterranean described the Desertec vision as “a private industry joint venture 
to…accelerate the implementation of the Desertec vision in EU-MENA…it’s about 
making money, at the end of the day how will they make money?” Similarly, a World 
Bank official explained that they did not work with Dii because they work only with 
governments, not private companies. Furthermore, s/he stated it’s about “let’s play 
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German,” meaning that the project was about promoting German renewable energy 
technologies in other countries. 
The vast timescale and temporal complexity involved in the project also posed 
challenges for communicating it to the media. These lengthy timescales are fundamental 
to electricity planning; 50 years is one, or at most two, investment cycles in the power 
sector, including planning, permitting, construction, operation, and decommissioning. A 
public relations director for a major Dii shareholder company explained that at a 2009 
press conference, they showed pictures of CSP plants in Spain and reporters had the 
impression that the first power plants had already been built in North Africa to deliver 
power to Europe. He reflected upon this stating, 
 
It was totally strange…we said, hey wait, this is a group of shareholders, we will 
make this happen in the next *forty* years, until 2050…[but] journalists just did a 
journey to Northern Africa and looked for the first spots. This was just…it was 
strange. It was only the German side…and it was all about these rumors and we 
don't need nuclear energy and all about that. The fight was done. You know the 
war was over. Yeah. Because the future is today, and the future is in Northern 
Africa…It was something like a surreal experiment. It was only a dream yeah. A 
vision. And they thought it was real. And so therefore…we did a lot of talks in the 
background…and explained to [sic] everybody [that] this is a vision. We're proud 
to be part of it, but it's [got] a long way to go. We're talking about realization in 
2050. Not yet, not 2040, not 2015, two thousand *fifty*. Five. Zero. Yeah. And it 
really it seems like something that won’t work. Now, four years later…they said, 
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hey, Desertec is dead. Nothing happened. No, you can't realize this vision because 
you don't believe it yourself, and you've only been part of the shareholders 
[group] to bury this project. We said -'what?!' [They said] yeah, it's a plan from 
the energy industry, you don't want renewables, therefore you built up this group.  
 
He said the media assumed that Dii played a role analogous to GM in intentionally 
sabotaging electric car technology. Dii was launched with high expectations for what 
they could accomplish. When goals were not met on a much shorter timescale than Dii 
had promised, expectations were disappointed. Several interviewees explained that they 
thought the journalists were too optimistic when Dii was founded and then later became 
critical of the vision because they regretted their lack of skepticism. One stated, 
 
The first step is [the journalists] are getting a little bit enthusiastic too. Second 
step is you are asking yourself, [wait a] moment. Nothing in history has been only 
historic, Hercules, [the] biggest, superlative, there must be some problem. Let's 
wait. And if you have been part of the mass media hype there is a certain form of 
being ashamed of having been too enthusiastic about something as a journalist 
because you have to stay skeptical, [sic] distant. That is what we are seeing now 
in the mass media— this is a form of backlash because of their being ashamed a 
little bit, having been part of the enthusiastic hype. 
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Especially in light of media skepticism, Dii would need to catapult the vision from 
designed to constructed through temporal tactics that make the dream a feasible reality. 
These tactics are part of the process of negotiating a vision. In order to gain leverage for 
breaking ground on the envisioned Desertec system, Dii must frame 2050 as proximal, 
which as Michael (2000) pointed out, does work. In one of many examples, the Desertec 
Foundation posted a picture on Facebook of the first CSP plant under construction in 
Morocco stating, 
The future has begun. Germanwatch e.V. employee sends us this picture from 
Ouarzazate (Morocco) where he evaluates the realisation of the biggest solar 
power plant of the world in terms of sustainability and socio-economic 
development. Help to spread the word: Energy Transition is possible! 
 
The framing that the future is here works to frame CSP as a reality in the present. I will 
return to this quote in Chapter 7 as I explore the challenges of constructing the first CSP 
plant in Ouarzazate. System imaginers also framed the vision as inevitable to make any 
advances appear as steps toward an end goal made certain by market logic; market 
integration therefore became a new, feasible certitude. An official from the World Bank 
framed the export of renewable energy to Europe as inevitable as a matter of cost, supply, 
and demand 
 
There is a communication under preparation in Brussels and maybe that would 
develop a better framework for meeting the objectives of Europe for the 
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imports… but at the moment it is fairly complicated. But I’m pretty sure it will 
happen at some point, the question is when… Because Europe has made a 
commitment to 85-90% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2050, which requires a full 
decarbonization of the power sector. At some point it would be cheaper to tap into 
the solar resources of the Middle East-North Africa than putting more wind farms 
offshore or anything like that, so clearly if you look at the supply-demand curve 
there is a point at which basically [it] points to imports anyway, so just it kind of 
makes sense… (emphasis added) 
 
S/he added that this would not be a linear path but that it was likely the endpoint would 
be reached. Market innovation is therefore not about implementing novel technologies 
but about speeding progress toward an inevitable future. 
Officials I interviewed from the Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN), 
which is developing 2 GW of CSP in Morocco, saw the vision as desirable but situated it 
in the distant future, which could defer it. When I asked about the feasibility of the 
Desertec vision, a MASEN interviewee stated 
 
I think you are one of [sic] the rare persons who [sic] uses the correct words. You 
know what, because Desertec is a concept and it's not a project… they cannot 
build, and they're not aiming to build… And [there is] very, very huge work to do. 
And it will not be done in [sic] one day. Because energy is a very specific sector. 
Each country has its own legislation… And that's why the Desertec concept is still 
a good concept…but this is a long [sic] trip. 
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Another official from MASEN stated that Desertec is a good idea, but the end 
goal is distant due to complexity, 
 
Desertec is an idea, is a concept, is a nice concept. Produce electricity where it is 
cheapest and transmit over HVDC where it’s needed. Simple idea. But the 
interconnections and political will are very complex. Multinational projects take a 
lot of political will and leadership and we’re working on that (not verbatim). 
 
The interviewees expressed two different framings: that the vision is far-off in the future 
so it does not need to be enacted now, or that it is urgent but takes a long time to build so 
progress must be accelerated. Framing the future as proximal raises expectations that 
progress will be made soon and along with it risks that expectations will be disappointed.  
 Neocolonial Critique.  Dii’s most significant public perception issue when it 
formed in 2009 was that the vision was fundamentally neocolonial. For critics of the 
Desertec vision, CSP had not shed its colonial politics.102 They framed the Desertec 
vision as a neocolonial European scheme to exploit North Africa’s natural resources. 
Critics often describe Dii as a German initiative to export North African solar power to 
meet 15% of Europe’s energy needs by 2050, and they do not mention local renewable 
energy use. Daniel Ayuk Mbi Egbe, the head of the African Network for Solar Energy, 
which focuses on distributed PV installations to alleviate energy poverty stated (as quoted 
by The Guardian) 
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Many Africans are sceptical [about Desertec]," he said. "[Europeans] make 
promises, but at the end of the day, they bring their engineers, they bring their 
equipment, and they go. It's a new form of resource exploitation, just like in the 
past (Hickman, 2011). 
 
The media also circulated a comment made by a graduate student in Arabic and Islamic 
Studies living in Morocco on a New York Times blog. She said “Haven’t we already been 
here before? ''Europeans covet Africa's wealth of natural resources,'' she continued, ''so 
they make economic investments for the benefit of Europeans and the detriment of 
Africans” (Zeller, 2009). She explained in an interview with me that she was unfamiliar 
with the project’s details but wanted to provide the historical context related to it. 
In contrast, the paradigms espoused by many Desertec advocates assume that the 
concepts of sovereignty and the nation-state are outdated. They assume the nation-state is 
obsolete and that politics impedes building rational, modern infrastructure. Sovereignty is 
isolationism. They perceive the history of the colonial empire, followed by former 
colonies reclaiming their sovereignty, as being in the distant past. 
 These are two different worldviews, one seeing the region as a shatterbelt 
with a complex and divisive history
103
 and the other viewing it as a post-colonial, 
globalized region in which nation-state boundaries are obsolete. The first point of view 
risks dwelling on the past and assuming that all collaboration between Europe and North 
Africa is neocolonial. The second risks ignoring histories that are still important to 
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citizens living in the region and even shape today’s electricity system, as illustrated by 
the history of Moroccan electricity systems in Chapter 6. Just as I argued in Chapter 4 
that there is nothing intrinsically xenophobic about the vision, there is also nothing 
intrinsically neocolonial about the vision. The possible neocolonial outcomes depend 
upon how the process plays out, as Chapter 6 will illustrate. The neocolonial critique 
shaped Design II, which did not envision building single south-north HVDC transmission 
corridors that could be perceived as draining energy out of North Africa.  
Wildcards. Another challenge for a vision with a long timescale is that numerous 
circumstantial, unforeseen events—which scenario planners call wildcards— occur in the 
visioning process that the media and skeptics can then use as evidence that the vision is 
not feasible. The actors must concretely design the vision within the region in order for it 
to be seen as feasible, but in doing so they expose numerous potential problems in a large 
and complex region. Random circumstances in the region therefore disrupted the vision’s 
feasibility. For example, in February 2012, a Siemens executive was murdered in Cairo. 
Later that year, Siemens withdrew from the CSP business altogether, closing their CSP 
office in Germany and withdrawing from Dii as well. While its withdrawal was a 
reflection on the CSP sector as a whole and the fact that Siemens expects a higher return 
on its investment than smaller, less reputable companies would, this reflected poorly on 
Dii and the vision as a whole. In another example of a wildcard, in January 2013, a 
bloody hostage crisis at a BP natural gas plant in the Algerian Sahara made headlines 
throughout Europe. Dii issued a statement emphasizing how important it would be for 
their work to continue. In third example, in 2011, Turkey threatened to withhold 
electricity and water exports from Syria because of the government’s harsh repression of 
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protestors, illustrating that electricity could be withheld for political reasons.
104
 Dii 
responded to these events by stating that instability in the region increased the importance 
and urgency of their work. 
In 2010-2011 uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt spread across the region in what has 
been called the Arab Spring, which also disrupted the vision’s feasibility. On March 4, 
2011 and on March 23, 2011, Dii released statements emphasizing the importance of 
continuing their work despite and because of the Arab Spring. Their 2011 promotional 
brochure stated, 
 
political transitions in North Africa and Middle East plus a worldwide 
reevaluation of our energy supply give greater urgency to the questions of where 
are the large-scale sustainable energy resources of the future (emphasis added). 
 
Here they use temporal techniques to suggest that the vision should be accelerated rather 
than slowed by the tumultuous events in the region.  
Dii attempted to reframe the Arab Spring as a social justification for the vision. 
They suggested that the countries that are becoming more democratic are those interested 
in large-scale wind and solar and that the Desertec vision will have positive 
socioeconomic effects and therefore contribute to overall political stability. (In Chapter 3, 
I illustrated that CSP took hold in Spain during its transition to democracy. CSP often 
gains traction during crises.) Dii presented the vision as a solution to political instability 
by giving people local value added through the energy industry to improve quality of life. 
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Michael Köhler, head of the cabinet for EU Energy Commissioner Oettinger, articulated 
this view, 
we will pursue this because our objective— even more so after the Arab Spring— 
is to create a shared zone, not only of democracy, but of shared prosperity in the 
Mediterranean between Europe and the Mediterranean, and we see energy 
cooperation as one of the key elements in this regard. 
Dii demonstrated its commitment to the region by hosting its conference in Cairo 
after the January 2011 revolution. The conference was held just a week before another 
wave of massive street protests in November 2011 in Tahrir Square, which called for an 
end to military rule. In one protest, mobs stormed the Semiramis Intercontinental Hotel in 
Tahrir Square where the conference had been held, and the staff had to beat them back 
with pots and pans (Lynch, 2013). Simultaneously, money poured into Egypt for 
development, which the Desertec Foundation termed the green Marshall Plan. Egypt did 
not have the robust private sector to absorb this funding, which increased interest in 
foreign investment there. Despite the turmoil, Dii saw the possibility of playing a central 
role in the transition toward liberal democracy in the MENA region. However, the Arab 
Spring disrupted the search for a pilot project for proof-of-concept as investors turned 
away from Egypt and focused on Morocco due to political stability. 
Government instability is a significant risk factor for investors, and integrating the 
European grid with grids in unstable countries to increase grid stability to be a shaky 
proposition at best. The Arab Spring increased the perceived risk of project development 
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in these countries due, in part, to unstable governments and regulatory environments. 
Solar investors see the biggest risks in investing in solar in MENA as: regulatory, 
political, and force majeure (including terrorism) (Komendantova, Patt, Barras, & 
Battaglini, 2012). Design I argued that risk relates to short-term policy decisions and 
wasting fossil fuels. In contrast, Design II framed risk based upon investor perception of 
risk in investment in North African countries. Even so, certain Dii investors renewed 
their confidence in North Africa. The CEO of Acwa Power said at the 2013 Dii 
conference “the proof is in the pudding. Our independent power producers in Egypt are 
still being paid regularly for supplying electricity in Egypt.” Shortly thereafter, the CEO 
of E.On Climate and Renewables (part of the German utility company E.On) exclaimed, 
to a round of applause, that he was not worried about the political situation in North 
Africa, he was worried about the political situation in Europe.  
Energy security. As discussed in Chapter 4, countries in the region do not frame 
energy security congruently. Design I framed energy security as diversifying the energy 
portfolio, not as energy independence, because they viewed energy integration as 
advantageous for numerous reasons. One response to Desertec was that by 2050 Europe 
would become beholden to the sun kings of MENA, who could form a solar cartel and 
withhold electricity from Europe for political reasons. The Desertec Foundation 
countered that economic integration would provide sufficient incentive to prevent the 
political withholding of electricity, which conformed to the Foundation’s idea that there 
could be such a thing as global energy security. According to the FAQ on the Desertec 
Foundation website 
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The big difference with regard to the dependency on fossil fuels lies here: 
Renewable power can be produced just as well in Europe, albeit at higher costs 
and requiring more input. It is hence in the interest of the power-exporting 
countries to offer an economical and reliable product; otherwise the demand 
would decrease and a drop in investments, export revenues and employment could 
be expected. In this sense, an energy cartel much like the model of OPEC tends to 
be self-destructive and makes little sense. Solar power that is not delivered is thus 
lost and may not be sold later at a higher price as with oil or gas. 
 
This illustrates a key difference between electricity and oil markets i.e., electricity 
markets are highly temporally dependent. Generation that is withheld would be curtailed, 
or lost; it could not be stored and sold later on. Design II is a highly temporally dependent 
system, shaped by this energy security concern. However, countries are not entirely 
rational economic actors and could withhold electricity for political reasons despite the 
economic disadvantages. 
Price of PV. Based on its technology neutral framing, Dii focused on scaling up 
the cheapest renewable energy technologies. In 2011, there was a surplus of PV panels on 
the global market due to Chinese industrial policy, which resulted in a dramatic price 
decrease, from 2 euros per watt to 50 cents per watt. PV is the only energy technology 
that achieves economies of scale from the size of factory production, rather than from 
building large power plants. Therefore, project developers, such as the Dii’s founding 
shareholders, had little influence on this development. As one shareholder representative 
put it, “no one anticipated this.” Another stated, “everybody said, oh we will get there 
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with CSP because we can generate electricity for 17-20 hours [per day]…and during that 
time the price for PV modules just fell down. Wow!! This was an effect! And this 
changed the discussion in [sic] the group.” A representative from Dii also described this 
shift, which was magnified by PV companies joining Dii 
 
…Desertec, was actually CSP focused. So that definitely changed and this is of 
course also due to the fact that PV prices dropped dramatically, so PV became... 
much more attractive...than CSP on a relative basis. But also due to the fact that 
the PV companies who joined as associated partners started to lobby more for 
their interests. And what happened is that, for example, First Solar, managed to 
apply successfully for an upgrade to shareholder at the start of this year [2013]. 
So this has been also a milestone getting one of the leaders worldwide in 
photovoltaics on board as a shareholder. 
 
Dii expressed that it cannot predict the future and know what the next technological 
breakthrough will be. Therefore, it focused not on energy innovation but on projects 
developed with the best available, most mature technology. The focus on PV, as well as 
wind energy reaching grid party, shaped Design II significantly. 
Eurozone crisis. These European political challenges relate partly to the fact that 
Dii was founded just before the Eurozone crisis. When Dii was formed, European 
companies saw that MENA countries were experiencing 7-9% GDP growth per year, plus 
skyrocketing energy demand, while Europe’s economy was stagnating. They had surplus 
capital to spend, and North Africa appeared to be an attractive place. After 2011, Dii had 
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a difficult time recruiting new partners and lost members as companies like Siemens fled 
the solar power sector during the economic crisis. European economic development no 
longer appeared to reflect linear progress. For instance, in 2013, the Moroccan GDP 
gained 5%, while the Spanish GDP lost 5%. Electricity demand grew rapidly in Morocco 
while falling short of projections in Spain. As such, the presumed mismatch in demand 
between the load centers in Europe and the empty deserts of North Africa was in fact 
reversed. This left the vision in turmoil, as it became even clearer that exporting 
electricity to Europe would be possible only in the distant future. In the short term, 
Europe might export to North Africa, rather than the reverse, just as Spain currently 
exports to Morocco. 
 
Design II: The Integration Miracle 
 
In its first report, Desert Power 2050, published in 2011, Dii (and its contractor 
the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research) depicted not only a fully 
interconnected grid for EU-MENA but also a single regional electricity market. They 
designed the system to prioritize the lowest cost electricity, which was the most highly 
valued trait of the system in Design II, to supply the commodity of “desert power.” The 
system design no longer prioritized dispatchable electricity from CSP, rather it sought to 
address the intermittency of renewable energy through “the integration miracle,” in which 
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massive systems integration would complement peak loads in different parts of the region 
allowing electrons to flow where they are needed, when they are needed.
105
 
In this integrated power market, Dii imagined three categories of countries: super 
producers (e.g., Morocco and Norway), whose renewable energy resources far outstrip 
demand, leaving electricity available for export; importers (e.g., Germany and Turkey), 
whose renewable energy resources are smaller than demand requiring imports; and 
balancers, whose resources and demand are well matched (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Egypt). 
Surplus solar electricity produced in Morocco in the middle of the day when North 
African demand is low could be sent to power Europe’s industrial center, while surplus 
wind in Spain could cover Morocco’s peak demand from 6-9:00pm. People in the 
Mediterranean power sector sometimes referred to this envisioned transmission system a 
“copper plate,” because copper is an excellent conductor, and electrical charge is 
instantly available on any part of a copper plate. 
Cost. Since a private industrial consortium had taken over the vision, its first 
priority became cost and creating a pipeline of renewable energy projects on which the 
shareholder companies could bid. Dii based Design II on a cost optimization model. A 
DLR expert stated that Dii’s study was “driven by the question whether the economy 
under the right boundary conditions may find the best solution by itself,” rather than 
Design I’s “heuristic” approach of integrating fluctuating capacity with baseload power 
and finding the best place to site transmission cables. While Design I focused on 
demonstrating that renewable energy export is a feasible option, Design II focused on 
deploying the cheapest renewable energy possible and integrating markets to allow 
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electricity to flow based on market logic. Dii argued that an integrated EU-MENA power 
system would be worth more than the sum of the two parts, because the interconnected 
system would supply cheaper renewable electricity than the two separated systems. 
Markets, HVDC & Neocolonialism. Design II used the same transmission line 
technology as Design I—HVDC—but Design II imagined a single electricity market in 
MENA, rather than transmission corridors that would take electricity from a power plant 
in the Sahara acting as a virtual power plant for Germany to the north. This reflected 
Dii’s private industry neoliberal view on power markets. It also indirectly addressed the 
neocolonial critique because it would avoid a situation in which a country would export 
electricity to Europe when it could not meet its domestic demand. Instead of focusing on 
exports to meet a missing piece of the European system, it focused on building a fully 
integrated reliable, affordable, and renewable electricity system for the entire region. 
Dispatchability & technology neutrality. The key challenge in managing 
electrical power systems is to ensure that generation matches the load curve (or, rather, 
meets demand), and renewable energy makes this more challenging.
106
 Due to an increase 
in fluctuating renewable energy production in Europe, the part of demand covered by 
constantly running power plants (baseload power) is decreasing. Again, this illustrates 
how important a system-level view is for scaling up renewable energy. Dii’s identity as a 
technology neutral, private industry consortium shaped the energy mix in the system, as 
well as the system properties. Dii system imaginers prioritized low cost renewable energy 
and systems integration but were ambivalent about which renewable energy technologies 
should be used to meet these goals. A Dii shareholder interviewee from ABB explained 
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that CSP offers the benefit of dispatchability, but although dispatchability is a system 
benefit, there is not a sufficient market for it in many cases. Furthermore, even though 
CSP’s thermal storage is cheaper than electrical storage from distributed PV, it is still an 
additional cost compared to having no storage at all. The economic optimization model 
for Design II suggested that it is cheaper to have excess capacity in the system to meet 
demand than it is to store electricity. The model accounted for CSP’s dispatchability, but 
wind and PV, which are not dispatchable, were the winning technologies of the report 
nevertheless. Wind power is the cheapest form of renewable energy, and the wind peaks 
in Northern Europe and North Africa are at complementary times of day. In Design II, 
Dii concluded that is it cheaper to deploy wind and PV in a regionally integrated system 
than to pay for storage from CSP. ABB was convinced that supply and demand could be 
effectively and reliably met in a regional power system like the one outlined in the Desert 
Power 2050 report, even though it differs somewhat from today’s electrical power system 
configuration. 
At the 2013 Dii conference, a group of panelists argued that both baseload power 
and dispatchability were antiquated constructs. An official from MASEN questioned who 
would let the utility companies know that era of dispatchability is over. He bemoaned 
that thinking of backup, conventional power is “bringing us to the wall.” One interviewee 
stated, “We have to change the idea of baseload power…night, no sun, or no wind…we 
just have to equalize those differences.” In contrast, a manager from the Moroccan utility 
company at the Dii conference articulated the traditional view that the network is a public 
service that needs to provide 10% backup to ensure the security of system. 
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An expert from DLR argued that the vision’s most important goal—which in 
Design I was not generating desert power but firm power on demand—was lost due to the 
shift to technology neutrality. It was clear to DLR that their design had undergone a 
profound shift from “firm power on demand to fluctuating supply for export.” An 
interviewee pointed out that Spain currently has a surplus of electricity, while Morocco 
will not have a surplus for decades to come. So, according to him, trading surpluses of 
renewable energy among countries does not make sense and puts Dii “up against a wall.” 
The head of the DLR feasibility studies for Design I stated, “At DLR, we opened the door 
with our studies. And since 2006 we are standing here and keeping the door open. And 
everybody's busy in running against the wall beside. Yeah. Nobody goes through that 
door.”  
The energy mix & technology neutrality. Dii’s shift to technology neutrality, its 
focus on low cost, and its decreased focus on dispatchability led CSP to be framed as 
expensive and immature. The focus on desalination and integrated power plants for 
integrated solutions was excluded from Design II. Wind was the winning technology of 
the report, which was framed as mature, cheap, and less dependent upon geographical 
conditions. Also, it could be sited where there is not competition with value-added 
sectors. East-West interconnection would balance out solar power between day and night, 
while wind is complementary in north-south integration between North Africa and 
Europe.  
PV was the second most important technology in Design II. The drop in the price 
of utility-scale PV was a wildcard in the vision’s development. Design II framed PV as 
quickly scalable. Furthermore, since Design I had been developed, Germany had begun 
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meeting part of the day peak demand with rooftop PV. This would have been the part of 
Europe’s day peak met by CSP from MENA, where the peak load is in the evening. As 
one of the Dii shareholders explained, 
 
the German industry partners hoped [to give] CSP [a chance because of] baseload 
power. And there was a big discussion in Desertec if we needed baseload or if we 
needed peak. And since the European countries have day peak and not so much 
the evening peak like other countries in the Gulf or in the Mediterranean regions, 
a day peak would have helped a lot, just to shave the peaks and let's say benefit 
from ... cheap power…compared to the former German peak prices. They [the 
peak prices] disappeared anyway, but not because of Desertec; they disappeared 
because of the German-based renewables with wind and photovoltaics. 
 
This is also quite different from what Design I proposed, which was not to shave the day 
peak but to provide something approximating baseload power. The quote illustrates that 
even subtle changes in the existing energy landscape affect designs for future systems; 
they are not developed a blank slate (or plate).  
 
Sustainability. Dii conceived of sustainability in Design II as achieving the 
lowest system cost and reaching a 90% clean energy system, above Design I’s 80% 
target. While the percentage of renewable energy would be higher, the lifecycle analysis 
approach from Design I was lost. There was no longer a focus on integrated solutions, 
and water was not discussed. The vision’s paradigm shifted from limits to growth to no 
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limits to what systems integration could provide. Integrated is beautiful, rather than small 
is beautiful. Dii framed extensive systems integration as more flexible and efficient than 
distributed energy systems, which were deemed to be out of the scope of the study. This 
represented a major shift away from the limits to growth framing and reflected Dii’s 
narrower focus on developing a feasible system at the lowest cost possible.  
Social benefits. The win-win framing was retained in Design II, but the foci on 
the ethics of integration for a crowded planet, development, and integrated solutions were 
lost. Dii saw the social benefit of Design II as threefold: “all countries benefit from 
access to affordable renewable energy, and reduced cost of decarbonization, all three 
types of countries benefit in a different way leading to mutual reliance, providing 
sustainable and affordable power for future generations.” At the 2011 conference, Dii’s 
CEO framed Europeans as “unlucky” to not have as much sun as MENA. By bridging 
continents and connecting people, Dii could create “win-win” situations. One Dii 
shareholder representative said that “the impact on the society is really perfect.” An 
official from MASEN stated, “it won’t happen unless it’s a win-win.”  
The win-win framing refers to wins at a broad and abstract scale—national energy 
policy, security, regional stability, peace, and development—rather than referring to 
which social strata of the population would benefit. In my interviews I uncovered few 
predictions of the social impacts. Many stakeholders, perhaps contradictorily, saw the 
vision as a win-win but the social impacts as unknowable due to the uncertainty involved 
in planning over such lengthy timescales. (See Appendix A for a complete list of benefits 
and drawbacks identified by the interviewees). When I asked an official from MASEN 
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who would lose from the vision, he stated 
 
there are [sic] no losers in this situation. When you [sic] implement the good 
conditions where everyone can find a situation where he is a winner, he will win 
something. So things uh – I, I don't answer this kind of – I don't have any answers 
for this kind of question [sic] but you make sure if you develop something all the 
region will gain in it and much more than perhaps anticipated. 
 
This question also caught a Dii stakeholder representative, who had never considered 
whether there would be any losers from the Desertec vision, off guard. He had received a 
phone call from some Toureg people from the desert who wanted to be sure that Dii 
would not take their land for solar power. Many interviewees referenced losers in the 
private sector, such as the “old incumbents,” including oil companies and state-run utility 
companies, but they qualified this by explaining that if these companies continue to be 
system imaginers and adapt they would not lose either. An executive I interviewed from 
BP indicated that they were not concerned about the security of demand for oil; even if 
the Desertec vision were developed there would be plenty of uses for oil and natural gas 
in the transportation sector. Generally, the interviews yielded few findings of projected 
social drawbacks, and system imaginers genuinely believed that the system would be a 
win-win or it would not be feasible. 
Energy security and the solar cartel. Unlike in Design I, in which Europe 
would pay more to diversify its energy portfolio, Design II framed energy security partly 
as a matter of cost because the integrated system would be cheaper than separate EU and 
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MENA systems. The framing of energy security in Design II responded indirectly to 
public concerns discussed above that renewable energy exports could be withheld for 
political reasons or through a solar cartel. Security of supply was not seen as adding more 
fuel sources (as it was in Design I) but as increasing the number of countries that provide 
each country with electricity. No single exporter would provide more than 10% of 
Europe’s electricity supply, which placed constraints on energy dependence. Coupled 
with this, the new role of fossil fuels in the system would be to provide 10% backup 
power for Europe as its “insurance policy,” ensuring that if a country withheld electricity 
exports, Europe’s grid would remain reliable. Security of supply would be achieved not 
through mutually assured destruction but through the “mutual reliance” provided by an 
interdependent system. They stated, “[The countries’] complementary roles lead to a 
situation of interdependence across the system, in which no single country is dependent 
on another but instead each country is reliant on the system as a whole.” This quote 
illustrated that the countries themselves were not being envisioned as relying upon one 
another. Instead, the technological system itself would stand in as a proxy for 
collaboration, again substituting technological integration for political integration.
107
 
Desert Power 2050 did not acknowledge that the distribution of super producers, 
importers, and balancers in the region would transform the geopolitics of energy 
production in the MENA region. Egypt and Saudi Arabia would become balancing 
countries rather than fossil fuel exporters. These countries would benefit from tariffs on 
electricity funneled through their countries, but they would not control the major 
electricity generation resources for the region. Oil-poor countries, including Morocco, 
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would become super producers of renewable energy and the most important exporters in 
the system. This discussion is continued in Chapter 6 by exploring Morocco’s views on 
energy security and integration. 
Temporality and modernity. A key difference between Design I and Design II is 
that Design II would be highly temporally dependent, providing evidence related to the 
temporal significance of energy transformations discussed in Chapter 1. The copper plate 
would be based on the concept of “perfect foresight.” Generating electricity essentially 
would become a matter of predicting the weather, as daily and seasonal variations in 
climate change that would affect both electricity generation and demand must be 
predicted to the minute with perfect foresight in order for the system to be reliable. 
Design II envisioned using the natural advantages of particular areas rich in natural 
resources to outweigh the natural disadvantages of variations in weather and climate. The 
copper plate design would attempt to flatten out the rhythmicity of nature and the 
vulnerability posed by the seasons through massive systems integration. Although it is a 
climate change mitigation project, it verges on being a geoengineering project in its scope 
(see the Atlantropa project in Chapter 3, which was also geoengineering project for the 
Mediterranean). 
I argued in the introduction that the modernity of an energy system relates more to 
its system configuration, and how the system configuration controls time, than to novel 
technologies. Controlling time was an important project of the Enlightenment (Adam, 
1998). During the second Industrial Revolution, technologies further changed people’s 
perceptions of time and space. The natural rhythm of time, what Adam (1998) called 
natura naturata, became obsolete, and system builders “re-creat[ed] the variable 
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rhythmic times of life in uniform, invariable decontextualized, quantifiable form...the 
control of time is extended to the seasonable rhythmicity of nature” (p. 68-69). For 
example, electricity systems allowed people to stay up later reading, to travel to 
amusement parks, and to commute via street car (Nye, 1990). The relatively high speeds 
of transcontinental rail led peoples’ perception of the size of the United States to shrink 
(Allenby, 2012). As the United States industrialized, “no longer would solar energy and 
animal physiology set limits to human movement across the landscape” (Cronon 1991, 
Kindle loc. 1825). In the 21
st
 century, system imaginers are seeking to integrate natura 
naturata into the centralized system configuration to allow for high penetration of 
intermittent renewable energy. Renewable energy then becomes a matter of how 
electrical power systems can control time—not through changing social patterns but by 
leaving the centralized system in place while compensating for the intermittency of wind 
and solar cycles in the system design. Design II is in this sense the ultimate modern 
project in how it controls time. Chapter 6 will compare this to the Moroccan view of time 
past and time present balanced in a modern electricity system. 
 
Design III: Virtual Exports 
 
The German utility company and Dii shareholder company, RWE, developed 
Design III in 2012. Design III did not replace Design II but instead provided an 
alternative. RWE proposed building a virtual exports system since the physical 
transmission infrastructure was limited and additional lines were difficult to site. This 
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program—RWE Desert Power— would allow German consumers to opt into a surcharge 
on their electricity bill used to finance clean energy projects in North Africa. RWE is 
pursuing an initial large-scale wind and PV project in Morocco as part of Design III. 
They announced the project at the Dii conference in Berlin in 2012. Accusations were 
later made in the media that RWE was trying to “hijack the vision,” which they 
vehemently denied, saying the project would provide a blueprint for Moroccan project 
development they would share with all Dii shareholders.  
Design III reflected a broader trend in liberalized electricity markets that Graham 
(2000) called “infrastructural consumerism,” providing consumers with choices for 
“tailored infrastructure services within internationalizing niche markets” (ibid, p. 192). In 
this market-based design, the focus on integrated solutions and the benefits stemming 
from technological integration were largely lost as the HVDC grid that would provide 
connectivity, stability, and reliability would not be developed. Sustainability in this 
design related only to carbon mitigation, not lifecycle analysis or the triple bottom line.  
Design III would not require a temporally dependent, complex system-level 
reorganization of the Mediterranean electricity system. Therefore, RWE framed it as 
more feasible than Design II. However, Design III could impede the system-level scale-
up of renewable energy if it created a niche consumer market rather than an 
infrastructural shift. For example, Moroccan government officials believe virtual exports 
would limit the future possibility for real exports.
108
 It would also be dependent upon a 
high price for carbon dioxide.  
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 See Chapter 6. 
  259 
Design III reflects the theme from Chapter 4 about technological integration and 
immigration politics in the Mediterranean region. The principles upon which the Desertec 
vision was rooted were the integration goals. Would there be cultural integration benefits 
without physical integration? For the average German consumer of desert power, or the 
average Moroccan renewable energy construction worker, could Design III provide an 
opportunity for cultural exchange? If electrons do not flow across borders, would people 
flow across borders to understand more about where their virtual electricity comes from? 
Some stakeholders suggested that the vision would be more socially just if citizens, 
instead of corporations, funded the power plants. In Margaret Heckel’s book, Desertec: 
Energy for Everybody, which is a journalist account of the Desertec vision’s history, a 
fictional character named Anna traveled to North Africa to see the power plant she funds.  
 
[Anna] owns enough mirrors of a power plant in Tunisia to supply her with all of 
the energy she uses. So she has an idea: Why not use the money to make a trip 
with her friends to see the solar power plant? As with all plants with a Desertec 
label, the people that built it were very keen to ensure that the local population 
benefited as much as possible from it. Anna knows that nearby her plant there are 
schools, which train technicians for installing the mirrors and even a small 
university with different programs. So why not go and look for herself how the 
power is generated in the desert? It’s a cool idea– a trip to see where your power 
supply is generated. She dashes off an email to the Desertec Foundation ‘A group 
of us is on our way to visit the solar plant in Tunisia. We love the idea of 
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community-financed Desertec power plants. What do we have to do to make more 
of them happen?’ 
 
Heckel imagined that energy integration would spur interest in cultural integration 
and exchange. But would Anna’s voyage represent green tourism or cultural voyeurism? 
Design III could become a means of marketing exotic electrons for export. During the 
colonial period, all imported goods in Germany were called “colonial goods.” They were 
marketed with Orientalist imagery that emphasized their exoticism (see Figure 37). The 
Design III picture does not exoticize North Africans, but it does omit them from the 
landscape by portraying a sandy, empty desert (see Figure 38). Would Design III be a 
means of “conquering quality of life,” as Piccard put it,109 or improving quality of life 
through technological development and the negotiation of north-south differences? I 
argued in Chapter 4 that global energy security based upon energy equity holds higher 
standards than energy equality, including a just process for recognizing and engaging 
local populations in the development of the energy system. The local population should 
be seen as true participants and collaborators in the energy system rather than the exotic 
other. What would the role of citizens be in a system with global energy security? As 
with issues of neocolonialism and xenophobia, the design of the system would not yet 
cement particular justice outcomes. It would be dependent upon the procedural justice of 
the political process pursued, the goals of the stakeholders, and even the attitudes of 
citizens. 
                                                        
109
 See Chapter 4. 
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Figure 37. Advertising for Imported Chocolate during the Colonial Era. German 
Chocolate Museum, Koln, Photo by Author. Used with Permission. 
 
Figure 38. RWE Desert Power Design. Source: Vorweg Gehen110 
  
                                                        
110 http://www.rwe.com/web/cms/en/364512/rwe/innovation/projects-technologies/renewables/desert-
power/ 
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Table 4. 
Comparison of the Three Designs 
Property/ 
Technology 
Design I: A System for 
Integrated Solutions on a 
Crowded Planet 
Design II: The 
Integration Miracle 





Technology advocacy, but based 





CSP technology Mature, dispatchable, 
multipurpose, desalination 
Expensive, immature Focused on building the 
cheapest renewables e.g., 
PV, wind 
PV Expensive, fluctuating  Cheap and scalable  Cheap and scalable  
Wind Expensive, fluctuating Cheapest RE technology Cheapest RE technology 
Fossil fuels Reliable, mature technologies, 
provide peak power  
Volatile. Limited natural gas 
needed for security/ backup. 








Single HVDC corridor lines: 
efficient, safe, stable, redundant, 
connective, invisible for Europe. 
HVDC supergrid. More 
focused on the market than 
the individual transmission 
lines. Full integration. 
Market based, no 
transmission 
Market Separate electricity markets Integrated Mediterranean 
electricity market 
Market for carbon, rather 
than electricity 
System services Power for Europe (and some for 
MENA), water for MENA, 
peace for Gaza 
Cheap electricity for all Electricity for MENA, 
carbon credits for Europe 
Export type 
 
Firm power on demand “Desert power”. Fluctuating 
supply for export 
Virtual. Carbon credits. 
Sustainability  Triple bottom line (affordability, 
compatibility, security), using 
the least materials possible 
Least cost possible, carbon 
mitigation 
Carbon mitigation 
Cost Not the first priority, will pay 
more for an important system 
service. The focus is on overall 
affordability. 
Cost optimization is the first 
priority 
 
Cost as shouldered by 
wealthy consumers in 
Germany 
Social benefits Win-win. Expanding premium 
networked spaces, energy 
interdependence, Europe should 
help its neighbors develop 
Win-win. Cheap renewable 
energy, mutual reliance, 
sustainable/ affordable 
power for future generations 
Carbon credits for 
Europe, renewable 






A modern energy system is 
based on energy farming 
 
A modern energy system 
controls natural variation to 
provide an almost 100% 
renewable energy future 
A modern energy system 
is one based on market 
liberalization  
Energy security Security is the number of fuel 
sources in the portfolio, plus 
network stability 
Low cost, limited 
dependency on single 
exporter (mutual reliance) 
Does away with physical 
integration and its risks 
 







Reference cable Reference project Reference project, high 
carbon price 
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Summary: The Evolution of a Vision and Design 
Above, I described the evolution and negotiation of the Desertec vision and its 
design over eight years (summarized in Table 4). Design I—developed by a government-
funded research organization—proposed to build an HVDC grid in the EU-MENA 
region, keeping each country’s electricity market separate while sourcing dispatchable 
power from CSP from the deserts of North Africa for Europe. The system imaginers were 
advocates of CSP but within the context of its system benefits and contributions to 
addressing integrated challenges like the energy-water nexus. In Design I, energy security 
referred to the diversification of the number of fuel sources in the portfolio. Following 
the release of Design I, the constellation of actors advocating for it changed, most 
significantly through the institutionalization of the vision, with the founding of Dii and 
the Desertec Foundation. Dii’s multiple personalities, through which it constructed its 
credibility, shaped the vision and its design. Other factors that shaped the design included 
temporal tactics to frame the future as inevitable and proximal; public responses like 
concerns of neocolonialism; concerns that exporters in the south of the Mediterranean 
would form a solar cartel; and wildcards such as the Arab Spring, the fall of PV prices, 
and the Eurozone crisis. 
Dii’s complexity and multiple identities shaped Design II by developing a market-
based approach that reflected the goals of the private companies and a technology neutral 
approach that prioritized low system cost but did not advocate for particular technologies. 
Design II, the integration miracle, presented a design for a fully integrated electricity grid 
and market for EU-MENA that prioritized low system cost as the most important system 
property. Dii addressed public concerns about a solar cartel by framing energy security as 
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a 10% import cap for Europe from any other single country plus 10% natural gas backup 
generation. Furthermore, since the price of PV and wind had dropped significantly in the 
interim, and Dii adopted a technology neutral identity, PV and wind were framed as 
mature and were the winning technologies of the report. Dispatchability was no longer 
highly valued as a system trait. Instead, the system would be highly dependent upon 
natural temporal cycles—the weather, seasonal variation, and solar and wind fluctuations. 
Because Dii’s framing of sustainability was based on low cost and high renewable energy 
penetration, rather than limits to growth, it was willing to build excess generating 
capacity into the grid in order to balance the system because this was cheaper than paying 
for dispatchability and storage. Design II would result in a more radical shift in the 
system, in which the load curve would be met in novel, highly temporally dependent 
ways, and a centralized system manager would likely be needed to direct the flow of 
power on the transmission lines (described below).  
Design II also addressed concerns about neocolonialism by proposing a fully 
integrated electricity market based on mutual reliance that would not import electricity 
from a country that could not meet its domestic needs. However, a proponent of Design I 
argued that Design I actually had a lower risk of colonialism and injustice.   
 
But [Design II] ended in colonialism…. Here you have Morocco, here you have 
Germany. Now. Our concept, you build a solar power plant here and connect it to 
an HVDC line, and you send this electricity here where it is needed on demand 
and fills a [sic] gap in the grid. This is like moving this plant virtually to that point 
and operating it there. That's our concept. The other concept is, you have power 
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plants here [in North Africa], and you connect the grid the Moroccan grid via 
supergrid-- I don't know how it works but it's a supergrid-- to [the] German 
supergrid and any fluctuations here, any surpluses, they go to Germany or they go 
through Spain and France to Germany and backwards. Jah. And now imagine that 
there is some— I don't know in Europe there is some failure, they need badly 
energy. What will they do? They will suck energy and the lights will go out in 
Morocco. Because when they suck, they suck strongly. So if the grids are 
connected, those who win have more power or more money to pay. They say oh 
we [will] pay 2 euro per kilowatt-hour because all our industry before it shuts 
down, we [will] pay anything. The Moroccans say 'oops!' And the lights go out in 
Morocco, if there's some failure. So the infrastructure here to cover the load in 
Morocco must be completely separated from the infrastructure in Morocco. 
Completely separated. And then there is no risk of this type of colonialism. 
There's no risk [that] the Moroccans will have some damage because the Germans 
need electricity. 
 
In this conception, keeping the electricity markets separate bears less risk of unjust 
outcomes. The interviewee also argued that the Dii system would require increasing 
power systems infrastructure in the Mediterranean by five to ten times by focusing on 
surplus power instead of dispatchability and storage. One goal of Design I was to design 
the infrastructure to minimize natural resource use, in order to comply with the Limits to 
Growth philosophy and ensure the project was sustainable economically, ecologically, 
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and socially. This was excluded from Design II. Focusing almost exclusively on low cost 
led to other problems, such water usage, which will be addressed in Chapter 7. 
After the controversy surrounding building a transmission line through Spain, 
which will be described below, a third alternative emerged for virtual exports of desert 
power based on carbon credits. Many of the societal goals for the vision were lost without 
the technological integration approach, although it could still offer the benefits of carbon 
dioxide mitigation, development for MENA, and cultural exchange through citizen-
funded power plants. None of these benefits would be achieved automatically, which is 
one reason to utilize the energy justice framework presented in Chapter 8. 
 
A Dream Deferred Across Scales: The Politics of Proof-of-Concept 
 
“The idea to harvest the energy from the deserts has been around for decades in 
one form or another- a fantastic idea. In fact, so fantastic that the chances of this 
idea being realized must surely be zero. Implementing a system that supplies 
whole continents with renewable energy from deserts would require an extreme 
amount of commitment and intelligence by an unusually large number of 
stakeholders, by governments, by industries, by NGOs, by scientists, and by 
private citizens.  
 – Aglaia Wieland, Former Managing Director, Dii conference 2012  
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In the quote above, Wieland pointed out the vision’s long history and the complex 
stakeholder cooperation that would be required to achieve the vision. Bertrand Piccard 
suggested that Desertec is a deferred dream that can be achieved through some human 
power and shedding assumptions that hold the system imaginers back. A dream can be 
deferred as it goes back and forth across phases— imagined, envisioned, designed, and 
constructed. Networks of powerful actors would provide the momentum to propel the 
vision to the next stage in which it would be instantiated in power generation and 
transmission across continents. Means of proving feasibility can move the vision back 
and forth on the scale from imagined to constructed. However, as energy technologies 
were enrolled in the quest to “conquer” quality of life (as Piccard suggested), and to 
shape technological change with ethical precepts and societal goals, it became clear how 
different the goals and values were not only of actors across the Mediterranean but also 
of the stakeholders advocating for vision themselves.   
The networks advocating for this vision are too diffuse to propel it forward 
successfully. Hughes (1986), after writing Networks of Power, advocated that scholars of 
technology and society use a network-based approach to eliminate categories and explore 
networks, or “seamless webs” among science, technology, and institutions. The networks 
working on electrical power systems integration in the diverse Mediterranean region 
hardly form a seamless web but rather a disjointed and at times conflicting jumble. Even 
the actors that worked on Desertec, as well as MedRing, the Mediterranean Solar Plan,  
Medgrid, and other versions of the vision, were pulled apart by centrifugal forces. This 
prevented electrons from flowing effortlessly across borders. 
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As discussed in Chapter 1, Winner (1980) argued that artifacts have politics. In 
the visioning phase, it is not yet apparent what politics the system will have as it moves 
from imagined to constructed. For example, I argued that the Desertec vision is not 
intrinsically xenophobic, neocolonial, or Orientalist. It will depend upon how the process 
plays out. The politics of a system are shaped in the visioning and design process but not 
yet cemented. However, in order to move to the next step, some agreement is needed 
about which principles to drop as ballast and which to retain. The challenge for the 
Desertec vision outlined in the rest of the chapter is that Desertec proponents do not agree 
on the “old certitudes” that should be shed or retained in order to achieve proof-of-
concept, or even the appropriate method of proof-of-concept.  
Proof-of-concept. Three methods of proving feasibility emerged during the 
design phase: 1) developing a better regulatory framework and policies to support the 
eventual development of the system 2) building the first reference transmission line 
between Europe and North Africa to prove that exports can be achieved 3) building a 
reference project, most likely a CSP plant in North Africa with the Desertec brand. These 
steps attempt to move from a system design to a constructed reality in the desert. The 
actors contested which method would be best and how quickly it could be achieved. 
When these steps failed, it pushed the vision back to the imagination stage and the very 
principles (the old certitudes) upon which it rested were called into question.  
The first—and least developed—option for proving feasibility was to have Dii 
develop and advocate for a better political and regulatory framework. A Desertec founder 
described the institutional role of Dii as leveling the playing field for renewable energy 
by helping to develop regulations that would allow everyone to benefit from renewable 
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energy. However, since some shareholder companies were interested in bidding on a 
pipeline of projects, the regulatory goals were overshadowed by the quest for a pilot 
project. Furthermore, Dii had the least success with the political framework working 
group due to the political complexity of the copper plate (described later). 
Design I advocated for using a reference cable, rather than a reference project, to 
demonstrate the feasibility of exports. In 2013, DLR released a study that described 
building a 1,000 MW CSP plant near Marrakech, Morocco and an HVDC line to 
Germany, operating the plant as a virtual baseload power plant in the German electricity 
system (see Figure 39). They compared the cost between siting the power line underneath 
the Mediterranean versus siting it through Spain and France. They found that it would be 
comparable due to the cost of compensating landowners if the line were built through the 
countries. In some sense, DLR was again recommending developing a reference cable for 
proof-of-concept, as the first of the 20 lines proposed in Design I.  
 
 





                                                        
111 Fernübertragung regelbarer Solarenergie von Nordafrika nach Mitteleuropa 
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Dii—as well as RWE— pursued a reference project as proof-of-concept because 
many of their shareholders were project developers. They changed the framing of 
Desertec to match this method of proof-of-concept. They tweeted, “Desertec is not a 
$500bn project. It’s rather lots of projects in the region.” A 2011 conference pamphlet 
stated, “Desertec is a vision: an overall concept rather than one centralized, stand-alone 
project.” They emphasized that while there was a big picture they would take small steps 
to achieve it. A Mediterranean electricity systems expert stated, 
 
So there’s more a transparent approach—showing options is what we do and then 
I mean in the end… the goal is to get a good market environment, such that the 
market can do its best job. And then this should give us the most efficient, least 
costly road toward a sustainable energy system and that’s how it should work 
because, I mean…centrally planning the electricity system for this region or for 
any region this size is a bit of a crazy idea. 
 
This focuses on building the system through a piecemeal approach—taking Robert 
Shuman-like concrete steps
112
 through individual projects to slowly grow an EU-MENA 
region and its power system. 
I found in my interviews following the release of the 2013 DLR study that many 
people perceived Design II and its reference project to be more feasible than a 
transmission corridor for proof-of-concept. An official from BWMi stated,  
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I don’t think it’s very likely that we [will] have a direct HVDC connection from 
Morocco to Germany. I think that’s rather, let’s say, visionary and, well, maybe in 
50 years or so, but I don’t think that’s very realistic. What might be, what is 
realistic I think is that interconnections within Europe but also to the 
Mediterranean partner countries in Northern Africa will be expanded. 
 
A Moroccan energy expert echoed this stating, 
 
And [DLR] made some proposals but they are kind of very, they're not very 
realistic at the moment. I don't want to say that they are not realistic at all but they 
now today it's kind of on the long term— in the longer view you can say…all the 
consumers are paying a little bit for having kind of this project- why not? But 
today … also the line which is going through Spain, I mean still you have to 
resolve this problem and the line, the underwater line, this costs [a lot.]”   
 
In 2014, Dii released a statement entitled “Europeans do not understand 
Desertec,” which emphasized that they do not view single cross-continental transmission 
corridors as feasible. They stated 
Many people believed it [Desertec] was all about a couple of huge power plants in 
North Africa with a big exclusive power line to Europe. This will ultimately not 
happen and makes absolutely no sense. And it was not the main point. The people 
and the local industry North Africa and the Middle East need the electricity. 
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Egypt, for example, is experiencing a sevenfold increase in electricity 
demand over the next 35 years. Of course, the MENA region and Europe will 
both benefit from interconnections in the middle and long term. But many people 
in Europe are thinking mainly in European or national categories (Schwarz, 
2014). 
Dii reiterated that they are interested in the copper plate model instead of single lines but 
also that their vision is not for a single project but a series of steps taken over a long 
timescale. This piecemeal approach, which downplayed the overall system 
transformation required, came to be constructed as more feasible and less neocolonial 
than the export of firm power on demand. DLR still views their design as more feasible 
because it reflects known methods of electricity systems management and avoids 
integrating the electricity markets of developing countries with those of wealthier 
countries. Both the reference cable method of proof-of-concept and the reference project 
model butted up against political challenges described below. 
 
The Politics of the Copper Plate 
In order for the copper plate to function, the flow of electrons across borders must 
not be impeded by politics. Dii’s third annual conference in November 2012 was 
supposed to convene diplomats from Morocco, Spain, France, Italy, Malta, and 
Luxembourg to sign an MOU with Germany for the first Desertec cooperation project 
between EU member states and Morocco. This would have facilitated proof-of-concept 
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from both a regulatory standpoint and a reference cable standpoint. However, Spain 
failed to show up, and the negotiations crumbled. 
Spain did not provide a public reason for not signing, but the reasons can be 
inferred. First, Spain accepted Article 9, which allows European countries to meet their 
carbon dioxide reduction targets based on renewable electricity imports from countries 
outside of the EU, during a different time period. Following the economic crisis, youth 
employment reached 50%. Renewable energy subsides have become politically 
unpopular, with the feed-in tariff dubbed the feed-in debt. Furthermore, tensions between 
Spain and Germany grew during the Eurozone crisis. Interviewees in Spain expressed 
that Germany was throwing around its money and power, neglecting other Eurozone 
countries’ needs. Some Spaniards suspected that the Germans would be willing to break 
the Spanish grid by allowing Moroccan green electrons to languish there while Germany 
took credit for the carbon reductions. Second, Spain has had a surplus of electricity since 
demand dwindled during the economic crisis, and Spain’s utilization of its power plants 
is only at 50%. There is significant curtailment of electricity from wind, as it is easier to 
shut off than nuclear and coal-fired power plants. Therefore, it does not make sense for 
Spain to import electricity, especially if it is more expensive than their domestic price. 
Again, this illustrates the complex and changing sociopolitical and sociotechnical context 
in which the Desertec system would be built. 
Even if the copper plate is technologically achievable, the Spanish example shows 
that social and political resistance cannot be diffused through it. French historian Braudel 
conceived of the Mediterranean as a sea in between mountains. Spain does not want to be 
seen as African or for Morocco to be seen as European. Slavin (2001) stated "cultural 
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trends had extirpated Spain's Moorish legacy to assert her Europeanness and repudiate 
the adage that 'Africa begins at the Pyrenees’" (p. 90). Spain does not want the Strait of 
Gibraltar to become a passageway for electrons any more than Spain wants it to become a 
passageway for people.
113
 The flat copper plate would attempt to erase Braudel’s 
mountains, but the Pyrenees Mountains are a major social and geographic obstacle to 
electrons flowing across the border between Spain and France. Transmission across the 
Pyrenees Mountains on the imagined future superhighway of electricity is the most 
congested in Europe. Here, Europe must confront the siting problems it attempted to 
avoid by siting its energy generation in Africa. There is an existing 1,200 MW (1.2 GW) 
capacity connection, and a new double circuit high voltage 400 kV line to increase the 
capacity to 2.7 GW was proposed as early as the 1980s, and again in 2003. But activists 
protested it due to concerns about the construction noise, the environmental impacts on 
sensitive regions, and possible disruption to a hot spring that attracts tourists (Ciupuliga 
& Cuppen, 2013). Spain currently imports more electricity from France than it exports, 
because prices are typically lower there. The Pyrenees Mountains are effectively a 
bottleneck of the sun, as electrons cannot flow freely across them. The copper plate is 
envisioned to even out both fluctuations of time and space through a massive centralized 
grid. However, the copper plate design reached a discontinuity when conflicts in the 
Pyrenees Mountains disrupted the potential for the flow of power.  
When Spain failed to sign, people doubted the feasibility of Design II, and the 
Desertec vision shifted back toward the dreaming stage. Representatives from the 
Spanish TSO Red Eléctrica spoke derisively of the copper plate design: 
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We’re shareholders of Desertec and Medgrid. We try to introduce the concept of 
export from North Africa. But really we consider that in the peninsula in Spain we 
already have enough resources for renewables…Desertec, the copper plate, is a 
dream. (not verbatim) 
 
A Spanish energy analyst stated, “Exports are science fiction now.” Such perceptions 
disrupted the framing of the copper plate as feasible. It therefore shifted back to the 
dreaming phase rather than being viewed as a tenable technological design. 
For Red Eléctrica, the vision’s feasibility is dependent upon building reference 
projects in North Africa. An interviewee expressed that if the Maghreb builds significant 
renewable energy capacity, then Red Eléctrica will build a new transmission line; 
furthermore, the problem is not between Morocco and Spain but in closing the 
transmission ring among Algeria, Libya, and Egypt. An interviewee from Red Eléctrica 
stated, “we’ll wait to build the grid infrastructure until it becomes apparent that we’ll 
need it.” A European grid expert stated “you are in a real chicken or egg 
problem…because without transmission no one would invest and without anybody 
intending to invest, nobody would start to build transmission.” System integration 
proponents argue that it is too difficult to secure private investment for the power plants 
if the line to the market does not exist. In contrast, Red Eléctrica views that the project’s 
feasibility lies in successfully building the renewable energy capacity in North Africa. 
Those advocating for the vision attempted to shift it back toward groundbreaking 
by securing a Spanish perception of a win-win. An official from a development bank said, 
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“So, you know, we're trying to seduce them— what can I say.” An official from the 
German government stated “we are trying to get Spain in the boat…so Spain sees itself as 
more of a winner in the whole project.” It is not yet clear if Spain could be convinced, but 
it seems unlikely in the near future.  
The political aspects of this conflict illustrate the myriad challenges of using 
technology as the glue of political integration and cooperation. The substitutability of 
technological integration for political integration
114
 was called into question as electrons 
failed to move without friction across nation-state borders. The copper plate design 
steamrolls geographic and sociopolitical differences in the diverse EU-MENA region. 
However, Europe itself is neither geographically nor culturally flat, and its construction is 
incomplete. Even Spain itself is not coherently integrated. For example, during my 
fieldwork in Spain, I witnessed Catalan protestors take to the streets of Barcelona, 
demanding separation from Spain. Furthermore, Europe’s neighbors have struggled to 
become more interconnected to the EU. Morocco’s EU membership bid was rejected, and 
Turkey is undergoing a lengthy process to join. Deserts are not empty borderless zones 
connected to a Mediterranean hub (as described in Chapter 4) but complex sociopolitical 
landscapes.  
Old certitudes and internal conflicts. The actors advocating for the vision were 
not internally in agreement either. After the issue with Spain and the numerous forces and 
processes that disrupted and shaped the vision’s design described above, the values on 
which the Desertec vision was based were called into question. In early July of 2013, the 
Desertec Foundation announced that it would no longer be a shareholder of Dii and that 
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Dii was no longer allowed to use the Desertec brand name. The “internal intrigue” of Dii, 
as one of its consultants termed it, came to a head. A week before, the German media had 
reported on a dispute between the two directors in which Aglaia Wieland wanted to 
pursue a reference project for export and Paul van Son wanted to pursue renewable 
energy to meet North Africa’s growing energy needs. The Desertec Foundation 
announced that such disputes between experts should occur only behind closed doors and 
that mismanagement was damaging the Desertec brand. After all, Dii based its identity 
partly on being a trusted advisor. Dii countered that the dispute had been a 
misunderstanding and that there was no difference in strategy. The chairman of the 
shareholder board from RWE recommended Dr. Wieland should be fired for stirring up 
media controversy, and the board agreed. Some people internal to Dii suggested that this 
was simply a power struggle—that the co-director of Dii, who was often the silent 
counterpart in the media, was attempting to stage a coup against Mr. van Son. She was 
unpopular with some people close to the organization, who suggested the entire dispute 
between the directors and between Dii and the Desertec Foundation was simply due to 
personality conflicts.  
An interviewee from the Desertec Foundation thought that the conflict partly 
related to differing NGO and private sector viewpoints. Several Dii shareholder 
representatives valued interacting with an NGO to better understand how it thinks and 
operates. Other Dii shareholder companies did not see the need to create two “clubs” in 
the first place, but Desertec’s founders wanted to ensure that their brand was sheltered 
somewhat from corporate interests. The relationship between the two organizations has 
long been rocky, with the Desertec Foundation expecting funding from Dii while Dii has 
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been reluctant to give it. The founder of the Desertec vision explained that a problem of 
instrumental rationality had developed in which the organizations that were founded to 
achieve a particular purpose had shifted their purpose to securing the organization itself. 
One’s former allies gradually become competitors under this scenario. In the transition 
from the vision, to proof-of-concept, to construction, it became clear the actors did not 
agree on how to prove that the vision is feasible, nor did they agree on the initial 
premises—what were they trying to prove in the first place?  
If realizing a dream requires dropping ballast in the form of old certitudes and 
deep paradigms, and these are not agreed upon, it will be difficult to propel the vision 
from a dream to a constructed power plant in the desert or reference cable across the 
Mediterranean. The Desertec Foundation reified the Desertec brand as an object that 
could be transported to a different region or stamped on a power plant. Later on, the 
stakeholders questioned what values this brand was based upon. Would it matter if a 
reference project were branded as “Desertec I”? The Foundation said that the Desertec 
brand is simply the concept that renewable energy from deserts can be transported to 
power any region of the globe. However, the Desertec Foundation is also developing a set 
of normative sustainability criteria for certifying power plants stamped with the Desertec 
brand. In Anna’s trip to Tunisia, the reader is told that the Desertec brand on the power 
plant ensures it is an ethical power plant benefitting local communities rather than an 
exotic export. The Foundation’s standards for ensuring this include:  that the power plant 
should provide either local electricity for communities and industry or dispatchable 
electricity for Europe, that excess capacity should be avoided where possible, that grid 
stability should be prioritized, that power plants should use the least amount of water 
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possible, that the power plant should provide education and training locally, that the local 
public should have a say in the project’s development, that environmental impacts and 
rare species should be considered, that waste should be minimized, and that the plant 
should be properly decommissioned at the end of its lifecycle. Most of these principles 
were included in Design I but not in Design II. The development of this ethical 
framework extends the concept of feasibility from simply ‘is it possible’ to ‘under what 
circumstances should it be done and what benefits should come from it?’ Similarly, I 
argued in Chapter 3 that as CSP became enrolled in the sustainability debate people 
began asking whether CSP should be built and in what landscapes. 
Valuing low cost in Design II as a system principle above all others created 
problems for Dii. Without a strong focus on other principles, the cost argument alone was 
not strong enough to motivate the system’s construction. Former shareholder M+W 
Group also thought cost should be prioritized, but as the studies progressed they were 
convinced that the added cost from the HVDC cable would make imported electricity too 
expensive; transmitting electricity across the Mediterranean would add around 2 
eurocents per kilowatt-hour to the electricity price. Furthermore, North Africa’s 
electricity demand is skyrocketing, and it will be a long time before MENA countries 
have a surplus to export. When low cost is the main value, a simple decline in the cost of 
a single technology—such as PV—can derail an entire system design. Due to the reduced 
price of PV, some shareholders argued that it would be sufficient to build renewable 
energy in southern Spain, Greece, or southern Italy. If desert power is valued primarily 
for its cost, the significant uncertainties in transmission costs and the uncertainties of the 
added cost of the system once decommissioned infrastructure is accounted for can derail 
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the vision. Furthermore, focusing on multiple goals and priorities can help to enroll 
additional stakeholders. If only carbon mitigation were the focus, for example, that value 
would not apply in Morocco, which prioritizes building a supply chain industry and local 
jobs through renewable energy.
115
  
Dii was internally in disagreement about whether Desertec would still be Desertec 
without cross-continental transmission lines. Is it the same vision if it focuses on 
renewable energy technology in deserts for local people rather than for a trans-
Mediterranean electricity network? If the vision focused only on technology in deserts for 
local populations, would that still reflect the original idea and its principles? Dii is 
ambivalent about whether the Desert brand is stamped on power plants in the MENA 
region. An employee from Munich Re argued that the brand is not important for building 
renewable energy for local use because one would not build a power plant in the desert 
and call it Desertec I rather than naming it Ouarzazate I, for instance. In fact, Ouarzazate 
I was renamed Noor I, Arabizing its identity, and MASEN has made it clear that Noor I is 
their project, not Dii’s project.116  Even if the electricity were to be exported, that 
agreement among the countries would not be called Desertec either. Dii shareholder 
interviewees doubted that the brand, Desertec, has ability to do work, while the Desertec 
Foundation saw the brand as a normative object with principles. This conflict left the 
vision’s proponents without a shared set of values to advance the vision. 
Taming Dii. When Dii did not meet expectations, and its principles were called 
into question, it metamorphosed into a different identity in the summer of 2013, 
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becoming the “Desert Power Industry Initiative” or simply Dii. Dii then framed its 
approach more explicitly around opening markets for renewable energy between Europe 
and North Africa, arguing that eventual integration through a single liberal power market 
in the region will make power cheaper for the entire region but that a pipeline of projects 
should be developed now to meet local demand. Design II focused on cost optimization, 
in which the cheapest renewable energy was framed as the most feasible. If the Desertec 
vision becomes merely a market-based project focused on low cost, then the principles 
behind it would be lost. There is a fundamental difference between Dii’s view of desert 
power as relating to “pure economics”—an inevitable future that the market will 
eventually reach on its own— and the Desertec Foundation’s view of the vision as 
embedded in normative goals, such as peace through integration and poverty reduction.  
In October of 2014, the Dii shareholder committee voted to narrow Dii’s identity, 
turning it into a consultancy organization to provide construction services. Dii stated, 
“Dii adapts its business model to provide concrete services for renewable energy projects” 
for shareholder members. In the press release, Dii framed itself as having contributed to 
the greatly increased interest in renewable energy in the MENA region. It also framed 
itself as having identified sites for renewable energy projects; however, it no longer 
framed the sites as being in remote, empty deserts
117
 but next to people and load centers.  
 
For the entire region, Dii has identified a volume of 800 GW at suitable locations 
close to demand centers with access to infrastructure. The regional electricity 
demand will quadruple in the next few decades until 2050 by strong population 
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growth and economic development up to over 2,300 terawatt hours. (emphasis 
added) 
 
In 2015, the headquarters of Dii moved from Munich to Dubai to demonstrate its 
commitment to local power. While Dii increased its focus on local power, it also lost its 
focus on the broader system transition. When the deep beliefs and paradigms that needed 
to be shed or retained in the vision’s design were called into question, the vision retreated 
back to the imagining stage. 
 
Centralized Management of Complex Systems: The Mediterranean TSO as an 
Innovation and a Risk 
  
As Dii focused on a pilot project, they lost focus on the broader system. At the 
beginning of the chapter, I argued that the view of innovation as rooting a deferred dream 
did not entirely acknowledge the complex systems issues at stake. One type of innovation 
that is not acknowledged is the development of institutions to help manage and maintain 
a regional power system. Complex systems are typically defined by a lack of centralized 
management (Allenby, 2012), but electrical power systems, despite their complexity, are 
currently centrally managed. Electrical power systems are not scale-free but are still 
hierarchical systems. As markets were liberalized in the 1990s, and generation, 
transmission, and distribution were unbundled, transmission systems operators were 
developed to manage the traffic on transmission lines and to implement regulations such 
  283 
as prioritizing grid access for green electrons. It is the responsibility of the Transmission 
Systems Operator (TSO) to provide system security and reliability, voltage and frequency 
control, and measures to prevent network breakdown in case of emergency (Euro-
Mediterranean Energy Market Integration Project, 2010). The Medring studies identified 
the lack of common rules within the region as a graver weakness than missing cross-
border transmission lines. A TSO and an unprecedented Mediterranean-wide regulatory 
institution would need to make and enforce these rules. 
California developed the TSO and was the test bed for the global trend toward the 
liberalization of electricity sectors. Its failures illustrate the risks that accompany these 
reforms. In 1998, California lawmakers established three new, complicated regulatory 
bodies to deregulate the power sector: the Power Exchange (PX), the California 
Independent System Operator (CAISO), and the Electricity Oversight Board, which 
oversaw the PX and CAISO. The PX created a centralized spot market for electricity, 
which continuously auctioned power prices. Utility companies paid wholesale prices to 
generators determined by the highest bid to the PX. CAISO coordinated the load on the 
transmission lines, attempted to achieve the lowest cost for transmission, avoided 
congestion on the transmission lines, and ensured sufficient reserve power. CAISO 
balanced generation and demand so that the transmission lines would not become 
overloaded, which would cause blackouts (Blumstein et al., 2002).  
Compromises made among many stakeholders—consumers, generators, utility 
companies—established a flawed system. After three years, the regulatory system broke 
down resulting in blackouts affecting millions of customers. The PX declared 
bankruptcy, CAISO became insolvent, and the market collapsed (Blumstein et al., 2002). 
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Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) declared bankruptcy, and other utilities teetered near the 
edge of insolvency. Governor Davis declared a state of emergency, and the California 
Department of Water Resources hastily negotiated long-term contracts between 
generating facilities and utilities. Many of the remaining qualifying facilities, which were 
not being paid by the insolvent companies, went offline (Wiser, Pickle, & Goldman, 
1998). In part, companies, especially Enron, gamed the system by shutting down power 
plants to reduce supply to artificially increase the spot market price for electricity 
(Williams & Dubash, 2004). However, many argue Enron was not solely responsible and 
that the failures were equally caused by a complicated and poorly run system. While the 
Power Exchange was dissolved, CAISO still operates today. In trying to address issues of 
efficiency and cost, California faced new risks in terms of effectively managing a 
complex system. 
The developers of Design II do not acknowledge that a common market would 
likely require a TSO or equivalent—and one that operates across dozens of countries 
rather than within a single state, posing new risks. The Mediterranean Transmission 
System Operator (Med-TSO) could gain significant geopolitical power by controlling the 
power systems of Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. In terms of new 
regionalism theory,
118
 the Mediterranean TSO would be the region-state organization that 
would bind this technological system together. If Desertec were a 21
st
 century Apollo 
Project, then the Med-TSO would be its control center. The Med-TSO would ensure that 
the copper plate provides electricity where it is needed when it is needed; it would be the 
organization to decide whether the lights would go out in Morocco if there were a failure 
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in Germany. Similarly, when the European Coal and Steel Community was developed in 
the 1950s, Jean Monnet (a founding father of the EU and first president of the High 
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community) thought that a dose of dirigisme 
would be needed “to ensure genuinely free competition, to eliminate discrimination, to 
provide investment guidance and to prevent the formation of cartels,” which the High 
Authority provided (Spierenburg & Poidevin, 1994, pp. 3-4). The High Authority 
enforced the rules and objectives of the treaty that created the Coal and Steel Community, 
crafted common policies, and created a common market for coal (ibid). Today, there is a 
Med-TSO organization, but it acts as a think tank and does not yet possess any regulatory 
power. Successfully managing a regional electricity system with a common market would 
be more innovative than implementing renewable energy technologies. The developer of 
Design I had little faith that Design II could be adequately managed. It is profoundly 
different from the type of system that system builders have managed for the past century 
because of its single regional market and grid. 
The German and Spanish electricity systems illustrate the importance of a 
system’s management plan, as they are in turmoil after reaching 20% fluctuating 
renewable energy capacity without one. Red Eléctrica, the Spanish TSO, runs the world’s 
leading renewable energy control center. It avoids shutting down baseload nuclear and 
coal power plants and curtails renewable energy generation instead. They explained ‘we 
have the control tool to reduce wind power, but we cannot disconnect the conventional 
generators like we’d like to’ due to cost (not verbatim). One exception was Easter of 
2012, a very sunny and windy day with a typical holiday decrease in demand, when Red 
Eléctrica cut Spain’s nuclear generation by 20% for only the third time in history. 
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Germany has experienced negative electricity pricing during high periods of renewable 
energy generation, and conventional power plant operators must decide whether it is 
cheaper to pay consumers to take their electricity or temporarily shut down their power 
plants. If Germany can export this surplus electricity to neighboring countries, it can 
avoid negative pricing. 
An interviewee from the German government explained that the first step in the 
energy transformation was reaching 20% renewable energy. From 20-50%, the challenge 
will be to transform the system, a step that North Africa has not yet reached. Dii focused 
on a single project at a time approach to help to construct markets that would one day 
lead to systems integration through market logic. This is another chicken-or-egg problem 
for electricity policy, as the system plan ought to come before the project development to 
avoid building a technological juggernaut, but the overall system plan is so ambitious and 
politically complex that it is consistently stalled. 
Part of the challenge of developing regional regulatory and system’s management 
institutions is that the development of electricity regulatory institutions has always been a 
political development challenge specific to sovereign nations. For example, American 
regulation was based on democratic debate and a struggle between the state and federal 
levels. Other countries are “building systems on a very different base of institutions and 
regulations”(Williams & Dubash, 2004). An official from MASEN explained why 
Morocco does not have an independent energy regulatory body, 
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when you speak about a sector you need to have a thorough understanding of a 
history and how it comes…this sector is very special. And each country has its 
own specific situation and it's very dependent on [sic] its history.   
 
Yet the liberalization framing espouses a very limited view of electricity’s role in society 
and in politics (ibid). Chapter 6 will explore at the nation-state level the political 
development issues entailed in building a domestic renewable energy system and 
connecting it to a regional grid. 
 Adam (2003) observed that “we have no institutions adequate and appropriate to 
our current temporal politics...there is, in order words, no governance of time…almost 
every principle and tool is predestined against taking responsibility for the future” (p. 74). 
This is very important when planning a system across five decades, a system that would 
be too big to fail. If the broader dream is deferred but piecemeal steps continue to be 
taken toward it, will it, as Langston Hughes wonders in the dystopic part of his poem 




This chapter illustrated that many in the electricity sector see innovation in 
electrical power systems as the realization of a deferred dream, rather than the 
implementation of radical new technologies. A modern electricity system is not 
innovative in the sense that it requires technologies that have not yet been developed but 
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in the system-level reconfigurations needed to meet sustainability challenges in the power 
sector. This chapter illustrates how important it is to consider energy policy at the 
system-level, as the implementation of new technologies is affected by the broader 
system properties and goals. Designs for new systems face difficulties when they do not 
sufficiently consider the complex existing sociotechnical landscape in which they would 
be built, both in terms of the existing technological configuration and its challenges and 
the politics of the Mediterranean region rooted in a long history of conflict and 
collaboration.  
The actors attempted to shift the vision for a new power system for the 
Mediterranean region from designed to constructed. They did this through temporal 
tactics that framed the vision as proximal, colonizing a space in the future for it. They 
also worked to frame the vision as feasible through particular methods of proof-of-
concept, a cross-continental transmission line, a reference project in the desert, or a 
regulatory framework to pave the way for the vision. Disagreements about the method of 
proof-of-concept revealed deeper value conflicts stemming from the prioritization of low 
cost from the industry perspective versus the prioritization of integrated solutions and 
dispatchable power from the nonprofit organization perspective (i.e., Desertec 
Foundation). The sociotechnical vision did not exactly evolve; all three designs co-
existed and eventually came into conflict, shifting from the design phase back to the 
visioning, or even dreaming, phase. 
The Dii convened some of the most powerful energy companies worldwide and 
illustrated just how difficult it would be to transform electrical power systems, even if the 
overall centralized system configuration were maintained. From a practical standpoint, 
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this chapter illustrated that cost is not the only reason renewable energy has not emerged, 
despite what is commonly assumed. In fact, Dii envisioned a system based on renewable 
energy that would be cheaper than a based on fossil fuels in 2050. Even when low cost is 
made the top priority, there are still many problems including regional politics, systems 
transformation, systems management, and sociopolitical conflict.  
The next chapter will explore electricity policy’s relationship to political 
development at the nation-state level, to better illustrate the complexity involved in 
attempting to govern a regional electricity system. Unlike the Desertec vision, Morocco 
views CSP as emerging and in need of R&D. Dii sought to speed up toward an inevitable 
future, to develop technologies today whose time has come. In contrast, Morocco is 
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CHAPTER 6 
SOLAR POWER AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOROCCO AND ITS 
REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
Introduction: Solar Power, Political Development, and Regionalism in Morocco  
 
All debates on energy policy become, by definition, a debate on the stakes of the 
future and returns of the choices of the model of society to which we aspire as a 
national collectivity.  
– Maroc (Morocco) 2030 energy scenario report119 
 
Morocco as a case study. This chapter concretely illustrates the complex 
historical, social, and political landscape of one country in the MENA region—
Morocco— highlighting the complexity of building an electrical power system across all 
of them. In this chapter, Morocco provides a case study for exploring North African 
perspectives on regional energy integration and for understanding how a nation-state’s 
politics, political development, and history relate to visions for electricity integration. 
Additionally, it is important to understand Morocco’s views on the Desertec vision 
because it would be an important hub in the system, as a bridge between Europe and 
North Africa. Morocco’s actions and opinions on regional integration are critical for 
understanding the future prospects of Mediterranean electricity systems. Within a global 
context, Morocco is an interesting case study in electrical power systems due to its 
                                                        
119 "Tout débat sur la politique énergétique devient, par définition, un débat sur des enjeux d’avenir et 
renvoie à des choix de modelé de société auxquels aspire une collectivité nationale." 
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unique history of regional involvement, and its present and imagined future in which 
regional political cooperation plays or would play an important role. Such issues would 
be overlooked in an examination of U.S. energy policy, in which the political discourse 
focuses on energy independence, not interdependence. Additionally, Morocco is the only 
North African country with a CSP plant under construction; while this plant is not a 
Desertec project, but a project under the Moroccan Solar Plan, it provides an example of 
the effects of the scale up of CSP in the MENA region, which will be the focus of 
Chapter 7. 
This case study offers several generalizable findings about Mediterranean 
electricity integration relevant to the nation-state scale. First, each country has a tacit 
social contract or pact for its electricity system, shaped by its unique history and goals. 
This pact complicates regional policymaking that transcends sovereign borders because 
goals for the electricity system would have to be agreed upon at a transnational or 
regional level. Second, understanding each country’s history is important for 
comprehending its specific, even peculiar, energy system configuration and institutions, 
and these histories matter to the stakeholders and affect regional integration processes. 
Third, renewable energy plays a role in national pride and nation building, which could 
conflict with the multilateral goals of borderless regional energy cooperation. 
I found that Moroccan government officials are largely supportive of 
Mediterranean electricity integration. However, caution should be taken in generalizing 
Morocco’s enthusiasm to the rest of the MENA countries. Scholars sometimes use the 
term “Moroccan exceptionalism” to describe the country, for reasons ranging from its 
historical sovereignty from the Ottoman Empire, to its ties to Europe and the United 
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States, to its religious tolerance, to its relative stability throughout the Arab Spring. 
Morocco is often viewed as accepting European culture, and it has a francophone elite 
class. While its official language is Modern Standard Arabic (Fus’ha) and the Moroccan 
dialect (Darija) is the colloquial language, French is often spoken in business and 
government affairs and used in official documents, although its influence is diminishing 
to some extent. Morocco generally focuses more on diplomacy with Europe than the rest 
of the MENA region and signed free trade agreements with the EU and the United States 
in the 2000s. Europe also provides Morocco with more financial aid than any other 
country (European Commission, 2010). 
Political development. Throughout the dissertation, I have argued that 
transformations in electricity systems have significant political and social dimensions that 
are often overlooked. In this chapter, I explore the domestic political and social 
development issues related to renewable energy system transformations. While scholars 
have explored the political development aspects of how U.S. electrical power systems 
developed, this is largely an unexplored topic in Morocco, particularly in the Anglophone 
literature. By political development, I am referring to issues of national and social 
identity and cohesion, as well as changes in Morocco’s political structure that are under 
consideration for the future but not necessarily underway yet. This chapter and the next 
will examine political development issues surrounding the evolution of electrical power 
systems in Morocco, with a particular focus on issues of inequity. This focus on inequity 
will aid in applying the energy justice framework in Chapter 8.  
 Hecht (2009) argued that technology is a useful domain for examining national 
identity. She found that debates in France about technology related not to its present but 
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to what it could become in the future. As CSP is adopted in the MENA region, this 
chapter continues the discussion started in Chapter 3 about how government support for 
CSP relates to national identity and national pride.
120
 In 2009, Morocco adopted an 
ambitious renewable energy strategy, aiming for 42% of its installed electricity 
generation capacity to come from renewable energy—14% from solar (mostly from 
CSP), 14% from wind, and 14% from hydroelectricity—or 27% of electricity 
consumption from renewables by 2020. I found that Morocco’s renewable energy 
strategy relates to nation-building and national pride. This is evidenced as renewable 
energy has appeared in symbols throughout the country and the green mosques program, 
which will educate citizens in a majority Muslim country about renewable energy and 
energy efficiency. As a country that lacks fossil fuels, Morocco is reframing what counts 
as energy wealth and working to “valorize domestic resources,” to build its future as an 
industrialized society. However, I found that technocracy in Morocco differs greatly from 
that in France, as experts and expertise are always subsumed under the state rather than 
held above it. 
Morocco and modern technological systems. How Morocco imagines a modern 
electricity system relates closely to its political development. In Chapter 3, I argued that 
the framing of CSP as a farming technology has persisted over a century and a half, even 
while its other framings have shifted. In Chapters 4 and 5, I illustrated how the first 
Desertec vision portrayed a modern electricity system as a centralized system based on 
energy farming in the Mediterranean, rather than hunting and gathering fossil fuels. The 
Moroccan state has viewed a modern electricity system as a centralized one from the 
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system’s inception during Protectorate, through to King Hassan II’s ambitious dam 
building projects for irrigation that he continued after independence from France, and 
finally to large-scale solar power. Centralized regional electricity integration fits into 
Morocco’s electricity development partly because the centralized system configuration it 
promotes is the configuration that has been prioritized and viewed as modern since 
Morocco’s early electrification.   
At the core of the political development issue is the negotiation of Morocco’s past 
and present as an agrarian society and its imagined future, by some, as a high-technology 
knowledge economy. Morocco’s agricultural policy has been interwoven with its energy 
policy since the colonial era through the connection between irrigation and dam building. 
As an energy farm, CSP straddles the gap between an agrarian and industrialized society, 
as solar farms harvest sunlight to make the desert bloom, while growing a domestic 
technology supply chain and green commodity for export to Europe. It remains to be seen 
whether this hybridized view of CSP is a clever means of enacting policy change across 
conflicted social identities to balance tradition and modernity or whether it will reinforce 
business-as-usual. As Morocco transitions from the dam policy toward solar energy, the 
Kingdom balances Morocco’s identity as an agrarian society with its imagined future as a 
knowledge economy with a robust national system of innovation. In Chapter 5, I 
illustrated that the European renewable energy sector largely views innovation as a matter 
of rooting a deferred dream in the present, rather than developing novel technologies; 
furthermore, they view that progress should then be accelerated to reach this inevitable 
future. In contrast, the Moroccan vision for electrical power systems reflects a delicate 
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balance among the past, present, and future that has long been important in Morocco’s 
political development.  
Social contract. One method of examining the social and political aspects of 
nation-state level energy strategies is to discern the tenets of its social contract for 
electricity. A social contract for electricity is “a set of arrangements and expectations that 
have arisen over time and reflect what the public expects from electric power systems 
that operate in the public interest” (Victor & Heller, 2006, Kindle loc. 5230). These social 
contracts are largely tacit and unwritten but are nevertheless powerful social 
constructions guiding the development of electrical power systems. Since public 
participation in the energy sector is typically low in Morocco, and therefore lacks citizen 
consent, it is more accurate to refer to a social pact for electricity rather than a contract.   
 
Rousseau’s idea of a social contract is … not a pact between rulers and ruled, 
powerful and weak, masters and slaves. On the contrary, the only parties to the 
contract are the people themselves who consent only to rule over themselves 
(Dunn, 2002).  
 
Catusse, Vairel, & Bono (2010) similarly argued that “social pact” should be substituted 
for “social contract” in the fight against poverty in Morocco as it lacks citizen 
participation.  
The ability to address the principles and goals that compose Morocco’s social pact 
is threatened by myriad challenges facing the country, including energy security and 
subsidies, youth unemployment, and social inequality and inequity. The new social pact 
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seeks to address broader social needs— including reducing social and educational 
inequity, improving industrial policy, attracting foreign direct investment, fostering 
expertise, and stemming rural exodus— to achieve political stability in the post-Arab 
Spring context while reducing energy subsidies despite protests. I discuss how this 
changing social pact relates to renewable energy policy and political development.  
To illustrate how the social pact has changed over time, this chapter describes its 
origin and formulation during the French Protectorate era to its evolution after 
Independence as Moroccans reclaimed their state and its infrastructure. Under the French 
Protectorate, Morocco’s electricity system was built to serve extractive industries and 
colonial settlers, not locals, which left imprints on today’s system and its inequities. The 
social pact was negotiated between the Protectorate government and French, not 
Moroccan, citizens, to ensure that French citizens and companies benefitted from 
electricity development and the export of products. After Moroccan independence, the 
social pact for electricity reflected a process of political development that reclaimed the 
state for Moroccans, and electricity governance was further centralized during this time 
and continued the dam building and irrigation policies developed under the Protectorate. 
In the 1990s, Morocco emerged from the authoritarian “years of lead” and integrated a 
promise for universal access to electricity into the pact while beginning to liberalize its 
electricity system under international pressures.  
The Regional Aspects of the Social Pact. This chapter discusses the implications 
and the prospects for the social pact in a regional context. It illustrates how Moroccan 
energy needs and Moroccan energy policy both reflect and complicate plans for future 
Mediterranean electricity systems integration. I found strong support in my interviews for 
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the eventual export of renewable energy from Morocco to Europe, provided that Morocco 
has ownership over its solar plan (rather than Europe having ownership over it) and that 
there is a just process for developing plans for regional integration. Many Moroccan 
officials I interviewed perceived regional integration as a key part of energy security and 
sustainable development. They see themselves as unfairly excluded from European 
electricity markets, especially since they produce electrons that are compatible with the 
European grid. At the same time, Morocco’s focus on nation building and national pride 
through renewable energy is perhaps contradictory to the multilateralism implicit in the 
Desertec vision. Recognizing that the 44 countries within the Desertec vision have 
individual social contracts for electricity systems’ development illustrates part of the 
challenge for multilateral, regional electricity systems planning. As electricity grids begin 
crossing nation-state lines around the globe, how will it affect the promise states and their 
populations make about the distribution of the social benefits and burdens of electricity 
development? While there is no answer to this question yet, it will be important to 
consider if the trend toward transnational electricity systems continues. 
In Chapter 4, I discussed attempts to frame the Mediterranean not as a shatterbelt, 
but as a region of connectivity and deep integration. Chapter 5 illustrated the conflicting 
perspectives in the region that disrupted the feasibility of the Desertec vision. This 
chapter illustrates how Morocco is influenced by its storied past, its complicated present, 
and its imagined future. Numerous centrifugal forces tug Morocco in different directions: 
its historical ties to Europe, its aid and economic dependency on Europe, a long history of 
conflict with neighboring Algeria, global energy markets, a new focus on economic 
integration with countries to the south such as Mauritania, and the influence of the 
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agendas of multilateral development banks. Morocco’s energy sovereignty is affected by 
the pull of these forces. At times, these multiple forces lead to contradictions in 
Morocco’s energy policy. For example, while Morocco develops national pride around a 
program of renewable energy self-sufficiency, it also continues to explore for oil and to 
frame itself as electrically European. These centrifugal forces present a coherence 
problem for the region and its relations. The narrative below illustrates these centrifugal 
forces and contradictions. 
Justice. I argued in Chapters 4 and 5 that the politics and implications for the 
justice outcomes of the envisioned regional electricity system are not yet cemented but 
are dependent upon procedural justice. Given the colonial history in the region, it would 
be an important first step toward Mediterranean electricity integration to foster integrated 
projects that achieve true north-south collaboration that is not based on coercion but on 
procedural justice. This would be a useful form of “proof-of-concept” that would 
improve the social feasibility of the vision.
121
 Morocco offers a model for such proof-of-
concept through its integrated projects model, which combines social goals with 
technology adaptation that does not copy and apply technologies but rather adapts them 
to specific social contexts. Morocco seeks to develop the capacity to have ownership over 
the vision for regional electricity systems integration and to be considered collaborators 
in technology development. Applying the integrated projects model to the region could 
foster north-south partnership to address social goals and treat Moroccan experts as true 
contributors to energy innovation instead of technology adopters. Capacity building is a 
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prerequisite to this so that less powerful countries are not in a position in which they can 
be easily coerced.  
Morocco: Geography, Economy, and Demographics in Brief 
 
Orientalist depictions of Morocco, such as those initially used in the Desertec 
vision, frame it as a nation characterized by sand dunes and camels. In contrast, 
Morocco’s diverse landscape includes 400 kilometers of coastline; the High Atlas, 
Middle Atlas, and Anti-Atlas Mountain ranges; maquis shrubland; short grassland; 
forests teaming with monkeys; canyons; and gorges, in addition to the sand dunes. It is 
not an unpopulated desert but a rapidly growing country with a population of 33.3 million 
people (World Bank, 2013) that is projected to reach 41.36 million people by 2050 (Haut-
Commissariat au plan, n.d.). Morocco is remarkably geographically similar to California 
in terms of land area, length and width, shape, continental location, climate, vegetation, 
and offshore current, as well as population (Zeigler, 1997). Its economy differs greatly, 
with California’s GDP per capita averaging around $46,000 per person and Morocco’s at 
$2,940. 
Morocco’s name in Arabic— al Maghreb— means the far west, as it is the 
furthest west Arab country. It is often framed as a bridge between North Africa and 
Europe and is just nine miles from Spain across the Strait of Gibraltar. Algeria borders 
Morocco to the east. South of Morocco is a territory the UN calls Western Sahara, but 
Morocco considers it as part of its borders. Its sovereignty has been contested since 1975 
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when the Spanish colonizers left, and the UN does not recognize it as part of Morocco. 
Not including Western Sahara, Morocco’s area is 172,000 square miles with a length of 
750 miles and width of 250 miles (Zeigler, 1997). 
 
 
Figure 40. Political Map of Morocco. Source: Pat Website (public domain maps)
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The World Bank classifies Morocco as a lower middle income country with a 
gross national income per capita of $2,940 (World Bank Group, 2014). Morocco’s GDP 
growth has been relatively strong since 2000, averaging 5% per year (SIE, 2012), the 
highest growth in North Africa.
123
 However, these increases in GDP are somewhat 
misleading because they largely reflect years when favorable climatic conditions yielded 




 Morocco weathered the global economic crisis fairly well in part by spending 2.2% of GDP on a 2010-
2020 stimulus package (ESMAP, 2011).  
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more agricultural products, and Figure 41 below illustrates the variability of GDP growth 
over the past decade (ESMAP, 2011).  
Morocco is low on the human development scale compared to other Arab 
countries (Catusse et al., 2010). It also has significant urban-rural inequalities; “per capita 
household consumption in rural areas is only 54% of that in Morocco’s urban areas” 
(World Bank, 2011). Its urbanization rate in 2013 was 59.2% as people, especially youth, 
flee rural areas with limited infrastructure for cities (Haut-Commissariat au Plan, n.d.-d). 
Its overall unemployment rate is 9.5%, and the unemployment rate is in fact higher in 
cities (14.4%) than in rural areas (4%) (Haut-Commissariat au Plan, n.d.-c) The 
unemployment rate for those without a college degree is 4.6%; unemployment is higher 
among educated people, at 15% for those with a college degree and 19.8% for those with 
a more advanced degree (Haut-Commissariat au Plan, n.d.-b)  
In terms of economic activity, Morocco is a largely agrarian society, with 
agriculture making up 20% of GDP and employing roughly 40% of the population 
(World Bank, 2012; ESMAP, 2011). In rural areas, this agricultural focus is more 
pronounced, with 72.7% of the population employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
(Haut-Commissariat au Plan, n.d.-a) Tourism is Morocco’s second largest sector; it 
employed 41% of the population in the fourth quarter of 2013 (hcp.ma). Morocco’s 
manufacturing capacities are not well developed. Industry (including building) employs 
20.2% of the population (Haut-Commissariat au Plan, n.d.-a; Rivlin, 2013; Vidican et al., 
2013). Morocco’s holds 75% of the world’s phosphate reserves, making it one of the top 
three exporters worldwide (Oxford Business Group, 2012). Phosphorous is an essential 
component in fertilizers, food and drink, pipe corrosion prevention, and detergents. 
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Finally, remittances from the 3 million Moroccans living abroad add more to the 
economy than phosphates (Maghraoui, 2009). 
 
  
Figure 41. Moroccan GDP Growth, 5% Average Since 2000. Source Société 
d’investissement énergétique, 2012. 
 Morocco’s government is a parliamentary monarchy. The ruling family dates 
back to the Alaouites of the Maghreb; the first Alaouite, Moulay Chérif, took the throne 
in 1631. In addition to its historical legitimacy, the ruling family has religious legitimacy 
because it is sharifian, meaning the family descended from the Prophet Muhammad. The 
king is therefore called the Commander of the Faithful. The Moroccan ruling family and 
state are called the makhzen. The parliament is elected, with a multi-party system. 
 
The Socioeconomic Stakes of Morocco’s Contemporary Energy Policy  
 
Is there a future for Morocco? – Rida Lamrini 
 
This section overviews the societal context of Morocco’s electricity system to 
illustrate how it fits into political development and issues of inequity, as well as to 
provide the foundations for explaining Morocco’s evolving social pact for electricity. The 
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development statistics interspersed below tell an incomplete story and quantify aspects 
that are difficult to measure, but they provide context for how Morocco’s problems are 
perceived and constructed in order to understand the current social pact for electricity and 
its relationship to political development. Contemporary Moroccan energy policy is a 
common thread running through Morocco’s socioeconomic challenges from 
unemployment and poverty to anomie among educated youth and rural exodus. 
Examining energy policy and energy systems illuminates many of Morocco’s societal 
challenges and goals, as Moroccans continue to transform what was a colonial electricity 
system into a system that does work for Moroccans. Energy policy considers both 
Morocco’s future development and how the Kingdom imagines the future itself, such as 
its perceptions of the future’s malleability, openness, and predestination. The specificity 
of Morocco’s challenges illustrates the complexity that would be entailed in constructing 
a regional energy system, fusing the energy particularities and needs of dozens of nation-
states.  
In 1999, Mohammed VI inherited the throne from his father, King Hassan II, 
sparking hope for a new future across Morocco. The new king was nicknamed the King 
of the Poor for his focus on social inequality. He renewed the country’s focus on human 
development and improved public services and instituted a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to investigate and rectify the human rights abuses of the past. He furthered 
economic liberalization under the theme of “new public management” with increased 
efficiency, rationalization, and provision of public goods (Catusse et al., 2010). His 
slogans “a new concept of authority” (une nouveau concept de l’autorité) (ibid) and “the 
New Morocco” (le nouveau Maroc) increased focus on marginalized populations and 
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women’s rights (Lamrini, 2006). However, seven years after Mohammed VI took the 
throne, as excitement died down, Moroccan author Rida Lamrini asked through a young 
Moroccan interlocutor whether there was a future for Morocco. He stated that it is 
literally a question that Moroccans inhabit, as the dream of young people often is to leave 
the country, rather than to stay and construct a better future. He stated, “Politicians are 
discredited. Short of ideas. With neither a project for society nor a mobilizing workplace. 
The elites are conspicuously silent, indigent.”124 Those guiding Morocco’s renewable 
energy policy seek to address this dilemma, to construct a future for Morocco in which 
renewable energy is the mobilizing project for society.   
Emerging industrial policy. Morocco’s new industrial policy illustrates a clear 
shift toward envisioning Morocco as a future knowledge economy with a national system 
of innovation. Currently, France and Spain remain Morocco’s largest commercial 
partners. Morocco sends 53% of its exports to the EU, drawing its diplomatic and 
economic focus to the north (Société Marocaine d’Assurance à l’Exportation, 2013; 
Zisenwine, 2012). Despite its favored geographical position between Europe and North 
Africa, Morocco has not yet grown significant export industries outside of phosphates, 
which suffer from declining commodity prices, and its trade deficit has been steadily 
increasing from $3 billion in 2001 to $18.7 billion in 2007 (Rivlin, 2013) especially due 
to its increasing dependency on foreign oil. Its attention is also being pulled to the south 
as it seeks to become an economic leader in Africa, to tap into new export markets. For 
                                                        
124
 "la classe politique discréditée. A court d'idées. Sans projet de société, ni chantier mobilisateur. Les 
élites brillent par leur silence, leur indigence." 
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example, one energy expert in Morocco expressed that European PV markets were 
saturated and that the markets of tomorrow would be in sub-Saharan Africa. 
To grow and diversify its economy, Morocco has recently enacted a 
comprehensive industrial policy, particularly in the energy and manufacturing domains.  
In 2005, Morocco launched the Emergence Plan (Le Plan Émergence) to advance the 
competitiveness of the industrial sector and to increase GDP growth, add jobs, and reduce 
the trade deficit. The plan targeted the sectors in which Morocco already had a 
competitive advantage—offshoring, automobiles, aeronautics, agriculture/food, and 
leather textiles. Many interviewees emphasized Morocco’s success in the first three 
categories, in particular the new Renault vehicle manufacturing plant in Tangier. Jobs at 
call centers have grown at Rabat Technopolis and Casanearshore, and the European 
Offshoring Association named Morocco the Offshoring Destination of 2012 (“Morocco 
Named ‘2012 Offshoring Destination of the Year’ by the European Outsourcing 
Association,” 2012). The National Pact for Industrial Emergence (Le Pacte Nationale 
Pour l'Émergence Industrielle) updated this strategy in 2009. 
Along with the Emergence Plan, the Moroccan Innovation Strategy, led by the 
Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and the Digital Economy (Ministère de l’Industrie, du 
Commerce et de l’Economie Numérique (MCINet),125 seeks to grow a national innovation 
system. This strategy also clearly envisions Morocco as a future knowledge economy and 
industrialized country. It seeks to bolster research-industry collaborations, to improve 
Morocco’s competitiveness in technology, to turn Morocco into an attractive center for 
R&D in the Mediterranean region, and to provide financial mechanisms that promote 
                                                        
125 Formerly called the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and New Technologies 
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innovation (MCINet presentation, 2013). MCINet seeks to increase the number of patents 
per year by 1,000 and the number of innovative start-ups per year by 200. MCINet also 
runs the Moroccan Center for the Promotion of Exports (Centre Marocain de Promotion 
des Exportations under MCINet) with 31 target markets not just in Western Europe but 
also within the Maghreb and North Africa, Russia, China, the United States, and Canada 
(Maroc Export, 2013).  
Research and development. A number of challenges related to Morocco’s R&D 
sector must be addressed for Morocco to become a knowledge economy. The head of the 
country’s energy development fund stated that the country’s R&D sector was “sleeping” 
until recently. In 2008, the country’s R&D budget was only 800 million MAD ($85 
million). According to one interviewee, energy policymakers aim to grow Morocco’s 
R&D capacities to foster a competitive sector by the time Morocco’s low cost labor 
advantage is expended.  
The structure of Morocco’s higher educational system, which reflects the French 
system’s focus in basic research rather than the German system’s focus on applied 
vocational skills, is one challenge for growing R&D. The head of the Moroccan Institute 
on Solar Energy and New Energy Technologies (Institut de Recherche en Energie Solaire 
et Energies Nouvelles or IRESEN) explained to me that France could afford to focus on 
basic research in its universities since its industries conduct applied research. Since 
Morocco does not have a developed industrial sector, focusing only on basic research in 
universities does not serve Moroccan industry. “Morocco is above all today a technology 
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consumer” he said. “We always have a tendency to copy-apply, copy-apply. And it’s 
dangerous.”126  
Renewable energy plans reflect an effort to grow R&D capacities in the 
universities and to develop more vocational and industry-specific training programs, 
which is an area in which expertise is growing in Morocco. According to interviewees, 
Morocco has 15 public universities with science and technology departments, with 6,000 
professors working in science and technology. These universities host 31 training 
programs in renewable energy, with 150 researchers active in renewable energy with 
65% working in solar energy and 25% working in wind, biomass, or hydroelectricity 
(Barhdadi, 2013). Appendix One provides a list of many of these programs.
127
 These 
research units have produced 600 publications and are working on 35 international R&D 
projects with Moroccan specialists (ibid). New opportunities are under development, 
including the new International University of Rabat’s program in energy and 
sustainability. 
Despite these strengths, one interviewee explained that foreigners have been hired 
to teach courses in new programs due to insufficient local expertise. Morocco suffers 
from brain drain as 6,000 researchers have left for developed countries as part of the 
Moroccan research diaspora. The renewable energy sector has recruited some experts 
home, such as Ahmed Baroudi, who was working in the space and telecommunications 
sector in France before King Mohammed VI asked him to return to run the country’s 
                                                        
126 Le Maroc est surtout aujourd'hui un consommateur technologique…“on a toujours tendance à copier-
appliquer, copier-appliquer. Et là c'est dangereux. »  
127 It is challenging to find data on R&D and public universities in Morocco.  I am relying on unpublished 
research conducted by interviewees on the sector and on a forum I attended on renewable energy education 
in Morocco. 
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energy investment fund. However, there are numerous disincentives to return home as an 
academic researcher. For instance, any professor, no matter how accomplished, would 
have to start as an assistant professor at the lowest salary of 12,000 MAD per month 
($1,449/month), which is equivalent to a US graduate student’s part-time salary.  
Another challenge in the R&D sector is the lack of competitive research funding 
and university autonomy. According to interviews, until recently, research funding was 
shared evenly among the existing research centers, which was enough for conferences but 
not for serious research. Often research teams do not receive their funds until the end of 
the project. Universities have little autonomy in Morocco; the professors work for the 
Ministry of Finance, and the presidents of universities have very little power. The 
Ministry of Finance evaluates every line item public universities spend, which makes it 
difficult to gain approval for purchasing laboratory equipment. Law 0100 in 2000 gave 
universities greater autonomy on paper, but it has not been implemented. The renewable 
energy sector seeks to address this, and IRESEN was established to fund competitive 
research proposals from research teams that include international collaborators. These 
efforts in industrial policy and R&D amount to major capacity building efforts to put 
Morocco on a level playing field with its neighbors to the North. These efforts would put 
Morocco in better position to achieve positive outcomes from energy integration projects. 
A technocratic state without rule of experts? In her history on the development 
of French nuclear power, Hecht (2009) coined the term “technocratic prose,” which refers 
to placing technology above and beyond the sphere of politics and out of the reach of 
politicians. She stated that “technologies gave these elite [technologists] a unique vehicle 
for political action” (p. 11). These technologists were key to shaping nuclear power as a 
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technology of national pride in France. I use the term technocracy in reference to Hecht’s 
conceptualization of technocratic prose and experts playing a key role in influencing the 
state, rather than to mean non-elected bureaucrats (as the term is often used in Europe). I 
explore the role of technocracy as an evolving aspect of Morocco’s political development 
and energy policymaking below. 
Morocco’s energy policymaking has a technocratic impulse, reflecting a linear 
model of technology policy that STS and Science and Technology Policy scholars have 
critiqued in the United States. This is evidenced through the framing of energy policy as 
founded in statistics, called in French les données, meaning the data, or literally the 
givens. When Abdelkader Amara was appointed as the new Minister of Energy, Mines, 
Water, and Environment in 2013, the Ministry’s website underwent a complete overhaul 
and “key indicators” and “key statistics” became prominent features of the site. Figure 42 
below illustrates the Ministry of Energy’s policymaking process in which the steps 
include: collecting statistics, analyzing and interpreting statistics, and communicating for 
a given action, which forms the energy policymaking step. While it is drawn as an 
iterative process, it also assumes—like the classic science and technology policy linear 
model—that data leads to accurate statistics, which leads to good policy and, implicitly, 
which leads to socioeconomic benefits. 
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This focus on les données is reflected in the foundational documents of 
Morocco’s new energy policy. For example, the Maroc 2030 scenario study on energy, 
quoted at the beginning of the chapter, framed electricity planning as a social, political, 
and development issue. Yet the report also framed electricity policy as founded upon les 
données. A quote from the study summarizes this perspective: “In the field of energy, 
quantitative data play a primordial (important) role, given the capacity of the structuring 
of the sector on the rest of the economic and social system” (p. 55).129 The study explains 
that errors in the estimation of demand could have macroeconomic consequences for 
years to come. Indeed, this was seen in the case of South Africa in the 1990s (Victor & 
Heller, 2006). Founding energy policy on les données becomes, in part, a strategy to 
address uncertainty. 
Morocco mitigates the uncertainty of long planning scales by using both les 
données and traditional centralized rule by a monarch. While the model above suggests 
that there is a technocratic impulse in Morocco, it does not go as far as technocratic 
                                                        
128 http://www.mem.gov.ma/SiteAssets/PdfStatistiques/AnalyseIndicateursEnerg24Mai2013.pdf 
129 "Dans le domaine de l’énergie, les données quantitatives jouent un rôle primordial, étant donné la 
capacité de structuration que ce secteur a sur le reste du système économique et social."    
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prose, because the Moroccan state is always held above the technology and the experts. 
While it is clear that data do inform decisions, the state plays a more central role than the 
figure above illustrates. In order to cope with electricity development’s long planning 
periods, the Moroccan state chooses winning and losing technologies, as one interviewee 
put it, “setting a direction and going for it,” in addition to allowing some voluntary 
actions under the policy, such as enabling a wind company to sell its energy to the grid.  
Since the state must shoulder risk by supporting 20-40 year energy development 
projects— beyond the lifetime of many companies— it is seen as justified in putting 
conditions in place, such as requiring local content and requiring foreign companies to 
partner with a local research institution. Here, the government is simultaneously involved 
in incentivizing private investment and subsuming it under state control; unlike in 
Western liberal economies, the state is explicitly viewed as the sector assuming the risk, 
rather than private investors. An interviewee summarized this stating, "so the condition 
is, if you want [the state] to buy electricity from you [the foreign company] for the next 
thirty years, you need to transfer the technology to these [local] companies."  He 
continued 
 
in Morocco we believe that the state has to show the way, because the public 
involvement is important, because I told you, there is not something called the 
truth and we have to find it. The state is there to show the way, to show a way, 
because we need that. 
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As the Moroccan state acts as a moral arbitrator to stipulate the appropriate actions of 
Moroccans in society (Ben Ali 1997; Maghraoui 2009), it also acts as a technological 
arbitrator to select appropriate technologies for Morocco.  
By comparison, Dii’s vision of energy policymaking is fundamentally different. 
Dii seeks to frame its vision as the inevitable endpoint of technological and political 
progress. In Dii’s vision, experts play an important role in accelerating progress toward 
this vision, provided politics do not, as Dii puts it, get in the way. The economy is framed 
as the technological arbitrator. The state selecting winning technologies is the opposite of 
Dii’s technology neutral position described in Chapter 5, which was framed as objective 
and unbiased but also suggested that a private company unelected by the public should 
make decisions based upon market logic about what technologies are best. One Moroccan 
interviewee described this approach as equally arbitrary to the state choosing winning 
technologies. In one view, the state assumes the risk and sets the course and in the other, 
private investors assume the risk and market logic supposedly sets the course.  
Dii’s model of prioritizing market control and technocracy was not entirely 
accepted in Europe. For example, the head of the German Development Corporation 
(GIZ) and a resident fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations argued that what 
is at stake in the Desertec project is far broader than clean energy (Gnad & Vietor, 2011). 
Instead, a “Mediterranean Solar Union” of “supranational dimensions” could revive the 
European Union and develop positive mutual dependencies on both the North and South 
sides of the Mediterranean. They argued that what started as a comprehensive vision is 
being closed down and needs to be opened back up. Therefore, they recommended that 
the Vice President of the European Union and the European External Action Service take 
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charge of it. They argued that Desertec is too important to be left in the hands of an 
industrial initiative and “requires the boss’s attention” [i.e., the Vice President of the EU].  
They state “visions that affect society as a whole—especially a common European vision, 
which is able to replace financial transfer payments as a substitute for policy—need to 
receive political priority.” The Irish Times accused politicians of “outsourcing” their 
duties to Dii instead of tackling crucial questions about the future of the EU, the future of 
North-South collaboration, and the future of energy in the Mediterranean (Kinsella, 
2009). This tension between state and private sector governance over electrical power 
systems is an evolving political development issue at stake in constructing a multilateral 
electricity system but is rarely discussed.  
Morocco’s technocratic impulse has likely been influenced by efforts ongoing 
since the early 1980s to liberalize its economy. In its democratization efforts, Morocco 
clearly trends toward liberal forms. As the Emergence industrial policies described above 
illustrate, neoliberalism has not taken the state out of technology planning (Catusse et al., 
2010). Rather, the role of the state and expertise in energy planning is evolving. 
Moroccan energy policy reflects a balancing of neoliberal and traditional governance, in 
which a very political realm with intersecting social goals is contradictorily segmented 
into a) a rational management process bridging technocratic and political spheres b) a 
state-led, centrally controlled process. It is outside of the scope of this study to explain in 
depth the effects of neoliberalism on Morocco, although I do avoid the blunt neoliberal 
critique that has been popular in the literature over the past several years (i.e., 
neoliberalism is fundamentally bad and market liberalization has been corrupted by an 
authoritarian Moroccan state) (e.g, Bogaert, 2011; Joffé, 2009). I am interested more 
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specifically in the technocratic impulse of energy policy in Morocco, why it seems to 
lack rule by experts, and how this might shape energy policy in Morocco in the future. 
Traditionally, Moroccan elites fell into one of three categories—the makhzen or 
royal family, wealthy merchant families like the Soucis, and technocrats (in this case 
unelected bureaucrats) who work for the government based on their expertise (Ben Ali, 
1997)  Following gradual neoliberal reforms that started in 1983, there has been some 
decoupling of the sphere of public action reserved for experts and the political sphere that 
family parties dominate, which has allowed for some public discourse on topics that used 
to be handled only by elites in positions of power (Catusse et al., 2010).  
When King Mohammed VI came into power in 1999 many assumed that a 
“linear” development and modernization process would follow (Tozy, 2008). More 
emphasis was placed on sourcing new political leaders, with less focus than in the past on 
leadership based upon ethnicity or family ties (ibid). This has created a tension related to 
expertise in which the elected politicians are often untrained, while those working for the 
King are (ibid). According to Tozy (2008) "The monarchy skims off the best and the 
brightest to attend les grandes écoles in France and become appointed technocrats, while 
elected officials remain woefully underskilled" (p. 38). After faring worst that expected 
in the elections, Morocco’s Islamist Peace, Justice, and Development party replaced some 
fundamentalist leadership with trained experts (doctors and engineers) with Islamist 
leanings (Tozy, 2008). Expertise is clearly valued in Morocco to some extent but as Tozy 
(2008) stated, “The dilemma of power in Morocco is to nurture a class of political leaders 
who take part in the conduct of public affairs without having any assurance that they can 
change the basic orientation of political life." 
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Despite Morocco’s technocratic impulse and reforms to broaden the scope of 
political participation, experts, especially those who use technology as a vehicle for 
political action, are surprisingly missing. One interviewee at a private research 
organization who used to be employed by the state said that researchers should not be 
involved in forming policy. It was up for the state to choose the way and for the experts 
to follow. Not all scientists agreed and, instead, bemoaned that when Morocco is in need 
of technical expertise, foreign experts are often consulted in the development of national 
policy strategies rather than domestic experts. Moroccan solar researchers—even those 
who were the first to study CSP in Morocco before it was adopted by the state—feel 
irrelevant, disempowered, and ignored. As one interviewee put it, the R&D sector is 
sleeping, the government controls university management, and outside experts have little 
voice in policymaking. One researcher expressed that the government believes they 
consult experts, but the local experts perceive themselves as excluded as the Bureau of 
Foreign Studies brings in foreign experts. Furthermore, some Moroccan researchers felt 
excluded from international events such as the Dii conferences. Another energy 
researcher said  
 
… we have approximately 150 active researchers and they have worked on this 
field [solar power] for many years. And now we can consider them as experts in 
the field. They have, they have skills, they have expertise because they…gave 
many, many lectures, they have [sic] produced many publications in very 
prestigious journals and reviews, so they…are experts in their fields. But only [a] 
few, let me see, practically, nobody, no one of them has been frequently 
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approached and asked to present and to provide his expertise in the form of the 
implementation of Desertec or solar energy plants....there are [sic] experts 
wanting to participate in the implementation of the Moroccan strategy. They have 
this predisposition, but they want to be involved, to be involved in the 
implementation. They don't want to go and ask to be involved. They want to be 
invited to be involved...Most of the authorities are looking for experts from 
outside...and we are here! And we don't ask for money. We are nationalists. We 
would like to work for our nation, for our country. We like our country, and we 
want to participate. But…we would like to be invited. 
 
They want to have the privileges of elites through the deference shown by an invitation, 
but they are not seen as players in the political process.  
Therefore, unlike in France, technology does not give experts a unique license to 
participate in the political sphere. While there is a technocratic impulse in Morocco, it 
does not involve the rule of experts, particularly not domestic ones. Instead the experts 
are subsumed under the state. Two nonprofit associations provide coordination and 
networking functions for the academics working in renewable energy and promote 
collaborations between industry and academia—SMADER (the Moroccan Society for the 
Development of Renewable Energy) and MANEREE. The researchers who tried to 
promote solar energy before it was popular in Morocco developed these organizations to 
gain a voice in the process. 
The attempt to develop new sources of domestic expertise was rekindled 
following the Arab Spring, and new actors sprang up in civil society. For example, 
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organizations, such as MENA Policy Hub and Sim Sim, empower young people to 
participate in policy analysis. MENA Policy hub writes white papers and hosts debates on 
issues including waste management, sustainable development, and energy, and presents 
its results to decision-makers. The president stated on the website,  
 
our ambition [post Arab Spring] is to respond to the large regional and national 
stakes with a young perspective and to tap into the opportunities offered by social 
media, raising strong and high a space for dialogue, for collaboration, and forging 





As Morocco evolves in the post-Arab Spring context, it is unclear what the future 
role of experts will be in the Moroccan state. One question is whether or not the portrayal 
of energy policy being about statistics will serve to mask significant social issues 
imbedded in energy transformations
131—especially if advice from local experts and 
citizens is not institutionalized. This improves transparency, but it also risks 
depoliticizing a key political and social domain in Morocco. If the only legitimate 
knowledge is that which can be expressed through statistics and figures, it could impede 
the willingness to make predictions for the future about the social effects of new energy 
                                                        
130
 Notre ambition est de répondre aux grands enjeux nationaux et régionaux à partir d’une perspective 
jeune et de puiser dans les possibilités offertes par les médias sociaux, levant haut et fort un espace de 
dialogue, de collaboration et forgeant la culture d’analyse, de l’enquête, de la réflexion dans l’esprit de 
nos institutions et nos jeunes citoyens. 
131
 See Chapter 1. 
  318 
systems that do not fit into this quantitative framework. No one in my interview sample 
was willing to speculate about any future harms or societal losers stemming from 
regional energy integration typically because the interviewees saw this as unknowable 
information due to its complexity. Estimations for future social benefit and drawbacks are 
needed even if quantitative precision is lost. However, new organizations like MENA 
Policy Hub suggest the relationship between citizenship and expertise in Morocco is 
changing, possibly offering new opportunities for addressing Morocco’s energy crisis. 
Will the new social pact allow for the incorporation of forms of expertise from new 
participants in civil society? Morocco’s liberal and technocratic impulses illustrate an 
ongoing tension—one described by Ezrahi (1990)—between those who govern being 
those have the right to govern and those who govern being those who have the 
knowledge to govern. Chapter 7 continues this discussion by examining public 
engagement in CSP siting.  
Morocco’s Contemporary Electricity System  
 
Transitioning the Moroccan electricity system from fossil fuels to renewable 
energy as part of Morocco’s industrial strategy envisions Morocco as a future knowledge 
economy. To achieve this future, Morocco’s energy crisis must be overcome—addressing 
Morocco’s complete lack of fossil fuel wealth in the face of skyrocketing electricity 
demand. As electricity access increases and Morocco’s GDP grows, demand projections 
indicate that Morocco must at least double its installed capacity by 2020 and double it 
again by 2030. According to an interviewee from the national utility company ONEE 
(Office National de l’électricité et de l’eau potable), Morocco must double electricity 
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generation capacity as early as 2017, not 2020. As Figure 43 illustrates, electricity 
consumption increased 6-8% per year over the past ten years.  
Morocco’s energy needs and its energy consumption profile are dramatically 
changing. The defining factors of increasing energy demand include economic and 
demographic growth, urbanization, and industrial and agricultural growth (Royaume du 
Maroc Haut Commissariat au Plan, 2006). The biggest consumers are the industrial and 
residential sectors, not the agricultural sector. In 2010, industry used 38% of electricity, 
households used 33%, the transportation sector used 18%, the agricultural sector used 
6%, and the tertiary sector used 5% (Société d’investissement énérgetiques, 2010). Rural 
electrification contributed to increasing electricity demand, as the electrification rate 
grew from 65% in 2002 to 86% in 2006 to 93% in 2007 to 95.4% in 2008 (World Bank, 
2009). This electrification rate might be overestimated, as one interviewee expressed that 
sometimes the rate is calculated based upon whether a village has any access to electricity 
(e.g., if their schoolhouse has access) rather than counting each individual household. 
Almost no information is available about this, and the national utility company indicated 
that they count at the household level.  
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Figure 43. Morocco's Increasing Energy Demand Since 1999 in Gigawatt-hours. Source: 




Morocco’s total installed generating capacity in 2009 was just 6.2 GW, with 
ONEE contributing 4.4 GW of capacity and independent power producers contributing 
1.8 GW—compared to 75 GW of installed capacity in California, 100 GW in Spain, and 
177 GW in Germany. Morocco has a grid of 260,000 kilometers of low, medium, and 
high voltage transmission lines (Martínez, 2014; Office National de l’électricité, 2013; 
The World Bank: Energy Sector Management Assistance program, 2009). To meet 
increasing demand, Morocco seeks to develop 4 GW of solar and wind capacity by 2020 
and 520 MW (.52 GW) of hydroelectricity and pumped storage, although the percentage 
of overall hydroelectricity generating capacity will go down due to increasing demand. 
Figure 44 and Figure 45 compare current capacity to planned capacity. If the targets are 
met, Moroccan electricity consumption would exceed the 20% EU renewable energy 
standard and would reach Germany’s current levels. By comparison, neighboring 
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Algeria’s installed capacity is 93% natural gas, and in 2008, only 3% of electricity in the 
MENA region came from renewables (International Energy Agency/ OECD, 2010). 
 
Figure 44. Morocco's Installed Generation Capacity in 2009, Source MEMEE, Chart by 
Author 
 
Figure 45. Morocco's Planned Installed Capacity for 2020, Source MEMEE, Pie Chart by 
Author 
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Recently added capacity in Morocco has largely come from natural gas, fuel oil, 
and coal. For example, the 472 MW Ain Beni Mathar plant commissioned in 2011 is 
mostly natural gas fired with a small amount of solar trough (see Figure 46). The plant 
uses the natural gas with which Morocco is compensated for being a transit country in the 
natural gas pipeline between Algeria and Spain. Morocco is planning another extension 
of its Jorf Lasfar coal-fired power plant in addition to the 660 MW coal-fired power plant 
in Safi to be finished in 2017 (both phosphate centers) and 300 MW of fuel oil plants in 
Kenitra, north of the capital city of Rabat (ESMAP, 2011). Fuel oil plants are used during 
peak load, and it is possible that CSP with storage could meet a specific system’s need by 
replacing fuel oil to provide power during peak hours. Morocco also has large reserves of  
shale oil with deposits at Timahdit and Tarfaya that are undeveloped and will likely be 
part of Morocco’s long-term energy strategy, although little focus has been placed on 
them so far. 
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Figure 46. King Mohammed VI Inaugurating the CSP Portion of the Ain Beni Mathar 




As Moroccan energy demand increases, its energy dependence deepens, along 
with its overall trade deficit. This energy dependence is framed as an energy security 
issue, even though almost all interviewees expressed support for regional integration. 
According to an interview with MASEN, Morocco imported 95% of its total energy in 
2013 and 99% of its fossil fuels. Morocco is already dependent on electricity imports. 
Morocco and Spain share a 400 kV submarine transmission cable across the Strait of 
Gibraltar with a transfer capacity of 700 MW (Vidican et al., 2013). Algeria and Morocco 
have three transmission interconnections including a 400 kV circuit overhead line plus 
two 220 kV overhead lines with a total transfer capacity of 1,400 MW (ibid). Imports 
from Spain and Algeria grew from 10% of consumption before 2006 to 18% in 2008 
because drought decreased hydroelectricity consumption to 7% (Energy Sector 
Management Assistance Program (ESMAP), 2011; “Indicateurs Clés,” 2014). Imports 
                                                        
133 http://oujda-portail.net/ma/hm-the-king-inaugurates-integrated-solar-combined-cycle-power-plantin-
eastern-morocco-19180.html#.VQEg7GZTPn8 
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decreased in early 2009 due to increased water availability for hydroelectricity (ibid) and 
reached 14% in 2012 (“Indicateurs Clés,” 2014). However, conflicting information exists 
on the quantity of these electricity imports as European sources often report higher 
figures, with some claiming as much as 20-25% of Morocco’s electricity is imported 
from Spain, suggesting the information is sensitive due to energy security concerns.  
In order to decrease this dependence, Morocco plans to incorporate large 
quantities of intermittent renewable energy into its grid, posing new challenges for grid 
stability and reliability. In other words, renewable energy again poses a challenge in 
terms of a broader system transformation, as argued throughout this dissertation. A 
representative from ONEE, the national utility company, stated “the integration of the 
grid with renewable energy is a major challenge for ONEE.”134 ONEE has built 460 MW 
of pumped storage (STEP) with an additional 350 MW under construction. STEP 
provides energy at night by transferring water from a basin that is higher in altitude to 
one that is lower. ONEE is also working on consumer load balancing programs, in which 
consumers are asked to reduce their consumption when wind resources are scarce, and it 
is developing a pilot smart grid program in Casablanca. As illustrated previously, 
electricity systems are temporally dependent; grid management initiatives address peak 
times of consumption to maintain the highly valued system property of reliability that 
would be necessary for developing a future industrial economy. While demand increased 
an average of 5% from 2011 to 2012, it increased 10% during the evening peak hours and 
increased more than 5% during the hottest and coldest months, requiring the construction 
of expensive plants that operate mainly during peak hours. As one energy expert in 
                                                        
134 Parce que l'integration des reseaux aux energies renouvelables c'est un defi majeur pour l'ONE.  
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Morocco put it, “7-10pm [are] three hours [that] ONEE [sic] fears like the devil”.135 The 
reliability of supply worsens in the outskirts of the grid. While staying in the small 
southern desert town of Merzouga, I experienced load shedding, especially during peak 
hours, while demand was always met during the time I spent in the capital of Rabat. 
Significant and uneven increases in demand are a new challenge for energy access, as 
they could result in a lack of reliability for households and industry alike, or even the loss 
of electricity for people who have come to depend upon it.  
These measures alone are insufficient to ensure the future reliability of the grid in 
Morocco and along with it its energy security and valued system services. Again, the 
systems-level transformation provides the impetus for regional integration. An official 
from ONEE explained that energy security for Morocco involves developing national 
energy resources in addition to a favorable regional context for coordination and 
integration through initiatives like Desertec to balance out intermittency. He stated, 
“Regional coordination is necessary for ensuring energy security.”136 Interconnections 
with Spain and Algeria can help balance the load by importing electricity during peak 
hours. This illustrates how difficult the system context of electricity makes energy 
independence in reality. The solution to fossil fuel dependency at the system-level 
requires regional grid dependency, pulling Morocco toward the region.  
 
Power sector investment and international influence. To meet increasing 
demand, Morocco needs a $10 billion infusion in its electricity system in the near future 
                                                        
135
 As Chapter 3 explained, peak load has long been during these hours in North Africa 
136 Et il faut une coordination regionale pour assurer cette securite energetique. 
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for transmission, generation, and distribution (The World Bank: Energy Sector 
Management Assistance program, 2009). Unfortunately, these weighty needs for capital 
coincide with financial stress in Morocco’s energy sector. Some recently electrified 
villages do not pay their electricity bills, leaving ONEE insolvent and unable to pay all of 
its contractors, according to interviewees. By the summer of 2014, ONEE was over $6.2 
billion (51 billion MAD) in debt, and the government signed a plan to raise 45 million 
MAD in capital by 2017 for ONEE (Agueniou, 2014). Samir, Morocco’s refining 
company, is also in dire financial straits and recently received an injection of $500 
million from Corral, its holding company, to recapitalize it (“500 millions USD pour 
refinancer Samir,” 2014). Local banks may be in a favorable position to provide 
financing for the electricity sector, but there is limited foreign currency on the market 
and, given the size of the investment, local banks would then concentrate all of their risk 
in the energy sector (ibid). Increased electricity rates for consumers who use more than 
100 kwh per month will provide some financing although not nearly enough. 
Overall, Morocco will need assistance from foreign investors and development 
banks to cover its energy investment needs, considering the weak state of the sector 
(ESMAP, 2011). Worldwide, capital available for energy investment has again 
plummeted, leaving developing countries in search of funding (Dubash, 2003). Two-
thirds of the required capital for energy development is in Asia, and 40% of that capital is 
in China (Royaume du Maroc Haut Commissariat au Plan, 2006). Morocco hopes to 
secure Asian capital for projects in the disputed territory of Western Sahara that 
European investment banks will not fund (Ortiz, 2014). In April 2014, Morocco called on 
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Japan to make an investment promised in 2013 to fund $2 billion in African energy 
projects (Alternative Energy Africa, 2014). 
However, Morocco has had limited success in attracting foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in the past (Royaume du Maroc Haut Commissariat au Plan, 2006). The lack of 
investment is partly due to investors’ risk perceptions.137 The 2013 Corruption 
Perceptions Index ranked Morocco 91
st
 out of 177 countries, and the World Bank’s Ease 
of Doing Business ranked Morocco 87
th
 out of 189 countries. This is a perception index, 
not an absolute measure of corruption, but investors’ perceptions of risk due to corruption 
and inefficient bureaucracy have figured heavily into Mediterranean renewable energy 
projects and have been a major concern for Dii and other CSP developers 
(Komendantova, Patt, & Williges, 2011). 
Development bank funding has been tied to liberalization efforts—tugging 
Morocco in the direction of liberalizing its power sector. Part of European investment in 
Morocco’s energy sector has gone toward liberalization measures (European 
Commission, 2010). In the early 2000s, the World Bank formally acknowledged that the 
needs of each country’s electrical power sector are unique (Byrne & Mun, 2003). When it 
became involved in Morocco’s new energy strategy in 2009, it intervened tentatively due 
to criticsm due to past problems with neoliberal strategies (World Bank, 2009). The 
World Bank shifted from a deregulation model to a Private-Public Partnerships model 
(Dubash & Williams 2006) that is used today in the Moroccan renewable energy sector. 
Education, Renewable Energy, and Inequity in Morocco. Morocco’s primary 
goal behind this significant investment in the renewable energy sector—even considering 
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 See Chapter 5 for the Dii’s perspective on risk perceptions. 
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the urgency of increasing demand— is to generate jobs, more so than generating 
electrons. One of Morocco’s top scholars in the field of energy reframed Morocco’s lack 
of resources, stating that Morocco’s greatest resource is men and its second greatest 
resource is solar energy. If the country does not valorize its greatest wealth—people— 
through human development and democracy, then its other resources cannot be valorized. 
This view of citizenship reflects Morocco’s evolving political development context since 
the Arab Spring. Lamrini (2006) argued that the problem is not inherently poor UN 
development statistics but a lack of political will and an indifference of citizens that 
needs to be addressed through a clear vision and individual empowerment to reform the 
political system.  
The lack of valorization of human capital and citizen disempowerment is reflected 
in the anomie of educated youth in Morocco and the MENA region. The MENA region’s 
youth unemployment rates are among the highest in the world, coupled with a rapidly 
growing youth demographic (Vidican et al., 2013, citing ILO 2011a). Seventy-nine 
percent of Morocco’s urban unemployed population is within the 15-34 year old age 
bracket (African Development Bank), and Morocco’s overall youth unemployment rate is 
over 20%. Many of these unemployed youth are educated; while only 4.2% of the non-
educated workforce was unemployed in 2009, 18% of the educated workforce lacked 
jobs (Maddy-Weitzman & Zisenwine, 2012). A young Moroccan participating in frequent 
protests relating to unemployment told the New York Times in 2013 that she dreamed of 
finding a job in Morocco’s growing renewable energy sector (Alami, 2013). Yet most of 
Morocco’s new jobs are sprouting up at call centers in Rabat and Casablanca, under 
names like “Technopolis,” through Morocco’s growing offshoring sector. Following the 
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Arab Spring, young Moroccans are demanding a higher standard of living, and many 
young educated scientists and engineers are leaving the country as part of the Moroccan 
research diaspora, challenging Morocco’s dream for a national innovation system as well 
as its overall economy.    
This lack of valorization of Morocco’s human capital is also reflected in systemic 
educational disparities and challenges. Morocco spends one quarter of its state budget, or 
5.4% of GDP, on education. It has not achieved the outcomes expected from such a large 
investment, with an adult literacy rate of only 71% (UNICEF, 2012) (although this is the 
average literacy rate for lower middle income countries) (“Literacy rate, adult total (% of 
people ages 15 and above) | Data | Graph,” n.d.).138 There are a variety of reasons for 
illiteracy, including choosing which of Morocco’s many languages to teach in and 
finding teachers qualified to teach in it (Alami, 2013). Public university is free in 
Morocco, but a high quality education and advanced degrees are often out of reach for 
lower to middle class Moroccans. Morocco hopes renewable energy will improve 
educational opportunities for young people that lead to jobs. At a 2013 forum hosted by 
the Moroccan Society for the Development of Renewable Energy (SMADER) on 
developing training and educational programs in renewable energy, a frustrated young 
woman in the audience stood up to complain that such training opportunities would likely 
only be available to the wealthy, perpetuating existing disparities.   
Educational disparities and dysfunctions relate to broader economic and social 
inequality and inequity, and energy policy in Morocco therefore faces the challenge of 
                                                        
138 Measures of literacy in Morocco vary greatly. In 2009, the World Bank measured the literacy rate at 
only 56.1%. 
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exacerbating uneven development. The mountain and desert regions have been called 
“depressed Mediterranean zones” (zones Méditerranéen défavorisée) due to their relative 
isolation and poverty (Roux, 1997). Young people are leaving these areas in droves in 
search of urban employment, resulting in an urbanization rate of 55.1% (Royaume du 
Maroc Haut Commissariat au Plan, 2006). These depressed zones are the target regions 
for renewable energy development, interweaving renewable energy development with 
these broader socioeconomic issues. A huge gulf separates the two Moroccos, or the 
Moroccan elite living in large cities from the rural or urban poor living in villages and 
slums. This came to a head in 2003, when Morocco, previously assumed to be immune 
from religious extremism and violence, experienced seven simultaneous suicide 
bombings in Casablanca. These attacks targeted symbols of wealth and foreign influence, 
not governmental power, illustrating the effects of extreme poverty and social change 
(Sater, 2010). The suicide bombers came from the burgeoning Casablanca bidonvilles 
(slums), where people often must pirate electricity to gain access (Zaki, 2010). The 
government responded with social programs aimed at dispersing the bidonvilles, as well 
as repression as thousands of people were arrested (Howe, 2005). At a seminar arranged 
to discussed the bombings, the president of Al Akhawayn University, an elite American-
style university, expressed that inequalities in educational access were partly to blame for 
the bombings (Howe, 2005). 
The challenges described above provide the context for understanding how 
Morocco’s changing needs affect the formulation of a new social pact for electricity. The 
next section illustrates how plans for renewable energy are developing in the context of 
national pride. 
  331 
 
Renewable Energy and National Pride  
 
“Economic development will not be complete without its radiance (rayonnement) 
on all of the national territory…”   
-- Massolia on the Second Moroccan Forum on Energy (“Deuxièmes Assises de 
l’Energie,” 2011) 
 
Renewable energy provides Morocco with an opportunity to reimagine itself as 
what Hecht (2009) called “a technological nation” and an emerging, industrializing 
knowledge society. It has the beginnings of a shared national project, part of capacity-
building efforts to put Morocco on a level playing field within the region. In her study on 
French nuclear power, Hecht (2009) used the term the “radiance of France” to explore the 
“strength and flexibility of the association between technological prowess and national 
identity,” in which the term radiance in French (rayonnement) means both radiation and 
radiance (p. 4). The quote above addresses Morocco’s renewable energy development in 
terms of socioeconomic development designed to radiate to the disadvantaged rural areas 
of the country. Morocco seeks to accomplish this through the commercialization of its 
sun and wind. As a country that lacks the oil wealth of many of its neighbors, Morocco 
seeks to reframe what counts as energy wealth and “valorize” it. Just as people have 
framed alternative energy technologies, Morocco is framing alternative energy wealth. 
Mehdi Alaoui M’Daghri, co-founder of the Morocco Solar Festival in Ouarzazate stated, 
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“We organized this festival to show one idea—gold is in the sky. The sun is a treasure for 
our country…for arts and culture, science and technology, knowledge and discovery” 
(Hocke, 2014).  
As such, Morocco is reimagining itself from being a fuel-impoverished country to 
being a country rich in energy resources in need of valorization. To valorize a resource in 
this context means to unlock the socioeconomic benefits of resources through 
commercialization and technological development. In 2013, the new Moroccan Minister 
of Energy said at the Dii conference that the Ministry’s objective “is to valorize our solar 
energy resources.” Through solar radiation maps like the one below, Morocco is framed 
as a national awash with solar gold waiting to be harvested. Some interviewees even 
referred to Morocco’s “gisement solaire,” which literally means Morocco’s solar 
deposits, reframing what is typically thought of as fossil fuel deposits into deposits of 
renewable energy. The discourse is similar for wind. Furthermore, the trade winds that 
brought Morocco phosphates also created plump algae that can be valorized to produce 
biofuels. The Maroc 2030 energy scenario study even refers to the “valorization of the 
privileged geographic position of the country for regional integration” through the 
Maghreb-Europe pipeline and the Morocco-Spain-Algeria grid. Energy efficiency is even 
seen as a resource to be valorized. Other interviewees discussed the valorization of 
Morocco’s human resources through entrepreneurship initiatives and increasing 
employment opportunities in order to develop innovative energy solutions. 
Mascir, a new private research organization developed as part of Morocco’s 
efforts to reform its R&D sector, also focuses on the valorization of energy resources. It 
even has a “Director of Business Development and Valorization.” Biofuels made from 
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Moroccan algae are “Champions league” technologies, or those that will compete 
abroad.
139
 These technologies have their own technological specifications— such as 
fungible fuels from algae that work in any car— and also social specifications, such as 
avoiding genetically engineered algae so the fuel would be socially acceptable in Europe. 
Other technologies being designed are “local competitors,” like at-home breast cancer or 
leukemia testing for rural areas or quality control testing designed for small producers to 
certify their products for export. In this case, local means dedicated to the Moroccan or 
similar market, which could in fact encompass many countries. It means that the 
technology focuses more on providing the best price than on the best performance, 
although it would meet minimum efficiency standards. The previous director of Mascir 
stated "So it's big science but designed to be cheap and designed to be easy to use by 
cooperatives." Mascir is also developing biodegradable plastic bags that would address 
the issue of the plastic polluting the Moroccan landscape. These technologies are geared 
toward people in rural Morocco and Maghrebian countries. This reflects the disparate 
goals behind Morocco’s energy policies—to develop a major high-technology export 
while meeting the needs of the most impoverished citizens in the country. 
 
                                                        
139 This refers to a prestigious soccer tournament organized by the Union of European Football 
Associations. 
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Figure 47. Solar Irradiation in Morocco Measured in Kilowatt-hours per Square Meter. 
Creative Commons License, SolarGIS © 2015 GeoModel Solar.
140
 
As renewable energy resources were reframed as wealth, renewable energy 
development became a symbol of national pride. At the 2013 Dii conference in Rabat, 
Fathallah Sijilmassi, the Moroccan head of the Mediterranean Solar Plan, stated that the 
conference was "emotional because Morocco since the beginning was one of the active 
tangible pioneers in the field of renewable energy with tangible projects like Ouarzazate." 
Examples of renewable energy as national pride appear throughout the country. For 
example, centers of transportation advertise Morocco’s commitment to renewable energy 
to tourists and citizens alike. The airports in Rabat and Casablanca have signs in the 
airport security line that count how much of the airport’s energy is coming from solar PV 
and the avoided carbon dioxide emissions (see Figure 48). In the customs line to enter 
                                                        
140 http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SolarGIS-Solar-map-Morocco-en.png 
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Morocco in the Casablanca airport, tourist and business travelers alike watch a video with 
a man holding the sun in the palm of his hand followed by a young girl with the dawn 
behind her saying “we need new sources of energy to improve quality of life.” In another 
example, the new train station in Marrakech has a free solar charger for travelers to 
charge their electronic devices (see Figure 49).  
 
  
Figure 48. Solar Counter in the Casablanca Airport. Photo by Author. 
  
Figure 49. Free Solar Charger in Marrakech. Photo by Author. 
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The new Moroccan 100 dirham bill (about $10) pictures wind turbines in the 
desert and a desert caravan, juxtaposing tradition and modernity (see Figure 50). A 
Moroccan interviewee who runs the Sahara Wind company stated about the new bill 
 
The previous bill showed a hydropower dam, agricultural activities, and women 
sorting through oranges, which represented Morocco's main economy…So it’s 
just to tell you this is essentially the building of a nation, the building of a new 
economy. And Moroccans will see that every day…they’ll do business with 
that… 
 
This offers evidence of Morocco’s process of balancing between its traditional 
agricultural economy and a knowledge-based society. Although citrus has been replaced 
with wind turbines on the currency, the foreground still represents one of Morocco’s 
stereotypical activities—desert caravans.  
 
 
Figure 50. The New Moroccan 100 Dirham Bill (Roughly $10). Photo by Author. 
Renewable energy is becoming enrolled in symbolic ways in Moroccan politics, 
again fusing renewable energy with traditional economic and religious activities. For 
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instance, SIE is working with the Moroccan Islamic Ministry to promote energy 
efficiency in 15,000 of the country’s roughly 50,000 mosques, resulting in a 40% 
reduction in energy use. Morocco is the first Islamic country with a “green mosque” 
label. Integrating renewable energy into mosque architecture and sermons is an effective 
communications tool to explain to the public that saving energy is important. Morocco 
has also taken measures to improve the efficiency of 2,000 hammam fires (Royaume du 
Maroc Haut Commissariat au Plan, 2006). The hammam is a public bath, traditionally 
heated with firewood, which serves social functions, e.g., a meeting place for women, a 
place for women to try to find wives for their sons, as well as livelihood functions 
because some households lack showers. They have also worked to improve the efficiency 
of 100 pottery kilns, a traditional economic activity (ibid). Tying renewable energy and 
energy efficiency to important aspects of religion and the traditional agricultural 
economy sends a powerful educational and symbolic message about the importance of 
renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
 Perhaps in contradiction to developing a renewable energy strategy based 
upon national pride, Morocco has long-term aspirations for a major oil discovery and 
continues its oil and natural gas exploration activities. Rumors circulate about significant 
offshore oil or gas discovery but none has been confirmed. Morocco appears to be 
ambivalent about what natural resource it sells to Europe—sun, oil, or natural gas. Since 
Morocco’s energy policy is based upon socioeconomic goals, and environmental goals 
play a minor role, it is not necessarily committed to a renewable energy future. 
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Morocco’s version of technological neutrality141 is based upon valuing any natural 
resource that situates it on more stable footing in terms of energy dependence and a 
potential export to Europe. It underscores a commitment to a vision for a future in which 
Morocco is an industrialized country with a strong export commodity, rather than a 
commitment to a particular technology or a particular genre of technology. While 
renewable energy provides an opportunity to shape “a new Morocco” in a world in which 
only two countries (Spain and Germany) generate a significant portion of their electricity 
from renewables, oil would allow Morocco to benefit from the traditional resources that 
other nations in the region have. Below I will illustrate that several times throughout its 
history Morocco has developed a national reputation around large-scale renewable energy 
projects—first dams and then CSP—while continuing quietly to develop fossil fuels. 
Moroccan Electricity Systems Under the Protectorate: the Colonial Social Pact  
 
Before explaining how Morocco’s social pact is changing today in relationship to 
renewable energy, I will explore the foundations of the social pact from early 
electrification to the present. From 1911 to 1956 Morocco was under French and Spanish 
rule, although as early as 1830, Europe already had significant influence over Morocco 
both politically and technologically (Miller, 2013). Understanding Morocco’s colonial 
energy past is essential to interpreting its energy present. Almost no social and cultural 
history of colonialism in Morocco exists (Maghraoui, 2013), which is the genre of history 
in which this study would be interested. While scholarship is lacking on the history of 
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 See Chapter 5. 
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African electrification in general (Barjot, 2002b), enough has been written in the 
Francophone literature to distill the general principles of Morocco’s early social pact for 
electricity, which developed within a colonial electricity pact tied closely to agricultural 
policy and resource extraction. This section also provides an English description of 
Moroccan electrification, which is lacking in the literature. 
Although various communities argue that the French Protectorate was “an 
aberration not especially worthy of study,” Miller (2013) illustrated its importance to 
“modern Moroccan history as an unfolding, variegated, often discontinuous and a 
textured canvas, yet all of one piece” (Kindle loc. 421). Maghraoui (2013) argues that 
colonialism is part of an “unfolding process of ‘modernity.’” Therefore, studying the 
colonial power system will provide longitudinal grounding for the analysis of the 
contemporary viewpoints of what is viewed as a modern electrical power system for 
Morocco. The colonial electricity system left imprints on today’s system and its various 
contradictions and inequities. This reflects findings from the STS literature that electrical 
power systems develop momentum, rigidity, and obduracy as they form and have lasting 
impressions on social justice (Hommels, 2008; Hughes, 1983). It explains the historical 
relationship between electricity and agricultural policy in Morocco, including why 
Morocco has significant installed hydroelectric capacity despite its capricious water 
sources and persistent drought. The footprints of this system include the lack of attention 
given to bidonvilles (slums) and the mountainous zones of the country, the focus on 
privileging elites, the focus on electricity development for resource extraction rather than 
improving citizens’ capabilities, the focus on valorizing resources, and a strong focus on 
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centralization and state control. The system had to be reshaped to provide electricity and 
electrical modernization for the average Moroccan.  
Under the Protectorate, Morocco was the focus of incomplete engineering dreams 
based on myths of the type described in Chapter 3. Part of the ideological foundation of 
French colonization was the myth that Morocco used to be the Granary of Rome—or a 
significant producer of grain exported to the Roman Empire—but Arabs had neglected 
the land and only French technology could return it to its former state (Davis, 2007; 
Swearingen, 1988). Miller (2013) described such colonial motivations as “…the oft-
invoked and misguided image of a Moroccan ‘Far West’— an empty land, an unutilized 
space, ripe for exploitation by the pioneering spirit” (Kindle loc. 2722). This frontier 
provided a space in which to pioneer new technologies, such as dams, road construction 
techniques, electrified rail (Berthonnet, 2008; Bouneau, 2002), and city planning (Miller, 
2013). These large-scale technologies were imagined as emblematic of what one historian 
called “the drunkenness of Saint Simon” (Couvreux, Moussa, Marseille, Beltran, & 
Cladé, 2002). Saint Simonianism was a French utopian socialist movement in the 1950s 
and 1960s, reflected in the fantastical projects the French imagined in Africa, especially 
dam building, and the grandiose, modernizing dreams that underpinned them (ibid).  
At the start of the Protectorate in 1911, there was no electricity infrastructure in 
Morocco (D’Angio, 2002). Louis Lyautey, the first director general of the Protectorate 
(Résident Général) from 1912-1925, tried to physically ground the civilizing discourse 
within agricultural modernization and the construction of power plants and railroads 
(Davis, 2007; S. G. Miller, 2013). He divided the country into ‘the useful Morocco’ (le 
Maroc utile) in the arable plains, and ‘the useless Morocco’ (le Maroc inutile) in the 
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mountain and desert regions (Swearingen, 1998). He sought to secure the desert and 
mountainous areas (to prevent uprisings from Berber tribes) while developing “useful 
Morocco,” which was the official colonial focus (Bisson, 2003). This established 
inequalities between the coasts and mountains of Morocco that still exist today. 
Lyautey built new French cities near the medinas, or traditional walled cities 
where Moroccans lived. The juxtaposition of the “new cities” built by the French with the 
medinas illustrated a perceived difference between tradition and modernity and both the 
technical and moral as part of the civilizing discourse (Heurtebise, 2002), as the new 
cities had access to technology and the medinas largely did not. Lyautey vowed to leave 
the medinas alone, to “supply them with water and electricity…but that is all” (Miller, 
2013, loc. 2320). This was merely rhetoric used to justify the Protectorate’s existence, as 
there is no evidence that average Moroccans benefited from electrification during this 
time period. In fact, the French thought that electrifying the medina would spoil its 
traditional qualities. In the medina in the city of Fes, citizens, grain mill operators, and 
students in the city’s historic religious boarding schools wanted access to electricity, but 
the French implemented regulations to maintain the traditional look of the medina for 
tourist purposes (Apelian, 2012), preventing electrification and even the installation of 
gas pumps by Shell (Porter, 2000). In some cases, students used electricity furtively to 
study at night in areas not frequented by tourists (Apelian, 2012). By attempting to make 
time stand still in the medina, the French actually shaped it and along with it they shaped 
a distinct perception of what counted as traditional and what counted as modern (Porter, 
2000). 
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Large-scale electrification was delayed under the Protectorate due to lack of 
funds, time needed to securitize the Atlas Mountains, the need for a decree enacted in 
1914 to bring Morocco’s waters under state control, and the prioritization of the Tangier-
Fes railroad line as stipulated by the Franco-German treaty that resolved the Agadir 
Crisis (D’Angio, 2002). Morocco attracted significant capital for electricity development 
in the 1920s (Barjot, 2002a). The infusion of cash needed to build the first power plants 
in the country, which were coal-fired, was financed by a consortium of Parisian banks 
called Morocco’s General Company (la Compagnie Générale du Maroc) (D’Angio, 
2002). Once electrification began, several companies controlled the distribution of 
electricity, the largest of which was the Moroccan Business for the Distribution of Water, 
Gas, and Electricity (la Société marocaine de distribution d'eau, de gaz et d'électricité or 
SMD), which served Casablanca and Rabat (ibid). Electricity demand skyrocketed in 
Morocco and other French colonies, but most of it stemmed from European settlers’ 
usage, electrified rail, and extractive industries, not local demand or Moroccans 
benefiting from electrification (Barjot, 2002b).  
French experiments with electrified rail played an important role in colonial 
electrification and the integration of the two systems intensified resource extraction. The 
French sought to “valorize” Morocco’s electrical resources to transport phosphates from 
mines to the port of Casablanca (Bouneau, 2002). By 1933, Morocco had the continent’s 
only electrified rail and had 1,427 km of transmission lines running to most Moroccan 
cities, the phosphate mines, and the railroad (Barjot, 2002a).  
It was under the French Protectorate that Morocco’s agricultural policy became 
intertwined with electricity policy, beginning a long history related to the energy-water 
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nexus impeding plans for large-scale technological systems in Morocco. The French 
hoped that, after their difficulties colonizing desiccated Algeria, Morocco would provide 
an El Dorado of water resources that they could exploit (Davis, 2007; S. G. Miller, 2013; 
Swearingen, 1988). They viewed the Moroccan High Atlas Mountains as “a chateau of 
water,” with three large rivers fed by snowmelt, l’oum er Rebia, le Sebou, and la 
Moulouya (pronounced Malwiya) (Saul, 2002). The French hoped Morocco would 
become a contemporary Granary of Rome—to supply Europe with large-scale grain 
exports—and they implemented an ambitious strategy to grow grain for export. A decade 
later, it became apparent that Morocco’s water resources had deceived the French, as they 
were subject to capricious rainfall and persistent drought, which foiled the Granary of 
Rome vision. In fact, recent evidence illustrates that while North Africa did provide grain 
to Rome during the Roman Empire, it did so with traditional methods and at nowhere 
near the scale the French assumed (Davis, 2007). Like the incomplete engineering dreams 
described in Chapter 3, Morocco’s agricultural policy under the Protectorate was based 
upon ideology, false premises, and a lack of sufficient understanding of the landscape.  
Furthermore, exports to Europe were disrupted by French politics. French grain 
producers successfully lobbied for a ceiling on Moroccan imports so that their market 
was not flooded with Moroccan grain (Swearingen, 1998). Even with this ceiling, 
Morocco exported grain even as people starved (Sater, 2010). The neocolonial concerns 
surrounding Desertec relate to Morocco becoming not a Granary of Rome, but the 
Electricity Depot of the EU, even while local people lack access. This was one 
motivation behind proposing a single market prioritizing regional reliability, which was 
then disrupted by EU politics. The concern is also that solar power plants would be built 
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with a similar lack of understanding of the landscape and local people’s needs (this will 
be further addressed in Chapter 7). 
In 1925, Théodore Steeg replaced Lyautey and faced the culmination of the 
Granary of Rome crisis as severe drought, locusts, and famine devastated the country 
(Swearingen, 1998). Under Steeg, agricultural export policy shifted in what Swearingen 
(1988) called the “California Dream,” shifting Morocco’s attention across the Atlantic in 
hopes of turning Morocco into “a new California” (une nouvelle Californie). The French 
sent missions to California in the 1930s to study its agricultural and irrigation 
technologies and to Tennessee to study dam building (ibid). Swearingen (1988) quoted 
Georges Louis, the head of a French expedition to California in 1932, who stated 
“California, through irrigation, had caused the desert to blossom, creating immense 
wealth that had become a magnet for men, creating more wealth” (p. 69). A journalist at 
the time stated “the miracle of irrigation, which made California’s fortune, is occurring 
again on Moroccan soil.” (p. 75). This “miracle of agriculture” discourse described by 
Swearingen (1988) is similar to the discourse surrounding CSP and Dii’s “irrigation 
miracle” to put deserts into service by building solar farms to make the desert bloom with 
cheap renewable energy to spur wealth through electricity exports. The Protectorate also 
compared their plans for large-scale irrigation to the Tennessee Valley Authority, to 
uplift rural areas and stem rural exodus (Swearingen, 1988). However, few benefits of 
large-scale dams in this time period went to Moroccans.
142
 The Protectorate developed a 
policy to irrigate one million hectares, in which “not a drop of water [was to] reach the 
                                                        
142 The TVA built large hydroelectric projects in the United States that were aimed at poverty reduction 
and advocating for public versus private electricity systems (McCraw, 1971).   
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sea,” initiating a period of dam building that played a crucial role in forming both 
Morocco’s agricultural and electrical power systems. The focus on exports shifted from 
grain to citrus and vegetable bumper crops grown through irrigation and labeled with the 
“Maroc label” that imitated the Sunkist label to mark the quality of Moroccan exports 
(compare to the marketing techniques of Design III in Chapter 5). Today, Morocco still 
looks to California guidance on energy policy, implementing similar liberal reforms and 
CSP technologies. This also illustrates the long emphasis placed on fostering export 
markets to Europe. 
Because the exploitation of hydrologic and hydroelectric resources under the new 
California plan required a centralized state and national plan to amortize large 
investments (Couvreux et al., 2002)— and centralized electricity was needed for 
commercializing phosphates— the development of electrical power systems was also 
envisioned at a large scale with the centralization of production and interconnection from 
the start (Couvreux et al., 2002; Saul, 2002). This was unusual in Africa (Frémeaux & 
d'Almeida, 2002) where most electricity systems mostly evolved piecemeal (Saul, 2002), 
and it illustrates the historical roots of Morocco’s contemporary emphasis on centralized, 
state-run electricity systems. Hydroelectricity development had also become more urgent 
after World War I increased coal prices (Saul, 2002). A single state-controlled company, 
Énergie électrique du Maroc (EEM) or Electrical Energy of Morocco, was established in 
1924 to “rationally develop” hydroelectricity and irrigation (Saul, 2002). They had a 
monopoly over electricity generation (ibid). The first reservoir dam, Sidi Maachou, was 
completed in 1929 and supplied drinking water and 65 million kWh per year of electricity 
(Swearingen, 1988; Saul, 2002). 
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While Morocco’s grandiose plans for renewable energy development 
(hydropower) and irrigation were a source of pride used to substantiate the colonial 
enterprise, fossil fuels quietly played an equally important role in the system (similar to 
today). Because hydroelectricity alone could not meet Morocco’s energy demand due to 
weak rainfall and unpredictable drought, the French simultaneously built thermal power 
plants (Saul, 2002). This came at a high cost because, even considering the long 
amortization periods of hydroelectricity, thermal power plants were 20 times more 
expensive than hydroelectricity (ibid). The port of Casablanca became the hub of thermal 
electricity generation. From 1924-1938, EEM further consolidated the energy system, 
purchasing the existing coal generation from Casablanca and building a diesel power 
plant in Oujda near the Algerian border in 1929 and one in Agadir in 1930. From 1938-
1955, five dams were constructed, as well as expansion of Roches-Noires coal-fired plant 
in the Carrières Centrales bidonville (slum) outside of Casablanca, which played a 
leading role in Morocco’s energy system (d’Almeida-Topor & Frémeaux, 2002; Saul, 
2002). Roches-Noires was originally a diesel plant built in 1924 that was converted to 
coal-fired generation when the French discovered a modest deposit of anthracite coal at 
Jerrada in 1929 (Debbarh, 2015).  
Although Morocco’s electricity system governance was centralized, it was also a 
mixed public-private effort due to a delicate colonial balance of addressing the social 
goals promised within the civilizing discourse while satisfying citizens in the metropole 
by ensuring benefits to French companies. French entrepreneurs and companies benefited 
from North African electrification, as Morocco was an attractive place to do business for 
French electricity firms (Barjot, 2002a). Barjot found that foreign companies gained 
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much more revenue in Morocco than in Algeria and Tunisia, even though they conducted 
more business in Algeria. In addition to the state-run EEM, a French firm called the 
General Society of Companies in Morocco (Société générale d'entreprises au Maroc) 
played a leading role in electrification. They built dams and 11 high voltage lines from 
1921 to 1939, which EEM purchased (ibid).  
Electricity policy in Morocco had to balance between providing services in 
Morocco and gaining public support in France, especially during the Great Depression. 
Due to the dam building efforts, as well as building 300 km of electrified rail, Morocco 
was perceived at home and abroad as the most advanced of the North African countries in 
electrification by the 1930s. One means of bolstering public opinion for North African 
electrification in France was through colonial expositions that celebrated the progress 
made in French colonial electrification as part of national pride, such as the one curated 
by former Director General Lyautey in 1931 (Hodeir, 2002). This was one of several 
international fairs Lyautey organized to celebrate France’s infrastructural achievements 
in North Africa (Miller, 2013). An exhibit called the “electricity fairy” illustrated 
electricity and its applications, including a series of lit fountains that showcased both 
France’s hydroelectric works and electricity. The electricity fairy analogy suggested a 
magical, feminine, and benign process of electrifying the colonies and fits into France’s 
“peaceful penetration” of North Africa discourse. Lyautey’s exhibit also advertised the 
importance of French electricity-related exports to the colonies, totaling 218 million 
francs (Hodeir, 2002). Due to these public communication efforts, and the benefits 
provided to French companies, support for Moroccan electrification remained strong in 
France (Barjot, 2002b). 
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Electrification nearly ground to a halt during World War II (Saul, 2002). After the 
war, Morocco grew rapidly while facing drought. By 1943, 75% of its electricity came 
from hydroelectricity. In 1949, the giant D’imFout dam was completed at 50 meters high 
(by comparison, for a U.S. audience, the Hoover dam is 85 m) on 907 hectares (Hoover 
89 hectares), producing 170 million kWh annually (Hoover dam 4 billion kWh) and 
irrigating the plain of AbdaDoukkala for agricultural and mining needs (ibid; 
Swearingen, 1987). In 1952, EEM opened a new phase of Roches-Noires to make up for 
lost hydroelectric capacity due to drought, bringing the total capacity to 28 MW. In 1954, 
toward the end of the Protectorate, 58% of Morocco’s electricity generation came from 
hydroelectricity, 37% from thermal power, and 5% from diesel.
143
 Transmission 
infrastructure totaled 1,000 km of 150,000 Volt (V) transmission lines, 1,500 km of 
60,000 V, and 1,720 of 22,000 V (Saul, 2002). From 1945 to the end of the Protectorate, 
electricity consumption doubled every 5 years (ibid), and between 1926 and 1956, 
Morocco’s consumption multiplied 44-fold (ibid). This illustrates that Morocco’s energy 
consumption has been growing rapidly for nearly a century, and growth is not a recent 
trend as many have assumed. Between 1929 and the end of the Protectorate in 1956, the 
French built 14 dams in Morocco, 10 of which included hydroelectricity capacity. The 
dams’ total irrigable area totaled 221,450 hectares and 1,920,560,000 cubic meters of 
reservoir capacity (based on data from Swearingen, 1988). (The total electricity 
generating capacity is unknown).  
This history shows that colonial electrification was a source of inequality that 
exacerbated uneven development, benefiting foreigners and local elites and powering 
                                                        
143 This is the latest date during the Protectorate for which I can find data on the energy mix.  
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resource extraction, rather than benefiting local citizens. While the colonial social pact 
for electricity was ideologically couched in the civilizing discourse, in practice it focused 
on resource extraction— providing reliable electricity for agriculture and the phosphate 
industry for export. Saul (2002) argued that from a development perspective, Morocco 
was not, in fact, electrified during the Protectorate. Rather, the electrification that 
occurred was of “colonial character,” not meant to power Moroccan households, but to 
serve key extractive industries and an agricultural export industry. EEM accompanied 
development rather than driving it (Saul, 2002). Building infrastructure and public works 
was part of the civilizing discourse (D’Angio, 2002), but in order to maintain public 
support in France, the social pact focused on benefits to French companies rather than 
Moroccans. Promises for increased access to electricity in the medinas went unfulfilled 
because access to electricity in homes was largely for European settlers and local elites, 
illustrating deep social inequalities (Barjot, 2002a). By the end of the Protectorate in 
1956, Morocco was 115
th
 in the world in terms of kWh per person of electricity 
consumption (Saul, 2002). As French settlers fled Algeria in 1962, the electricity 
company there lost 87% of its customers (Berthonnet, 2008); the situation in Morocco 
was likely similar but no data is available. It is no surprise, then, that Ley imagined that 
large-scale energy systems for the MENA region are only needed where major extractive 
industries exist;
144
 the processes used to generate household electricity demand in 
Western countries were not a focus in the colonies.
145
 Furthermore, electricity cost 25% 
                                                        
144
 See Chapter 3. 
145 These processes included housing codes that mandated that new homes were wired for electricity and 
included appliances in the mortgage, door-to-door salesmen from utility companies selling appliances, 
government programs to convince rural women to adopt electrical appliances, and subsidized rural electric 
cooperatives. 
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more than in France due to the high costs of dam construction (Saul, 2002). Electricity 
still costs more in Morocco than in France and Spain.  
By the end of the Protectorate, 150,000 Moroccans lived in the bidonvilles that 
persist today (Zaki, 2010). The residents of the Carrières centrales bidonville 
neighborhood, the location both of Morocco’s first major thermal plant (Roches Noires) 
and the birthplace of Moroccan independence movements, pirate electricity in order to 
gain access today (Miller, 2013). Three decades later, Morocco was still not fully 
electrified, and it was not until the 1990s that universal access to electricity became part 
of the social pact for electricity.  
It is also questionable whether electricity development facilitated technology 
transfer during the colonial period; technology transfer is a key foundation of the 
Desertec vision’s “win” for North Africa. Berthonnet argued that dam technology was 
not transferred to Algeria because the French brought in engineers to conduct the work. 
After colonization they continued this model by bringing French construction firms in 
through cooperation agreements. There may have been technology transfer in Morocco 
because Lyautey established a school for training Moroccan cadets and schools to 
develop an elite class of future government workers loyal to France (Miller, 2013) but 
data is lacking. There was continuity in the French-Algerian technological relationship 
even after independence, as French companies provided technical assistance in the further 
development of electrical power infrastructure (Frémeaux & d'Almeida, 2002). It is not 
clear if this was true in Morocco, which remained a leader in hydroelectricity 
development. 
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North African energy integration in historical context. At first glance, the 
contemporary transmission integration between Morocco and North Africa appears to be 
an example of technological integration without political integration.
146
 However, 
electricity integration in the Maghreb has historical roots dating back to the French 
Protectorate in the 1940s. In 1941, General Weygand, a French general during World 
Wars I and II, held a meeting in Algiers about connecting the Moroccan, Algerian, and 
Tunisian grids (Saul, 2002).  Morocco was perceived in France as the most advanced 
North African country in electrification, with a production of 220 million kWh (Saul, 
2002), because Algeria and Tunisia had less hydropower resources (Berthonnet, 2008). 
The French planned that Morocco would triple its electricity production and export 200 
million kWh to Algeria within eight to 10 years (Saul, 2002). In 1945, the target was 
reduced to exporting 100 million kWh from 1953-1956, increasing thereafter. Unlike 
with grain exports, they stipulated that Morocco’s needs had to be met first (Saul, 2002). 
Morocco exported electricity to Algeria from 1956 until the oil crisis in 1974 (Debbarh, 
2015). In 1988, Algeria began exporting electricity to Morocco because Morocco’s 
hydroelectricity had declined due to drought (ibid).  Additionally, Algeria had discovered 
large natural gas reserves after independence, and the balance of energy wealth between 
the two countries had reversed.  
After 1975, electricity integration in North Africa was pursued under the Maghreb 
Electricity Committee (Comité Electricité du Maghreb), founded by Morocco, Algeria, 
and Tunisia (Royaume du Maroc Haut Commissariat au Plan, 2006). Libya and 
Mauritania joined the Committee in 1989. That same year, five North African countries, 
                                                        
146 See Chapter 4 for a discussion on this binary. 
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including Mauritania, formed the Arab-Maghreb Union (UMA) for political cooperation 
in the Maghreb. In 1990, the UMA established expert commissions to study fossil energy, 
renewable energy, and mining. A 1995 study by the UMA recommended that regulatory 
measures be established for an energy market in the Maghreb. The Arab-Maghreb grids 
are now connected as one “ELTAM” grid (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco) 
(ibid). A connection between Morocco and Mauritania is also under consideration. The 
U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury under the Clinton administration encouraged a 
liberalized, Western-oriented open market across North Africa (Howe, 2005). But 
significant electricity and other trade is still lacking due to political disputes and a North 
African economic/ export orientation toward Europe. 
 
The Social Pact after Independence  
 
After 1956, Morocco viewed achieving energy independence as complementary 
to achieving political independence in its development as a new state (Debbarh, n.d.). 
Very limited data is available about Moroccan electricity systems during this period, 
since Morocco was a state in transition with a relatively closed government. Morocco 
began consolidating its central control and sovereignty over its electricity system. While 
greater state control of the electricity sector was later viewed by development banks as 
economically inefficient, it was a matter of political development; to become a nation 
Moroccans had to take ownership of their country and build up domestic capacity, 
especially in the sectors in which French technical firms had played a major role. First, 
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Morocco began exploring for oil, hoping a discovery would bring economic 
independence and geopolitical power through a new export commodity, but very little 
was discovered (ibid). Morocco settled for building refining facilities in the 1950s and 
1960s so it could import crude oil instead of more expensive refined petroleum products 
such as today’s widely used butane bottles. The Moroccan government created the 
National Business for Petroleum Products (Société Nationale des Produits Pétroliers or 
SNPP) in 1974 to manage the state's interest in oil activities (ibid). Morocco's oil refining 
company, the Anonymous Moroccan Business for the Refining Industry (SAMIR or 
Société Anonyme Marocaine de l’industrie du Raffinage), was completely state run, and 
the other refining company, SCP, was 75% state run (ibid). Furthermore, the National 
Office of Electricity (ONE or Office National d’Électricité) replaced EEM in 1963, 
bringing all electricity activities over 10 MW under state control (ibid).  
After King Mohammed V’s death in 1961, King Hassan II inherited the throne. 
Hassan II faced the political development challenge of maintaining Morocco’s traditional 
past—which was essential both to its identity and to upholding the legitimacy of the 
regime, which was based upon the ruling family’s history going back to 1631. At the 
same time, he faced the challenge of modernizing the state and the economy. Roberson 
(2014) encapsulated this tension between tradition and modernity in a quote by King 
Hassan II who stated, “In this way, we shall graft the past onto the present to prepare for 
the future” (p. 57). Roberson (2014) stated, “A key question [for King Hassan II] was 
how to embrace aspects of the modern era while not abandoning significant traditions 
that served as a source of identity” (p. 59). In part, Hassan II sought to modernize the 
country by continuing the Protectorate’s dam building policies in earnest under the 1968 
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dam policy—politique des barrages— that renewed the goal to build one dam per year in 
order to irrigate one million hectares (Swearingen, 1998). The politique des barrages 
continued to interweave electricity policy with agricultural policy throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s and was an important part of Morocco’s national pride. The King officiated 
over groundbreaking or inauguration ceremonies, giving them national recognition as the 
King’s project, to build a national identity for Morocco through a new, sovereign version 
of what was originally a colonial project. Major Moroccan buildings and technologies 
were printed on currency to foster recognition around these nation-building projects 
(Roberson, 2014). For example, the 50 dirham bill under King Hassan II pictured a dam 
on the back.  
The social pact for electricity began to balance exports with local goals. King 
Hassan II’s goals for agricultural policy included: to assure the nutritional needs of the 
country, to develop agricultural exports, “to earn foreign currency,” and to raise the 
standard of living to slow rural exodus (Swearingen, 1988), similar to today’s goals for 
solar farms. (Chapter 7 will discuss interviews in which Moroccan citizens supported 
electricity exports as a means to “earn foreign currency.”) By the early 1970s "the policy 
had attained almost mythic proportions" (ibid, p. 163); King Hassan II was more 
successful at implementing the Protectorate’s dam building and irrigation goals than the 
French were (ibid). Installed hydroelectric capacity quadrupled from 317 MW in 1956 to 
1,266 MW in 2003, or 21% of installed capacity (Debbarh, n.d.).  
Even after Independence, Morocco was vulnerable to the influences of foreign 
investors and governments within the region. The 1973 “Moroccanization” decree sought 
to pursue a Moroccan form of liberalism post-independence, giving more economic 
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control to elite merchant families, such as the family that ran the refining company SNPP, 
but under the power of a “techno-bureaucracy” (Ben Ali, 1997). However, Morocco 
changed course in the 1980s, when it required international economic assistance due to a 
phosphate boom followed by a crash. Morocco’s economic growth rate was one of the 
lowest in the MENA region, averaging 1.5% per year, and it needed private investment 
(Rivlin, 2013). Morocco was further strained by a significant drought that lasted from 
1980-1985 (Doukkali, 2005).  It became clear that Morocco’s economy could no longer 
entirely be supported through clientelism (ibid). Morocco was therefore open to the 
influence of multilateral development banks that pushed further liberalization of its 
economy and energy sector (Ben Ali, 1997) By comparison, Morocco’s wealthy natural 
gas-rich neighbor, Algeria, has not taken any steps to liberalize its electricity market 
(RCREE, 2013), as its energy wealth precludes the need to attract foreign investment.  
Morocco’s Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) of 1983 implemented greater 
economic liberalization, reversing some of the state control implemented after 
Independence. Tariffs on imports were dramatically reduced as recommended by the 
World Bank and the IMF, exposing the economy to much cheaper products from 
overseas. According to an interviewee who lived through this time period, this made 
electronics like TVs much more accessible to Moroccans but bankrupted many Moroccan 
businesses. Morocco privatized oil refining, indexed its tariff and tax reform at the 
Rotterdam rates, and standardized the tax rates on different energy products, such as a 
diesel and butane (ibid). In 1996, Morocco signed a free trade agreement with Europe and 
in 2003 with the United States, but Dawson (2009) found that Morocco did not secure 
advantageous terms in these agreements with wealthier, more powerful countries. 
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The international dynamics that shaped Morocco’s economy explain why it has 
the most liberalized electricity sector in North Africa. It is the only country in the MENA 
region with private generators of electricity (RCREEE, 2013). Through ongoing 
liberalization, ONE lost its vertically integrated monopoly over the electricity sector 
(Debbarh, n.d.). The distribution of electricity in most major cities including Casablanca, 
Rabat, and Tangier changed to private distributors such as Rédal in Rabat (ibid), with 
46% of total demand provided by private and municipal distributers by 2011 (ESMAP, 
2011). Independent generators could sell to the grid, leading to public-private 
partnerships between ONE and independent generators, attracting private investment. For 
example, ABB/CMS
147
 constructed Morocco’s coal-fired plant at Jorf Lasfar. The Wind 
Company of Detroit and EDF developed the Abdelkhalek Torres wind power plant, and 
Endesa and Siemens partnered with ONE to build the first natural gas power plant in 
Morocco at Tahaddart (ibid). As of 2011, 68% of electricity generated in Morocco came 
from independent generators and the remainder from ONE (ibid). This liberalization was 
not the result of market logic, but was the result of steady international pressure to shape 
the Moroccan economy and along with it its political structure.  
Rural electrification become part of the social pact in the 1990s and began to 
address the uneven development that resulted from the colonial social pact. The period of 
rule under King Hassan II was marked by political repression and human rights violations 
and is now called “the years of lead.” Due to domestic pressure, including two 
assassination attempts, and international pressure, stemming partly from a book published 
in France that criticized the King (Notre Ami le Roi), Morocco instituted numerous social 
                                                        
147 a Dii shareholder company, see Chapter 5. 
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reforms in the 1990s (Maddy-Weitzman & Zisenwine, 2012). Electricity was at the center 
of the King’s demonstration of benevolence. This included the Program for Rural 
Electrification (the PERG or Programme d’électrification Rural Globale), which aimed 
to bring electricity to 12 million people, 1,892,000 homes, and 35,600 villages (Royaume 
du Maroc Haut Commissariat au Plan, 2006).
148
 The PERG included a small solar 
component. However, solar PV was reserved for the poorest and most remote homes (and 
nomad tents) in the country; 9,177 households in 646 villages received solar PV panels, 
which is a negligible part of Morocco’s overall electricity mix (ibid). ONE convinced 
rural communities to replace kerosene lanterns with butane bottles and electricity 
(Debbarh, n.d.). The program was largely successful, and the rural electrification rate 
climbed from 18% in 1995 to 46% in 2000. Today, the local ONE office is a common 
site in small villages across Moroccan landscape. This represents a major shift away from 
the colonial social pact. Furthermore, Morocco is relatively unique in Africa in having 
achieved high electrification rates.  
Fossil fuels post-independence. As Morocco continued its prominent dam 
policy, it, again, quietly developed more fossil fuel generation than hydroelectricity. Even 
as an Arab State, the oil crises changed Moroccan energy policy by illustrating 
Morocco’s vulnerability to capricious oil markets. In the 1980s, coal became cheaper 
than oil, and Morocco began substituting coal for fuel oil in its thermal power 
development. In 1994 and 1995, ONE completed the first two units of the coal-fired 
power station at Jorf Lasfar, a port that exports phosphates. For fossil fuel generation, 
                                                        
148 The World Bank, the European Investment Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Arab Fund 
for Economic and Social Development supported the PERG (Vidican et al., 2013). 
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Morocco was dependent not only on external fuels but also on international technology 
firms. Some assume that technology transfer and know-how come through this private 
development, but this assumption lacks empirical proof. Multinational energy giant ABB 
(later a Dii shareholder) and American CMS Energy completed phases three and four of 
Jorf Lasfar in 1998 and five and six in 2001 for a total of 1,356 MW and a $1.5 billion 
investment with a partial risk guarantee from the World Bank. At the time, this was the 
largest influx of FDI Morocco had ever secured (Müller-Jentsch, 2001). From 1986 to 
2003, coal consumption increased from 17% of Morocco’s energy mix to 32% as 
Morocco concentrated much of its electricity supply at Jorf Lasfar (Debbarh, n.d.). 
Despite continued dam building, Morocco’s energy dependence steadily increased as its 
only coalmine (at Jerrada) peaked in 1984 and closed in 2000 (Debbarh, n.d.; ONE 
presentation of NPP project, 2010).  
Morocco also developed natural gas capacities with imports from Algeria. In 
1996, the Maghreb-Europe pipeline was completed, which funnels natural gas from 
Algeria through Morocco to Spain. Morocco receives revenue and a portion of the natural 
gas, which it used to finance the 380 MW Tahaddart natural gas combined cycle power 
plant. Although it is not renewable, natural gas offers an interesting opportunity for 
Morocco to enhance cooperation within the Maghreb (Royaume du Maroc Haut 
Commissariat au Plan, 2006, p. 20). 
In 1992, Morocco enacted a new hydrocarbon code that made it one of the 
world’s most attractive places for oil exploration by multinational firms based on 
continued hopes that finding oil would bring geopolitical power to the state (Debbarh, 
n.d.). Morocco simultaneously shifted its dependence away from oil toward coal and 
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natural gas through the Jorf Lasfar and Tahddart plants. In 2000, Lone Star Energy, a 
U.S.-Moroccan company, announced a major oil and gas discovery in Talsint in eastern 
Morocco near the Algerian border. The Minister of Energy and Mines, Youssef Tahiri, 
declared that Morocco would begin exporting oil from 12-15 billion barrels of reserves 
(“The oil club’s newest member,” 2000; Howe, 2005). People saw it as a symbol of the 
new king’s good luck and a gift from God (ibid). However, the estimate of the reserves 
was far too high—there was only a negligible amount of oil— and it brought 
embarrassment to the presumptuously exuberant country. Still, the hope for discovering 
oil remains high, and Morocco continues to incentivize exploration in hopes of securing a 
valuable export commodity. 
The implications of energy policy in this time period are that increasing local 
electricity access in the social pact came at a high cost for Morocco as a fuel-poor nation. 
Trade-offs of increased energy access included steadily deepening energy dependence, 
subsidies on electricity and butane gas that strained the state’s budget, and a significant 
trade deficit as Morocco imported almost all of its coal, natural gas, and unrefined 
petroleum products (Debbarh, n.d.). Starting in 1973, Morocco’s petroleum bill exceeded 
its revenue from phosphate exports. Energy dependence increased from 73% in 1970 to 
85% in 1980 to 97% today (Debbarh, n.d.). Moroccan became both heavily energy 
dependent and heavily indebted to development banks. 
In summary, the social pact for electricity in post-independence Morocco pursued 
the large-scale state-controlled technological visions of the Protectorate era and 
established expectations that the Moroccan government would construct large-scale 
energy systems tied to the irrigation of one million hectares of land, feeding a nation, and 
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developing an agricultural export policy while bolstering the state’s sovereignty. 
Immediately after independence, Morocco’s social pact for energy focused on its 
provision from an increasingly state-controlled apparatus in order to put Moroccan 
resources back in Moroccan hands. This changed with the neoliberal trend, as electricity 
was increasingly privatized based on international pressures. As Morocco moved beyond 
the years of lead, the newest part of the pact was a promise for the state provision of 
universal access to electricity to be achieved within a relatively short time period, 
balancing domestic use with a yearning for a fossil fuel export commodity. Numerous 
centrifugal forces and dynamics affected the pact, including international energy trends 
(1970s oil crises) and pressure from multilateral development banks. With increased 
investment by multinational companies, energy dependence concerns, privatization, and 
new leadership, the pact started to change again in the 2000s. 
Renewable Energy and a Changing Social Pact for Electricity 
This section explores the future prospects of the social pact for electricity in 
Morocco as it pursues an ambitious renewable energy strategy and possible regional 
integration. Some aspects of the pact are new, while others reflect Morocco’s past along 
with it challenges and contradictions, as Morocco is pulled in different directions.  
The Arab Spring and a changing social pact. The provision of energy subsidies 
in Morocco is part of what Yousef (2004) and others have called the “authoritarian 
bargain,” or the provision of public goods in exchange for limited or no political 
participation. This authoritarian bargain is on shaky ground across the MENA region 
since the uprisings that reverberated across the Arab world in 2010. These uprisings 
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affected Morocco through protest organized by the February 20th Movement, composed 
mostly of youth contesting the social inequalities and inequities described above and a 
lack of political participation (Morocco campaign #feb20 #morocco, 2011). The 
government was not overthrown, and the Parliament, not the King, was the target of the 
protests (ibid). In 2011, Morocco established a constitutional commission to investigate 
changes to political institutions, which increased the power of the Prime Minister and 
Parliament over the monarchy (Maddy-Weitzman & Zisenwine, 2012). This change is a 
somewhat precarious balance between what Sater (2010) called tradition and modernity 
in post-colonial Morocco—between the long tradition of the monarchy and the newer 
parliamentary tradition.  
Morocco’s changing social pact for electricity fits into these broader social 
changes in the Arab world and the revision of the authoritarian bargain, largely through 
targeting energy subsidies. According to interviewees, in 2012, energy subsidies reached 
a crushing 6% of GDP and 80% of the country’s total subsidy bill, or $5-6 billion. The 
subsidized price of electricity is not available (Vidican et al., 2013) and is more 
complicated to calculate than fuel subsidies, since electricity prices vary based on the 
time of day and season. Currently, electricity is subsidized both for industry and 
households (World Bank report, 2007). Electricity rates are structured based on 
consumption levels, with different rates for households in the 0-100 kwh range, 101-200, 
201-500, and 500 and above (Debbarh, n.d.). Taken within regional context, subsidies are 
much lower in Morocco than in all other MENA countries except Palestine (RCREEE, 
2013). Moroccan electricity prices are also higher than in neighboring countries due to 
Morocco’s energy dependence, deregulation, and renewable energy development (ibid).   
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 The most significant energy subsidy in Morocco is on butane, not electricity. 
Due to the efforts of the PERG to eliminate kerosene, life in Morocco runs on butane. 
The butane subsidy rate has remained the same as prices have risen. In 2012, a 12 kg 
bottle of butane cost about $17.20 (140 MAD) on the market and was sold for roughly 
$4.90 (40 MAD) (Vidican et al., 2013). The Moroccan government originally envisioned 
butane would be used for cooking, but by the 2000s it was also widely used for heating 
water, agricultural water pumping, and lighting (ibid). In 2006, butane gas composed 
18% of Morocco’s consumption of petroleum products and had largely replaced kerosene 
lanterns (ibid).  
 
 
Figure 51. Butane Gas used with a Portable Stovetop in my Apartment Rented in Salé, 
Morocco. Photo by Author. 
The previous social pact that guaranteed these butane and other energy subsidies 
is crumbling, but government announcements to reduce energy subsidies are invariably 
met with protest. In April 2014, trade unions took to the streets of Casablanca to protest 
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the reduction in energy subsidies and the end of wage increases that had followed the 
Arab Spring (“Morocco’s unions protest austerity plans,” 2014).  
The Moroccan government is under pressure from development banks to balance 
the state budget and maintain its credit rating by eliminating these subsidies. 
Macroeconomists argue that the subsidies are inequitable because 80% of them go to the 
middle and upper class in Morocco who use more energy, particularly given that few 
Moroccan households can afford a vehicle. While the subsidies may be regressive, they 
are in some sense the largest transfers of power between the wealthy and poorer parts of 
the country (World Bank, 2011). Furthermore, poor households depend on the subsidies 
to afford energy and a reduction in subsidies could disproportionately affect them. In the 
summer of 2014, the Moroccan government signed a plan with ONEE to eliminate fuel 
subsidies but to provide 14 billion MAD to subsidize electricity rates over four years 
(Agueniou, 2014). Electricity rates will remain the same for households that use under 
100 kwh of electricity per month and subsidies will be reduced for those who use more, 
which are presumably the wealthier households (ibid). The Moroccan government is 
attempting to renegotiate the social pact that provided cheap energy to its citizens while 
maintaining the stability of the state and support for impoverished citizens. 
Developing Morocco’s new renewable energy strategy: from nuclear to CSP. 
Moroccan plans for renewable energy are developing within this evolving social pact for 
electricity, which focuses on addressing key social challenges that threaten Morocco’s 
well-being and stability while taking politically unpopular measures to reduce or 
eliminate energy subsidies. The Moroccan government is pursuing this through 
a renewable energy policy with multiple ancillary goals, such as job opportunities both 
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for uneducated people and unemployed college graduates, the development of a supply 
chain manufacturing industry for CSP, the improvement of educational opportunities in 
renewable energy, and the prevention of rural exodus to bidonvilles where extreme 
poverty has bred religious extremism.  
Morocco began reevaluating its energy policy in 2006, starting with a foresight 
exercise that became the Prospective Maroc (Morocco) 2030 scenario studies. The High 
Planning Commission (Royaume de Maroc Haut-Commissariat au Plan) conducted these 
studies, which provided a nuanced look at how contemporary Moroccan energy policy 
was shaped and played an important role in formulating the country’s new energy 
strategy (Royaume du Maroc Haut Commissariat au Plan, 2006).
 149
  The scenarios 
focused on four key questions important to Morocco’s future social pact for electricity, as 
well as energy justice: 
 What level of external energy dependence is tolerable for Morocco?  
 What levels of technology risk will Morocco accept for obtaining greater well-
being? 
 What should be the role of the market and public regulation for improving social 
equity? 
 How should Morocco balance public priorities between energy activities (like 
rural electrification) and other social activities with a redistributive effect 
(Royaume du Maroc, 2006)?   
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 They also conducted these studies for tourism and agriculture because they view these sectors as having 
the most constraints on sustainable development and competitiveness. 
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The report focuses on ensuring that economic development radiates over all of 
Morocco. Because universal electrification and access to butane had not yet been 
achieved, there was an energy gap at the heart of Moroccan society analogous to the 
digital gap in access to information technologies. They defined the social pillar of 
sustainable development as the impact of the price of energy on these vulnerable 
populations. They also framed energy justice in terms of equality with European levels of 
energy access, pointing out that despite its strong economic performance Morocco is 
nowhere close to achieving the well-being of its European neighbors, and it lacks 
widespread access to technologies like air conditioning and cars.  
The Maroc 2030 scenarios included 1) a reference scenario (business-as-usual), 2) a 
domestic energy self-sufficiency strategy, and 3) an open regionalism scenario. The self-
sufficiency strategy focused on developing Morocco’s domestic resources through 
public-private partnerships and improving overall industrialization. It depicted a future in 
which Morocco would be an emerging economy like China or India, imagining it will use 
the "engine of export" and comparative advantage from low wages to offset the trade 
imbalance through FDI.  
The key difference between the self-sufficiency strategy and today’s policy is that the 
scenarios placed more emphasis on nuclear power than CSP. In this scenario, Morocco 
envisioned adopting the technology that its colonizer, France, used to heal its wounded 
pride after World War II (as described by (Hecht, 2009)). Morocco has considered 
nuclear power since the 1970s when King Hassan II announced that the country would 
pursue it using the uranium in its phosphates, as part of his strategy for modernizing the 
country. Nuclear power has been viewed similarly in Morocco as it was in France, as a 
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means of achieving energy independence and the development of economic clusters, an 
engine of economic growth, and an opportunity for reduced carbon dioxide emissions. In 
2007, Morocco finished a 2 MW research reactor, for which it had received permission 
from the United States under a 2001 treaty. When the scenario study was conducted in 
2006, ONEE was planning to construct a 900 MW nuclear reactor by 2017. In 2010, 
Morocco signed an agreement with France to advance its nuclear power ambitions 
(“France to help Morocco’s nuclear energy drive,” 2010). That same year, Morocco 
presented plans for two nuclear power plants under the Copenhagen Accord signed at 
COP 15 and developed the National Center for Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology 
(CNESTEN). However, Morocco’s neighbors and its former colonizers have a strong 
influence on its policies. When Spain balked at Morocco’s nuclear ambitions, the plans 
were shelved. Again, Morocco’s energy future was shaped by the influences of 
international and regional actors. 
As addressed in Chapter 3, CSP has risen during times when nuclear energy has 
fallen from favor, as a large-scale source of energy and a source of national pride. Today, 
Morocco’s focus on nuclear power has been replaced with CSP. Solar energy officials 
express that nuclear power is no longer an option after the Fukushima accident. After 
Fukushima, a social movement called Maroc Solaire, Maroc sans Nucléaire (Solar 
Morocco, Morocco without Nuclear Power) formed to oppose nuclear power. A shift 
from nuclear power to CSP could signify a major disjuncture from the energy policy of 
Morocco’s former colonizer. 
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On March 6, 2009, at the Assises de l’énergie conference, King Mohammed VI 
presented an updated renewable energy strategy.
150
 The Moroccan Strategy for the 
Development of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency sought to increase installed 
generation capacity to 42% from renewable energy by 2020, split among 14% solar (2 
GW), 14% wind (2 GW), and 14% hydroelectricity at a cost of $9 billion. As a result of 
this ambitious plan, half of the 15 large-scale renewable energy projects underway in the 
MENA region today are under development in Morocco (RCREEE, 2013). The Strategy 
also seeks to develop local sources of hydrocarbons and to achieve market integration 
with the Maghreb and Europe. Later, a strategy for energy efficiency was launched with 
the goal of reducing electricity consumption by 12% by 2020 and 15% by 2030, 
especially in transportation and buildings. Additionally, Law 309 implemented liberal 
reforms in the electricity sector.  
The Moroccan Solar Plan and a changing social pact. Improving electricity access 
has been part of the social pact since the 1990s, but ensuring economic development from 
energy policy in marginalized areas of the country is becoming an important part of the 
new social pact for electricity in Morocco. While in the 1990s economic development 
was left mostly to multinational firms like ABB, today Morocco seeks to build up its 
R&D and economic capacities to ensure it achieves socioeconomic benefits from 
electricity development. As part of this initiative, the Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy 
(MASEN) was founded in 2010 as a quasi-governmental, quasi-private sector 
                                                        
150 At the time of the Maroc 2030 study, Morocco’s renewable energy and energy efficiency strategy 
focused on building 1 GW of wind and solar, increasing rural electrification, and providing energy for 
hammam fires (public baths) and pottery kilns, plus implementing 250,000 solar hot water heaters.  
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organization to put solar technologies on a level playing field with other energy 
technologies. MASEN is an example of what Victor & Heller (2006) call a “dual-firm,” 
which is a company managed like a private enterprise that is often partly publically and 
partly privately owned and has the political connections necessary to develop viable 
projects. As evidence of its power, its offices overlook the Rabat neighborhood of Hay-
Riad, “a haven for the upper and middle classes,” (Elsheshtawy, 2008, p. 102), and it has 
also been successful recruiting engineers living in the Moroccan research diaspora back 
to Morocco to work on solar energy.  
Their ambitious primary objective is to build 2 GW of solar electricity generating 
capacity by 2020, or 14% of Morocco’s total generating capacity. MASEN takes a 
technology neutral approach among the various solar technologies. A MASEN official 
said “we are most interested in the price of the electron, not the specific solar 
technology.” However, MASEN has had a clear preference for CSP from the outset. It is 
starting by developing two phases of proof-of-concept for CSP trough technology in 
Ouarzazate, with three hours of molten salt storage. Then it will test CSP power tower 
technology, followed by a small demonstration of large-scale PV. CSP has the trade-off 
of higher investment and fewer jobs but with export potential and storage (Vidican et al., 
2013). It is also more compatible with the grid and generates energy through molten salt 
storage during Morocco’s peak hours. 
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Figure 52. The Moroccan Solar Plan's Five sites and their Levels of Solar Irradiance
151
 
Source: Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy. 
MASEN will develop CSP at five sites, starting with 500 MW in Ouarzazate, 
followed by 400 MW in Midelt, 500 MW in Foum Al Oued, 500 MW in Sebkhat Tah, 
and 200 MW in Boujdour for a total of 2 GW (see Figure 52).  Figure 54 shows the 
locations of Morocco’s hydroelectric and thermal power plants, illustrating that many of 
its thermal power plants are along the coast and the border with Algeria, and much of its 
hydroelectric development is in the Atlas Mountains, the country’s poorest region. 
MASEN is attempting to address spatial inequalities in the country between the wealth in 
urban areas and the poverty in rural areas.  
MASEN is therefore invested in addressing the social needs in the regions in 
which it works. Reflecting the framing of system imaginers described in Chapter 5, 
MASEN sees itself as an "animator, enabler, and catalyst." In contrast to Dii, it sees itself 
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 Solar irradiance is the amount of solar radiation measured in watts reaching Morocco within a square 
meter over one hour. 
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as a catalyst not just in accelerating technology development but also in promoting 
socioeconomic development in Ouarzazate and the surrounding areas, linking MASEN to 
the social goals of reducing unemployment and rural exodus. “Our project should have an 
impact from kilometer zero to kilometer 1,000—the entire country,” said one MASEN 
official. He continued, “since there is a negative correlation in Morocco between solar 
radiation and development, we are working in the poorest areas of the country.” 
Socioeconomic development initiatives are also necessary to bolster MASEN's public 
image and gain public trust for a government agency dramatically altering regional land 
use by consuming a plot of land the size of the city of Rabat in a relatively isolated rural 
area and altering the local economy. A MASEN official stated 
 
…one of the most important aspects of the Moroccan Solar Plan, is the development 
of.. the region where we are implementing [sic] [the project]. It's a fact that the most 
suitable parts [of the country] to develop solar energy in Morocco are the places 
where you have no other industry— no other economic sector that is developed and 
the region is very poor…we drop a very huge investment in this region, and the local 
population can be stressed by [sic] that.  
 
Some of the development work is directly related to the project site. For example, the 
World Bank’s environmental assessment of the Noor CSP plant in Ouarzazate claimed 
that the site’s infrastructure was designed to be accessible to nearby villages. This 
included increased access to roads, water, and electricity. MASEN has also undertaken 
charity work in the Ouarzazate region, such as providing bicycles, glasses, dentistry, and 
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school buses for local children, as well as supporting the boarding school for girls in 
Ouarzazate. MASEN is particularly focused on women and girls in the region who have 
less access to education and entrepreneurial activities than men. They have also hosted 
entrepreneurship workshops in Ouarzazate unrelated to solar power to spur economic 
development. However, one interviewee from MASEN cautioned that they were not 
meant to replace government development agencies. Interagency collaboration would be 
useful in this context, but it is challenging because King Mohammed VI controls 
MASEN and political parties control the ministries that work on development. Chapter 7 
will discuss local perspectives on solar development.  
In addition to building solar energy capacity, the king integrated three other 
ambitious ancillary goals into MASEN's strategic mission in a framework called 
“integrated solar development”. These intermediary goals are rarely part of the 
conversation about integrated renewable energy infrastructure in the Mediterranean but 
are essential to meeting Morocco’s social pact for energy. They seek to address the 
general social and energy problems described above as part of an evolving social pact for 
electricity in Morocco. This includes, for example, energy dependenccy and the trade 
deficit, rural exodus, and unemployment for both educated and uneducated 
demographics.  
First, MASEN is required to create a local workforce in the solar sector. Some of 
the low-skilled construction jobs will be targeted toward the uneducated workforce in the 
region in which they will be building the plants. MASEN will also support educational 
opportunities to grow a skilled workforce through new educational programs related to 
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solar energy (see Appendix I). This envisions Morocco as a future knowledge economy, 
in which it no longer has low labor costs but has developed enough R&D to industrialize. 
Second, MASEN must develop related industries in Morocco to ensure the 
majority of the materials (e.g., mirrors, steel, turbines) for the power plants come from 
local sources. Thirty percent of the plant’s material must come from local content. From a 
private sector perspective, this increases the projects’ risk because the projects are 
dependent on fledgling enterprises, which could result in schedule slippage and cost 
overruns. However, at the 2013 Dii conference, the head of ACWA Power argued that 
they were able to submit the lowest bid for Noor I because they used 50% local content to 
bring down the electricity price to 15 euro cents per kilowatt hour, half of what solar 
electricity costs in Spain. The head of ACWA Power then became invested in the success 
of Moroccan industries stating, “I need to pray every day for the wealth and success of 
Morocco so I get my money back [from investment in the power plant].” 
MASEN’s third goal is to conduct research and development to create “disruptive 
technologies” that reduce the cost of solar power. MASEN views R&D as necessary to 
solar energy’s “survival” especially since it must now compete with newfound Moroccan 
shale gas deposits rather than other renewable technologies. The German Aerospace 
Center (DLR), which conducted the Desertec feasibility studies, will partner in the 
creation of the Institute for Training in Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, an 
R&D platform in Ouarzazate similar to the PSA in Spain at Almería that was discussed in 
Chapter 3. Morocco could currently build cheaper renewable energy with PV and wind 
but is taking a chance that it could become a global leader in CSP technologies and 
research. By developing different kinds of solar technologies in Ouarzazate, MASEN will 
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identify Morocco’s specific solar R&D needs. This would being to move Morocco away 
from the “copy-apply” model identified above as a challenge in its R&D sector toward 
capacity building for becoming true collaborators in international R&D projects and 
competitors in the international solar energy industry. 
All of MASEN’s primary goals, and the goals of Morocco’s renewable energy 
strategy in general, are socioeconomic, not environmental. Moroccan electricity agencies 
view climate change as an opportunity for attracting finance and demonstrating 
Morocco’s prowess in renewable energy technologies, especially as Western nations have 
largely failed to develop renewable energy to scale. The new Minister of Energy stated at 
the Dii conference that “the carbon emissions market is an opportunity for Morocco to 
finance clean projects.”152 Therefore, climate change is seen as an opportunity for 
attracting the capital needed to grow Morocco’s electrical power system, even while 
Morocco’s energy policy focuses mostly on social rather than environmental goals. 
Morocco also expects to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions by 3.7 million tons per year 
through the Moroccan Solar Plan, which they emphasize is a noble and voluntary effort 
made when the nations responsible for the problem are taking fewer mitigation steps. 
Morocco emphasizes that it is developing the technology to do the right thing even 
though Western nations have not. Furthermore, since European countries value green 
electrons as goods in-and-of-themselves, green electrons possibly will provide the export 
commodity for which Morocco has been long searching. Green electrons are valued in 
Morocco more as an export commodity than for their contribution to the environment. 
                                                        
152 "Le marché des émissions de gaz à effet de serre est une opportunité pour le Maroc pour le financement 
des projets dits propres."  
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Morocco’s socioeconomic goals for CSP and its CSP development strategy 
suggest that Morocco sees CSP as an emerging technology. In Chapter 3, I discussed 
CSP’s long history as an emerging technology dating back to the 1850s. In Chapter 5, I 
described how in the 2000s Desertec proponents framed CSP as mature and ready to 
deploy because they wanted to reduce its appearance of risk. Overall I argued that the 
perspective on innovation in the electricity sector in the West is to carve out a space for a 
deferred dream to take root, rather than to develop innovative technologies. In contrast, 
Moroccans frame CSP as emerging and in need of R&D for its survival. While the term 
innovation is lacking in the Desertec discourse, it is common in the Moroccan discourse 
on renewable energy. This makes sense, as Morocco is focused on CSP because of its 
possibility for building up the capacity to grow into a future knowledge economy with 
greater industrial, R&D, and educational capacities. 
In Chapter 3, I argued that a technology’s emergence should be understood as 
situated and contested. At the nation-state level, a technology’s emergence relates to a 
country’s goals for renewable energy. Morocco wants to be involved in renewable energy 
innovation, so that emerging technologies will bolster the country’s Emergence plan to 
develop the future of Morocco as a knowledge economy. In contrast to Desertec, it 
behooves Morocco to view CSP as an emerging technology for Morocco, offering 
opportunities to help it industrialize through supply chain industries, education, and 
R&D. This is similar to Spain’s focus on CSP in the 1980s at its Solar Research Platform, 
which the Spanish government viewed as an opportunity for an Industrial Revolution and 
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for fostering national pride during a time of political transition.
153
 What counts as an 
emerging technology should be historically situated and interpreted in the context of how 
a country imagines a modern electricity system. What would also be innovative for 
Morocco would be to develop an R&D agenda for CSP that is Moroccan, which balances 
its identity with meeting technological and development goals. Hecht (2009) argued that 
the footprints of French national identity were woven into its nuclear reactor design. 
Morocco has not yet reached the point at which it has shaped the technology as its own 
and is developing the capacity to do so. An initial step in creating this national identity 
for CSP was the King renaming the Ouarzazate I power plant in Arabic Noor, which 
means light. 
Overall, MASEN’s ancillary and financial goals for CSP reflect the new social 
pact for electricity, which focuses on solving socioeconomic problems such as 
unemployment and rural exodus, while reducing the energy subsidies that used to be part 
of the “authoritarian bargain” but threaten the state’s solvency because Morocco is fuel-
poor. Success in Moroccan renewable energy development will be measured by the 
creation of a new energy industry, rather than energy generation alone or environmental 
benefits. Several interviewees explained that without the achievement of these ancillary 
goals, Morocco might as well generate electricity through other means with which it has 
more experience, like coal. An employee in the electricity sector in Ouarzazate expressed 
that energy is not a good in-and-of-itself but rather a means of developing a national 
industrial fabric through renewable energy development.
154
 However, according to one 
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 See Chapter 3. 
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 L’énergie de son importance n’est pas une finalité en son soi, le Maroc mise tout particulièrement sur 
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interviewee, CSP’s payoff in local jobs is uncertain, and these ancillary goals are putting 
the young agency under pressure. Morocco is taking a significant political risk with CSP 
as it sets high expectations that CSP can fulfill myriad socioeconomic benefits.  
Table 5 ties MASEN’s goals to Morocco’s broader societal goals.  
Table 5. 
The Socioeconomic Goals Underpinning the Moroccan Solar Plan 
 
Moroccan Energy goals Social goals 
Meet doubling of demand 
 
Energy access, increasing standard of living 
Green jobs  Unemployment both for educated and uneducated 
demographics 
Grow an industry/ local 
content  
Industrialize Morocco, fight unemployment 
Local socioeconomic 
development  
Stem rural exodus 
Grow R&D capacities  Grow a knowledge economy 
Reduce subsidies, trade 
deficit  
Governmental stability, economic health 
Reduce CO2  National pride, means of securing financing 
Green electrons  Export commodity  
 
Financing the Moroccan Solar Plan. Morocco is focusing on solving 
socioeconomic problems through its solar energy policy while simultaneously 
eliminating state energy subsides. The Moroccan government will not enact a feed-in-
tariff (FIT) or other program that would result in large energy subsides, as was enacted in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
une intégration industrielle permettant l’augmentation de la participation du tissu industriel national dans 
le développement des énergies renouvelables.  
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Spain and Germany,
155
 because it would be contrary to the goals of their new social pact. 
This reflects the general sentiment in the MENA region, as only Syria and Palestine have 
FITs (RCREEE, 2013). However, ONEE will have to subsidize the difference between 
the price of the solar electricity and the subsidized grid price. MASEN took several steps 
to reduce costs, including requiring project developers to provide 20% of the project 
capital (130 million euros, or $177 million) and to rely on concessional financing from 
development banks.  
Noor I was financed through grants and loans from international development 
organizations, and it is likely that they will finance the subsequent phases as well. The 
Moroccan government and, in small part, private banks will provide the remaining 
financing. Concessional financing is provided at an interest rate of 3.5% rather than 8% 
from private financiers, which will ultimately reduce the price of the electricity by 20% 
according to MASEN. These initiatives brought the initial projected cost of 20 euro cents 
per kilowatt hour down to 14 euro cents per kilowatt hour. The government will subsidize 
the difference between the cost of the electricity and the grid price, or a gap of about 2 
cents per kilowatt hour during peak demand (ibid). Morocco's requirement that the 
bidders provide 20% (130 million euros) of the capital for the project made it challenging 
for many European companies, which were struggling due to the financial crisis and 
repeal of European solar subsidies, to place a competitive bid. 
ACWA Power’s subsidiary NOMAC won the bids on Noor I and II, along with 
two Spanish construction firms, but according to the Moroccan magazine, Economie 
Entreprises, they are only responsible for about 5% of the project. ACWA Power— a Dii 
                                                        
155
 See Chapter 5. 
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shareholder company— is a Saudi utility and water desalination company with a new 
focus on renewable energy, and a dual market firm controlled by the Saudi government. 
Morocco is the primary North African location for Saudi investment, especially in public 
works and infrastructure, including large investments in Morocco's energy system in 
addition to being a popular vacation spot for Saudi princes (Howe, 2005). Some solar 
industry experts were shocked by ACWA Power's low bid on Noor I, which was 29% 
below other bidders (“Plan solaire marocain: Masen sous pression,” 2013). Economie 
Entreprises reported that the Saudi state investment funds, Sanabil and the Saudi Agency 
for Public Pensions, provided the necessary capital, meaning it was not provided under 
free market conditions but under an agreement between the governments of Morocco and 
Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are planning to build 42 GW of solar power by 2032 
domestically, and Noor I will serve as a pilot project for them. Some people are 
concerned that this collaboration between governments in the MENA region could lead to 
a rentier model for solar power in which government elites benefit from investment but 
not local people and the economy focuses on a single natural resource for export. This 
model could be contradictory to the prospects for fulfilling the social pact for electricity 
in Morocco. Of course, the goals between the oil-rich and oil-poor countries in the region 
for renewables are quite different.
156
 The switch to renewables in Saudi Arabia would 
free up oil that it can sell for over $100/ barrel on the international market rather than 
subsidizing it at home at $4/barrel for electricity generation. In Morocco, it means greater 
energy security by reducing dependency on fossil fuel imports and possibly developing 
an export that is a source of geopolitical power. 
                                                        
156 See Chapter 4. 
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If Arab countries continue to develop a sense of national pride for the solar sector, 
as Spain and Germany did, the technology with its strong Judeo-Christian roots, as 
described in Chapter 3 with the discussion on Luz Energy, could develop an Arab 
identity. In June 2013, King Mohammed VI visited the Ouarzazate site and renamed the 
solar plant Noor I, reflecting Morocco’s renewed focus on making Arabic the national 
language. Now that ACWA Power has also won the bid for Noor III, it seems that Arab 
companies are poised to take over the CSP sector. If they reduce the cost of the 
technology while European CSP companies continue to lose bids and to falter due to the 
elimination of subsidies in Europe, the European CSP sector may crumble.  
A growing chorus from Europe claims that renewable energy will only thrive in 
the Mediterranean if North Africa's power sectors are liberalized. Yet so far renewable 
energy has achieved more success developing in a dual-market system in which ancillary 
social goals are the focus of renewable energy development, and renewable energy 
development is symbolic of national pride and national identity.  
Centralized systems, modernity, and citizenship. Morocco’s renewable energy 
strategy, with its focus on large-scale CSP, wind, and hydroelectricity, illustrates that a 
modern electricity system for Morocco is still conceived as a centralized system. With the 
dawn of the Moroccan Solar Plan, solar energy became enrolled in large-scale energy 
planning and nation-building. 
Distributed solar technologies have received very little attention compared to CSP 
(RCREEE, 2013). Morocco lacks the policies that would be needed to develop a 
distributed electricity system. It does not have a net metering system, which would allow 
owners of rooftop PV systems to receive credit for surplus energy generated during the 
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day and fed into the grid. Additionally, small solar PV plants under 1 MW cannot access 
the grid. According to RCREEE (2013), "The current legal framework does not authorize 
renewable energy developers to access low voltage lines, which generally prevents 
development of small-scale grid-connected RE projects" (p. 29).  
Prior to the Moroccan Solar Plan, solar PV panels were framed not for the elite as 
they are in the United States but for the poorest, most marginalized and remote homes 
that could not be connected to the grid during the PERG program initiated by King 
Hassan II (see above). For example, Figure 53 shows a nomad tent in the Moroccan 
desert with a small solar PV panel. I found a similar outlook in rural Ouarzazate. PV was 
framed as a technology appropriate for the poorest and remote communities, and grid 
access was desirable. Over lunch at the Dii 2013 conference, Bertrand Piccard recounted 
how the villagers he met were convinced that “the cable” was the only desirable method 
of electricity access. He tried to convince them that PV could be equally desirable and 
modern. 
 
Figure 53. Solar Panel Near a Desert Nomad Tent Outside of Merzouga, Morocco. 
ONEE owns the solar panels, and residents buy prepaid cards for the electricity. Photo by 
Lynnsee Starr, used with permission. 
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Some focus has been placed on a distributed solar hot water market to reduce 
demand for butane, but solar hot water has mostly been used in hotels requiring large 
quantities of reliable hot water (RCREEE, 2013). I interviewed a citizen who wanted to 
install solar hot water in his apartment but found it to be too difficult to find a distributor 
and someone to maintain the system due to the informal market. Solar hot water faces 
stiff competition from water heaters that run on heavily subsidized butane. The new 
Minister of Energy is more supportive of distributed energy, so it is possible the focus on 
distributed energy will increase in the future (“Des centrales photovoltaïque pour l’espace 
local un gain pour les citoyens et pour l’état,” 2013). 
Some people are critical of the centralized nature of Morocco’s renewable energy 
plans and advocate for energy policies for improved energy citizenship, meaning citizen 
engagement and ownership over energy development, and distributing power among 
private and public actors rather than increasing financial ties with and indebtedness 
to Saudi and other foreign companies. The head of the Sahara Wind company in Morocco 
stated  
CSP poses a governance risk by keeping the current power structure intact, by 
purchasing steam turbines whose technology cannot be transferred from 
industrialized countries with funding provided by a rentier state, which is giving 
away its fossil oil resources in the exact same way...  
He believes such technologies will continue to have authoritarian and anti-democratic 
properties, even if they utilize renewable fuels. Additionally, the head of a dual market 
firm in Morocco explained that it was important that energy development in Morocco 
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offer paths for people to become empowered as full citizens who care for common pool 
resources. He stated  
 
What is important is to create the conditions for all these people to become 
citizens. And citizenship for me is critical— very important— to make people 
aware of that and to offer them, to all people to offer them the chance to be 
citizens. As simple as that. Sensible. That's why concerning [our company]— all 
what we may address as projects and systematically ask one question to our 
directors— how do you guarantee the social return for any investment? If a social 
return is possible, then we do it. 
 
This is an entirely different viewpoint on what citizenship may be within a post-Arab 
Spring context. Such a perspective on citizenship would likely change the social pact for 
electricity into a social contract with the consent of citizens. The literature and 
practitioners typically find that such citizen empowerment in energy development is 
gained more readily from distributed projects. Below I take a closer look at centralized 
plans for solar energy in Morocco and the Mediterranean region and their benefits and 
drawbacks. Chapter 7 will then explore the challenges of energy citizenship and 
empowerment in large-scale energy projects at the local level and the implications of 
these projects for energy justice. 
Solar farms and Morocco’s dam policy. Morocco is grappling with its image as 
an agrarian society versus a future, imagined by some, that it will become an 
industrialized nation, a knowledge economy, and a center for exports to Europe traded 
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within liberalized, regional markets. Today, the agricultural sector makes up 21% of 
Morocco’s GDP, employs 38.7% of the population (including forestry and fishing), and 
comprises 40% of exports. Morocco is developing the industrial policy discussed above 
to build a knowledge economy—attracting FDI, building technology parks and call 
centers, improving training opportunities, and developing new industries like renewable 
energy.  
An official from MASEN explained that historically Morocco’s power plants 
have been built on the coasts and the “veins of the grid inject energy into the 
mountainous areas.” The Moroccan Solar Plan would reverse this situation with the 
mountainous and desert regions becoming the major energy producers. It is true that 
thermal power plants have long been built on the coasts all the way back to the initial 
Roches-Noires coal-fired power plant in the coastal city of Casablanca described above 
(see Figure 54). However, the mountains have long been sites of renewable energy 
generation (dams) due to the perception that they are a “chateau of water.” The Moroccan 
Solar Plan therefore fits into the politique des barrages dam building policy dating back 
to King Hassan II’s rule and even to the Protectorate.  
  384 
 
Figure 54. Moroccan Power Plants. Source: Cross Border Information. Used with 
permission.157 
 
CSP policy illustrates how Morocco in its political development continues to 
balance King Hassan II’s declaration that “we shall graft the past onto the present to 
prepare for the future” (as quoted by Roberson, 2014, p. 57). CSP straddles the gap 
between Morocco’s identity as an agrarian society versus its imagined future as an 
industrialized society. I illustrated in Chapter 3 that the framing of CSP as a solar farm 
has persisted over a century and a half. Under the Moroccan Solar Plan, solar farms 
would harvest sunlight to make the desert bloom while growing a domestic technology 
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supply chain and a potential commodity for export. Noor I will utilize water from the 
Mansour Eddahbi dam, built in 1972 for irrigating 19,000 hectares, controlling floods, 
and generating electricity (Swearingen, 1988). Put differently, Noor I is a solar farm 
irrigated by the politique des barrages, making the desert bloom with green electrons that 
could one day be exported to Europe.  
The goals for agricultural export under the 1970s dam policy are nearly the same 
as the goals for energy export today—to earn foreign currency, to develop an industry, 
and to raise the standard of living in rural areas to prevent rural exodus. The vision that 
Morocco will one day export large amounts of green electricity to Europe is similar to 
Morocco’s long-standing ambitions to become a major agricultural exporter to Europe. 
Under the Moroccan Solar Plan, Morocco imagines itself as a future exporter not of 
technology but of commoditized electrons. Oil, or other fossil fuels, would offer a similar 
export commodity but it would not provide the balance among the past, present, and 
future that CSP farming does.  
Solar farming balances tradition and modernity in contemporary Morocco. For 
example, there is a long tradition of viewing the King as builder, who leaves a lasting 
imprint on the country’s infrastructure by transforming a place from quaint to high 
modernist (Elsheshtawy, 2008). When new infrastructure projects are completed, the king 
comes to inaugurate them. Figure 46 illustrates the groundbreaking ceremony for the 
solar portion of an ISCCS natural gas plant in Morocco, with the king inaugurating the 
power plant. Such events still include the traditional hand-kissing ceremony, which has 
generally fallen out of favor as old-fashioned in Morocco (Boukhari, 2013). Dam 
building therefore becomes not the work of Moroccan or foreign engineers but the work 
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of the king. Dam building was also viewed as a project of agriculture not a project of 
large-scale technology.   
Unlike Desertec Design I, CSP is seen in Morocco as emerging. But similar to 
Desertec Design I, a modern electricity system is seen as one based on farming. This 
illustrates a balancing between the past and the present that is absent from Desertec 
Design II. The Desertec vision frames innovation as the achievement of a deferred dream, 
the end goal in the inevitable march of technological process, while the Moroccan vision 
relates to a delicate balancing among the past, present and future. CSP is a hybrid of 
tradition and modernity. 
The country’s agricultural focus is problematic because, as illustrated above by 
the history of Morocco’s relationship between its capricious water resources and 
agricultural development, the country suffers from persistent droughts making it difficult 
to grow traditional crops, e.g., olive and almond trees. The water-energy nexus has long 
challenged agriculture and energy in Morocco from the myth of the Granary of Rome 
onward. As a young Moroccan policy analyst stated, “people see Morocco as an 
agricultural society, yet we have no water and we’re well positioned within the region to 
excel at other exports.” An interviewee from ONEE said 
 
The problem is that today water, it’s a resource that’s rarer and rarer. And so, the 
dam policy was really successful in the past but today we cannot continue to 
count on the dams for responding to water needs. It is necessary to go toward 
different procedures….like water desalination… but these procedures are 
…consumers of electricity….when we think of the future, when we reflect on the 
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availability of water, we must think about the availability of energy for 
responding to the availability of water.
158
 
Chapter 7 will further illustrate the challenges of the energy-water nexus and will further 
explore solar power as part of la politique des barrages. 
Mediterranean Systems Integration and the Social Pact 
 
This section addresses the prospects for the Desertec vision in the context of the 
evolving national social pact for electricity in Morocco. As electricity grids begin 
crossing nation-state borders across the globe, how will it affect the promise states make 
to their populations about the distribution of the societal benefits and burdens of 
electricity development? In my fieldwork, I found strong support for regional energy 
integration and renewable energy exports among Moroccan government officials. 
Furthermore, many Moroccan policy officials viewed Morocco as unfairly excluded from 
the European electricity market. They are generally supportive of exporting electricity to 
Europe in the medium to long term, but some interviewees spoke of inequities stemming 
from the top-down way in which the Desertec vision was institutionalized. They want to 
develop mutually agreed upon terms that avoid coercion but also allow access to 
European markets.  
                                                        
158 Le probleme c'est que aujourd'hui l'eau, c'est une ressource qui est de plus en plus rare. Et donc, la 
politique des barrages elle a tellement bien reussi dans le passe qu'aujourd'hui on ne peut plus continuer a 
conter sur les barrages pour repondre aux besoins en eau.Il faut aller vers des procedes differents.  
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The open regionalism scenario in the Maroc 2030 studies viewed the most 
desirable future for Morocco as one in which it is deeply integrated with its neighbors’ 
electricity systems. It envisioned extensive electricity interconnections with Europe and 
the Maghreb, which is similar in principle to the Desertec vision. Morocco has significant 
potential to export green energy to Europe to improve north-south solidarity and the 
intermittency of renewable energy, as well as to preserve the environment and reduce 
emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, of which Morocco is a signatory. The report 
concluded that the regionalism scenario would be the most positive for sustainable 
development, but it expressed skepticism about the scenario’s feasibility because it would 
require the reactivation of Maghrebian collaborative processes through the Arab Maghreb 
Union, which has only met once since 1996, in addition to the North-South cooperation. 
The report criticized European countries for cooperating with North African countries on 
a bilateral basis rather than encouraging co-development within the Maghreb, although 
some multilateral organizations exist.
159
 
MASEN supports the eventual regional integration with the EU grid and the 
export of solar electricity after meeting its 2 GW (2,000 MW) goal. A representative from 
MASEN stated, “for us, 2,000 MW is only like an appetizer…especially if we reach grid 
parity.” (Grid parity is reached when the price of solar power equals the market price for 
electricity.) Dii’s CEO Paul van Son said that Morocco was the first country to approach 
                                                        
159
 Morocco is a member of the Euro-Mediterranean Forum and the facility for developing gas and 
electricity interconnections. At the time of this study, Morocco had recently signed the Intégration du 
marché maghrébin de l’électricité with Algeria, Tunisia, and the EU to further integrate the grids among 
the countries and possibly export electricity to Europe through a liberalized market. The Maghrebian 
market for electricity is still under discussion today, and a presentation by Algerian Sonelgaz at the Paving 
the Way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan conference in Rabat argued that such a market is possible and 
should be pursued. 
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the Dii when it was established. At the 2013 Dii conference in Rabat, the new Moroccan 
Minister of Energy stated  
 
‘The EU has moved toward renewable energy legislation and creating an 
institutional environment for renewable energy. The south of the Mediterranean 
has also put ambitious plans for renewable energy in place and growing an 
electrical market. Our signature indicates that we support this market. We wish to 
share between north and south of the Mediterranean.' "With these 
interconnections with Algeria and Spain, we’re geostrategically positioned for 
playing a major role in the exchange of electricity with the Mediterranean.”160  
 
One interviewee argued that once Morocco becomes an exporter of energy to Europe, it 
will become an industrialized country. Through the export of renewable energy to 
Europe, Morocco could fulfill the vision of becoming a knowledge economy. 
Morocco as Electrically European 
 
The fact that Morocco is tugged between the Arab world and Europe in terms of 
its identity and politics is reflected in its energy policy and system. This is illustrated in 
the contradiction that even as Morocco is building an independent sovereign renewable 
energy system based on national pride, it also adopts a European identity for its 
electricity system. Morocco’s energy sovereignty has been torn since the inception of its 
                                                        
160
 Single quote indicates a non-verbatim quote and double quote indicates a direct quote. 
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electrical power system—from choosing to continue the dam building plan started by the 
Protectorate, to pursuing nuclear power only to be stonewalled by the international 
community, to seeking international cooperation to ensure its electricity system will 
continue to be reliable while integrating high levels of renewable energy into it. Within a 
system context, CSP is a technology that would benefit from transnationalization or 
regionalization as it is scaled up, in order to maintain the centralized system configuration 
explained in Chapter 1 and ensure its reliability. Similarly, nuclear power for Morocco 
would have required support from Spain and international regulatory bodies. 
Since there is a cable connecting Morocco to the Spanish grid under the Strait of 
Gibraltar, MASEN’s view is that “Morocco is already electrically European.” The 
Moroccan grid operates on the same frequency as Europe and “we produce the same 
electron as Sweden.” An interviewee from ONEE emphasized the success of the 
interconnection between Morocco and Spain, developed in the 1990s as evidence of its 
European infrastructural know-how. Despite the skepticism of funders, operators, and 
many others, the interconnection worked well and its capacity was even later increased. 
He said that “Morocco is the first country to have the courage to construct 
interconnections with Europe” in the 1990s, and that the decision to pursue the “logic” of 
regional energy cooperation was made long ago. The first interconnection between 
Morocco and Spain was built in 1997 and was reinforced in 2006, and he indicated that 
Morocco is currently working on an interconnection with Portugal. He expressed that 
ONEE is very supportive of exporting renewable energy to Europe, but that it was 
necessary for Europe to implement mechanisms that favor the transfer of energy. He 
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stated “it is necessary to create an example today, one can consider that Morocco is a 
country integrated into the European market, because it is interconnected to the European 
market.” 
The Spanish transmission systems operator does not see Morocco as electrically 
European because its electricity sector has not been fully liberalized. Morocco is the only 
country in the MENA region that has attracted private investment in renewable energy, 
but they do not yet have an independent energy regulator. They are only welcome in the 
Spanish grid as a market player, not as a partner. As detailed in Chapter 5, Dii's vision of 
a copper plate in the MENA region might work technologically, but areas of political 
resistance in Spain and social resistance in the Pyrenees between Spain and France would 
likely stop electrons from flowing out of Morocco.  
While the Spanish TSO viewed Morocco as having different infrastructure from 
Europe, Morocco viewed political problems in Europe as impeding the vision for 
regional integration. A number of interviewees said that politics in Europe, rather than in 
North Africa, were blocking energy export. An official from ONEE stated, “We are 
convinced by regional cooperation through the development of these two components— 
namely interconnections and renewable energies— to enhance the energy needs. But it is 
also necessary for the European electricity grid to develop, to avoid having electrical 
islands in Europe, especially between Spain and France.” 161 From the Granary of Rome 
vision onward, politics in France and Spain have affected Morocco’s export economy. An 
                                                        
161 Il faut creer par exemple aujourd'hui, on peut considerer que le Maroc est un pays integre au marche 
europeen, parce que il est interconnecte au marche europeen. Et nous sommes convaincus que la 
cooperation regionale passe par le developpement de ces deux composants a savoir les interconnections et 
les energies renouvelables pour valoriser les besoins energetiques. 
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advisor from the Ministry of Energy emphasized that Morocco and Germany could have 
a successful bilateral cooperation on electricity transfer, but Spain and France are in the 
way. They perceived a reduction in enthusiasm for energy integration following the 
economic crisis and decided that they could proceed faster alone than waiting for 
European companies to develop projects.  
MASEN views Desertec as a good and simple concept to produce electricity 
where it is cheapest and to transmit it over HVDC lines. However, the conditions for 
export must be right, MASEN explained, as the issues go “way beyond electricity” to 
matters of geopolitics, security of supply, and the economic crisis, with 35% of Spain’s 
power plants shut down due to lack of demand. Achieving an agreement between 
Morocco and 27 EU countries would be very complex. They emphasize that Desertec is a 
concept or a vision for the distant future and decline to estimate when power export 
might be achieved.
162
 They fault Dii for setting unrealistic time expectations, even within 
the consortium, and they cite high staff turnover as evidence that expectations were not 
met internally. They think that Dii is moving away from exports because the investors’ 
expectations for how quickly exports could be achieved were not met. More proof-of-
concept in the form of political and regulatory frameworks that lay the groundwork for 
regional integration would be required, but, as discussed in Chapter 5, Desertec has had 
the least success with this form of proof-of-concept. 
Human development or technology development?. Many people in Europe 
view market liberalization as a precondition to achieving a regional energy grid with high 
                                                        
162 See Chapter 5 for a discussion on the temporal complexity of the vision. 
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levels of renewable energy generation. At the 2013 Dii conference, an official from the 
Moroccan Ministry of Energy stated that Morocco was liberalizing its grid so that it will 
be able to export to Europe. S/he said their objectives as part of Desertec and the Union 
for the Mediterranean were to support solar and to close the solar energy cost gap through 
exports to Europe, meaning that European subsidies would help Morocco to finance the 
cost gap between electricity from solar versus from fossil fuels. An official from ONEE 
emphasized the importance of access to the European market for financing renewable 
energy in the south:  
 
There is not a loser in this business, it’s win-win, because on the southern side it 
will be a valorisation of renewable energy, so a means of supporting the 
development of renewable energy in the south, a supplementary support that 
permits a faster development of renewable energy in the south. In the north [they 
will gain] clean energy, available, and that allows the developed countries to 
reach their environmental objective that are more and more ambitious. So it’s 
win-win. 
 
Some in the development community focus on CSP in terms of human development 
needs, which would help to fulfill Morocco’s social pact, while others focus on 
technological development, to bring CSP technology down the cost curve and then share 
the benefits of the technology across the globe. One side advocates for European 
development banks to make charitable contributions to CSP in MENA. The other side 
advocates for a market-based approach in which subsidized financing would be combined 
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with energy exports to achieve a competitive market price for CSP. A representative from 
the German development agency BMZ said at the Dii 2012 conference:  
 
I’m from a development agency. My mandate and my immediate concern is the 
development of Northern African countries. …the needs there are immense— the 
need for electricity is very large and growing, production is lagging behind, and 
so the immediate need is to install capacity for the domestic need… as a 
development agency, we are not in the business of supporting export schemes.  
 
An interviewee from the World Bank responded to this by expressing that charitable aid 
would be insufficient for developing CSP as a market feasible technology  
 
people who think that you can get the [technologies of scale from CSP] through 
aid funding don't know how little aid is available… or they don't understand how 
far down the cost curve CSP has to come. Every way we run the numbers, you 
can't get enough scale on the manufacturing side to bring down the costs to a 
competitive level without accessing the subsidized European market [through 
exporting the energy.] 
 
While national and regional identities and national pride form around CSP, the 
World Bank frames it as a globalized technology that should be produced in the most 
geographically efficient regions in accordance with a Ricardian model of trade. They 
view CSP as a globalized technology producing an export commodity, flattening national 
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identities for the technology. Were an electron to become a commodity, it would fit into a 
globalized export paradigm in which goods are exported even when they are not surplus 
goods, in other words when local supply has not been met even though local communities 
have shouldered the drawbacks of the production of the good. For example, once food 
became a globalized commodity, rather than a technology of national pride, countries 
exported significant amounts of food from places where people were starving or 
malnourished. Ensuring that local demand for electricity is met may ironically be valued 
more highly than meeting local demand for food. MASEN emphasizes that local 
electricity needs must be met before electricity can be exported; in fact even during the 
colonial era, the French emphasized that Moroccan electricity demand should be met 
before exporting to Algeria. If regional integration reduced access, it would violate 
Morocco’s social pact for electricity, which has focused on improved access since the 
1990s.  
Energy security, regional integration, and multilateralism.  The Moroccan 
government is focusing on developing renewable electricity from domestic resources to 
reduce its dependence on volatile oil prices. Despite this focus, Moroccan officials also 
perceived that the country would be more secure by increasing regional energy 
integration. An interviewee from ONEE explained that energy security for Morocco 
meant both developing national resources as well as regional interconnections and 
coordination mechanisms. There are two reasons for this perspective. The first is the now 
familiar idea that regional electricity integration is part of a system-level challenge in 
which Morocco would need interconnections to balance peak loads and to provide 
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backup generation as it builds intermittent renewable energy.
163
 The second is that 
regional integration appears to be secure for Morocco as long as it has its own fuels and 
its own export commodity. Once it has built up this capacity, it will not be in a position in 
which other actors in the region could easily coerce it. It is a testament to the promise of 
integration that Morocco views integration as more secure than importing oil. The caveat 
is the importance of developing the right kind of dependency that would put Morocco on 
secure footing. 
Morocco’s current interconnections with its neighbors are tenuous from a security 
standpoint. Morocco imports electricity from Algeria, but relations between the two 
countries are sour for numerous reasons, especially the Western Sahara issue, and the 
border between the two countries is closed. The Arab-Maghreb Union, founded to 
improve economic and political interconnections among the Maghreb countries, has only 
met once since 1996. At first blush, it appears that this case proves it is possible to have 
technological integration without political integration. However, the history described 
above illustrated that the French developed this transmission interconnection when they 
controlled both countries, and it became historically entrenched or path dependent. 
Morocco and Algeria cooperate best on energy issues, and the political tensions between 
the two countries impede deepening energy integration. Electricity integration in the 
absence of political integration lacks the security of supply that Morocco seeks to 
develop, especially if integration were to increase.  
                                                        
163
 See the n-1 criterion described in Chapter 5. Morocco avoided blackouts with electricity imports when it 
temporarily lost its coal-fired generation. 
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Positive political relationships and mutual trust must co-evolve with export for 
energy integration to be secure. A Moroccan energy professor who wrote a book in the 
1980s about exporting wind energy from Morocco to Europe argued that good North-
South collaboration is needed to enable export, in which the needs of both sides are 
satisfied and the social rift between North and South is closed. Although it is difficult to 
store electricity (and therefore to withhold it for political reasons), Europeans bear risks 
of security of supply, while Morocco, which negotiated unfavorable terms for the free 
trade agreements with Europe, seeks to become a better negotiator to improve its security 
(Dawson, 2009). By building up its negotiation and R&D capacity, Morocco will be in a 
better position to avoid being coerced by neighboring countries in integration processes. 
As argued in Chapter 5, multilateral cooperation on standards and management is 
also needed to achieve a secure regional grid. Managing a fully integrated Mediterranean 
electricity market would give more power to the Mediterranean TSO, which would be 
needed to manage traffic on the transmission lines. When I suggested that the 
Mediterranean TSO would take over grid management, an official from ONEE laughed at 
me. He said that each country would continue to independently manage its grid. Within a 
regional market, all of the national TSOs would work with the same rules and the same 
conditions through an organization like METSO West, which includes Libya, Tunisia, 
Algeria, Morocco, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France. “Because no one will accept it if 
someone else is to direct their grid,” he said. Yet Design II of the Desertec vision 
required regional management for a single energy market, and it would be impossible to 
develop if none of the countries were willing to cede grid management to a regional 
authority. Dii wants to depoliticize the electricity system by encouraging the creation of 
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independent regulatory bodies in North Africa stating, "Case-by-case decisions [about 
electricity regulation] based on the discretion of public bodies should be kept to a 
minimum" (Desertec Industrial Initiative, 2012). This removes country’s social goals and 
promises for electricity under the social pact from the equation and does not consider the 
history of the post-colonial process in which Morocco came to control its electricity 
system. 
Desertec and Neocolonialism. In Chapter 5, I described the neocolonial critique 
of Desertec—as a European scheme to exploit North Africa’s resources. In contrast, Dii’s 
CEO Paul van Son stated in an interview with the Tripoli Post, “Your country [Libya] 
would never allow any more western industries to colonialize it. I cannot imagine it. 
There is no way of colonialism. Nothing will happen if a country doesn’t like it” 
(“Renewable Energy is a Win-win Situation for Everyone, Says CEO of the Desertec 
Industrial Initiative (DII),” 2010) Van Son’s quote implies that the neocolonial critique 
frames Africans as potential victims lacking sovereignty. Furthermore, if Morocco 
exported electricity under coercive conditions, it would not meet its energy security 
goals; in order for the situation to be secure, good relations among countries would be 
required. Van Son further argued that colonization entails taking something away from 
the country, whereas in Design II, countries will export a commodity that would be lost if 
it were not utilized. On one hand, overlooking the problematic history of North African 
collaboration and colonial era projects like Atlantropa
164
 could perpetuate colonial 
discourses and stereotypes of North Africa and taint the Desertec vision. On the other 
hand, assuming that North Africans will not want to export electricity to Europe without 
                                                        
164 See Chapter 3. 
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listening to their opinions and analyzing their visions is problematic. I found in my 
interviews more support for exporting renewable energy from North Africa to Europe 
than the European critics of the “neocolonial Desertec scheme” have assumed, but I also 
observed discontent related to the procedural justice of the design of the Desertec vision. 
Some Moroccans distanced today’s collaborations with Europe from the colonial 
past. For example, the director of a Moroccan research center that facilitates cooperation 
between European and Moroccan researchers, whose grandfather played an active role in 
achieving Moroccan Independence, stated  
 
But generally, Morocco, we have no problem with our colonial past...It was our 
history....Now it's ok, we cooperate....no one said FDI is just French entrepreneurs 
using Moroccan workers. No, actually, they're bringing them jobs and know-how 
and opportunities to produce something meaningful.  
 
This illustrates that branding all interactions between North Africa and Europe as 
neocolonial is treacherous, because it could preclude fruitful collaborations in which 
knowledge is exchanged and created and value is added to the economy.   
Others were supportive of Desertec as a concept or idea, but were dissatisfied 
with the lack of avenues for North African participation in the development of the 
concept. Dii’s identity as a convener of stakeholders to discuss regional power systems 
was contested. An interviewee involved in energy research in Morocco encapsulated this 
point of view, stating  
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the initial Desertec idea is an idea, is a proposition, an idea that might be 
pertinent…so the concept itself is interesting. Now, of course, it was the case with 
this concept that one plus one must be worth eleven. Because one plus one could 
also be one…in this context it could be a total benefit to the European side. This 
should not be the case…and Dii had as its objective a bad strategy…Dii’s strategy 
was 100% commercial—it was European. And…the MENA region was only a 
tool for doing business, that’s all. So, all must be added value (so one plus one is 
equal to eleven) and that the region benefits, be it through the creation of jobs, 
expertise, etc.….so personally I attended the meeting with Dii… where they said 
“and here we have a proposition, you will give us the best terrain in Morocco. 
And there, we will install the central power plants, we will take the electricity.” 
So here is the proposition!...it can also be a form of colonization. I went, I took 
the best spot, I used it, et voila!  That is it! And that’s why I told you, there was a 
bad strategy or maybe there was not a strategy …and there was an amalgam. An 
amalgam between the Desertec Foundation, the Desertec concept, and the 
Desertec Industrial Initiative… This model is (I am sorry for the term, I will say it 
in English) bullshit. It’s the right term….because the idea yes the idea is good, 
and it is maybe pertinent for both, for everyone etc., but the tool that was created 
because we thought it would help. On the contrary… it was not the right tool with 
the right strategy. 
 
This quote illustrates that not all partnerships between Europe and Morocco are 
neocolonial and there is nothing intrinsically neocolonial about the Desertec vision itself, 
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as I argued in Chapter 5. However, optimizing procedural justice is essential in north-
south collaborations moving forward, especially considering the colonial past. He then 
expressed that what is really needed is global teamwork, rather than saying, “I decide and 
you provide.” Integrated projects are needed. This adds another layer to MASEN’s 
“integrated solar development” framing, in which North-South partnerships must be 
based on a just procedure and mutual benefit.   
The head of the Sahara Wind company, a Moroccan wind organization, contrasted 
the initial use of the Atlantic trade winds in the Age of Sail, which brought together two 
continents— Europe and North America— in exploiting a third one (Africa) through the 
slave trade, to the more positive use of Africa’s renewable energy potential. The Atlantic 
trade winds, whose planetary circular movements over the ocean shaped its surface 
currents for millions of years, have pushed dead animal carcasses toward to coast of 
North Africa. These settled at the bottom of the Atlas Mountains. Their accumulation and 
subsequent sedimentation over time account today for 75% of the world's phosphate 
reserves.
165
 He stated, 
 
By using the trade winds blowing over the Sahara desert to process their induced 
phosphate paleontological footprints into fertilizers, a new paradigm shift will 
occur in the ways natural resources are being accessed. Not only can fertilizers -
essential to world food security- be decoupled from fossil fuels and their 
fluctuating price cycles, but resource transformation efficiencies can be 
tremendously improved. By generating local added-value in reaching out to the 
                                                        
165 US Geological survey commodity index summaries of 2013, 2014, 2015 
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rest of the world's food plate, the remains of the world's largest predators 
transformed into fertilizers will have served a good revenge on our species' rather 




The interview was held on a day when images flooded the local news of sub-Saharan 
refugees who were trying to climb the fence from Morocco into its two Spanish enclaves 
while police beat them back. He highlighted the inequity between continents, stating, 
 
Ok. You're going to be exploited, through the slaves that are going to be taken and 
exploited in the U.S. and whatever resource you're going to have is going to be 
exploited by colonial powers, which will come thereafter. So with that hindsight, 
you have to see that those Atlantic trade winds mean a lot for mankind, and you 
do have to see that hindsight in order to improve the history, not re-write it but 
learn from it and say, ok. Are those winds just about two continents making fun of 
the rest of the world in exploiting its resources and peoples beyond limits? Or is 
there an opportunity to integrate another continent with a better story with a 
leadership that can look beyond... using perhaps a U.S. president that is black, and 
a new ambassador of the U.S. to Morocco that will be black…. And I think that 
you know, you cannot go into the 21
st
 century with a doomed continent, a 
continent of people trying to climb a fence. You see that and you go like oh my 
God. You know this is the world we live in. And I don't think it's acceptable. 
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 Phosphates are mostly composed of large fish, essentially shark’s and sea ray’s remains. 
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While I argued in Chapters 4 and 5 that the Desertec vision is not intrinsically 
xenophobic, it could become so if people from both north and south are not treated as 
equals. Another energy expert said that as long as people think there are two classes of 
people within society, energy justice could not be achieved. Sahara Wind, which is 
funded in part by NATO, seeks to develop wind energy for Morocco and later for export 
through high voltage direct current transmission lines to Europe, as well as surrounding 
Maghreb countries.
167
 Sahara Wind seeks to improve the access to the trade winds 
through integrative processes that will gradually make wind energy available for 
Morocco, Mauritania, and sub-Saharan Africa. Surplus energy would also be later used 
for export through HVDC transmission lines to Europe and surrounding Maghreb 
countries. Sahara Wind emphasized the importance of Moroccan, rather than European, 
ownership of these plans. In a postcolonial world, Morocco should be tied to Europe 
through a collaborative, equitable relationship rather than a coercive one. The director of 
Sahara Wind insisted this must come from Moroccan ownership of the process. 
Unfortunately this is not how the process evolved in Morocco. After Dii and 
MASEN signed an MOU, the German Embassy held a press conference claiming the 
Ouarzazate power plants as Dii pilot projects. This created subtle animosity and led to 
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 Funding from NATO comes with the full recognition of the Sahara Wind Project's concept rights. It 
partners with the Moroccan and Mauritanian governments with the full recognition, co-funding and/or 
involvement of other multilateral institutions including: the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO), the World Bank, as well as academic partners and other companies including ONEE (with 
whom the Terms of Reference of the Sahara Wind Project's HVDC line have been established; ONEE 
provided co-funding for the study of the integration of the HVDC line into its grid and the subsequent 
evaluation of water treatment solutions using wind energy.) The Moroccan OCP Group's CERPHOS 
phosphate research center contributed to Sahara Wind’s NATO research work. Other companies, such as 
the region's Telecom operators, provided access to their mast tower and other infrastructures. As the Sahara 
Wind Project involves applied research activities backed by governments and multilateral institutions, these 
institutions also endorse the intellectual property rights agreements. 
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significant media confusion between Desertec and the Moroccan Solar Plan. In contrast, 
Desertec’s founder stated that even when foreign experts are consulted, Moroccans 
should take get credit for their work. “The less they give credit to others, the more it is 
their project and their responsibility, so I think this is the best that can happen…that they 
get the credit, even if it was inspired by someone else.”  
Considering these issues of capacity building involved in constructing a national 
system of innovation, Morocco’s concept of integrated planning could be used to expand 
national learning systems theory. Viotti (2001) argued that processes of technological 
change in industrializing countries should be analyzed as national learning systems, not 
national innovation systems. Learning is the process of absorbing technologies, 
conducting incremental innovation, and diffusing the technologies (ibid). The Moroccan 
case study illustrates that this depiction of innovation may be overly combative. 
Technologies are neither absorbed nor transferred. Partnership and collaboration are 
involved as well as competition. As one interviewee expressed “no business will come to 
Morocco and transfer their know-how; this is merely false marketing. Working with 
foreign research teams is more likely to transfer know-how or to develop new 
knowledge.” In the process of this collaboration the technology could be transformed to 
better meet domestic needs. The Moroccan depiction of integrated projects is a useful 
addition to national learning systems theory because it acknowledges the international 
exchange often involved in the process. It could also aid in thinking through how these 
partnerships could be improved to enhance north-south collaboration and improve the 
adaptation of technologies or the development of new technologies that aid in fulfilling 
the social promises made for electricity systems development. Capacity building in the 
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area of industrial and R&D policy can help Morocco to avoid being coerced in north-
south negotiations and technology-related partnerships. An integrated project would go 
beyond the “copy-apply” model to consider positive North-South partnership, the 




In this chapter, I argued that energy plays an important role in political 
development in Morocco and other countries. The field of energy is not just technical but 
illustrates broader socioeconomic and political challenges in Morocco. These 
socioeconomic challenges are being integrated into an evolving social pact for electricity 
in Morocco. During the Protectorate, the social pact was largely negotiated between the 
Protectorate government and French colonists, which focused on providing benefits to 
French companies. Local access to electricity was not a priority and was in some cases 
forbidden in order to maintain the traditional characteristics of the medina for tourists. 
This lack of focus on energy for Moroccans, especially in the mountains areas, led to 
uneven development and inequities. After Independence, Moroccans sought to reclaim 
the state and consolidated the electricity sector under state power. King Hassan II 
continued the Protectorate’s dam building policies, interweaving agricultural and 
electricity policy. In the 1990s, as Morocco emerged from the Years of Lead, universal 
access was finally prioritized under the pact to address unequal access between urban and 
rural areas. Today, the pact is being renegotiated to address multiple socioeconomic 
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problems facing Morocco, from rural exodus to the unemployment of skilled youth. 
Some Moroccans argued that a new concept of citizenship was needed to encourage 
citizen empowerment and participation in their energy future, which would move the pact 
toward being a contract with citizen consent. This will be further explored in Chapter 7. 
A centralized electricity system has been viewed as the modern configuration of 
an electricity system from the Protectorate to the present. Distributed solar PV is framed 
as a technology for the poorest people in the country. This focus on centralized systems 
for Morocco fits well with the Desertec vision, which seeks to extend the centralized 
system logic across an entire region. Like Desertec Design I, Morocco also prioritizes 
building a centralized system based upon energy farming. This is because CSP as a solar 
farm delicately balances Morocco’s agricultural past and present with a potential 
imagined future as a knowledge economy with a robust R&D and innovation sector.  
To become a knowledge economy, Morocco is working to build capacity to 
ensure it is on a level playing field with European countries. Since Morocco’s focus for 
CSP is on industrialization, MASEN frames CSP as an emerging technology in need of 
R&D, as opposed to Desertec’s framing of CSP as a mature technology, in order to meet 
Morocco’s specific needs under the social pact. Dii is hoping to speed toward an 
inevitable future of technological progress to develop technologies whose time has come 
in the present. In contrast, Morocco is balancing its past, present, and future within its 
electricity policy. Despite this, Morocco is supportive of the Desertec vision, as it aids in 
maintaining its centralized electricity system and providing energy security and reliability 
through regional integration.  
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The implementation of the Desertec vision would be more politically complex 
than has been appreciated, because it intersects with nation-states’ social pacts for 
electricity, political development, and politics. The green electron is not a sufficient 
criterion for investment in North Africa as it is in Europe. Rather, individual countries’ 
goals for renewable energy development must be considered in order to facilitate 
multilateral, or even bilateral, partnerships. The regulation of the system at a regional 
level is problematic, as the negotiation of electricity policy and standards is a matter of 
political development for individual nation-states. A Mediterranean regulatory body 
would be faced with navigating these varying goals and visions. This is true even though 
there is much more support in Morocco for regional electricity integration than I expected 
to find. Given Morocco’s history of being torn by different dynamics as well as between 
its imagined future and storied past, Morocco views regional electricity integration as a 
desirable future, but not necessarily a feasible one given the sociopolitical complexity 
involved. 
In the post Arab Spring context, Morocco is just beginning slowly to implement 
the Advanced Regionalization plan, which would decentralize governance to give more 
power to local governments. It is unclear whether this plan would affect electricity policy 
and begin to change the entrenched perception of a modern electrical power system as 
centralized, especially since the initial focus is on bringing greater regional control to 
Western Sahara. Chapter 7 will explore the discrepancies between national-scale plans 
and local-scale implementation and governance.  
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CHAPTER 7 
PROSPECTS FOR LOCAL-SCALE GOVERNANCE OF TECHNOLOGY IN 
MOROCCO 
 
This chapter expands upon the theme of how electricity development relates to 
political development. Until now, I have discussed political development in terms of 
nation building, national sovereignty, national identity, and the consolidation of the 
nation-state. Here, I expand my exploration of political development to consider how 
Morocco’s political system might change in the future— especially as its relates to 
inequity— as gradual steps are taken toward the decentralization of governance and new 
modes of governance of technology. Morocco is considering continuing with its 
Advanced Regionalization plan to decentralize power, giving more authority and 
financial independence to regional and local governments and incrementally increasing 
democratization. Morocco launched the Advanced Regionalization process in 2010, and 
it entered its second phase in 2011. The current plan is under debate in the Parliament.  
According to King Mohammed VI, as quoted on the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Cooperation website, advanced regionalization 
 
is not “a mere technical or administrative arrangement, but “rather a resolute option 
for the renovation and modernization of State structures, and for the consolidation of 
integrated development.” It will not be reduced either into “a mere redistribution of 
powers between the centre and the regions” (Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, n.d.). 
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In this chapter, I consider the reciprocal shaping of governance in Morocco and 
technological development as Morocco considers increasing decentralized governance.  
In order to understand the possible implications of the decentralization of 
governance and its effects on technological development, I discuss the public engagement 
process for the siting of Morocco’s first CSP plant, which seeks to be more inclusive than 
the dam building projects of the past. These public engagement processes have 
implications for changing conceptualizations of citizenship and citizen participation in 
technology governance and, more broadly, political development in Morocco. In Chapter 
6, I began to argue that new conceptualizations of citizenship have been developing in 
Morocco as it advances with plans for renewable energy. One is the participation of new 
voices in governance in Morocco, such as the MENA Policy Hub. The other relates to 
questioning whether the centralized model of electricity generation promotes effective 
citizen engagement. A financier I quoted in Chapter 6 stated, “What is important is to 
create the conditions for [everyone who benefits from new energy development] to 
become citizens.” However, this chapter shows that various inequities and inequalities 
impeded the capacity of rural citizens to participate in decision-making. This chapter 
illustrates that just as Morocco as a nation has worked to build capacity to leverage a 
stronger position in R&D and political integration processes,
168
 the capacity of local 
citizens and communities to participate in decision-making needs to be improved by 
addressing inequities in rural areas related to, for example, education, isolation, and 
gender disparities.  
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 See Chapter 6. 
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Conflict arose over the legitimacy of the public engagement process and the 
representatives selected to speak for the villages adjacent to the power plant site. At the 
same time, the local population articulated strong political legitimacy for the king and 
pride for national plans for renewable energy development. This illustrates a paradox in 
greater liberalization and democratization efforts. Greater local participation and 
decentralized governance is needed to increase democratic participation and citizenship, 
but the local representation lacked legitimacy while the king had strong legitimacy at the 
national level. Given this paradox, what are the prospects for the governance of 
technology in Morocco, especially considering the local-scale inequities that affect the 
capacity of rural citizens to participate in decision-making and the structural problems 
with participatory procedures? How are rural citizens viewed and how do they view 
technological governance in the post-Arab Spring era as Morocco imagines a future as a 
knowledge economy with more decentralized, democratized governance?  
As Morocco considers increasing decentralized governance, I compare nationally-
led integrated CSP development to locally-led integrated development projects in the 
Ouarzazate region. I explore their benefits and challenges and their relationship to 
decentralized governance, citizenship, and integrated development. Integrated 
development explicitly ties electricity policy to matters of inequity, water, poverty, 
education, and industrial capacity. Through integrated development projects, Morocco 
explicitly seeks to align technical ends of technological development (i.e., the provision 
of electrons) with its societal goals (e.g., jobs, rural development, education).
169
 As I have 
argued throughout the dissertation, electricity is being called upon to meet complex 
                                                        
169 see Chapter 6. 
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sustainability challenges in the 21
st
 century that go beyond providing heat and light. The 
ability of electricity to deliver upon these promises depends upon effective technological 
governance processes designed to include local citizens in shaping technologies meant 
for local benefit.  
In the context of this broader dissertation on the Desertec vision for 
Mediterranean electricity systems integration, this chapter illustrates the possible 
implications of the Desertec vision moving from the visioning to the construction phase 
through the first CSP plant built under the Moroccan Solar Plan. While Noor is not 
Desertec’s project, it is an example of CSP development in Morocco and is intended here 
to be taken as a thought experiment for understanding the multi-scalar implications of the 
transnationalization of electricity. A transnational electricity vision like Desertec 
illustrates both the scale up of renewable energy technology and the connection of the 
multiple scales of justice (from local to global) in this massive imagined sociotechnical 
system. In Chapter 1, I recounted sitting along the Friedrichstraße in Berlin wondering 
what the ramifications would be of powering the street with renewable energy generated 
from power plants next to small villages in Morocco that lack clean drinking water. I 
asked: what will the outcomes be for social justice if the electricity system were 
globalized to bring together these disparate places—the commercial present of Berlin 
with its storied past and the future of a small village at the door of the Sahara that 
currently lacks clean drinking water? Will premium-networked spaces be expanded or 
will locals shoulder the burdens of energy development without gaining the benefits? 
These scales of justice relate to trade-offs and uncertainties in decision-making as 
construction begins. In Chapter 5, I illustrated how Desertec Design I aimed to address 
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the energy-water nexus, which was excluded later from Design II. When CSP shifts from 
the visioning phase to the construction phase in local, water-scarce desert landscapes, the 
energy-water nexus again rises to the fore. Furthermore, Desertec as a regional system 
would be tied to these thorny issues of political development, national sovereignty, and 
citizen engagement discussed in this chapter. 
The chapter begins with an overview of the inequities in the Ouarzazate region 
and Morocco that affect the capacity of citizens to participate in decision-making. I 
extend the comparison made in the last chapter between the dam building policy under 
King Hassan II and the Moroccan Solar Plan. The dam building policy provides a 
benchmark against which to compare the Moroccan Solar Plan and its effects on the local 
community. What differs is that while dam building generally did not benefit the affected 
public, the Noor process seeks to engage the local community and to provide them with 
benefits through an integrated development plan. This could be a significant departure 
from the past, because it would need to address the inequities of rural people living in the 
region of Ouarzazate. After that, I describe the siting process as an example of public 
engagement in technological governance. Local people wanted a say in nationally led 
integrated development plans. However, participation was impeded by the lack of 
capacity of the community to participate due to inequities, as well as the structure of the 
process and the greater legitimacy given to the king over local representatives. The 
chapter then compares the benefits and drawbacks of Noor versus local development 
projects initiated by NGOs. It concludes with the future prospects for technological 
governance in Morocco. 
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Social CSP report. As described in Chapter 2, I made five trips to Ouarzazate 
throughout the course of this research—two on my own, two as part of an ASU study 
abroad trip, and one as a participant in a portion of a broader research project headed by 
Boris Schinke and a team of German, Egyptian, and Moroccan researchers (funded by the 
German government). This project sought to understand how the siting, construction, and 
operation of the Noor solar power facility would affect communities living in the region. 
The extensive report—Social CSP—describes the development context of the Ouarzazate 
region and the existing and projected social impacts of Noor. I helped to author this 
report but did not participate in all of the research. I seek not to duplicate this report but 
to add to it by addressing the contributions described above. Readers are encouraged to 
read the full report, published in May 2015. I use some data from this study as clearly 
cited below, as well as data I collected during other trips. Any errors or misinterpretations 
are my own. I am deeply grateful for this research partnership, and I give credit to Boris 
Schinke in heading this project and to our Moroccan translators and research assistants 
for their exemplary work.  
Social Inequity at Different Scales in Morocco 
 
The first solar power plant under the Moroccan Solar Plan
170
 will be constructed 
in Ouarzazate, Morocco. The plant, called Noor, is expected to be a 500 MW power plant 
for proof-of-concept of trough and tower CSP technologies, as well as roughly 50 MW of 
large-scale PV (see Figure 55). When I visited in 2014, the first phase—160 MW of wet-
                                                        
170 See Chapter 6. 
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cooled solar trough with three hours of storage—was well under construction. The 
project developer is ACWA Power, a Saudi company described in Chapter 6. The plant is 
being financed with concessionary financing with loans from eight banks and 
governments.
171
 A thorough description of Noor can be found in the SocialCSP report.   
 
 
Figure 55. Noor Power Facility. (Wuppertal Institute; Germanwatch, forthcoming). 
 
Unlike the European imaginary of Saharan technological systems built in the 
middle-of-nowhere described in Chapter 3, Noor is intentionally being built in populated 
                                                        
171 The World Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the African 
Development Bank, the French Development Agency, the European Investment bank, the KfW 
Development Bank, the European Neighborhood Investment Facility, and the German Ministries of 
Environment and Development Cooperation. The electricity from Noor I is estimated to cost 18.9 US cents/ 
Kwh. Depending on their usage levels, consumers in the Ouarzazate Province pay between 0.9 Moroccan 
cents per kWh to 1.44 cents per kWh (Wuppertal Institute; Germanwatch, forthcoming). 
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areas so that local people will benefit from its development. The population of 
Ouarzazate city is 69,364, and the population of the broader Province of Ouarzazate is 
292,000. Ouarzazate is one of the doors to the Sahara, which Bisson (2003) described as 
populated areas on the outskirts of the Sahara desert that indelibly shape and are shaped 
by it.  
The Ouarzazate region reflects broader development trends and inequities in the 
Mediterranean region and therefore provides a useful case study for understanding not 
only the development of CSP in Morocco but also the possible implications of the 
development of CSP in other parts of the Mediterranean for an integrated electricity 
system and integrated development. Specifically, Roux (1997) described the 
Mediterranean overall as a region with wealthy coastal areas with higher rates of 
economic and population growth that receive the majority of the attention, in contrast to 
its interior characterized by depressed mountainous zones with weak economies and 
dilapidated infrastructure (called le Maroc inutile during the Protectorate, as described in 
Chapter 6). He argued that this dynamic poses even greater inequities than the inequities 
between the North and the South of the Mediterranean. The previous chapters of this 
dissertation suggested that these North-South inequities and political disagreements are 
significant. However, Roux’s point illustrates that there are many layers of inequity 
within and across the Mediterranean that would affect energy justice for a Mediterranean-
wide electricity system.
172
 A view from the mountainous Ouarzazate region of Morocco 
provides generalizable lessons about the inequalities and inequities that would affect the 
energy justice calculus of a regional Mediterranean electricity system. Additionally, the 
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description below of inequities in Morocco will provide context for evaluating the 
integrated development process and will also aid in testing the energy justice framework 
in Chapter 8. (For a detailed description of the social situation in Ouarzazate, see the 
Appendix of the SocialCSP report). 
Layers of inequality and inequity. Inequity and inequality in Morocco are 
important to its political development in terms of the capacity of citizens to participate in 
technological governance and how the view of the citizen might evolve in rural areas. As 
described in Chapter 4, equality implies sameness (e.g., everyone has access to the same 
quantity of electricity at the same price), while equity requires fairness (e.g., everyone 
has access to electricity that improves their human capabilities at an affordable price). I 
argued in Chapter 4 that energy justice implies a higher standard than energy equality.  
Electricity development is viewed as a boon for equalizing Morocco’s 
inequalities, yet electricity alone is insufficient to the task of addressing inequity. Rida 
Lamrini’s 2006 book Is there a Future for Morocco, Yasmina Asked Me173 reflected upon 
the effects of social inequity on Morocco’s political development. The first time Yasmina 
asked Lamrini whether there is a future for Morocco, he mulled over the evidence that 
would indicate that there is a bright future for Morocco. He considered the improved 
development statistics since the efforts of the 1990s. Foremost, he pondered whether 
nearly universal electrification rates might imply a promising future stating “the 
countryside has rejected the mantle of darkness that enveloped the evening to offer an 
                                                        
173 Y a-t-il un avenir au Maroc, me demanda Yasmina 
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electrified spectacle of starry constellations.”174 However, he was, in the end, cynical 
about Morocco’s future due to a combination of state dysfunctions—e.g., corruption, lack 
of competitiveness compared to other emerging economies, and a lack of political will—
as well as the indifference of the citizens—i.e., Moroccan youth eyeing emigration rather 
than staying to improve the country. As he contemplated how he would respond to 
Yasmina’s question, she was in a car accident, and Lamrini visited her in a hospital in 
Casablanca. There, he witnessed poor people lined up in the hospital hallways waiting 
hours, or even days, for treatment. Noting the concern on his face, the doctor assured him 
that he would never have to wait like this because he is not destitute. This did nothing to 
allay Lamrini’s fears, as he wished to live in a society where such inequities did not exist.  
I reflected upon these inequities as I sipped espresso with a professor in a 
comfortable café in Rabat across from Mohammed V University, one of the top 
universities in the country. He stated, “the first danger for men is men. There are people 
who think there are first- and second-class people—that’s a problem. It’s not a lack of 
resources [Morocco suffers from] but a lack of respect.” He went on to argue that 
Morocco must valorize people before natural resources in order to develop renewable 
energy. This conversation illustrates that a large segment of the population—these 
second-class citizens—are not empowered to participate. The Ouarzazate region 
embodies these tensions between different classes of people in Morocco’s political and 
social development as described below. 
                                                        
174“Les campagnes ont rejeté le manteau de ténèbres qui les enveloppait le soir pour offrir au regard le 
spectacle féerique des constellations étoilées."   
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Social inequality and inequity between the rural Ouarzazate region and major 
cities like Marrakech stems partly from isolation. To use the metaphor from Chapter 4, it 
is “islanded” in that it is remote, cut off, and lacks economic diversification—the 
opposite of the characteristics a premium-networked Mediterranean grid would seek to 
provide it. Ouarzazate is situated on a plateau between the High Atlas Mountains and the 
Anti-Atlas Mountains. It can only be reached by a winding, treacherous road through the 
Atlas Mountains from Marrakech, which is 120 miles away but takes about five and a 
half hours to reach by charter bus (see Figure 56). The Tichka Pass is one of the most 
dangerous stretches of road in Morocco. During the winter, it is sometimes snowed in and 
buses from Marrakesh must simply turn back. This isolation affects the area’s economy 
in multiple ways. For example, when I visited the Noor power plant during construction, 
the workers told me that the first shipment of mirrors arrived broken due to bad roads. I 
also talked to small-scale producers of olive oil in rural areas who explained how difficult 
it is to transport their oil to Marrakech. People in Ouarzazate viewed this isolation as a 
cause of their disadvantages.  
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Figure 56. The Tichka Road. Photo by Author. 
 
One of the results of social inequality and inequity between rural areas and major 
urban centers is rural exodus driven by desperation rather than a genuine desire to 
relocate. About an hour and a half from Ouarzazate, I visited the town of Agdz with 
researchers from the Germanwatch group. I asked one of our researchers about economic 
opportunities in the town. She explained that since there are no large businesses or 
factories in the area to employ people, many young men emigrate from rural areas to the 
cities of Casablanca or Rabat looking for construction jobs. They pay 2,000 dirhams 
($210) per month to rent an apartment, including electricity and water costs, and must 
share it with several other people. If they get married, they do so in the rural area and 
only see their family on several major holidays per year, which she viewed as a threat to 
social cohesion. This is a challenge that integrated development projects seek to address. 
While urban-rural inequalities are stark in Morocco, the tendency to focus only on 
this dividing line overlooks numerous other layers of inequality that relate to the capacity 
of the community to participate in decision-making. First, there are inequalities even 
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within cities. For example, in the outskirts and poor neighborhoods of Ouarzazate city, 
people lack water and sanitation services (Wuppertal Institute; Germanwatch, 
forthcoming). Additionally, many rural immigrants live in slums in the outskirts of major 
cities. Second, as Lamrini illustrated, there are major inequalities in access to and 
affordability of healthcare. People in Ouarzazate who can afford it often travel 4.5 hours 
over the Atlas Mountains to Marrakech for healthcare, as specialists and hospitals are 
lacking in the Province of Ouarzazate. Third, there are two Moroccos in terms of 
gender.
175
 Moroccan women do not enjoy equal access to rights and education, as 
evidenced by the 84% female illiteracy rate in the Province of Ouarzazate, compared to 
67% for men (Wuppertal Institute; Germanwatch, forthcoming). According to the head of 
a local NGO I interviewed, girls often cannot attend school because their family needs 
them for domestic chores, the families see it as unsafe to travel long distances to school, 
and school sanitation services are sometimes lacking making attendance untenable for 
girls after puberty. These multiple layers of inequity affect the capacity of citizens to 
become full citizens in energy development. 
Noor relates closely to these inequalities and inequities, as it is sited near 
marginalized rural villages within the rural Commune Ghessate. According to the 
Commune’s president in an interview with me, the Commune includes 44 villages and 
10,000 inhabitants over 1,034 kilometers of land. Many improvements have been made to 
the Commune since 2002. According to the president, reaching a 99% electrification rate 
was very important to its development (ibid). However, the villages adjacent to the power 
                                                        
175 Note also that I worked with and met many articulate, intelligent, and assertive women. It is important 
to avoid the stereotypes of Muslim women as passive and meek, as bemoaned by Arab feminists like 
Joumana Haddad. 
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plant suffer from inequalities compared to the rest of the Commune, such as unequal 
access to education and water. Tasslemante, the closest village to Noor, which is only a 
matter of yards from where construction is underway, has a population of 326 people in 
40 households (as of 2008) (ibid). Most significantly, Tasslemante lacks clean drinking 
water. Water is available in the village through several wells, but these wells provide only 
salty water fit for washing but not human consumption (see Figure 57). When our group 
from ASU visited the village, we were asked to bring our own bottled water for boiled tea 
so that no one from our group would become ill. Additionally, some people reported that 
several households in adjacent villages lack electricity, and these households will now be 
living in the shadow of a major energy facility (although it is unconfirmed whether this is 
true). For Noor to be part of an expansion of premium-networked spaces, it would need 
to address inequities in water and energy access. 
 
 
Figure 57. Well in Tasslemante, with two Researchers and a Woman Doing her Laundry. 
Photo by Author. 
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Energy inequity and capabilities in Ouarzazate. Inequities in energy access 
exist within Morocco and across the Mediterranean. Almost 96% of households in the 
Ouarzazate Province have electricity access (Wuppertal Institute; Germanwatch, 
forthcoming). The interviews from the SocialCSP study showed that people used 
electricity primarily for lighting, as well as TV, cooking, and in some cases heating and 
cooling. While the hope is that electricity access will improve people’s capabilities, the 
Executive Director of the High Atlas Foundation, a development NGO headquartered in 
Marrakech, argued that electricity has in fact harmed development because it has greatly 
increased TV use, threatening social cohesion as people spend less time on community 
activities and looking for employment and more time on entertainment. (TVs, however, 
can bring better access to diverse news outlets, see the capabilities section in Chapter 8). 
Furthermore, he said that villagers have trouble paying the bills, and the electricity is not 
reliable. However, the Social CSP interviews found that the majority of people could 
afford their electricity bills, although they complained about the price increasing.
176
 The 
results are mixed about whether electricity has improved citizenship in the community 
and more fine-grained data is needed to accurately judge. 
Unlike in premium-networked spaces, energy usage is not invisible in the 
Ouarzazate Province. For example, villagers trek to the city and haul butane bottles back 
over treacherous roads on donkeys to power agricultural water pumps. Butane is 
important for capabilities; it heats water and fuels portable stovetops and refrigerators. 
This allows people to have a higher quality of life with hot showers and with a cleaner 
                                                        
176 Electricity in the area is purchased through pre-paid charge cards instead of being metered and billed at 
the end of the month. 
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fuel less likely to burden women with lung disease. It also provides for irrigation through 
gas water pumps. When our group from ASU stopped for lunch in rural Morocco in 2013 
a shopkeeper charged our students a high price for water. When they questioned the 
price, the shopkeeper, who did not speak English, drew us away from our Western 
energy-wealthy mentality by gesturing toward the bottle of butane running the 
refrigerator. Our drink was not cold for free.  
Some traditional fuels are used in the region; I often saw hunchbacked Berber 
women plodding along the highway with large bushels of firewood on their backs. The 
firewood is used for cooking and heating—it is a cheaper fuel source but puts people at 
risk for lung disease. Traditional bread (tafernet) is cooked in ovens with these traditional 
fuel sources. Figure 58 illustrates the soot from such a stove, which fortunately in this 
case is located outside.
 177
 In terms of improving local capabilities, the High Atlas 
Foundation said that subsidized solar water pumps are the most demanded renewable 
energy technology in rural areas, because they allow people to avoid the trek mentioned 
above for butane bottles. 
                                                        
177 Further, charcoal, which is detrimental to health, is still used in both urban and rural areas of Morocco, 
especially for culturally important rituals. For example, the sheep slaughtered during the Eid-el-Kabir 
holiday are cooked using charcoal grills that choke the stairwells of apartment complexes with smoke.  
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Figure 58. Traditional Oven in Tasslemante, Morocco with a Transmission Line in the 
Background. Photo by Author. 
 
La politique des barrages and the future of inequity and energy development. 
The Moroccan Solar Plan will change the geography of energy and the distribution of its 
effects on inequity. As an interviewee from MASEN explained, thermal power plants 
were built traditionally on the coasts and the transmission lines were the veins that 
injected energy into the country. The areas of the country that have the most sun are also 
the poorest areas. For example, Ouarzazate is a poorer region with an agrarian economy. 
Its main economic activities include agriculture—which is mostly subsistence agriculture 
with only a few cash crops—tourism, and small handicrafts (e.g., textiles, rugs, 
ornamental daggers) (Wuppertal Institute & Germanwatch, forthcoming)
178
 While these 
agrarian rural areas generally do not host thermal power plants, they have long been the 
focus of dam building. As discussed in Chapter 6, Noor and its integrated  
 
                                                        
178 Despite the agricultural focus only 2% of the land is cultivated due to the arid climate (ibid). There are 
also several important mines (manganese, cobalt, and copper). Ouarzazate is called the Morocco of 
Hollywood and has a movie studio it seeks to grow. Increasing international competition had hurt the 
sector, but business has improved recently (ibid). 
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development plan balance traditional and modern views of Morocco’s political 
development dating back to la politique des barrages (dam policy) from King Hassan II. 
La politique des barrages provides a benchmark for understanding political 
development and local participation and benefit under the Moroccan Solar Plan. There 
are many similarities between la politique des barrages and the Moroccan Solar Plan. 
Therefore, while CSP appears to be a novel development project, it is also a dream whose 
time has come in terms of achieving large-scale farming in Morocco and exporting the 
harvest to Europe. CSP has been framed as a farming and irrigation technology since its 
invention in 1866.
179
 Today CSP is a new type of farm integrated into a modern 
electricity system for Morocco. The Mansour Eddahbi reservoir near Ouarzazate was 
built under la politique des barrages to irrigate 19,000 hectares, to contain flooding, and 
to provide electricity. It was completed in 1972 along the Draa River with a height of 70 
meters and an initial reservoir capacity of 560 million m
3
 (Swearingen, 1998). The latest 
bathymetry in 1998 indicated a capacity of 433 million m
3
 (Diekkruger et al., 2010)  
Soon it will provide cooling water for Noor I. CSP development seeks to make use of 
land that was ill-suited for agriculture to harvest electrons, and the Mansour Eddabhi dam 
will irrigate this CSP farm. This discourse balances between the vision of Morocco as a 
traditional agricultural society and a future knowledge economy through integrated solar 
development. 
 The possibility of generating green electrons as a major export commodity to 
Europe also fits into la politique des barrages discourse as described in Chapter 6. Just as 
dam building and irrigation sought to provide for the nutritional needs of the country, 
                                                        
179 see Chapter 3. 
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CSP seeks to provide for electricity needs. Dam building promoted regional development 
to raise the rural standing of living and stem rural exodus to the cities, very similar to the 
goals for CSP. Finally, just as King Hassan II hoped that agricultural projects made 
possible through extensive irrigation would develop major cash crops for export, green 
electrons are seen as a potential export commodity. Interviews conducted for the Social 
CSP study with people living in Ouarzazate Province indicated nearly unanimous support 
for exporting the electricity to Europe, provided local people benefit. According to these 
interviews, they viewed electricity exports as a source of “earning foreign currency,” the 
same discourse as agricultural exports under the dam policy.  
Despite these similarities, the stipulation that local people must benefit will 
require a rethinking of the dam policy of the past. Under la politique des barrages, the 
community living near the Mansour Eddhabi dam was displaced and harmed by the 
project rather than experiencing development benefits (Wuppertal Institute; 
Germanwatch, forthcoming). These disadvantages from energy development have lasting 
effects, as was illustrated when I visited the village of Idelsane near the Mansour Eddhabi 
dam as part of the Germanwatch study. There, villagers viewed themselves as still being 
disadvantaged after being displaced by the dam in the 1970s. They knew little about the 
CSP plant but were concerned mostly about their precarious water situation. Despite 
living near the dam, they must walk one kilometer up the road to reach drinkable water, 
as the water quality of the reservoir is poor. They have tried to dig wells only to reach 
brine. After the interview, we walked to the Mansour reservoir. There was no path, and it 
was a challenging and dirty trek. The water in the reservoir is low due to years of 
drought. The outskirts resemble an estuary—the ground is coated with white powder and 
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cracked, salty mud. The water in the lake is green from algae blooms, which have 
reduced the water quality. The reservoir was not designed to provide drinking water 
(Swearingen, 1988) even though it is a crucial need. Since people in the area lack access 
to drinking water, they attempt to drink water from the reservoir even though it is dirty. 
This story illustrates how important it is to avoid replicating the past problems caused by 
centralized energy infrastructure when constructing new renewable energy systems and to 
meet the needs of the local community with new infrastructural development.  
The new social pact for electricity in Morocco discussed in Chapter 6 seeks to 
ensure local social benefit from integrated development. The Noor power plant is viewed 
as part of a plan for integrated development in Morocco and MASEN as an animator for 
local development. MASEN stated that their projects should have an impact from 
kilometer zero to kilometer 1,000—the entire country. The main development 
requirement for Noor is to source 30% local content for the power plant in order to grow 
supply chain industries and to foster small enterprises that provide services such as 
maintenance and security. Additionally, MASEN is building the Institute for Training in 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (IFMEREE-Ouarzazate or L'Institut de 
Formation aux Métiers des Energies Renouvelables et de l'Efficacité Energétique 
d'Ouarzazate), which it hopes will become an R&D platform similar to the Solar 
Plataforma. ACWA Power had hired 1,200 to 1,600 construction jobs for Noor I by 
September 2014. About 80% of the jobs went to low-skilled laborers, 10% to semi-
skilled, and 10% to skilled (ibid). These benefits are expected to endure as 
entrepreneurship and economic growth is expanded in the region. 
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If exports were pursued under the Moroccan Solar Plan, how would people expect 
to benefit and how much benefit would they view as sufficient? Two common views 
about energy exports from North Africa are espoused in Europe. One is that exporting 
electricity is fundamentally neocolonial, as it will drain electricity out of North Africa.
180
 
This was surprisingly not how local people in Morocco viewed the situation. Second, the 
perspective from institutions like Dii is that North African countries want to export 
electricity and that socioeconomic benefits will automatically trickle down to the local 
population. The case study of Noor illustrates that while there is potential for such 
benefits, they are not automatic and relate to existing inequities in Morocco and the 
Mediterranean. As described below, local people wanted some say in how they would 
benefit from Noor, which suggests that they would also want some say over how they 
would benefit from the potential export of the electrons. Furthermore, this local benefit is 
essential to avoid tying inequities in Morocco with energy wealth in Germany and linking 
a premium-networked space with a depressed Mediterranean zone. 
  
Citizenship and Representation: The Noor I Public Engagement Process 
 
The inequities described above are tied to the evolving social pact. In Chapter 6, I 
argued that Morocco’s promises for the benefits of electricity generation reflect a social 
pact, rather than a social contract, because it lacks citizen consent. While the social pact 
addresses the distributive outcomes of electricity, it does not require a process for consent 
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that would allow local people to become empowered citizens in this process. The Noor 
siting process is an opportunity for understanding an early effort made to include citizens 
in the process of the governance of energy technologies under an evolving social pact for 
electricity in Morocco. Effective citizen input would improve the procedural justice 
aspects of energy planning and policymaking.  
This siting process was in part an instrumental action taken by the state that could 
be witnessed by the public, through what Ezrahi (1990) called “visual attestive culture.” 
Ezrahi (1990) defined visual attestive culture as a process in which a community of free 
and rational individuals witnesses government actions, promoting governmental 
transparency and accountability, and preventing arbitrary uses of power, at least in 
appearance. He viewed visual attestive culture as fundamental to the workings of liberal 
democracies.  
The engagement process for Noor reflects a tension between the use of visual 
attestive culture and what Ezrahi (1990) called the visual celebratory culture of a 
monarch. The visual celebratory culture can be seen in infrastructure projects across the 
country including Noor. For example, Figure 46 in Chapter 6 shows the king 
inaugurating the Ain Beni Mathar natural gas-CSP plant. Similarly, an online video 
shows the king commemorating Noor to dancing, singing, and overall celebration of the 
Kingdom’s accomplishments in renewable energy, reflecting the “king as builder” 
tradition (Elsheshtawy, 2008).
181
 In contrast to this visual celebratory culture at the 
plant’s commemoration, the siting process reflected an attempt to foster a visual attestive 
culture and at least a partial effort to gain the consent of the local population. 
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Paradoxically, the two coexist in Morocco as it takes incremental steps toward 
democratization. 
Below I provide an overview of the siting process; readers can refer to the 
Germanwatch Social CSP study for a detailed description and assessment of the siting 
process. The spirit of the law has recently given citizens the opportunity to be engaged in 
sustainable development projects that did not exist under King Hassan II. (Law 99-12, 
Charte nationale de l’environnement, allows for adequate information provision and 
participation on sustainable development projects, and Article 12 of the new constitution 
allows for the public participation of civic groups— see the baseline appendix of the 
Social CSP study).  Siting included a public engagement process that was in compliance 
with legal regulations (Wuppertal Institute; Germanwatch, forthcoming). The World 
Bank and contractors conducted a full environmental and social impacts study, along 
with numerous other studies by MASEN, which made legible the anticipated impacts of 
the power plant. Three public meetings were held about the project in November 2010, 
March 2010, and November 2012 (ibid). The rural Commune Ghessate (described on p. 
420) collectively owned the land near the site. This rocky land was used for some grazing 
and for gathering of rocks for building materials and sticks for firewood (ibid). Proceeds 
from the sale of this land were deposited into a compensatory fund called the Social 
Development Fund (ibid).  
The Social CSP study identified several major drawbacks in the public witnessing 
process. In my interpretation, the process paired structural drawbacks with a lack of 
capacity of the community to participate as witnesses. First, the meetings were held in a 
hotel in Ouarzazate, which was difficult for villagers to travel to and an intimidating 
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location to visit. Second, the documents explaining the project were available only in 
French and Fus’ha (formal Arabic), while many people in the villages speak only local 
dialects of Arabic and Berber and are illiterate. Third, some people, especially women, 
thought they were not educated enough to participate in the process. One rural woman 
interviewed at home during the Social CSP project, said she did not know of such things 
because “these walls are my frontiers.” In short, even though there was a participatory 
process available, the multiple inequities in the community—illiteracy, gender issues, 
lack of transportation, and isolation— resulted in a lack of capacity to participate 
meaningfully. 
Recognizing that they were building in the poorest areas of the country, MASEN 
did, in fact, seek to improve the capacity of the community. In addition to the 
industrialization goals previously mentioned, MASEN undertook “charity work” in the 
region to improve its resilience and MASEN’s license to work there. For example, they 
have funded entrepreneurship classes, a dormitory for young women to attend school in 
Ouarzazate, eyeglasses, dentistry, Internet, buses, and bicycles for children to ride to 
school. The charity framing is admirable and goes beyond simply preparing the region for 
economic investment to addressing the community’s lack of capacity. However, under 
the “charity framing” of local development, villagers were not viewed as true participants 
in deciding what projects were needed under the Social Development Fund financed by 
the land sale. Taken together, the inequities in the region illustrate a lack of capacity in 
rural citizens to participate substantively in decision-making, even though they have 
important ideas, opinions, and knowledge. Just as capacity-building needs to occur at the 
national level to put Morocco on a level playing field in international energy negotiations 
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and R&D with Europe,
182
 capacity-building exercises for local citizens are needed to 
improve capabilities to participate in decision-making. 
From a structural standpoint, the process did not allow for direct witnessing at all 
stages. In some cases representatives from the community were called upon who suffered 
from a lack of legitimacy. Early social contract theorists saw representation as acceptable 
instead of direct democracy because citizens agree on the original contract and then select 
representatives to speak for their needs (Brown, 2009). In this case, both initial consent 
for the social pact and legitimate representation were lacking. Six representatives from 
the Commune and nine governmental authorities from ONEE and MASEN approved the 
land sale for 1 Moroccan Dirham per m
2
, or 30.5 million dirhams ($3.2 million). During a 
focus group conducted under the Germanwatch study, people complained that their 
representatives in the sale did not consult the location population, or that the 
representatives did not truly represent the population.  
Villagers had to sell their sheep that they used to graze on the land, and they could 
no longer gather firewood and rocks from the site (Wuppertal Institute; Germanwatch, 
forthcoming). Additionally, construction encroached upon the perimeter of the village, 
much closer than villagers said they were originally promised (ibid). Furthermore, the 
benefits from the land sale largely went to the center of the commune some 10 kilometers 
away instead of to those who had lost capabilities from access to the land. As such, CSP 
is resulting in uneven development in the Ouarzazate region as those villages most 
affected are reaping fewer benefits. The villages closest to the power plant site lack 
access to clean water but will now live in the shadow of a major energy facility. 
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The Social CSP findings indicate that the citizens wanted to be involved as public 
witnesses to the process, but the process was partly captured by elites. Catusse, Vairel, & 
Bono (2010) argued that there are systemic issues with a lack of legitimate representation 
between villagers and elites in Morocco, in which the elites capture the benefits. The 
representatives do not necessarily share the same interests as the local population—a fact 
that is often masked by the assumption that the main disparities in Morocco are between 
urban and rural areas. The lack of capacity of the local citizen combined with problematic 
representation led to conflict. Villagers from Tasslemante and Tidgheste protested several 




The visual attestive witnessing process failed to a certain extent. The view of who 
counted as a witness was at times constrained to the local elite rather than based upon 
popular sovereignty. It did not fail because there is no civil society in Morocco, as some 
scholars suggest. There was an engaged civil society that wanted to participate but did 
not have the ability due to inequities impeding the capacity of the citizen to participate 
and issues with representation and procedure.  
 
The Solar Haj: Local Pride and National Legitimacy 
 
While there was dissatisfaction with the process and compensatory measures, the 
opposition had little to do with the technology itself. The centralized state’s decision to 
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were released from jail after community members paid fines on their behalf. 
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pursue a particular technology, instead of letting the free market or local population 
decide (as described in Chapter 6), was not a source of conflict. In fact, participants in the 
Social CSP interviews expressed strong patriotism for the project, which they were proud 
to have in their backyards. This differs from the siting processes I have studied for CSP 
in the United States, in which citizens were opposed to the technology itself as well as 
disappointed in the engagement procedure. CSP is perceived and interpreted differently 
in different political contexts, which would need to be accounted for in a transnational 
electricity system. 
In Chapter 6, I argued that solar power has become part of national pride and 
nation-building. This discourse was strong enough to have permeated the local level. In 
2013, I gazed out of the window, driving from rural Zagoura to the village of Agdz, an 
hour and a half southeast of Ouarzazate, Morocco. We passed a faded ONEE sign on 
which someone had scrawled allahu akhbar (God is good). We drove through winding 
roads with canyons covered only with rocks and shrubs, free of visible technological 
infrastructure other than the road ahead and high voltage transmission lines. The lines 
took sharper turns and dives than the treacherous road, draping across the road and down 
canyons. They crisscrossed over hills with the words printed in white “God, Country, 
King.” I was reminded of the ONEE logo (see Figure 59), in which a transmission line 
resembles the shape of the star on the Moroccan flag. The transmission lines therefore 
stood out as symbols of national pride etched out on a landscape free of other human 
infrastructure. This scene reflected both the region’s remoteness coupled with its 
unusually high electrification rate compared to rural areas of countries to the south. These 
lines are symbols rural Moroccans see every day—technological feats that have been 
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imprinted on the local conscience since Morocco’s Rural Electrification Program 
launched in 1996. This program laid the groundwork for the rural electricity system and 




Figure 59. ONEE Logo 
 





One Social CSP interviewee said, “All in all, the CSP project is good for the 
region, it gives a certain honor to our area, and we would say that it is not only a local 
project, it is a national project.” Members of all communities associated the development 
of Noor I with an intensified local pride and improved reputation for the Ouarzazate 
region. When I interviewed the President of the Commune Ghessate he expressed hope 
                                                        
184 "Flag of Morocco" by Denelson83, Zscout370 - adala.justice.gov.ma (Ar). Licensed under Public 
Domain via Wikimedia Commons - 
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that the Noor project would lay the foundations for Ouarzazate to become the site of the 
Haj for solar energy.
185
 He emphasized that, unlike a movie, CSP was a long-term project 
for the region, which would attract foreign companies and collaborators to Ouarzazate.  
Not only was there national pride for the Noor project but also villagers gave 
strong legitimacy to the king, despite problems with local representation. One participant 
in the Social CSP Tasslemante focus group in February 2013 stated 
 
The sale procedure should have been more transparent and clear. If the local 
authorities had told us clearly that they would want the land for the solar project, 
and especially that his majesty is involved, we would not have sold the land, we 
would have given it for free. 
 
The makhzen (state/ king) actually espoused more legitimacy than local representatives. 
Consent to rule existed at the national level but not at the local level. The solar siting case 
shows that there has not been a modern, linear transition from the visual celebratory 
culture of the king to the visual attestive culture of a liberal democracy. Both co-exist and 
depend upon one another.  
Amster (2013) explained this longstanding legitimacy of the makhzen but also 
argues that it is hybridized with French technocracy. 
 
The 1912 Treaty of Fez decapitated the Muslim body politic and replaced its 
makhzan state with a French technocracy, a regime of science imposed over and 
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against the Muslim body politic. In the king, Morocco retains an Islamic 
sovereignty reembodied. In the Moroccan postcolonial state, a positive 
technocracy nationalized and Islamicized (Kindle loc. 281).  
 
In the United States, representation in a visual witnessing process would come 
partly from technocratic experts, as in Hecht’s story about nuclear power in France 
(2009). Experts were starkly missing in the visual witnessing process for CSP siting. I 
argued in Chapter 6 that expert participation in the Moroccan state has been highly 
constrained and that experts are often missing in decision-making. Brown (2009) 
interpreted Rousseau as having said that consent is less important than the social contract 
that privileged expertise rather than divine rights. Privileging of experts is lacking in the 
Kingdom of Morocco.  
In place of experts, local elite played a role in witnessing the process, but the local 
community contested whether they represented the population. This controversy between 
illegitimate representation and the visual witnessing of the siting process reflects what 
Brown (2009) termed “the tension between public witnessing and elite method” (p. 85) 
and representation by experts and elites versus popular sovereignty. In Morocco, 
sovereignty is generally embodied in the king himself rather than in experts or the public. 
Attempts to develop popular sovereignty have had mixed results; voter turnout in the 
2007 Parliamentary election was only 37%, as the parties did not address the concerns of 
the citizens (Tozy, 2008) and failed to prioritize anti-corruption measures. The tension in 
Morocco’s hybridized process between visual attestive culture and visual celebratory 
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culture, is who gets to be a witness—regional governments, villagers, local experts, or 
local elites?  
The lack of local legitimacy of representation is a challenge for the Advanced 
Regionalization Process, especially when coupled with the lack of resources facing 
regional governments. As Morocco continues with its advanced regionalization project to 
expand regional governance, the Maghreb Arabe Press quoted King Mohammed VI as 
stating in July 2014,  
"In any case, we shall not put the region's future at risk. That is why we shall 
carry on with development and modernization projects there, particularly through 
the implementation of the development model for our southern provinces", HM 
[His Majesty] the King said, adding that this model is "based on a participatory 
approach, on good governance and on cohesive, multidimensional programs 
aimed at achieving integrated development" ("Morocco: HM King Mohammed 
VI", 2014) 
First, in the quote above, the king advocated for centralized, large development projects 
based on the dam building model that is nearly a century old. Then he argued for an 
integrated good governance approach, a more recent discourse that has been associated 
with the spread of liberalism across the globe. The success of the inclusion of the local 
people is essential for political development from la politique des barrages toward a 
participatory integrated development model. 
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These issues are also significant for Mediterranean electricity politics, because if 
the system were integrated these national political development challenges would be tied 
to the regional level. It may also be the case that this nationally embodied sovereignty for 
the project would be necessary for lending legitimacy to the export of electrons to 
Europe, as the king would retain sovereignty as the “builder” of the project, even as grids 
become interconnected. The push toward ceding more governance to the regional level 
through the TSO (described in Chapter 5) could therefore result in conflict.  
In a separate study, I found that the siting process for CSP in the United States 
also suffered from significant drawbacks. Put differently, the visual attestive process also 
faltered in the mature liberal democracy of the United States. If it is true that the 
democratic public engagement process was unsuccessful in Morocco, then it is significant 
to note that it failed in the United States as well and does not necessarily illustrate a lack 
of hope for decentralized governance in Morocco. The shortcomings of such processes, in 
part, illustrate the complexity of the trade-offs entailed in siting renewable energy, 
especially because integrated sustainability challenges are at stake.  
Integrated Challenges and Win-Win Solutions 
 
As construction begins on CSP plants in North Africa, it illustrates some of the 
trade-offs entailed in local-scale development. All three design of the Desertec vision 
were framed as a win-win. McShane et al. (2011) criticized sustainable development 
discourses that set unrealistic expectations for win-wins across the triple bottom line 
(people, planet, and profits). Instead, they recommend evaluating a project’s difficult 
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decisions, value conflicts, conflicts between social goods, strategic choices, and problem 
frames. For example, elites in Europe and Morocco may benefit from the system while 
Moroccans in Tasslemante are negatively affected and bypassed by benefits. Global 
climate change may be mitigated, but construction may damage the local environment. 
There may be instances in which the trade-off does not become apparent until 
construction begins or in which trade-offs are masked by value judgments concealed in a 
discourse of technological and market determinism. Furthermore, the Social CSP study in 
effect nicely illustrated that wins are a matter of the perspective of the winners and losers 
not simply objective, measurable facts. (See for comparison the discussion in Chapter 4 
about the perspective that the landscape near the CSP plant in Egypt was unpopulated, 
versus my observations that it was populated.) 
One local trade-off that is being insufficiently considered in the discussions on 
Mediterranean electricity integration is that between energy and water usage. As 
explained in Chapter 6, Morocco has capricious water sources that are unevenly 
distributed across the landscape and highly variable, and it suffers from long periods of 
drought. The Province of Ouarzazate is water scarce, with 360 m
3
 per person of water 
available per year, versus 700 m
3
/year nationally, and 1,000 m
3
/year as the definitional 
threshold for water scarcity (Wuppertal Institute; Germanwatch, forthcoming). Around 
98% of the population has water access, but there are huge disparities in the quality and 
quantity of water, even within Ouarzazate itself as well as within the Province (ibid). 
Water in the region naturally has high salinity and is worsening as groundwater resources 
are overdrafted (ibid). Irrigation from the Mansour Eddhabi dam continues to be critical 
for supporting subsistence and other agriculture in the region (Wuppertal Institute; 
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Germanwatch, forthcoming). Due to this water stress, local people are concerned about 
new demands on water in the region, including Noor (ibid).  
The future of water resources in the Ouarzazate Province is critical, highly 
uncertain, and under-researched. Noor I will use 1.75 million m
3
/year (5 Capitals, 
2012:83), but it is not clear whether it will significantly affect future water stress in the 
region because no one has studied this complex issue. The following stages will use dry-
cooling technology, which will significantly reduce water usage (up to 90% is a often 
cited industry figure.) Diekkruger et al. (2010) illustrate that data on the future of water 
resources in the Draa Valley of Ouarzazate are lacking and crude where available. They 
also argue that future water availability is highly dependent upon uncertain future social 
and governance choices and inequities, as well as climate change. Reactions to the Noor 
power facility are related to decision-making under uncertainty and the perceptions of 
people living under an already precarious water situation. Reciprocally, if the water from 
the dam were to run out, Noor would be unable to function without it. 
Some uncertainty is entailed in the development and trade-offs of sociotechnical 
systems in a multi-scalar world. One interviewee expressed to me that no one even at the 
local level wanted to discuss the trade-offs entailed in the Noor power facility. He said 
that discussing the negative aspects of the project could bring hushuma—a somewhat 
karmic concept of shame important in Moroccan culture—on the elites in the area. He 
compared it to a marriage contact in which no one wants to mention divorce enough 
though it is a possibility. Yet it is important to discuss these issues because they illustrate 
the complexity of the Desertec vision— and other visions for transnational sociotechnical 
energy systems— and can become intractable challenges as construction begins. 
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Exporting electricity would likely de facto export water; this would vary greatly based 
upon the generating technology used, with around 90% more water for wet-cooled than 
dry-cooled CSP and very little water for PV or wind (Miller & Moore, 2011). (This issue 
is not specific to electricity and, while it is overlooked, applies to agricultural and other 
exports as well.) Dasgupta (2010) refers to these as “implicit subsidies” on exports. 
Without taking these implicit subsidies into consideration, even renewable energy could 
deplete a country’s natural capital (see also Chapter 4). These integrated challenges 
would tie the commercial streets of Berlin to the challenges of integrated development in 
small Moroccan villages. Future water management in Morocco would then affect future 
electricity policy in the Mediterranean in highly complex and unpredictable ways. These 
trade-offs ought to be decided through a good procedure.  
 As described in Chapter 6, Desertec Design I included a vision for integrated 
solutions, which combined water desalination with electricity generation. Design II lost 
the focus on integrated solutions, especially in relationship to the energy-water nexus, the 
problems of which are illustrated with Noor. As the vision moved toward construction, 
the energy-water nexus indeed reemerged. The Desertec Foundation posted a picture on 
Facebook of Noor I under construction. It used the technique described in Chapter 6 of 
framing the future as proximal stating, “the future has begun…help to spread the word: 
Energy Transition is possible!” Several people responded in the comments, saying that 
the word that should be spread is that water stress is possible in the MENA region. The 
future is not here for Morocco if it means people at the local level will not have access to 
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water, which is an issue that was neglected in Desertec Design II.
186
 Below I will 
compare the Noor project to locally-driven integrated development solutions at the nexus 
of water and energy. 
 
 
Figure 61. Noor I under Construction on the Desertec Foundation's Facebook Page. 
Screenshot by Author. 
 
Decentralized integrated development. An energy scenario study developed by 
the Moroccan government in 2006 asked what Morocco’s priorities should be between 
energy activities (like rural electrification) and other social activities with a redistributive 
effect (Royaume du Maroc, 2006). What is the capacity of Noor to redistribute the social 
inequities discussed at the beginning of the chapter versus the integrated development 
activities underway at the local scale?  In Chapter 6, I discussed a distinction made by a 
Moroccan research organization between Champions League technologies and local 
technologies. Noor is clearly in the Champions League, as Noor or a similar project could 
provide the capability for exporting green electrons to Europe, and Noor seeks to improve 
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Morocco’s national energy security and to ensure multiple, ancillary benefits under the 
social pact discussed in Chapter 6. However, CSP is not necessarily redistributing social 
goods and is resulting in uneven development as benefits fail to go to those communities 
most affected and most in need.  
As I will discuss in Chapter 8, the goal of electricity development from an energy 
justice and socially redistributive perspective is that it will improve people’s capabilities 
to live out rich and fulfilling lives to address the inequities described in this chapter. The 
energy justice framework in Chapter 8 emphasizes the capabilities electricity access 
provides citizens, rather than just accounting for electrification rates. Below, I compare 
Noor to integrated development challenges led by local NGOs in terms of their ability to 
improve energy capabilities. This comparison will also aid in evaluating multi-scalar 
justice issues using the energy justice framework in Chapter 8. 
The integrated development initiatives stemming from the local level seek to 
address the lack of local capacity of citizens and inequities. A local NGO called the 
Association Tichka provides local community development services for the Ouarzazate 
Province through a model that conceives of the citizen as sovereign. Tichka is run by 
Moroccans for Moroccans, which has been shown in the development literature to be 
more successful than when foreigners lead these projects.  
Tichka engages the citizens of the village and seeks to avoid paternalism. The 
villagers come to Tichka with a proposal for a technology. Often local people ask for a 
small hospital but the core problem that is making people sick is dirty water. The 
Association then asks them to look critically at the root of the problem the technology is 
trying to solve, which Tichka finds typically relates to water and sanitation services. This 
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is done through a process to engage the population early rather than to wait until the 
project execution stage. The villagers ultimately decide whether they want the water 
filtration system or the hospital. Then they prepare a contract with signatures from 
everyone in the village for local buy-in, to define everyone’s roles in the contract to avoid 
top-down administration and future problems. They give the document to each household 
to read and decide what their contribution will be, as the population provides the 
workforce for the project. This model is bottom-up, not focused on the charity framing 
but on a public engagement framing, and it seeks to improve quality of life on an 
incremental, practical level. 
To observe Tichka’s version of integrated development, I visited the village of 
Zaouite Sidi Ahmed in late 2013. The local population had struggled with previous 
development projects, and many young people were leaving the village for urban areas. 
There was latent capacity in the village—ideas, people willing to volunteer, a 
cooperative, and an association—but insufficient resources. They planted trees, but they 
experienced mechanical problems with their butane pump used for pumping 
groundwater, and the trees died from a lack of water. Funding from Tichka allowed the 
villagers to install 85 solar panels for solar water pumping. They grew new olive trees. 
As an integrated development project, they also purchased an olive press so that they 
could press the olive oil themselves to sell higher quality oil. They even rent out the press 
to nearby villages; otherwise villagers must take the olives to Marrakech to be pressed. 
They purchased livestock for a continual source of income; the chickens can be sold 
quickly, and the dairy from the cows is used to make cheese. Additionally, they began 
growing a type of algae—spirulina—that is a popular health food in France and is 
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exported. This local-scale integrated development is advantageous in terms of bottom-up 
participation, improving capabilities in the near-term to improve resilience and 
community buy-in. 
Considering these benefits, it would be easy to assume that local-scale initiatives 
are fundamentally more just. Brown & Purcell (2005) call the privileging of the local 
scale “the local trap” because there is nothing “intrinsically more desirable [about the 
local scale] than other scales” in terms of their outcomes for sustainability, justice, and 
democracy. The local trap often encompasses a false assumption that localized decision-
making will always be more democratic (Purcell, 2006). Similarly, localism has long 
been viewed as central to the democratization of technology. For example, in his iconic 
work on technology and democracy, Sclove (1995) recommended developing 
technologies that promote local self-reliance. Furthermore, the local-trap is prevalent in 
the envisioned transition toward distributed energy systems. While the local trap implies 
that local autonomy and decision-making are more just, local people themselves frame 
Ouarzazate as disadvantaged because of its isolation, lacking interconnections to the rest 
of the country and Mediterranean region. A focus on local independence and self-
sufficiency overlooks the benefits to reducing isolation and building interdependencies, 
as this dissertation has illustrated in other chapters. Each region has comparative 
advantages and complementary attributes that could provide benefits through integration 
provided, as this dissertation has illustrated, that just political integration processes are 
developed. 
Another issue with local-scale development is that it is not of sufficient scale to 
address the goals of transitioning Morocco as a nation-state into a future knowledge 
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economy. Local and nation-scale development relate to different timescales and must 
occur simultaneously to fulfill Morocco’s social pact for electricity. Tichka’s 
development effects are immediate whereas Noor is geared toward a long-term vision for 
the country. It is more difficult to gauge the trade-offs for a larger project over a longer 
timescale, especially since the lack of capacity of the community impeded participation 
and the achievement of benefits from Noor.  
An additional issue is that the focus on the local-scale often overlooks the 
governance of existing centralized systems. To construct democratic technologies, Sclove 
(1995) recommended building new, small-scale, decentralized technologies without 
focusing on how existing infrastructure would have to be refurbished and transformed. 
Over the course of my fieldwork, even these small-scale technologies came to be viewed 
as an important part of the centralized system. As Morocco’s grid is strained, ONEE has 
begun to view rooftop PV systems in villages as a load balancing measure. Furthermore, 
there are advantages to being connected to centralized, large-scale power sources—for 
example, such sources can power factories that create jobs, while a solar PV panel is 
better suited for providing light and small-scale household uses, which are equally 
important to improving human capabilities. In Chapter 4, I quoted a Desertec stakeholder 
who explained that access to infrastructure in North Africa is better than access in sub-
Saharan Africa because without infrastructural and social connectivity in the desert 
humans cannot survive. The Desertec vision’s proponents view areas not connected to 
premium-networked spaces as isolated islands that do not benefit from the reliability and 
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large-scale power sources of a centralized grid.
187
 (Chapter 8 further discusses the justice 
aspects of centralized versus distributed energy systems.) 
To achieve even development, a balance between local and national governance 
and development is likely needed. Local capacity-building initiatives should be combined 
with larger-scale projects for Morocco’s political and social development. Noor I did not 
align with the capabilities of the workforce in neighboring villages, such as Tasslemante. 
National projects should align with the needs and capabilities of local people to address 
the inequities outlined above. Simultaneously, decentralized development is needed to 
improve the capabilities of the community, such as electrifying all homes and ensuring a 
clean supply of water in order to reduce the marginalization of local communities (this 
discussion is continued under the capabilities justice section in Chapter 8.) 
Conclusion: The Prospects for Political Development & Technological Governance 
in Morocco 
 
The Noor case fused new attempts at local governance with big projects 
traditionally run by the government. This process suffered from issues of legitimate local 
representation and uneven development, as a small village that lacks clean drinking water 
will now live in the shadow of a major energy facility. Rescaling governance in Morocco 
faces the paradox of greater legitimacy given to the king than local representatives, even 
as attempts are made to increase participation at the local level. Considering this paradox 
in the legitimating principles of power, what are the prospects for political development, 
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or more specifically an evolution in technological governance, in Morocco? The 
transition toward greater local governance as part of Morocco’s political development 
would be rocky, but there are hopeful possibilities for a transition toward more local 
empowerment and political participation.  
Some Moroccans I met prioritized the status quo in governance because of its 
stability, hoping to avoid the turmoil that has resulted from the Arab Spring in other 
countries. Yet, given the pressures of the Arab Spring, it seems unlikely that the status 
quo will be completely maintained. Activist youth are demanding radical change (i.e., 
doing away with the monarchy for fully elected representation) including the 2011 
February 20
th
 movement during the Arab Spring. For example, young artists and 
songwriters have been at the forefront of demanding change. A 17-year old Moroccan 
rapper, aka “Mr. Crazy,” was jailed for three months in 2014 for offending the state with 
lyrics about the lives of unemployed young people living in Casablanca. Rapper El 
Haqed (“the Enraged One”) has been imprisoned multiple times. While the most radical 
protests of 2011 have subsided, young people are continuing to stand up to the 
government to demand political change. 
The most likely prospect for future governance would be gradual changes in 
representation and who gets to participate in technological governance as Morocco 
combines new participatory processes and visions for what the country will become. For 
instance, the government is accepting citizen comments on regionalization in the Sahara 
on a website called Al Moubadara Lakoum (the people’s initiative), which is an example 
of public witnessing. New voices in governance range from the MENA Policy Hub 
discussed in Chapter 6 to new community associations composed of young people who 
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want to improve the quality of life in their communities. Allowing for experts outside of 
the government to participate in the policy discourse could provide for a more neutral 
connection between the local community and the government. This input would be less 
threatening to state than activism. Increasing the capacity of experts is one possible 
component of good governance, although not a perfect solution, especially if the experts 
do not represent local people’s interests.  
Both equity of process and outcomes should be considered in this potential 
political development transition. I have discussed multiple inequities in Ouarzazate in 
terms of the socioeconomic status and geography of the region. For public participation 
to be successful, capacity is needed to address these inequities and foster popular 
sovereignty, not just royal sovereignty. This is a chicken or egg problem. On the one 
hand, measures could be taken to improve the capacity of the community to participate 
while participatory processes are delayed. On the other hand, participatory processes 
could be implemented today to include new voices to empower them to participate. The 
comparison could be drawn to whether transmission lines should be built before or after 
power plants with export capacity. A working group convened in Morocco by the NGO 
Germanwatch in February 2015 in Rabat, Morocco found that representatives of 
government, industry, and academia wanted to see more opportunities for civil society 
participation in renewable energy development and more mobilization of NGOs to 
participate on these issues. They also found that additional measures beyond CSP are 
needed to reduce the economic marginalization of southern Morocco (Schinke, 2015). 
In the meantime, local NGOs like Tichka are taking on these capacity building 
efforts. In 2014, several young Moroccan researchers who participated in the 
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Germanwatch research project started a new NGO called the Human Touch. After 
interviewing numerous people in their community, these young women noted that 
“people are suffering too much in this region” and created an NGO to try to alleviate this 
suffering. They are part of the large unemployed but educated youth demographic that is 
taking on their responsibility as citizens to contribute to society. They offer hope that 
there is, in fact, a bright future for Morocco.  
If Mediterranean regional electricity systems were integrated to the extent 
envisioned in Desertec Design II, these political development challenges would be 
connected to regional electricity governance. Additionally, the inequities in the 
Ouarzazate region would be linked to premium-networked spaces in Europe if electricity 
were exported, although there are benefits to be gained from these exports if a just 
processes free from coercion guides the development of the exports.
188
 Through export 
these inequities could be improved, remain the same, or worsen; regardless they would be 
connected across space and nation-states. While it is often assumed that the benefits of 
large-scale development will trickle down to local citizens and communities, this chapter 
showed that the development of energy infrastructure in a particular locale does not 
automatically link it to the infrastructural and development benefits of premium-
networked spaces. These areas will not de facto win but could be harmed or bypassed in 
technological development; long-term efforts must be made to address local-scale 
inequities in order for local citizens to benefit, as Morocco is working to do through the 
integrated development model. Chapter 8 will aid in thinking through issues of just 
processes and outcomes more systematically in complex, multi-scalar energy systems.  
                                                        
188 This is further discussed in Chapter 8 under the sovereignty and freedom from coercion section. 
  452 
CHAPTER 8 
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ENERGY JUSTICE 
Introduction 
 
Complex energy systems impose myriad injustices from how energy is supplied 
to how it is consumed and finally how energy technologies are disposed. Furthermore, 
transformations in these energy systems, such as those addressed in this dissertation, have 
the potential to reconfigure and maximize just outcomes for vulnerable populations. 
Currently, even though energy access could improve the livelihoods of the vulnerable, the 
development of energy services for the world’s poor has been systematically neglected. 
On the demand side, a staggering 1.3 billion people worldwide lack any access to 
electricity (Practical Action, 2012), and up to 3 billion people lack “sufficient” access to 
electricity (Guruswamy, 2011). Without substantial policy changes, the rate of sub-
Saharan Africans with access to electricity is set to improve by a mere 10% by 2030, 
while the absolute number of those without power will increase (Practical Action, 2012). 
Supplying energy also imposes injustices. Worldwide, impoverished communities live 
near polluting, unsightly, and dangerous energy facilities, often shouldering the burdens 
of production while communities elsewhere benefit from using the energy. For example, 
communities in the oil-rich Niger Delta bear immense burdens, including the 
industrialization of their lands, water pollution, and a lack of personal safety (Amnesty 
International, n.d.). Even the low-carbon CSP plant in Morocco evaluated in Chapter 7 
resulted in drawbacks for local communities. This energy justice challenge crosses scales 
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in a globalized world, as, for example, benefits from burning Nigerian fossil fuels are 
largely reaped overseas, and monetary compensation typically goes to the national 
government rather than the local people (ibid).  
The challenge of energy justice is substantial, complex, and multi-scalar. Changes 
and innovation both in the system configuration and the technologies are needed that go 
beyond prioritizing the typical standards of low cost for current generations and 
reliability. In order to maximize societal benefit for energy systems undergoing 
transformation, energy system innovation and investment need ethical guidance 
throughout the visioning, designing, planning, construction, operation, and 
decommissioning stages based upon the principles of justice. The urgency is increased by 
the fact that decisions made in the energy sector today will have significant effects on 
justice outcomes for decades to come. Power plants last for 30 to 40 years and are 
integrated into entrenched and obdurate system configurations that distribute the benefits 
and drawbacks of supply and demand. As this dissertation illustrated, energy systems are 
not being built from scratch but are being integrated into these existing systems in an 
attempt to refurbish them. This process will have enduring effects on justice outcomes 
and trade-offs for both current and future generations. Therefore an operationalizable 
framework on energy justice is needed today to guide this systems change. 
Current colloquial and scholarly approaches to energy justice, while important 
and useful, are also scattershot and often narrowly framed with a focus only on the 
demand side, largely relating to whether people lack access to electricity. A more 
comprehensive conceptualization of energy justice is needed to weave together various 
definitions of energy justice and empirical material from this study with a plurality of 
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theories of justice. Framing energy justice only as equality of access is problematic 
because reaching a kW/person target will not ensure just outcomes. Energy justice is a 
multi-dimensional and ambiguous concept that—like sustainability—suffers from 
definitional issues. Just as it is easier to diagnose unsustainable practices than it is to 
depict a sustainable society, it is easier to identify energy injustices than to envision just 
energy systems without resorting to utopianism and unrealistic win-win discourses. A 
more comprehensive understanding of the term should be developed.  
Contemporary justice theory could aid both scholars and practitioners in 
developing a new conceptualization and framework for energy justice to aid in designing 
and evaluating energy system transformations. Nussbaum (2007) argued that theories of 
justice should be sufficiently abstract to apply to a range of social problems but be 
specific enough to offer useful guidance on real-world problems like energy. Hence, this 
paper interweaves various theories of justice to develop principles and guidance specific 
enough to aid in building just energy systems but abstract enough to allow for 
generalizable thought across energy case studies. Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach, for example, illustrates that energy’s worth must be measured not simply using 
electrification rates and usage per capita, as was often done in Morocco, but in the ways 
that electricity improves quality of life and helps people secure their rights. Furthermore, 
since sociotechnical systems play an important role in distributing just and unjust 
outcomes, the sociotechnical systems approach can also contribute to justice theory. 
Specifically, the findings from the Desertec sociotechnical systems case study illustrate 
how the theoretical categories of justice relate to complexity and to how energy systems 
affect people differently at local, regional, national, and international scales, as will be 
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explicated below. It is necessary to draw together the key issues from the case study with 
relevant theories of justice, to address how these theories are applicable but incomplete, 
in order to develop a comprehensive conception of energy justice that can be put into 
practice. 
This chapter begins by overviewing the complexity of the energy justice 
challenge based upon findings from this dissertation. Then it surveys existing 
conceptualizations of energy justice from the scholarly and grey literature, followed by a 
review of the justice literature. Based on this literature, it presents a preliminary energy 
justice framework to improve upon the conceptualization of energy justice and to 
diagnose energy injustice. Finally, it applies the framework to the empirical material from 
this dissertation, finding that it is useful for diagnosing injustice but needs to be revised to 
address foundational inequities, trade-offs, energy security, and multi-scalar systems-
level inequities and injustices. Overall, this chapter ties together the dissertation’s main 
arguments through the lens of justice, fulfilling the dissertation’s normative goals 
outlined in Chapter 1. Current policy discourses on sustainability often close down and 
narrow discussion and debate (Leach, Scoones, & Stirling, 2010), especially in the energy 
sector in which decisions and imaginations are often constrained based on existing, path 
dependent systems. The pluralistic and comprehensive framework on energy justice 
presented below could help to open up new “pathways to sustainability” (ibid) for energy 
systems that both power and empower communities for a more just energy future. 
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The Complex Challenge of Energy Justice 
This dissertation has illustrated how an energy technology’s politics are 
dependent upon the system context in which they are embedded. Furthermore, a 
technology’s success is dependent upon sociopolitical complexity, as well as the system 
complexity into which emerging technologies attempt to take root. Therefore, the 
challenge of energy justice is not simply a matter of designing socially robust 
technologies but is an even greater challenge of rebuilding complex sociotechnical 
systems spanning local to global scales. There are no simplistic, win-win solutions to 
providing electricity and fuels in sustainable and equitable ways across these complex 
sociotechnical systems. Below are some examples of the complexity of energy justice 
identified from this study that ought to be considered when drawing boundaries around 
the energy system to be evaluated and when evaluating energy justice procedure and 
outcomes.  
System transition complexity. It is important for energy policy in the 21
st
 
century to consider emerging technologies within the context of the complexity of the 
existing sociotechnical systems landscape and how this landscape is managed and 
governed. As this study has illustrated, electrical power systems are not scale-free and are 
generally centrally managed. Mediterranean electricity system imaginers framed a 
modern energy system not based upon radically innovative technologies but on a 
somewhat different system configuration and its management. Even subtle changes in 
this management can be complex. Electrical power grids can only accept a relatively 
small portion of the total generating capacity from intermittent energy sources before 
experiencing significant challenges with grid management; this is the impetus for 
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integration across nation-state lines. For example, grid managers in Spain prioritized 
electricity from coal in the system because it is very difficult to temporarily shut down a 
coal-fired plant but easy to stop wind turbines. As described in Chapter 5, a 
Mediterranean TSO would be needed to manage a regional power system. Whether the 
Desertec vision is pursued or not, Europe will have to make major system-level 
electricity transformations.  
Sociopolitical complexity. The Desertec case study illustrates the sociopolitical 
complexity of energy transformations. Energy transformations are not simply technical 
but are sociotechnical and political. As this dissertation has argued, the development of 
electricity regulatory institutions has long been a political development challenge specific 
to individual nation-states. Each of the 44 countries within the Desertec vision have an 
individual social contract or pact for electricity system development, which would have 
to be ceded in favor of multilateral, regional political planning. This sociopolitical 
complexity was also illustrated by how Morocco’s domestic energy system was torn in 
various directions by numerous, complex sociopolitical influences and dynamics. In 
another example of sociopolitical complexity, Spain failed to sign the Desertec trans-
continental transmission agreement for a variety of sociopolitical reasons including 
geopolitics, security of supply, and the economic crisis, whereas Moroccan officials saw 
European politics as interfering with the Desertec vision’s progress. The idea of a copper 
plate for energy generation in the Mediterranean region trivializes the significant 
sociopolitical complexity of the region. Overall, this sociopolitical complexity illustrates 
that the Desertec system—and other visions for energy transformations— would not be 
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built from scratch but within a complex context that shapes the social justice outcomes of 
the system.  
Temporal complexity. This dissertation illustrated the temporal complexity 
entailed in energy system transformations. Temporal complexity is particularly salient for 
transformations to renewable energy systems due to intermittency; supply and demand 
must be balanced at every second, otherwise blackouts and wasted electricity result. 
Unlike with oil markets, temporal complexity is related to energy security in renewable 
energy systems because generation withheld for political reasons would be wasted and 
could not be stored and sold later on.
189
 
Providing for both supply and demand requires planning across timescales that 
are staggering. Investment cycles in the power sector last up to 50 years, which is the 
time it takes to plan, build, operate, and decommission a single power plant. Temporal 
complexity relates to the sociology of expectations, as different stakeholders involved in 
the vision for an integrated renewable energy system in the Mediterranean had vastly 
different expectations for how quickly the first projects could be built and the exports 
could be achieved. These disparate timescales relate to rapidly changing technological 
and social contexts, making electricity system planning particularly challenging and 
complex. Even minor changes in the existing energy landscape affect plans for future 
energy systems.
190
 Long timescales associated with energy planning, as well as wildcards 
that disrupt plans, lead to uncertainty in decision-making and challenges with predicting 
factors ranging from cost to cultural effects. Morocco, for example, worked to mitigate 
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this uncertainty by using statistics (les données) to inform policymaking, which could be 
reductionist and mask important social issues.  
Urgency also plays a role in energy policymaking, and actors use temporal tactics 
to frame and control the future in an attempt to speed up their desired outcomes. Today’s 
system imaginers are acting not as inventors but as project accelerators working to situate 
technologies viewed as already ready in an inevitable future. This attempt to speed up 
technological development could be problematic for procedural justice as stakeholder 
engagement procedures could be neglected. Adam (2003) pointed out that there are no 
organizations that manage the governance of time. This lack of temporal governance is 
magnified because the inequalities established in the design phase could be perpetuated 
for decades, as Winner (1980) illustrated. Therefore, temporal complexity is closely 
related to intergenerational justice, because decisions made today will affect future 
generations. 
Another aspect of temporal complexity that illustrates its enduring consequences 
relates to lifecycle analysis. The lifecycle approach of analyzing energy technologies is 
essential to understanding the effects of energy technologies from cradle to gate, 
including their anticipated consequences for society (Wender et al., 2014). For example, a 
higher efficiency solar PV panel could be less energy efficient over the lifecycle because 
it requires much more energy to manufacture than a traditional PV panel. Household 
electricity consumption is not the end of the lifecycle, as energy generation technologies 
must later be decommissioned and disposed of or recycled. Even solar photovoltaic 
panels pose environmental risks if improperly disposed instead of recycled (Silicon 
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Valley Toxics Association, 2009). Therefore, lasting consequences can be observed 
relating to ecological justice even for renewable energy systems. The first design of the 
Desertec vision, described in Chapter 5, included lifecycle analysis to ensure that 
sufficient materials were available in a finite world to construct the envisioned system by 
2050. This was lost in Design II. 
Geographic complexity. A power plant would be better sited on a brownfield 
than on pristine land, but the brownfield site could require the construction of a new 
transmission line, thereby disrupting the landscape and having negative environmental 
effects. As such siting conflicts grow in the Western world, the burdens of electricity 
generation could be pushed onto the developing world. In a transnational electricity 
system, energy usage in one country shapes the landscapes of another. As this study 
illustrated, the design for an integrated Mediterranean electricity system was shaped by 
various geographic representations and framings of the region; these representations also 
affect its possible energy justice outcomes.
191
 A constructivist perspective on geography 
is important to understanding the interplay between the landscape and the technological 
system. This interplay has outcomes related to the category of recognition justice 
described later in the paper, as populations that are written out of the landscape do not 
receive benefits from the system. 
Socioeconomic complexity. The socioeconomic and economic complexity of 
electricity system transformations is more commonly acknowledged. This study 
illustrated how Morocco expected more than electrons from its new energy system; it 
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also expected multiple, ancillary socioeconomic benefits. In other cases, energy 
transformations can disadvantage vulnerable populations who benefited from the old 
system. For example, efforts to shut down the heavily polluting Navajo Generating 
Station in Arizona faced stiff resistance from workers whose livelihoods depend on the 
power plant. Similarly, communities on the Gulf Coast resisted a moratorium on 
deepwater drilling following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill that was intended to give 
regulators time to understand what happened and to mitigate future risks.  
The economics of electricity transformations are also complex. New technologies 
in the power sector, such as solar PV and electrical storage, must compete with older 
technologies that are integrated into obdurate systems and supported by a subtle web of 
subsidies. Subsidies for renewable energy became unpopular in Europe during the 
financial crisis. In Morocco, subsidies are important for the affordability of energy but 
challenge the financial health of the state. Additionally, because of the timescale involved 
in Mediterranean regional power systems development, it was difficult to determine how 
much added cost would result from a 100% renewable energy future in the Mediterranean 
since much of the existing infrastructure would need to be replaced by 2050 anyway. In 
other cases, economic factors trivialized the complexity of energy transitions; for 
example, Dii focused on low cost above other factors, but other problems like the energy-
water nexus could become intractable over time.  
Environmental complexity. Transitions toward renewable energy in Europe 
primarily seek to address climate change through significant mitigation measures. 
However, there are no simple fixes to environmental challenges across the lifecycle due 
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to complexity and long timescales. All energy systems result in environmental harms of 
some kind. For example, green energy technologies that emit little to no carbon during 
energy generation do not necessarily fulfill the social and environmental pillars of 
sustainability and may harm the environment in other ways, such as avian deaths from 
wind turbines and solar power plants. 
Supply and Demand 
Supply. Even though energy justice typically focuses on demand-side issues of 
access, the complex, system-level challenge of energy justice ranges across the lifecycle 
from how energy is supplied through to its end uses. Most prominently, issues of energy 
supply relate to land use, siting, and energy geography. The field of environmental justice 
has illustrated how power plants, refining facilities, and transmission lines are often sited 
in the backyards of marginalized populations who are often not recognized and given a 
voice in the process. In energy development projects across the globe, communities are 
often neither sufficiently involved in the siting process nor fairly compensated. For 
example, the community in the Democratic Republic of Congo whose land was flooded 
for the Inga Dam project was not recognized as having legitimate claims to the land. 
They became energy refugees living in tent settlements with transmission lines running 
overhead to transmit power to a copper mine (Lustgarten, 2009).  
Justice issues in energy supply are not limited to siting. They are also multi-
scalar, as complex energy supply chains interweave justice issues in disparate locations. 
For example, PV panels on rooftops in Arizona may be tied to rare earth metal mining in 
China where workers have insufficient protection from hazards. Inequities in the village 
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of Tasslemante could be tied to the streets of Berlin through the envisioned Desertec 
system. The supply of electricity also poses integrated challenges. As the Tasslemante 
case study discussed in Chapter 7, electricity is tied to sticky integrated challenges 
relating to water and other environmental resources, as well as to socioeconomic 
outcomes. 
The drawbacks of energy supply are often neglected in the Western world until 
disaster strikes, resulting in an “attention-neglect cycle” (Bryne, Toly, & Young-Doo 
Wang, 2006). Forms of supplying primary energy are becoming riskier as fossil fuel 
supplies dwindle, from hydraulic fracturing (i.e., fracking) to deepwater drilling. From 
1992 to 2006, deepwater oil production rose 820% in the United States (Minerals 
Management Service, 2008)
 
and by 2008 15 rigs in the Gulf of Mexico were operating in 
ultradeep water, meaning below 5,000 feet (ibid). Yet regulations are lacking to cope 
with the systemic risks and lack of scientific understanding of high pressure and high 
temperature environments. In another example, nuclear power poses the risk of “normal” 
and catastrophic accidents (Perrow, 1999), and the recent accident at the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear plant following the tsunami in Japan led Germany and other countries to 
phase out their nuclear power plants. Additionally, power plants also pose health risks; in 
the United States power plant emissions are indirectly tied to roughly 13,000 deaths each 
year (Schneider, C. & J. Banks. 2010) in addition to their effects on climate. This 
underscores the need to consider energy risks and the principles of justice early in the 
design of energy supply chains rather than only in times of crisis, especially so that 
vulnerable populations do not shoulder the risks disproportionately.  
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On an international level, energy supply is also linked to complex geopolitics and 
international relations, because oil and natural resources are global-scale markets and 
resources are unevenly distributed. Oil rich rentier states lack accountability to their 
populations as they rely upon rents, or revenue, from the state oil sector rather than taxes 
(Ross, 2001). Rentier states struggle with economic diversification and authoritarian 
governments, and relations are often tense with Western countries that purchase their 
fuels. The more recent trend toward the internationalization of electricity poses some risk 
that countries could become dependent upon electricity exports, just as rentier states are 
dependent upon oil exports. It also raises questions about who benefits and loses when 
electricity is transmitted over long distances and potentially across power disparities. 
Poorer countries integrated into regional systems may shoulder a greater risk in 
disruptions of the supply of electricity, as they will be more likely to suffer from 
blackouts than wealthier countries should a failure occur. However, regional integration 
also offers benefits such as economic opportunities from electricity and technology 
exports, the exchange of know-how, and North-South research collaborations. 
Demand (Energy Poverty and Wealth). On the energy demand side, existing 
energy justice conceptions focus on those populations that completely lack access to 
electricity worldwide, which are not connected to premium-networked spaces. Some 
other populations have access, but it is insufficient to meet their needs. Many of these 
energy-impoverished populations also shoulder a disproportionate share of energy’s 
supply burdens. Furthermore, energy poverty exists—and could grow—even in countries 
with full electrification rates. In MENA, losing access to reliable 24/7 electricity where 
populations have become dependent on it is problematic for equity and quality of life. 
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Access to electricity itself is an insufficient criterion for energy justice and must 
at least be considered along with access to the devices that use it. Households must be 
“electrically modernized,” or wired for electrical lighting, outlets, and appliances to make 
full use of the electricity (Tobey, 1996). The key question, which often goes unaddressed, 
is whether the benefits provided by the electricity improve quality of life. Some 
development NGOs in Morocco complained that electricity merely powers TVs for 
entertainment and worsens social relations,
192
 although these TVs could also bring access 
to information through independent media sources where only state-run press was 
available before. Energy system builders should take such factors into consideration 
when designing energy systems. 
In contrast, premium-networked spaces benefit from profound energy wealth even 
in unseen ways. For instance, energy is embedded in all of the products that Westerners 
use from manufacturing to shipping. Energy-consuming servers, which are placed out-of-
sight, power Internet searches (Google, 2009). People in premium-networked spaces plug 
in computers in public places without giving a moment’s thought to who pays for the 
electricity. Because Western countries have become so dependent upon this instantly 
available energy wealth, the principle that dominates these planning processes is typically 
reliability. For example, U.S. utility companies will often say that they sell the service of 
reliability rather than electrons. While maintaining reliable supplies of electricity and 
energy to meet demand is crucial, this goal often overtakes other priorities. Efforts across 
the globe seek to expand the principles upon which electricity is built. For example, the 
Africa-EU Energy Partnership aims to build power systems that are reliable but also 
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affordable, accessible, and sustainable. Efforts to expand the principles and priorities 
involved in energy planning could be informed by energy justice theory, as described 
below. 
From mining to generation to transmission to usage, energy poses challenges for 
just process and outcomes. This energy justice challenge is highly complex and crosses 
multiple scales in a system context. The energy justice challenge goes beyond designing 
individual technologies to understanding how they fit into complex sociotechnical 
systems and anticipating outcomes for society that will last over decades. Not only are 
the outcomes complex, the upfront visioning and design process is also complex due to 
the sociopolitical and other factors discussed in this dissertation. Energy also challenges 
justice theory because in order to diagnose injustices wider boundaries must be drawn to 
encompass the broader, multi-scalar system. Justice theory is only beginning to address 
these multi-scalar, transnational issues. As described in the framework below, injustices 
in sociotechnical energy systems cross different categories of justice and pose new 
considerations ranging from sovereignty to trade-offs.  
 
Existing Conceptions of Energy Justice 
This section reviews the scholarly and colloquial conceptions of energy justice, in 
order to collate the scattershot conceptions and use them as a starting point for the 
framework. As useful as these conceptions are, the theoretical concept of energy justice 
needs to be expanded from the demand side issues of energy poverty to consider supply 
side and multi-scalar justice issues. This section also illustrates that energy justice matters 
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to a diversity of groups across the globe—from religious institutions to development 
banks to Native Americans—and that an energy justice framework could be useful to 
them.  
In the United States and Canada, the term energy justice often focuses on 
technology choice and is used to advocate for the use of renewable energy over what 
many environmental NGOs see as polluting or risky energy technologies—primarily 
coal, but also natural gas sourced from fracking, nuclear energy, and even hydropower. 
The organization leading these efforts is a U.S.-based 501(c)3 grassroots nonprofit 
organization called the Energy Justice Network. Their website includes a map of the 
“dirty energy and waste” facilities in the country. It makes visible technologies, not 
actual inequities, meaning that the facilities are not correlated with data on race, income, 
gender, Superfund sites or other industrial uses, or other baseline indicators of 
environmental injustice. 
Supply-side issues of energy siting attract a variety of community groups. Few 
explicitly use the term energy justice with the exception of several Western religious 
organizations. The U.S. National Council of Churches, an ecumenical organization, has 
an eco-justice movement, which themed 2012 the year of the ethics of energy. Their work 
is grounded their 1978 “Proposed Policy Statement on the Ethical Implications of Energy 
Production and Use,” which emphasized stewardship over environmental resources rather 
than the domination of nature, based on an energy technology’s ability to build shalom, 
or “wholeness and harmonious relationship in creation and in community” (Birch, 1978). 
They also emphasize ecological justice, defined based upon the principles of 
sustainability, equity, and participation, rejecting the dichotomy between social and 
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environmental issues. This is one of the most comprehensive colloquial discussions on 
energy equity issues. The 2012 year of energy ethics included six webinars on energy 
stewardship issues for Sunday school on Earth Day. In another religious example of 
energy justice efforts, the Canada Mennonite Central Committee on Energy Justice 
evaluates the energy justice aspects of Manitoba’s hydroelectric systems. They challenge 
the image of hydropower as clean, and their protest is grounded in a belief in the spiritual 
value and sacredness of hydroelectric power systems. They recommend that spiritual 
impact assessment be included in environmental impact assessment for new generation 
facilities. 
Catholic theologians have also written on energy justice. Ivan Illich, a Roman 
Catholic priest, wrote the only existing book on energy ethics, which is discussed below. 
Jose Ambrozic, Chairman of the Board at the Universidad Catolica San Palo, argues that 
Catholic social justice theology can address the shortfalls of Rawlsian justice theory 
(Ambrozic, 2010). Ambrozic argues the solution to the energy crisis is “not technical, but 
moral” (p. 393). He objects to the Rawlsian assertion that the principles of justice should 
be decided only in the political sphere. Since Catholic theology sees humans as reflecting 
the divine image, humans’ spiritual and material dimensions, including energy needs, 
should be addressed as well. Christian freedom, he argues, is having the capacity to fulfill 
duties to love and work for justice. Energy is a basic need that Christians must aid in 
providing through international development as a vocation. A full exploration of the 
relationship between religion and energy justice is beyond the scope of this paper but is 
an area ripe for future exploration.  
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Relevant to both the supply and demand sides, one strand of social justice theory 
applicable to energy justice is that of recognition justice, developed by Nancy Fraser, 
who argued that minority groups that have been traditionally disadvantaged must be 
recognized. (Recognition justice is discussed more comprehensively below.) Thus far the 
theory has been applied to identity-based groups, but it would be more applicable to 
energy if it addressed affected groups. Examples of energy-abused minority groups that 
should be recognized include the energy impoverished, Native Americans and other 
indigenous groups, and local people in the Sahara who were not recognized based on the 
colonial imaginaries of the Sahara as an empty landscape. Additionally, the Women’s 
Energy Justice Network coined the phrase “the energy oppressed poor” to describe those 
without sufficient access to electricity and clean cooking fuels. They are the most 
prominent of the disadvantaged minority groups who should be recognized in the energy 
justice domain. In the United States, Native American groups use the term energy justice 
to protest the exploitation of energy on tribal lands and to promote the use of renewable 
energy. Honor the Earth, an organization formed by Native American activist and scholar 
Winona LaDuke and the Indigo Girls band, includes an initiative on energy justice to 
increase the use of renewable energy and promote tribal energy sovereignty. The 
Indigenous Environmental Network has a similar initiative. Energy refugees, or the 
energy displaced, are, often forcibly, removed from their land, and are another category 
of people who could be recognized but have not been categorized thus far. 
Scholars and development practitioners typically equate energy justice with 
ending energy poverty, or a lack of access to electricity and clean cooking fuels 
(Guruswamy, 2010). Some development experts see energy as a “precondition” or 
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“prerequisite” to satisfying many other needs, such as pumping clean water, powering 
hospitals, and refrigerating vaccines, as well as meeting the Millennium Development 
Goals. They believe an energy poverty line should be developed as a proxy for measuring 
well-being (Giannini Pereira, Vasconcelos Freitas, & da Silva, 2011). Other 
organizations, like the Solar Electric Light Fund, go a step further, calling energy a 
human right. The Poor People’s Energy Outlook states that “total energy access” is “the 
point of use in terms of the energy services people need, want, and have a right to—
lighting, cooking and water heating, space heating, cooling, and information and 
communications technologies” (emphasis added) (Practical Action, 2012, p. xi).  
Energy poverty is often viewed as a problem affecting only developing countries 
where many citizens have no electricity access, but recent studies illustrate that 
gradations of energy poverty exist across the globe. Although it is often overlooked, this 
illustrates that energy poverty is not just a matter of having energy or not but of whether 
one has a sufficient amount of energy. Buzar (2007) refers to energy poverty in the 
industrialized world as “the hidden geography of energy.” Even though Eastern and 
Central Europe are fully electrified, many households lack affordable heat, but such 
problems have been largely overlooked (ibid). In fact, many fully electrified countries 
have glaring inequalities in energy access. While 38% of Norwegians use half of the 
electricity generated in Norway, only 25% of Americans use half of the total U.S. energy 
generation (Jacobson, Milman, & Kammen, 2005). The U.S. Center for Energy and 
Environmental Policy defines energy justice not merely on the basis of access to 
electricity but also on “the achievement of a proportionate distribution of energy burdens 
among low- and moderate-income groups, disadvantaged populations, and minorities 
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when compared to the energy burden falling on the rest of society” (Center for Energy 
and Environmental Policy University of Delaware, 2012).  
While these conceptions of energy justice focus on increasing energy 
consumption, other scholars think energy justice has more to do with ending energy 
gluttony and redistributing these finite resources elsewhere. Illich wrote in the 1970s that 
viewing high energy consumption as a moral imperative enslaves the poor to a maximum 
economic growth model, social control, and other problems like pollution. He stated: 
 
This allows our lifestyle to become energy intensive, the right to work and need 
for gas connected, jobs and watts could be recognized as basic rights because they 
could be interpreted as basic needs, the modern state an employment agency with 
a gun to protect the fuel pump, politicians could win by the mere promise of more 
watts and jobs. The need for energy became morally obvious (Illich, 1983, 
published in Ghosn, 2009).  
 
He argued that there is an amount of electricity per capita beyond which energy is 
provisioned at such great scale that it is beyond the control of just governance processes 
(Illich, 1974). He advocated for an energy ceiling—a line above which energy ceases to 
be correlated with improved quality of life. More recently, Grimsby (2011) revisited 
Illich’s argument, claiming that a focus on energy poverty rather than energy equity 
ignores the gap in energy consumption per capita between developing and developed 
words. He thinks that increasing the consumption of the poor without decreasing the 
consumption of the wealthy would put too much strain on the world’s resources, 
  472 
reflecting the Limits to Growth approach from Desertec Design I. He argued that an 
energy ceiling might be more pro-poor than an energy floor. (This is a fairly common 
discussion among environmental NGOs concerned about climate change and finite 
resources.) 
One take-away point is that energy access, and its worth to people, should not be 
measured in electrification rates alone. Goldemberg, Johansson, Reddy, & Williams 
(1988) advocate for treating sustainable energy as a means of achieving human 
development goals, rather than as a good in-and-of-itself. The current energy 
development growth paradigm measures development based on energy supply and 
electrification rates. Instead, energy’s worth should be valued according to the services it 
provides, such as lighting a house or powering a factory. Later I will explore how this 
more nuanced take on the “energy as a precursor” discourse relates well to capabilities 
justice theory.  
A very different conception of energy justice focuses on how centralized energy 
systems impose particular political configurations on society. Here, energy justice is 
conceived as stemming from radically reconfiguring centralized energy systems into 
distributed systems in which citizens produce their own energy through small-scale 
technologies in their backyards (one of the system reconfiguration scenarios discussed in 
Chapter 1). While distributed systems are not explicitly correlated with energy justice, 
they underpin a popular vision of a just energy system. E.F. Schumacher developed this 
view in the 1970s, calling for appropriate, small-scale technologies, such as solar 
photovoltaics. This philosophy emphasizes that a democratic and open society can only 
be built on decentralized infrastructures and that centralized technologies like nuclear 
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power subject society to an insular, military form of management (Sclove, 1995; Winner, 
1977).  
This dissertation shows that evaluating energy systems from a system-level 
perspective is essential, but the distributed energy critique often offers an idyllic vision of 
a just energy society, which may have limited utility in redressing energy injustices. Sen 
(2009) described the perils of comparative justice based upon utopian visions stating that 
a “theory of justice that can serve as the basis of practical reasoning must include ways of 
judging how to reduce injustice and advance justice, rather than aiming only at the 
characterization of perfectly just societies” (p. ix). He thinks injustice should be 
compared on a relative basis, not on the basis of a vision for a perfectly just society. For 
example, comparing Dali to Picasso is helpful to art critics. However, it is not necessary 
to compare Dali and Picasso to the most perfect picture in the world, or a “third irrelevant 
alternative” (ibid, p. 101). In its extreme form, the distributed path’s techno-utopian view 
offers this third alternative, which could serve to mask new injustices stemming from a 
distributed system. While it makes the essential point that technological systems affect 
social arrangements and the reverse, it also overestimates the power of particular 
technologies to legislate social change and leaves energy justice for the unlikely day 
when societies’ path dependent energy infrastructures are ripped out and replaced with 
radically different systems.  
I do not mean to suggest that distributed technologies do not have advantages but 
that the distributed pathway is not a perfect solution for sociotechnical reordering that is 
free from trade-offs. The distributed energy vision often succumbs to the local trap, in 
which local-scale technologies are automatically assumed to be more just and democratic 
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(Purcell & Brown, 2005). Moreover, some criticize development banks for using solar 
PV to give the rural poor a small amount of electricity instead of linking them to 
premium-networked spaces, which could further the marginalization of the rural poor 
(Byrne & Toly, 2006). For example, PV in Morocco was framed as an appropriate 
technology for the poorest and most remote populations. Once a household gains access 
to a small solar panel—which is no doubt helpful in providing light—they are checked 
off as electrified and may not benefit from increased access any time in the near future, 
especially in a country that is struggling to meet growing electricity demand. In Chapter 
4, I addressed how the Desertec dream stopped at the imagined boundary between North 
Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, even though people need energy more desperately in sub-
Saharan Africa. Technologies such as solar lanterns are often viewed as more appropriate 
for these remote landscapes. I asked: Who should have the right to be linked to premium-
networked spaces? What technologies are appropriate in the perceptions of local people? 
In Chapter 7, I compared the merits and drawbacks of national-scale electricity 
development versus local-scale electricity development in Morocco, finding that there 
were benefits and drawbacks to each, which were dependent not only on scale but also 
more importantly on procedure.  
The answer to these questions is context dependent and requires comparative, 
system-level approaches. The issue of comparative energy justice is challenging at both 
the system and individual technology scales. Byrne & Toly (2006) argue that judging 
technologies as better (e.g., wind) rather than worse (e.g., coal) is an insufficient metric 
that lacks content. It provides little information about for whom it would be better, by 
what standard, and at what cost (including social and environmental costs not merely 
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economic costs). Furthermore, these issues are multi-scalar, linking locales such as the 
village of Tasslemante in Morocco, to the streets of Berlin, perhaps even to rural areas in 
Benin. A richer comparison based upon the framework below and a public engagement 
process for discussing and selecting trade-offs and defining what appropriate 
technologies are would be needed, as outlined in the next section. 
 
What Justice Theory Offers Energy 
 
Below I overview the six categories of justice identified in the literature, which I then 
combine into the initial justice framework. 
Distributive justice. Most of the existing conceptualizations of energy justice 
focus on distributive justice issues, primarily disparities in energy access. John Rawls 
developed distributive justice theory, which focuses on how benefits and harms are 
distributed within society. Rawls imagined a primordial period, or the original position, 
in which individuals convene to structure the societal institutions of justice. These 
individuals should be from the same geographic territory; have similar mental and 
physical capabilities; and be free, roughly equal, and independent. They negotiate the 
principles of justice for society from behind a “Veil of Ignorance,” in which individuals 
do not know what their personal status in society will be. They work to gain “mutual 
benefit” by rationally and objectively negotiating the distribution of primary goods (ibid, 
p. 64). 
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On the demand side, energy’s distributive outcomes are well defined by the 
concepts of energy poverty—who has access and who does not— and energy 
affordability—who pays and how much do they pay. The supply-side distributive 
injustices—who shoulders the risks of energy siting and production— are less 
acknowledged in the energy justice literature, although well acknowledged in the 
environmental justice literature. Distributive justice relates to often considered questions 
about whether there is equality and affordability of energy access. One significant 
distributive justice issue addressed throughout the dissertation is whether people have 
access to premium-networked spaces and whether the right to be networked is 
acknowledged. Design I in Chapter 5 pointed out that a lack of access to infrastructure in 
rural areas led to trends such as urban crowding. Design I’s proponents argued that 
Europe had an obligation to ensure that its neighbors also enjoyed high levels of energy 
access so that they were not left in misery. Distributive justice relates to who wins and 
loses on the supply and demand sides of energy generation. For example, this dissertation 
asked: as siting conflicts become increasing polarized in the West, will electricity 
generation be pushed even further away from load centers into the developing world, 
resulting in an uneven share of the burdens of supply and the benefits of access? Who 
would benefit and who would lose if the entire Mediterranean were powered with 
Saharan desert power? In Chapter 5, the distributive justice concern was addressed that if 
a failure occurred in a regional power system, richer countries that are willing and able to 
pay more for electricity will likely maintain reliability, while poorer countries suffer from 
blackouts. Therefore, poorer countries bear a disproportionate risk related to a potential 
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failure in the system. Distributive justice is the lens through which energy justice is 
typically perceived, but energy justice should be expanded to address other categories.  
Procedural justice. A fair process for distributing these outcomes is also required 
for energy justice. A variety of scholars, most prominently Nussbaum and Sen, find 
Rawls’ “original position” problematic in terms of procedural justice. In reality, not 
everyone is allowed to participate in the process of the distribution of goods and 
drawbacks (Barry, 1996). Nor are all of the participants truly on an equal playing field 
and able to work to their mutual advantage (ibid). This is relevant to energy justice 
because certain groups are disadvantaged. For example, women are disproportionately 
affected by dirty cookstoves, senior citizens typically have a higher energy burden, and 
the differently abled depend on electricity for medical care and devices. It is possible that 
these groups need more energy in order to have equal human capabilities.  
Myriad institutions, not individuals, govern energy systems including national 
political and regulatory institutions, international organizations like the International 
Energy Agency, multinational corporations, and possibly even regional transmission 
system operators.
193
 The process of governing energy is sociopolitically complex due to 
the number of institutions involved and their history. The decisions made by these 
institutions will affect citizens and the environment for decades. However, they do not 
typically frame problems in ways that account for energy systems’ injustices and 
recognize disadvantaged groups, nor do they often provide representation for vulnerable 
and disadvantaged groups. For example, this dissertation illustrated that citizens did not 
participate in developing the social pact for electricity in Morocco, which defines the 
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benefits that should come from an electricity system. Furthermore, locals in Morocco 
lacked legitimate representation to stand up for their interests in energy development 
processes. This dissertation also illustrated how Dii played a role as a convener of 
stakeholders in the MENA region. This was a contested role in terms of procedural 
justice because Dii also acted as a gatekeeper in these conversations, and the 
conversations unsurprisingly did not provide an outlet for dissenting views. Achieving 
just processes for energy systems is therefore institutionally complex. Designing 
procedures through which citizens can participate in the design of energy projects and 
systems is vital both for procedural and distributive justice.  
To achieve procedural justice, it is important to ask the following questions. Who 
frames the principles of justice? For whom are they framed? How are they framed? 
(Nussbaum, 2007). Disadvantaged groups— including the differently abled, women, 
children, senior citizens, and even nature— should have a voice or legitimate 
representation in the process. Without just processes, the needs of these citizens are 
unlikely to be addressed. Efforts to address energy poverty—like gel cookstoves—have 
sometimes failed due to the lack of an inclusive, culturally appropriate process for 
designing the technology. Cookstoves provide multiple socio-cultural functions (e.g., 
taste of food, bug control from smoke, cost of fuel) that will not necessarily be accounted 
for in the clean cookstove’s design without a participatory process.   
Social justice: capabilities. Nussbaum and Sen argue that justice is not only 
connected to the institutions of society but also to the capabilities that individuals have to 
secure rights and live fulfilling and enriching lives (Sen, 2009). Aggregate measures of 
human development, like GDP, are insufficient for measuring this as they do not measure 
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capabilities or consider the distribution of benefits (ibid). Similarly, national 
electrification rates and energy consumption per capita do not measure the worth of 
energy access to people. Energy’s worth should instead be valued according to the 
services it provides, such as lighting a house or powering a factory, and how these 
services empower people. The capabilities approach also illustrates that a theory of 
energy justice that is based only on technological choice is insufficient to guarantee 
enhanced human thriving and just outcomes. For example, renewable energy should not 
be considered a good in-and-of-itself but a tool for achieving human development goals 
(Goldemberg et al., 1988). 
 Since energy relates to capabilities, is it a human right as some NGOs argue? 
Nussbaum (2007) views capabilities as foundational for providing people with the 
capacity to secure their rights. For example, better education can help a person to secure 
his or her right to free speech (ibid). From a capabilities perspective, energy itself is not a 
right but is part of the capabilities that people need to be able to secure rights. On the 
other hand, conceiving of energy as a human right could be politically and strategically 
useful if it invokes a duty to achieve energy equity. Rights invoke duties e.g., the right 
not to be murdered leads to a duty not to murder (Mandle, 2006). If energy were a right, 
then there would be a duty to provide it. Pragmatically, it would be best to focus on the 
framing that will aid most in improving energy justice.  
 Capabilities justice also offers a critique of Illich’s energy use ceiling. Nussbaum 
is undecided about what counts as sufficient capabilities. For example, in terms of 
adequate shelter, a mansion is excessive, while a tent is deficient (Nussbaum, 2007). 
Likewise, what counts as sufficient access to electricity is unclear. However, 
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conceptualizing energy as providing capabilities rather than meeting demand, would, in 
theory, address Illich’s concern that over a certain threshold energy becomes harmful to 
quality of life (Illich, 1974). This does not mean that developing countries should be 
denied access to industrialized countries’ energy usage rates but that the improvement of 
human capabilities across the globe should be the primary goal and should not be 
obscured by a simplistic discussion of targets and ceilings that does not examine the 
capabilities of humans to thrive in society. 
In the network society described by Castells (1996), technology is material 
culture. Conceiving of innovation as a technology whose time has come—rather than a 
novel technology—194 is problematic in this regard because the technology may not be 
designed to meet the needs of current and future generations, especially in a way that 
improves their human capabilities. For example, the development of CSP in the 
Mediterranean was seen by some international organizations as a matter of human 
development, while others saw it as a matter of technology development. A combined 
focus on the two is needed so that the technologies are designed to be appropriate and to 
enhance capabilities for the affected communities. The Green Revolution, for example, 
illustrated that technologies are designed for specific social and cultural contexts and 
cannot be transferred in a linear and simplistic fashion. It also demonstrated that 
improved access to a commodity, while a worthy end-goal, can do damage in the process 
of implementation. During the Green Revolution, the local knowledge and innovativeness 
of the poor were misinterpreted and underestimated. The same could occur for 
transferring electrical power systems and clean cookstoves. The other extreme should 
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also be avoided— assuming that grid access is infeasible for those communities that want 
it. (Or, it is possible that countries without well-established grids could leapfrog to a 
different type of system that still provides benefits including the large-scale provision of 
power and reliability.) Culturally specific technological design is important for the 
achievement of capabilities justice. 
Social justice: recognition justice. Another type of social justice theory is that of 
recognition justice, developed by Nancy Fraser. Fraser argues that minority groups that 
have been traditionally disadvantaged must be recognized for justice to be achieved. 
Examples of these groups, such as the energy oppressed poor, were provided above. For 
recognition justice to occur, residents near power plant sites should have a voice in the 
process. Developers should ask whether any particular racial, gender, or ethic group is 
asked to shoulder a disproportionate share of the energy burden. This study also 
illustrated that desert communities are often written out of geographical representations 
of the landscape and, therefore, their capabilities neither are improved from energy 
development nor from the distribution of benefits. The Desertec vision initially framed 
deserts as empty, but following controversy about whether the regional vision would 
meet local demand, Dii emphasized the importance of building projects near demand 
centers in North Africa to provide for skyrocketing energy needs for a growing 
population.  
One potential pitfall of recognition justice is that groups, such as the energy 
oppressed poor, could be framed in a way that victimizes instead of empowers them. 
Development agencies and governments should be cautious about how they frame 
populations without access to energy and their energy needs to avoid characterizing them 
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as unworthy of grid electricity. Small-scale technologies only provide certain end-uses 
(for example, they cannot power a factory). Distributed systems may indeed be the best 
choice in many contexts, but these decisions should not be made on assumptions that 
people in the Global South only need/deserve minimal amounts of electricity. This 
dissertation illustrated this pitfall with discussions of uneven development stemming 
from colonial electrification in Morocco
195
 and incomplete engineering dreams for the 
Sahara that ignored local populations.
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Ecological justice. Transformations in electrical power systems are clearly 
important in relation to ecological justice due to their effects on climate change, 
environmental pollution, and other harms. The discipline of environmental ethics 
emerged in the 1960s with a critique that Kantian ethics, which confers moral status and 
dignity on beings based upon their ability to reason, was insufficient for ensuring the 
protection of nature (Callicott, 2009; “Environmental Ethics,” 2008). Anthropocentric 
thought attributes only instrumental value to nature, and the ethical treatment of nature is 
based upon its affect on human beings (Stenmark, 2009).  Environmental ethicists 
developed a non-anthropocentric, or non-human centered, ethic for valuing nature that 
would confer moral standing and significance to all organisms. In a compelling 
illustration of the shortfalls of anthropocentric and utilitarian ethics, Routley (1973) 
developed a hypothetical scenario in which the last man on earth faced no moral 
constraints on destroying the remaining organisms.   
                                                        
195 See Chapter 6 
196 See Chapter 3 
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Holmes Rolston III and other non-anthropocentrists argue that each organism has 
a “good-of-its-kind,” or an intrinsic value, separate from its human-attributed 
instrumental value (Rolston III, 1998, p. 131). Something that has intrinsic worth cannot 
be an end in itself (Callicott 2009).
197
 Non-anthropocentrism is divided into two strands:  
ecocentrism and biocentrism. Biocentrists focus on living beings at the individual level 
(Stenmark 2009). Laura Westra, a strong proponent of this approach, views humans as 
disturbing the ecosystem. The most ethical decision is to avoid this disturbance. She 
argues for a “strong non-anthropocentric holism” to protect natural systems (Westra, 
2009). 
In contrast, environmental pragmatists argue that non-anthropocentric arguments 
are too simplistic and unrealistic for furthering environmental ethics in the policy realm, 
where such arguments have gained little traction (Stone, 2003). Pragmatists are working 
to develop politically feasible management theories to advance environmental policy 
goals. For example, Minteer and Collins (2008) are developing an ecological ethics for 
the environmental management field analogous to bioethics in the medical field. Norton 
(1991), a pragmatist, developed the convergence hypothesis, which speculates that non-
anthropocentric and long-sighted anthropocentric viewpoints converge on the same 
policy goals because human and non-human interests typically align over a broad 
timescale. He proposed contextual management, in which decisions are made at the local 
level that aim to achieve the health of broader ecosystems. He thought the convergence 
hypothesis would generally hold when management decisions are based upon the safe 
                                                        
197
 To illustrate, Rolston (1999) recounted a switch in the signs at his favorite campground from an 
anthropocentric to a more non-anthropocentric rationale. The first sign instructed humans to leave the 
flowers for others to enjoy; the second sign stated “let the flowers live!”.    
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minimum standard: “all species should be protected as long as the socioeconomic costs 
for doing so are bearable” (p. 136).  
Minteer & Manning (2009) conducted an empirical study of environmental values 
on forest management in Vermont, finding a “strong moral pluralism,” that people value 
the environment for a multitude of reasons through a human-centric lens, supporting 
Norton’s views. The stakeholders in this study did not express non-anthropocentric 
environmental values. In this dissertation, Morocco’s perspective on climate change and 
environmental outcomes was nearly entirely instrumental—green electrons were not 
valued as goods in-and-of-themselves to protect the climate but as means of generating 
socioeconomic benefits. Morocco does not value the environment in non-anthropocentric 
ways, but it is working to support low carbon energy projects due to socioeconomic 
values. This generally supports the environmental pragmatist view on energy policy.   
The other way in which this study supports a pragmatic view on energy justice, is 
through the discussion on natural capital in Chapter 4. When exporting electricity, or 
other goods, countries often implicitly export non-renewable imbedded natural capital, 
such as water and land use-related goods, which Dasgupta (2010) referred to as an 
“implicit subsidy.” Countries will need to decide whether these are acceptable costs to the 
environment and whether they wish to prioritize a development model that uses their 
resources to gain income from exports or whether they will prioritize domestic resource 
use. 
This study sees the pragmatic view as a more operationalizable method of 
incorporating ecological justice into the conceptualization of energy justice. Electricity 
policy could, of course, relate to the protection of intrinsic environmental values, as even 
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low carbon electricity technologies harm the local environment. Therefore, I have 
included ecological justice in the framework, with the caveat that this ecological justice is 
inevitably interpreted through anthropocentric lenses. 
Intergenerational equity. Closely related to environmental justice is the concept 
of intergenerational equity. The Bruntland Commission report’s well-know definition of 
sustainable development is meeting the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their needs. This is foundational to the concept of 
intergenerational equity. The econometric practice of using a discount rate prioritizes 
present over future generations (Matson & Carasso, 1999). It is clear that the full 
environmental cost of energy technologies to both present and future generations 
typically is not accounted (ibid). This study illustrated the temporal complexity of 
managing electricity systems, as described above, ranging from the long timescales 
involved in electricity planning, to the concept of the lifecycle of technologies, to the 
issue that our current energy institutions are ill-equipped to management complex 
temporal governance issues. Therefore, justice for future generations is relevant to 
electricity policy and should not be overlooked. This is also a matter of recognition 
justice—ensuring future generations are recognized—and procedural justice—ensuring 
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A New Framework for Energy Justice 
 
The energy justice framework in Table 6 is based upon the literature with empirical 
examples relating to energy. It was revised based upon findings from this study, as 
illustrated in Table 7.  
Table 6. 





Empirical questions Examples from 
energy cases 
Procedural -- Existence of a just 
process for distributing 
the primary goods/ 
burdens & benefits of 
the system  
-- Relates to freedom 
from coercion 
(discussed below) 
(See Gould, Norton) 
 
-- Are the energy governance institutions 
just? 
-- Who participates in energy systems 
planning and who does not (which 
nation-states, which publics, which 
institutions)? What are the power 
disparities? 
-- Are some of the parties coerced into 
any actions, like selling resources? 
-- Who manages the public trust? 
-- Are trade-offs agreed upon in a 
transparent manner through public 
engagement processes? 
-- Process for choosing 





-- Corruption is 
widespread in energy 
development 
procedures 
-- North-South energy 
projects may include 
neocolonial power 
disparities. 
-- Are productive and 







should be recognized.  
-- Typically identity-
based but could be 
modified to recognize 
affected publics. 
(See Fraser, Young) 
-- Are residents near power plant sites 
recognized? Do they have a voice in the 
process? 
-- Is a particular racial, gender, or ethnic 
group ignored? 
-- Are disadvantaged groups recognized 
in a way that empowers or subjugates 





-- Inga Dam site in the 
DRC framed as 
uninhabited and the 





affected by dirty 
cookstoves 
-- Native Americans 
disproportionately 
affected by energy 
extraction. 




-- Just institutions are 
insufficient; must also 
examine individuals’ 
capacity to live out a 
good life. 
-- Energy could be 
viewed as a precursor to 
basic human rights, or 
as a human right 
-- Human security 
relates to energy 
security 
 (See Sen, Nussbaum, 
Holland, Reddy) 
-- Who frames the principles of justice? 
-- Instead of considering electrification 
rates, what services does the energy 
system provide (e.g. powering resorts in 
Majorca, pumping water in Egypt)? 
-- Does the affected public have any 
power/ capability to imagine the future 
of energy systems? 
-- Are adaptive preferences influencing 
individuals to downplay their needs? 
-- Development projects 
use solar PV to improve 
capabilities, e.g., 
pumping water to 
improve health 
-- Energy developed 
based on projected 
demand increases, not 
on needed services. 
Distributive -- How are the primary 
goods and burdens/ 
benefits distributed? 
How are trade-offs 
chosen and distributed? 
(See Rawlsian theorists 
& Cozzens, (2007)) 
-- Do win-win discourses mask the 
distribution of burdens/ benefits? 
-- Is energy access affordable? What 
percentage of household income does it 
consume (i.e., energy burden)? 
-- Who has access to energy worldwide 
(energy poverty)? Should energy usage 
limits be set in the developed world? 
-- Who bears the risks of energy supply 
(e.g., pollution, land use, financing risks, 
mechanical failure)?  
-- 1.3 billion people 
lack electricity, many of 
whom accept a 
disproportionate share 





-- Current generation 





-- Are future generations considered in 
the energy planning process? 
-- Will renewable energy systems 
actually replace fossil fuel power plants? 
-- Who bears the burden of climate 
mitigation? 
-- Current generation 
benefits from fossil fuel 
use while the future 
generation bears greater 
climate change impacts. 
Ecological 
justice 
-- All organisms should 
get a fair share of 
resources, i.e., 
distributive justice 




pragmatists argue for 
good procedure to base 
environmental 
management on a 
plurality of values 
(Norton, 2005) 
-- What are the environmental impacts of 
energy systems on the local and global 
environment, from a lifecycle 
perspective? 
-- Even solar PV has 
negative environmental 
effects through mining 
and disposal. 
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Applying and Testing the Energy Justice Framework 
 
 Below I refine the energy justice framework based upon this empirical study. 
Two student research assistants and I coded the energy justice issues identified in this 
dissertation. The framework was useful and very few justice-related issues fell outside of 
the framework categories. Issues were identified in each category of justice, with the 
exception of purely non-anthropocentric ecological justice issues. Unsurprisingly, the 
most common category of injustice was distributive, but the framework helped to identify 
critical issues in other categories, as well as issues discussed below that were not neatly 
addressed by the categories.  
 Applying the framework illustrated many cases in which the justice 
categories were linked. For example, a lack of recognition meant capabilities were not 
met for the unrecognized population since the design of the infrastructure did not account 
for their needs. They were also bypassed or disadvantaged by the distributive outcomes 
of energy generation because they were not included in the procedure. Schlosberg (2007) 
also already noted that recognition is a precondition to achieving distributive justice. The 
framework now better illustrates the connections, synergies, and interdependencies 
among the categories of justice. In particular, better procedural justice was needed to 
avoid an inequitable distribution of outcomes. In several cases I argued that Desertec was 
not a fundamentally neocolonial or xenophobic vision; rather, these issues could be 
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addressed through the implementation of a fair procedure and regional dialogue. 
Therefore, I moved procedural justice to the top of the framework as a precursor to 
achieving possible outcomes in other categories of justice.  
Below, I will discuss five energy justice challenges identified in applying the 
energy justice framework— neocolonialism, capacity building and freedom from 
coercion, global energy security and justice, trade-offs and win-win discourses in energy 
system design, and the diagnosis of injustice at multiple scales—and then present the 
updated framework.  
Neocolonialism. Colonialism and neocolonialism were empirical issues that arose 
from this study that were not neatly addressed by a single category of justice. Chapter 3 
illustrated the colonial history, dating back to the 1850s, of today’s discourses for 
Mediterranean energy system integration. Chapter 4 addressed the imagined geography 
of the Mediterranean and how the conquering and pioneering metaphors associated with 
deserts frame them as interstitial zones, devoid of people, to be bridged. These metaphors 
suggest that there is still an envisioned frontier to colonize.  
The similarities to colonial era discourses suggest a lack of awareness and 
recognition of this complex history. The Desertec paradigm assumed that in a globalized 
world nation-state borders and sovereignty should no longer be important, but rather 
solving problems that transcend borders should be prioritized. However, as the colonial 
history and the negative outcomes for local people stemming from it still matters deeply 
to people living in the region, this could be perceived as callous. That said, 
neocolonialism was not always used substantively in the discourse but rather as cryptic 
stand-in for critiquing the justice dynamics of energy systems that cross nation-state 
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borders between developed and developing worlds.
198
 Just as colloquially calling 
something unsustainable or sustainable is often a mild way of calling it bad or good 
(Thompson, 2007), the neocolonial critique was often bandied about to express 
discomfort with a vision that connected dozens of countries across broad disparities. It 
was also used to appeal to guilt over past actions by European colonial powers. In 
Chapter 5, the Desertec Whitebook included an argument that Europeans had a moral 
obligation to help North African countries develop due to the inequities between the 
regions. Desertec Design I proponents then argued that energy autonomy was ethically 
questionable because Europe would proceed with energy development without 
acknowledging and improving the “future misery of its neighbors.” 
The energy justice framework helps to identify the issues latent in the neocolonial 
critique in more actionable forms. Neocolonial issues relate to distributive, procedural, 
and recognition justice. First, in energy visions for the Mediterranean, local people are 
often written out of the landscape, or desert landscapes are creatively redrawn to match 
the system’s needs rather than local needs on the ground. As illustrated in Orientalist 
depictions of desert landscapes (such as in Design III in Chapter 5), these recognition 
justice pitfalls were often related to subvert racism. As illustrated in Chapter 6, colonial 
institutions focused on benefiting the empire, not on recognizing the needs of local 
people or ensuring they benefit. Second, neocolonial concerns related to fears that poorer 
countries would end up with worse distributive outcomes, accepting a disproportionate 
share of the burdens of energy generation versus energy provision. For example, the 
German Aerospace Center (DLR) was concerned that more powerful countries within the 
                                                        
198 See Chapter 5 for a description of the neocolonial critique of Desertec. 
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Dii system (Design II) could afford to pay more to maintain the reliability of their power 
system while the lights went out in Morocco, if there were some failure.
199
 Furthermore, 
the issue of guilt and obligation stemming from the past could be addressed more 
productively by examining the distributive energy justice issues at a regional scale using 
comparative techniques, so that the standard of living in Europe stemming from energy 
wealth is used as a benchmark for the standard of living in North Africa. Third, procedure 
matters for whether the outcomes of the system are neocolonial, as I have argued 
throughout the dissertation. Not all collaboration between the North and South of the 
Mediterranean is intrinsically neocolonial and assuming as much may impede 
opportunities for fruitful collaboration. Implementing a good procedure to avoid past 
negative distributive outcomes, as illustrated by the uneven development stemming from 
Morocco’s colonial electricity system, is essential both at the national and transnational 
scales. This procedure should include voices from less powerful countries in the EU-
MENA region.  
Ironically, while some European reporters assumed that people in North Africa 
would view Desertec as neocolonial, decision-makers in Morocco supported exporting 
electricity to Europe and even saw Morocco as unfairly cut out of the European 
electricity market. In fact, Morocco was working to address the distributive justice issues 
stemming from the neocolonial critique through local content requirements and other 
policies to ensure benefits remained in the country. They were not intending to allow 
themselves to be exploited. Some Moroccans emphasized that the Desertec vision itself 
was ethical but that the procedure that had been available to participate was insufficiently 
                                                        
199 See Chapter 5. 
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inclusive and therefore neocolonial. Moroccans should be given voice in deciding 
whether the process and outcomes are unjust. 
From energy sovereignty to capacity building and freedom from coercion. In 
part, issues of neocolonialism relate to sovereignty, since colonies like Morocco lost their 
sovereignty for decades to European colonial powers. As I described in Chapter 5, after 
Independence the Moroccan government sought to reform the electrical power system 
into one that did work for Moroccans. Energy sovereignty refers to the right of 
communities and nation-states to have the ultimate authority over how their energy 
systems are designed and used. For example, Smith & Frehner (2010) believed that 
energy justice for Native Americans would include developing a “sustainable and self-
sufficient community” that provides for self-determination and more equitable control of 
science, technology, and geopolitical space. Holleman (2012) argued that countries in the 
Global South should enjoy energy sovereignty rather than being supply depots for the 
North. 
I argued throughout the dissertation that energy development at the local and 
national levels relates to issues of political development and sovereignty. Each nation-
state has its own tacit social pact or social contract for electricity generation based on 
specific nation-state challenges. Energy development also relates to issues of national 
identity and pride. Processes for including the public in renewable energy siting were a 
test bed for greater decentralization of governance in Morocco, as Morocco considered a 
significant shift in its political development toward advanced regionalization.
200
 To 
develop a single market for electricity in the Mediterranean, along with the necessary 
                                                        
200 See Chapter 7. 
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political and regulatory institutions to management it (such as a Transmission System 
Operator), would require countries to cede sovereignty, and the specific goals of their 
national pacts/contracts, to regional, multi-lateral political processes. This presents 
drawbacks, as nations risk not securing the socioeconomic benefit they hope to gain from 
their electrical power systems, as well as risks from shouldering a possible system failure. 
It also has benefits, as nations could gain better economic and political collaboration—
and even cultural understanding—as well as technological efficiency and saved costs 
through sociotechnical integration.  
While sovereignty is an important concept it is also somewhat outdated, stemming 
from Realist international relations theory that views the international community as 
being in a state of anarchy in which states pursue their own narrow interests without 
moral principles (Waltz, 2004). More recent scholarship sees the sovereign nation-state 
as no longer dominant, with governance occurring instead through the actions of 
multinational corporations, NGOs, and international institutions steered by states (Stoker, 
1998). These actions are indeed normative and sometimes morally principled (Nussbaum, 
2007).  
If a sovereign state were needed to apply the principles of justice and 
geographical proximity were required for negotiating the principles of justice (as Rawls 
argued) energy justice in a globalized world would simply be impossible because these 
complex systems cross borders and non-state actors have significant power in energy 
governance. System complexity makes energy independence and sovereignty infeasible 
in reality as energy must be sourced from supply chains and interdependencies are 
needed to maintain the reliability of the centralized system. Discourses of energy 
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independence and sovereignty can serve to mask supply chain injustices that cross local, 
national, and regional scales in complex ways. If energy sovereignty were necessary for 
achieving energy justice, the trend toward the transnationalization or even globalization 
of electricity described in Chapter 1 would always result in injustices.  
Freedom from coercion is a better principle for addressing issues of 
neocolonialism and energy independence/ interdependence. Sen emphasized the 
importance of freedom for the capabilities approach. Someone who chooses to stay at 
home for the day has more freedom than if a gang of thugs forced them to stay home, 
even though the end result is the same (Sen, 2009). Forcing nation-states to become 
energy-supply depots for richer countries violates the principle of freedom from coercion, 
without the implication that actors should only look out for their own interests, or the 
implication that actors must be sovereign and independent to achieve just outcomes. 
Freedom from coercion should be combined with ideas from recognition justice, so that 
greater care is given to the needs of minority groups, like Native Americans, who 
currently advocate for energy sovereignty. Achieving energy sovereignty is less 
important than ensuring a public and stakeholder engagement process free from coercion. 
It would be problematic for a private industry consortium like Dii to govern the visioning 
process for regional electricity systems because it is not elected by Mediterranean publics 
to represent them in the development of a just regional energy system. Freedom from 
coercion should be considered within the framework under procedural justice. 
Just energy integration could be achieved between former colonies and colonial 
powers if the process is free from coercion. If Morocco were coerced into one day 
exporting green electricity to Europe, this would be unjust, but, in fact, Moroccans 
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viewed their lack of access to European electricity markets as inequitable. Developing 
countries must decide for themselves whether they could yield more beneficial outcomes 
from using their energy resources domestically or exporting them, through a process free 
from coercion. When OECD countries switch to regional production networks, nearby 
non-OECD countries typically focus on exports that they hope will secure investments 
(Panebianco, 2003). Developing countries can benefit from know-how, technology, jobs, 
and capital, but in reality they often reap few benefits (ibid). Ensuring these benefits is an 
important part of distributive energy justice at the global scale. Additionally, addressing 
the “implicit subsidies” (Dasgupta, 2010) in these exported products relates to ecological 
justice, as the natural capital imbedded in these exports is rarely appropriately priced.  
One complication with freedom from coercion is that capacity building of the 
kind described in Morocco in Chapters 6 and 7 is likely a precursor to avoiding coercion 
due to power disparities. The disparities and differences in quality of life between the 
North and South of the Mediterranean, described by the shatterbelt framing,
201
 put 
weaker countries at risk of coercion. In Chapter 6, I illustrated that Morocco’s electricity 
development is tugged in different directions because it is a poorer country. In contrast, 
neighboring Algeria has not had to seek FDI or liberalize its energy sector because it is 
wealthy from its natural gas resources. Through capacity building, Morocco seeks to 
become a better negotiator in international processes and a true collaborator in North-
South energy projects. At the local level, people living in depressed Mediterranean zones 
are the ones who most need the benefits from electricity development but are the least 
equipped to benefit from it or to participate in the process to influence projects to secure 
                                                        
201 see Chapter 4. 
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their benefit. Electricity has been framed by some NGOs as a precursor to securing 
human rights, but foundational development is needed in order for the community to have 
sufficient capacity to be prepared for the benefits from electrification and to avoid being 
coerced due to inequities and inequalities stemming from a lack of a level playing field. 
Addressing these inequities within and across the region through capacity building may 
be foundational to the eventual achievement of energy justice. 
Energy security. Energy security is often seen as geopolitical and, again, a matter 
of nation-states protecting their interests. For example, in the United States, energy 
security is often conflated with energy independence. This study illustrated that multiple, 
and at times conflicting, framings of energy security exist. In Chapter 5, I discussed 
energy security framings in the three Desertec system designs ranging from 
diversification of the fuel portfolio, network stability, cost and affordability, to 
sufficiency of supply. For oil-rich countries in MENA, such as Saudi Arabia, maintaining 
high oil prices and sufficient demand is essential for energy security. For fuel-poor 
countries in MENA, securing a reliable and affordable source of fuels is framed as energy 
security.
202
 In the European Union, energy integration—rather than energy 
independence—is often viewed as inevitable but the EU seeks to shift this integration 
toward ‘good’ countries, and away from Russia, and to avoid a situation in which a solar 
or oil cartel coerces them into certain political or monetary actions. In Morocco, energy 
integration was indeed framed as part of energy security and sustainable development, as 
developing national renewable energy resources simultaneously with regional connection 
to improve the intermittency problem for renewable energy would result in improved 
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energy security for Morocco. In fact, renewable energy is pushing countries outside of 
the United States to seriously consider energy integration as part of their energy security, 
due to the intermittency of renewable energy. This is a surprising finding, as renewable 
energy is often associated with energy independence and self-sufficiency.  
In the midst of this plurality of framings of energy security, the Desertec 
Foundation added the concept of global energy security. The idea of global energy 
security counters the energy independence discourse and focuses on securitizing energy 
interdependence. As a concept that emphasizes how security and environmental problems 
cross nation-state boundaries, global energy security adapts a different worldview from 
the Realist perspective of the traditional sovereign nation-state acting in its own interest. 
Just as I argued it would be difficult to combine the social pacts/contracts for electricity 
generation across a region,
203
 it may be difficult to fuse together the disparate framings of 
energy security described above into a global conception of energy security. However, as 
electricity systems become internationalized, or even globalized,
204
 it is important to 
consider the prospects and tenets of global energy security for an interdependent world.   
In Chapter 4, I argued that global energy security should not simply be based 
upon whether there is equality across global energy systems, in which everyone has 
access to the same premium-networked spaces with reliable, affordable energy. Instead, 
fairness should be considered. Global energy security for an interdependent world ought 
to move past equality and geopolitics and toward energy equity and justice, holding 
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system builders and decision-makers to a higher standard. Below I propose several tenets 
of global energy security informed by this study. 
Human security and improving human capabilities and energy inequities across 
the globe should be the first priority of global energy security. Human energy insecurity 
poses risks as, for example, marginalized populations turn to religious radicalism. The 
bidonvilles, or slums, of Casablanca, Morocco are one of the few areas that are not fully 
electrified in the country, where people often must rely on pirated electricity (Zaki, 
2011). The 2003 Casablanca bombers came from this area, which many people attributed 
to the extreme poverty there (Howe, 2005).
205
 Global energy security is not possible in a 
world in which massive energy poverty and injustice exists. This requires recognition 
justice for affected and disempowered communities so that they benefit from the 
capabilities provided by energy infrastructure when these systems are transformed.   
 To meet human security needs, global energy security should include a just 
process for recognizing and engaging citizens in the region in the development of an 
energy system. Above I discussed a fair process for multilateral cooperation that avoids 
coercion. Below the nation-state scale, citizens should be seen as true participants and 
collaborators in the energy system. Since direct participation at the region scale is 
obviously not always possible, representatives should adequately speak for the 
populations they represent.
206
 Even though representation is necessary, the regional 
process should also seek to improve energy citizenship
207
 to engage citizens in the region 
in imagining and constructing just energy futures that promote cross-cultural learning, 
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 See Chapter 6. 
206
 In Chapter 7, I discussed how representatives did not necessarily reflect the interests of the population 
affected by power plant siting 
207
 As discussed in Chapter 6. 
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tolerance, and immigration policy. In Chapter 5 I discussed the possibility that an 
integrated electricity system funded in part by citizens in Europe could lead either to 
cross-cultural awareness and green tourism or to marketing green electricity from North 
Africa using Orientalist imagery that frames the exports as exotic. The latter would be 
counter to the goal of fostering energy citizenship. 
It is also important that global energy security avoids technological imperialism 
and that countries be given the opportunity to collaborate in R&D and to take a certain 
level of ownership over their electrical power systems, rather than only importing, for 
example, German technologies. Western countries using renewable energy technologies 
as “soft power” would not provide energy security for poorer countries and would violate 
the principle of freedom from coercion. It was clear that Morocco wanted energy 
dependency on its own terms. If Morocco were coerced into exporting electricity, or 
other unfavorable outcomes of energy integration, then energy integration would not 
meet their energy security goals. Achieving global energy security would therefore 
require a just procedure for envisioning and designing energy systems that is founded 
upon mutual trust, which has been a challenge historically at the multilateral level. 
The Limits to Growth framing underpinned the Desertec Foundation’s perception 
of global energy security, in which energy sustainability and energy access for a growing 
population must be addressed at a regional, if not planetary, scale due to earth’s limited 
resources. Climate change mitigation and adaptation could also be a tenet of global 
energy security, although it should not be the sole factor. This is likely what the Desertec 
Foundation had in mind with the concept of global energy security, based upon the limits 
to growth framing. Decisions made by individual nation-states about the carbon intensity 
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of their electricity generating systems will have global effects. Addressing climate change 
as part of global energy security is also important for intergenerational justice, as 
decisions made in the power sector today will affect several generations to come.  
Trade-offs and win-win discourses. Even if system builders were equipped with 
guidance from the energy justice framework, they cannot equally prioritize everything in 
a finite world. All energy systems result in some social drawbacks for particular publics 
and environmental damage. Unfortunately, trade-offs will be made in energy systems 
design even if they are not made explicit through a transparent procedure.  
Sen and Nussbaum differ on whether it is justifiable to make trade-offs within the 
capabilities framework. Nussbaum argues that trade-offs are forbidden because human 
goods are not fungible. One cannot make up for a lack of freedom of speech with more of 
something else (Nussbaum, 2007). In contrast, Sen sees trade-offs as a “somewhat crude 
vocabulary for multidimensional assessment” and views them as necessary in an 
imperfect world (Sen, 2009). Sen advocates for a pluralistic approach in which the public 
makes explicit reasoned trade-offs. Nussbaum’s view is principled, since such trade-offs 
could be perverse and morally repugnant as they limit people’s capabilities to secure their 
human rights. For example, quantifying the number of human lives that will be lost from 
particular air pollution standards, while honest, has led to public disgust. In some cases, 
such trade-offs may be “taboo trade-offs,” or those that “violate deeply-held normative 
institutions about the integrity, even sanctity, of certain forms of relationships and the 
moral-political values that derive from those relationships” (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997, p. 
256). Some researchers have found that offering people monetary compensation for 
values they hold sacred—like siting energy facilities on sacred lands—backfires and 
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further polarizes people (Atran & Axelrod, 2008). Systems builders should aim not to 
make trade-offs that impede or overlook human capabilities, such as building an energy 
system that reduces water security in neighboring villages or leaves people living 
adjacent to a major energy facility without electricity access.  
In Chapter 1, I asked: what can be learned about energy justice by examining the 
Desertec vision at multiple scales? I found that if Germany’s energy system were 
connected to Morocco’s, energy justice trade-offs would be intertwined across nation-
state borders and between wealthier and poorer countries. Yet the Desertec vision is 
framed as a win-win. Unless the system boundaries are drawn very narrowly, such win-
win outcomes would be impossible to achieve. As this dissertation has illustrated, 
electricity issues are tied to complex integrated challenges, such as the energy-water 
nexus, in which water-impoverished villages could be negatively affected by CSP’s use 
of water. Desertec’s win-win framing generally referred to wins at a high level at the 
regional and abstract scale—security, regional stability, national energy policy—rather 
than examining the distributive outcomes of different social strata of the population.
208
 
This scalar disconnect is particularly salient as income inequality increases within nations 
and decreases among them (Firebaugh, 2009). Multi-scalar distributive outcomes could 
be masked by this win-win discourse. Morocco may benefit as a nation-state from 
reducing electricity imports by building solar power plants, but CSP siting negatively 
affected the village adjacent to the first power plant. Spain did not need electricity from 
North Africa and did not see itself as a winner in a future in which it became a transit 
country for other countries’ green electrons. No system is a win-win; it is impossible to 
                                                        
208 see Chapter 7. 
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achieve a win at all scales, as technological systems require trade-offs in a world with 
limited resources (see McShane et al., 2011). 
A just regional collaborative process could in theory lead to a reasoned and just 
distribution of trade-offs. Public engagement methods for choosing trade-offs to make 
them explicit, while avoiding morally repugnant decisions that impede human 
capabilities, should be developed and tested for feasibility. Here, procedural justice is 
closely tied to capabilities and recognition justice—to ensure the most vulnerable 
populations are recognized and that their capabilities are improved—and to distributive 
justice as a just process is needed to avoid poorer countries accepting a disproportionate 
share of the trade-offs. 
Multi-scalar, systems justice. In the beginning of the dissertation I asked what 
could be learned about energy justice by examining this vision at multiple scales. In order 
to design just energy systems in an energy interdependent world, justice concerns must be 
weighed across multiple jurisdictions and wide sociopolitical differences. System-level 
thinking and complexity (as defined above) are crucial for understanding energy 
transformations and energy justice, especially as they cross scales. A sociotechnical 
systems methodology provides a useful perspective on justice especially in a 
transnational world. Complex systems do not start from scratch but are layered on top of 
existing infrastructure, which complicates the ability to improve upon the energy justice 
outcomes of the old system throughout the energy transformation. Moreover, a 
technology’s politics are very dependent upon the politics of the system. The justice 
outcomes of single technologies, like a solar PV panel, should therefore be considered in 
the context of how they link up to broader sociotechnical systems with complex politics. 
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For example, citizens in Arizona benefit from installing rooftop PV, while workers in 
rare earth metal mines in China that provide the materials for PV accept serious 
environmental and health burdens. In the Desertec system a water-poor, marginalized 
village in Morocco would be connected to the modern streets of Berlin. Moreover, the 
Desertec vision and other visions for the Sahara would have an impact so broad that they 
could be viewed as geoengineering projects. Looking across scales changes the calculus 
of energy justice outcomes and trade-offs. 
Multi-scalar energy transformations seek to address integrated challenges from 
water quality and access to development to poverty. These new “reverse-salients” 
(Hughes, 1983)
209
 illustrate the complexity of achieving positive energy system outcomes 
as trade-offs cross not only scales but also extend into domains outside of energy. Energy 
justice calls for complex solutions to complex problems, it is urgent, and it requires 
immediate attention to end human suffering. Comparative, or relative, justice in this 
globalized, high-tech world demands more than simply meeting basic needs. In the era of 
the Anthropocene, sufficient access to premium-networked spaces and fairness of 
outcomes is a must for achieving technological equity.  
Nussbaum (2007) argued that there is no mutual advantage, as conceived by 
Rawls. Justice is justice, even if people in the developed world have to pay a lot for it. 
She argued that international institutions should be redesigned so that these injustices are 
avoided (ibid). Though she does not acknowledge it, this design process is fundamentally 
an issue about how transnational sociotechnical systems are constructed and redesigned. 
It is where technology policy and sociotechnical systems building intersect with the 
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principles of justice. Energy is not the only area in which justice at one scale is connected 
to another and is a generalizable issue relating to justice and sociotechnical systems 
construction. Systems justice calls for us to collate the diverse ideas about energy justice, 
expand upon them based on reasoned principles, and re-evaluate them with a new 
framework. If we chose to move beyond a conceptualization of energy justice that merely 
pits the haves against the have-nots (i.e., energy poverty) and avoids a polarized 
centralized versus distributed energy debate, it will be necessary to address complex, 
multi-scalar systems.  
Updated Framework. The revised framework aims to be useful both to the 
scholarly community and to energy systems builders in diagnosing injustices as energy 
system transformations evolve. Before using the framework, energy evaluators should 
explicitly define the energy system boundaries, substantiating these decisions based on 
mapping out the institutions and stakeholders that should be involved in the analysis. 
Outcomes will appear different when the boundary conditions are drawn at different 
scales (from local to global.) Both supply and demand sides should be considered. 
Evaluators should also consider what principles and values are public priorities in the 
design of the system, comprising the social contract for electricity. Often these principles 
include reliability, affordability, access, and sustainability. However, more nuanced and 
unique goals could be mapped out through a participatory stakeholder engagement 
process to gain citizen consent. Table 7 presents the updated version of the energy justice 
framework that accounts for the findings from this empirical study. 
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Table 7. 
Updated Energy Justice Framework. Graphic by Ben Lewis 
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Conclusion: Visions for Just Energy Systems 
 
As described in Chapter 1, this dissertation encompassed both analytical and 
normative goals, which were brought together in this chapter by a theoretical and 
empirical examination of energy justice. This dissertation asked: how are regional 
sociotechnical systems designed? What forces and processes shape aspects of the vision? 
And what are the consequences for a diverse Mediterranean region, with deep North-
South inequities? To explore these questions, I used the Desertec vision as a key example 
of what is arguably the world’s most ambitious renewable energy plan in order to better 
understand the political and societal aspects of a massive scale-up of renewable energy. 
This dissertation analyzed this proposed renewable energy transformation at multiple 
scales, from the global history of CSP technologies, to the vision’s development at the 
regional level, to the vision’s instantiation at the national level in Morocco, through to the 
construction of a CSP plant in Morocco.  
While energy system transformations are often seen as technical, they are 
fundamentally sociotechnical, with high levels of temporal, geographical, sociopolitical, 
and environmental complexity. As energy transformations are underway across the globe, 
more focus on the visioning stage for sociotechnical systems is needed than has been 
provided by previous work on sociotechnical systems that relied upon historical methods. 
Sociotechnical systems have different justice outcomes and trade-offs at each stage, from 
imagined through to constructed and decommissioned, and from the local to the global 
scale. In order to propel the vision to the next step, some agreement is needed among 
stakeholders about the goals for the system. One challenge for the Desertec vision was 
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that stakeholders could not agree on the principles behind the vision or even the 
appropriate method of proof-of-concept.  
Through an exploration of three designs of the Desertec vision in Chapter 5, I 
illustrated how the visioning stage plays an important role in innovation and in shaping 
the future. That said, the consequences stemming from the visioning stage are less 
cemented than I originally assumed they would be, and a just procedure for apportioning 
trade-offs using the justice framework could guide this visioning stage. Once these 
systems develop momentum, their justice outcomes will be enduring, as evidenced from 
the long-standing infrastructural inequities between mountainous and coastal areas in the 
Mediterranean region. 
One challenge with achieving energy justice is that these systems are highly 
complex, and the visioning process relates to uncertain futures. The sociopolitical 
complexity of the Mediterranean energy system would only deepen if multilateral 
processes were implemented for regional electricity systems. In Chapter 6, I argued that 
the Desertec vision would be complicated by the individual pacts or contracts for the 
benefits of electricity generation that each individual nation-state has. These social 
contracts reflect the goals and expectations for societal benefit stemming from electrical 
power systems (Victor & Heller, 2006). As electricity grids begin crossing nation-state 
lines around the globe, how will it affect the promises states make to their populations 
about the distribution of the social benefits and burdens of electricity development? This 
question should be one focus of the policy discussion as plans for regional energy 
integration are pursued. As the social pact is renegotiated in Morocco and other countries 
in the region—and countries consider negotiating the social pact at a bilateral or 
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multilateral level through electricity integration—it is important to consider the principles 
of justice outlined in this chapter to ensure positive societal outcomes from electricity 
development. 
Considering the importance of the visioning stage and other contemporary 
challenges of electrical power systems, I argued throughout the dissertation that some of 
the analytical components of Hughes’ iconic work, Networks of Power, should be 
updated. Additionally, this final chapter shows that the complex normative components 
of sociotechnical systems need to be more rigorously incorporated into sociotechnical 
systems theory. In summary, I argued for four main analytical updates to Networks of 
Power, which I can now relate to themes of justice. First, I argued in Chapter 3 that a 
technology’s emergence is situated. The politics of these technologies can change over 
time, but a just process that is founded on capacity building to address the uneven playing 
field related to inequity in the region is needed to avoid coercion. Otherwise the negative 
distributive, capabilities, recognition, and intergenerational justice issues, which are at the 
core of what actors in the Mediterranean refer to as neocolonialism, could result. Second, 
I argued that there are new, broader reverse salients at stake in electricity system 
transformations that connect electricity to integrated challenges. I argued above that this 
is a crucial aspect of complex systems justice in a multi-scalar world. Third, the 
conceptualization of innovation as a deferred dream successfully taking root—rather than 
a new invention—relates to new forms of systems management complexity. In order for 
negative capabilities outcomes to be addressed, technological innovation should be 
tailored to the needs of specific communities and locales. Fourth, energy development is 
important to political development. Contemporary energy transformations should not 
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only be considered in a multi-country comparative study (e.g., England, Germany, United 
States) but should be analyzed in a transnational context. In this chapter, I argued that 
political development in a transnational world ought to move beyond the outmoded 
concept of energy sovereignty toward freedom from coercion and capacity building in 
order for energy justice to be achieved.  
In Chapter 1, I described four scenarios for the future of energy transformations 
across the globe—a mixed distributed and centralized path, a distributed path, 
regionalization with significant energy integration, and business-as-usual based upon 
extracting extreme sources of fossil fuels. Business-as-usual is clearly no longer an 
option within the European sociopolitical context due to concern about climate change. 
The Desertec case study illuminated the sociopolitical significance and complexity of 
these possible energy transformations. A path toward renewable energy that is completely 
centralized in nature poses nearly insurmountable political collaboration challenges, as 
the goals and political processes of dozens of countries would need to be aligned. Yet, I 
have also illustrated some of the drawbacks and challenges related to the distributed path, 
which would require the most dramatic system transformation. It is unclear what path 
will be taken, but transformations are tangibly underway, and each path has different 
implications for justice.  
 Regardless of which pathway is pursued, better planning will be needed to avoid 
building technological juggernauts. This is a crucial opportunity to utilize the energy 
justice framework developed in this dissertation to guide energy transformations before 
injustices in new energy infrastructure are cemented. Chapter 5 illustrated that many in 
the electricity sector see innovation in electrical power systems as the realization of a 
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deferred dream, rather than the implementation of radical new technologies. A modern 
electricity system is not innovative in the sense that it requires technologies that have not 
yet been developed but in the system-level reconfigurations needed to meet sustainability 
challenges in the power sector. The system plan should come before individual projects 
are built—rather than after the system is in crisis— yet sociopolitical complexity often 
prevents this from occurring. 
It is often assumed that ridding energy systems of oil and coal will automatically 
alleviate injustices. However, this dissertation has illustrated that addressing energy 
justice is far more complex and multifaceted than this. Adam's assertion that institutions 
for temporal governance are lacking is important for theories of justice, as it strikes at the 
heart of procedural, distributive, and intergenerational justice issues (2003). I argued that 
just as landscapes are considered in the transformation of electrical power systems, so 
ought to be “timescapes.” This temporal governance is crucial for anticipating problems 
with infrastructure that would be too big to fail, for apportioning the future trade-offs of 
energy systems, and for ensuring injustices are not cemented for decades to come. In his 
poem “What Happens to a Dream Deferred,” Langston Hughes wondered whether a 
deferred dream will “stink like rotten meat and fester like a sore.” To avoid a dystopic 
ending, better forms of temporal governance, as well as improved modes of evaluating 
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APPENDIX A:  
DESERTEC WINNERS/ LOSERS IDENTIFIED BY THE INTERVIEWEES FROM 
THIS STUDY 
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Winners/ Benefits Losers/ Drawbacks 
North Africans who get jobs Oil companies and traditional utilities, if 
they do not adapt 
Local content Touregs/ Berbers/ local people in the desert 
Access to electricity for people in North 
Africa 
Environmental impacts inevitable from all 
energy development 
Stable electricity system for North Africa 
to build other industries upon 
Loss of sovereignty for countries 
Stopping immigration  
Reducing the cost of electricity through 
integration. Reducing cost volatility. 
 
Giving people in villages reliable 
electricity 24 hours per day 
 
Already fostered increased awareness about 
renewable energy in Europe and worldwide 
 
Improved infrastructure for North Africa—
better roads near power plant sites 
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APPENDIX B:  
TRAINING PROGRAMS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY IN MOROCCO  
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(Note: not necessarily an exhaustive list) 
 
Université Polytechnique Mohammed VI at the Université Khadjayat near Settat 
 
Université Cadi Ayyad-Marrakech: Centre National D’Etudes et de Recherches sur 
l’Eau et l’Energie  
 
Laboratoire des Energies Renouvelables et Efficacité Energétique—solar hot water, solar 
PV, solar desalination, solar distillation of medical plants, biomass 
Studying: monitoring and modeling passive energy systems in buildings, k project with 
German company Simply Solar on parabolic troughs, solar desalination, desalination with 
reverse osmosis coupled with PV and wind energy, solar drying for medical plants, solar 
refrigeration  
 
Université Ibn Zohr 
 
6 relevant laboratories 
2 masters degrees in Agadir (material, energy, and environmental engineering & science 
and technology for the environment: water, air, and sun) 
Master in Energy and Renewable Energy in Guelmim 
Professional license in Techniques of Exploiting Renewable Energy in Ouarzazate 
A Diploma Engineer of State in engineering of processes of energy and environment 
Studying: semiconductors, numeric modeling for PV, CSP 
 
Université Mohammed V Agdal, Ecole Normale Supérieure Rabat 
PV group working on semi-conducting materials 
Professional license in Physical Techniques of Energies 
Studying: imperfections in the structure of PV cells, the effects of light elements on the 
electronic properties, semiconducting materials, concentrating PV 
 
Université Caid Ayyad Faculté des Sciences Semlalia Marrakech 
 
Five relevant laboratories 
Professional License in Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energies 
Masters in Energy and Environment 
Professional License and Specialized Masters in Buildings and Public Works 
Studying: thin layers for PV conversion, simple and hybrid PV systems, energy systems 
based on thermal transfer, energy efficiency in buildings, thermal performance by solar 
radiation in greenhouses, physical instrumentation of renewable energy etc. 
 
Université Hassan II Casablanca Faculté des Sciences Ain Chock 
 
2 relevant laboratories 
Masters in Energy Systems and Renewable Energy  
License in Solar and Wind Energy 
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License in physics with an energy option 
Continuing training for businesses in the field of renewable energy- masters and license 
Studying: modeling hybrid energy systems, modeling different Rankine cycles with 
applications for CSP, wind energy conversion, modeling and simulation for energy 
performance with a Fresnel system, storage for solar thermal, energy efficiency in the 
electric hybrid grid, solar drying, PV and shading 
 
Université Hassan II- Mohammedia – Casablanca Faculté des Sciences Ben M’sik, 
Casablanca 
 
Three relevant laboratories 
Masters in Renewable energy and material 
Masters in valorization of natural resources and the protection of the environment 
Studying: renewable energy optimization systems, optimizing electrodes for fuel cells, 
project InnoPV and InnoWind 2030—solar fridge and solar PV map 
 
Université Moulay Ismail FST d’Errachidia 
 
They offer training in renewable energy relating to: Solar PV, solar thermal, wind, 
engineering of energy process, material for the production of energy, energy systems, 
recuperation of energy, energy efficiency 
Studying: material advances in the production of energy, material in phase changes, 
nanomaterial in the field of renewable energy, energy efficiency, recuperation of energy 
 
Université Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah Faculté des Sciences Dhar El Mehrz 
 
One relevant laboratory 
Offer undergraduate student training in SMP material, a masters in the Physics of 
Materials and Nanostructures in cooperation with the University of Le Mans in France, 
more than 30 PhD students studying renewable energy. 
Studying: PV properties relating to semiconductors, physics of conjugated polymers for 
applications in PV cells and organic light emitting diodes, magnetic properties of thin 
films and magnetic superlattices, nanocomposite polymer, photonic processes, electronic 
properties of impurities and excitonic complexes 
 
Université Moulay Ismail FS de Meknès 
 
Two relevant laboratories 
Training relating to solar PV, solar thermal, wind, hydro, biomass, geothermal, systems 
of production in renewable energies, recuperation of energy, energy efficiency 
Studying: concentrated PV, organic PV cells, new materials for solar, energy efficiency 
 
Université Ibn Tofail Faculté des Sciences Kenitra 
 
One relevant laboratory 
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Professional License in Renewable Energy 
Specialized Masters in Renewable Energy 
Studying: material for solar energy, semi-conductors and surface engineering, semi-
conductor PV applications, luminescence of material etc. 
 
Université Mohammed V- Agdal: faculté des sciences de Rabat 
 
Two relevant laboratories 
Fundamental license in Physical Material Sciences 
Studying: PV conversation, electrochemical generators for the storage of energy, 
nanomaterial for batteries, semi-conductors for the environment, material for energy, 
solar radiation, solar drying, cooling and air conditioning, air conditioning for 
greenhouses, composite materials, etc. 
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Thanks for your email and apologies for the delayed reply. 
 





[see attached file: p19-at14a morocco+ power!-con copy.jpg] 
Nick Carn 
 




Established in 1989, Cross-border Information (CbI) is a business intelligence and 
consultancy company with a research focus on Africa and the Middle East.  
  
By constantly monitoring commercial and political activity across our core regions we 
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Permission for image 11 
 
Dear Sharlissa, 
Thank you very much for your email. You can use the photograph without any problems. 
It would be nice, if you write underneath the photograph that it is made in the Chocolate 
Museum Cologne 





Mit freundlichen Grüßen von der Schokoladenseite 
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Permission for image 53 
 
You have my permission to use the picture of the solar panel in front of the nomad tent.  
 





Lynnsee Starr  
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Permission for image 7/ 23 
 
Hi Sharlissa, Thanks for your email. You have our permission to use the photo. Best of 







[mailto:sharlissa.moore=asu.edu@newfangled.com] On Behalf Of 
sharlissa.moore@asu.edu 
Sent: Saturday, March 21, 2015 1:41 PM 
To: Jennifer Z. Rigney 
Subject: Contact Us 
 
Form ID:    7936 
 
First Name:    Sharlissa 
 
Last Name:    Moore 
 




Company:    Arizona State University 
 
Title:    PhD candidate 
 
Country:    US 
 
Comments:    Hello, 
 
I am wondering if I could have permission to use the picture of the Ivanpah plant 
"Ivanpah begins: steam blows" on your Ivanpah website 
(http://www.ivanpahsolar.com/photos-and-videos) for a chapter of my dissertation on the 
history of concentrating solar power. I will give credit for the image to BrightSource of 
course. Thank you for your consideration. 
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Permission for images 26 and 47 
 
Dear Sharlissa, 
The map image is available under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 
Unported License. Therefore you can make use of the image as long as you correctly 
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Permission for image 3. 
Sharlissa, 
  
You have my permission to use the electricity load diagram. I’ve included a high-
resolution tiff version of the file with a copyright tag for your use. Simply note in the 
figure caption that the image is used with permission. If you need the image in a different 





Dr. James D. Myers 
Department of Geology and Geophysics 
Dept 3006 
University of Wyoming 
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Permission for images 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34 
 Dear Sharlissa, 
  
I asked the CEO of Dii about your request and we do not mind that you use the pictures 
you showed in your email by referring to the source as Dii, I am the person who prepared 
the scenario maps, if the map resolution you have is not sufficient for you then I will send 
you the same maps with high resolution. 
  











Please find enclosed the email exchange (in German) between me and Ms. Volmer. Ms. 
Volmer contacted Mr. Peter van Son, who is now responsible at RWE for the Desertec 
Project and he gave you the permission to use his Picture (as far as I understood the 
picture originally appeared on the Dii platform) .  I hope that this is enough for the 





-----Original Message-----  
From: Volmer, Manuela [Manuela.Volmer@rwe.com] 
Received: Dienstag, 31 Mär. 2015, 1:58PM 
To: Sturm, Christine [Christine.Sturm@rwe.com] 
Subject: WG: Picture permission question 
Hallo Frau Sturm, 
  
das Bild kann genutzt werden. 
  
Viele Grüße  
  
Manuela Volmer  
  
RWE Group Business Service GmbH 
Forschung & Entwicklung Konzern – R&D Support 
Rellinghauser Str. 37, 45128 Essen  
T intern: 70-15467 
T extern: +49 201 12-15467 
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E manuela.volmer@rwe.com   
  
Kennen Sie schon unsere Online-Broschüre, in der Sie mehr über unsere 
Forschungsprojekte erfahren?www.innovation.rwe.com 
  
Von: van Son, Paul  
Gesendet: Dienstag, 31. März 2015 13:54 
An: Volmer, Manuela 
Betreff: Re: Picture permission question 
  
Vielen Dank. Selbstverständlich darf sie mein  Bild nutzen.  
Gruss, paul van Son 
 
Von meinem iPhone gesendet 
 
Am 31.03.2015 um 15:22 schrieb Volmer, Manuela <Manuela.Volmer@rwe.com>: 
Hallo Herr van Son, 
  
ich arbeite in der Abteilung von Herrn Drake und koordiniere hier die Beantwortung von 
Anfragen, die uns erreichen. Eine Studentin möchte gerne ein Bild nutzen (siehe unten). 
Ich glaube, das Bild war ursprünglich auf den Dii-Seiten zu sehen. Können Sie sagen, ob 
sie es nutzen kann? 
  
Viele Grüße  
  
Manuela Volmer  
  
RWE Group Business Service GmbH 
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Forschung & Entwicklung Konzern – R&D Support 
Rellinghauser Str. 37, 45128 Essen  
T intern: 70-15467 
T extern: +49 201 12-15467 
E manuela.volmer@rwe.com   
  
Kennen Sie schon unsere Online-Broschüre, in der Sie mehr über unsere 
Forschungsprojekte erfahren?www.innovation.rwe.com 
  
Von: Sturm, Christine  
Gesendet: Dienstag, 31. März 2015 10:01 
An: Volmer, Manuela 
Betreff: WG: picture permission question 
  
Hallo Frau Volmer, 
  
anbei wie besprochen das Bild, das meine Kommilitonin gerne in ihrer Arbeit nutzen 
möchte. 
  
Mit freundlichen Grüßen / Kind regards 
Christine Sturm 
RWE Energiedienstleistungen GmbH 
Leiterin Stoffstrommanagement  
Head of Feedstock Management  
Unterste-Wilms-Str. 52 
44143 Dortmund 
Tel +49 231 438 6182 
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Fax +49 231 438 2482 
Mobil +49 172 571 9611 
mailto:christine.sturm@rwe.com 
www.rwe.com 
Geschäftsführung: Jörn-Erik Mantz 
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Dortmund 
Eingetragen beim Amtsgericht Dortmund 
Handelsregister-Nr. HRB 23078 
USt.-IdNr. DE 265464927 




Von: Christine Sturm [mailto:lala.sturm@googlemail.com]  
Gesendet: Mittwoch, 25. März 2015 16:00 
An: Sturm, Christine 




From: Sharlissa Moore <sharlissa.moore@asu.edu> 
Date: Sunday, March 22, 2015 at 9:18 PM 
To: Christine Sturm <Christine.Sturm@asu.edu> 
Subject: picture permission question 
  
Hi Christine, 
I hope you are doing well! How are things in Germany?  I am finalizing my dissertation, 
and I am wondering if I could use the Desert Power picture from the RWE website (link 
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  562 
Desertec Foundation image 24, 29 
 
Dear Sharlissa  
Ignacio asked me to confirm the use of the pictures.  
That’s no problem, you may use all three pics. Please mention DESERTEC foundation as 
the source.  
Do you think it is possible to send us the dissertation as pdf and we upload it to our 




Mit freundlichen Grüßen 
  
Andreas Huber 
Mitglied des Vorstands 
DESERTEC Foundation 
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Solar Plataforma: Image 6, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 
Buenos días Sharlissa, 
 
Disculpa el retraso en la respuesta. Sí, no hay problema, las fotos que están disponibles 
en la WEB de la PSA puedas emplearlas.  
 
Si fuera posible, nos interesaría que nos facilitase una copia de tu trabajo, en el momento 
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Permission for Image 10 
Dear Sharlissa, 
 
Thank you for the form. 
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Permission for Image 46 
 
Ok Pas de problème si cette utilisation est positive, bonne chance et bon courage 
 
 
2015-05-01 3:49 GMT+02:00 Sharlissa Moore <sharlissa.moore@asu.edu>: 
Bonjour, 
Je suis étudiante doctorant á Arizona State University aux États-Unis. Puis je-utiliser la 
photo dans votre journal de HM le roi: http://oujda-portail.net/ma/hm-the-king-
inaugurates-integrated-solar-combined-cycle-power-plantin-eastern-morocco-
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